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THE

LUTHERAN QUARTERLY.

CONDUCTED BY

M. VALENTINE, D.D., LL D. PHILIP M. BIKLE, Ph.D.
JAS. W. RICHARD, D.D., LL.D. THOMAS C. BILLHEIMER, D D.

WITH THE SPECIAL CO-OPERATION OF

PRES. S. A. ORT, D.D., LL.D. PROF F. D ALTMAN, D.D.
PROF. ALFRED HILLER, D.D.

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THE

LUTHERAN QUARTERLY.

JANUARY, 1905.

ARTICLE I.

THE THEOLOGICAL TRAINING OF OUR PREACHERS.*

By W. H. Dunbar, D.D.

My part in the service of this evening is in some sense perfunctory, almost, I should say, superfluous. It can only be introductory, and must of necessity be very limited. In the few moments I can take I shall speak of *The Theological Training of our Preachers.*

We are here to receive the public utterances of two of our brethren upon whom has been laid the high and holy responsibility of giving shape to the doctrinal thought of the men who are to stand in our pulpits. This is in accord with a wise provision of the Constitution of our Seminary. The founders assumed that the Church had no right to take for granted the doctrinal position and the theological equipment of even its most faithful and trusted servants, to whom was committed the training of its preachers.

The service of this evening is given a preëminent significance by its double character. And it is made especially important by the places which these two men are to occupy in our Theological Faculty.

* A charge delivered by Dr. Dunbar, as President of the Board of Directors, at the Inauguration of the Rev. J. A. Singmaster, D.D., and the Rev. Luther Kuhlman, D.D., as Professors in the Theological Seminary of the General Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in the United States, Gettysburg, Pa., October 13th, 1904.

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The one is to be instructor in *Systematic Theology.* In some sense this must be regarded as the foundation of the preacher's training. For if the preacher goes wrong in doctrine; if there is a lack of clear apprehension of foundation truths; if there be uncertainty in the statement of religious principles, all technical knowledge goes for naught, or, worse still, is but equipment for the promulgation of error. A false note in the system of theology will vitiate all the rest. *Dogmatic Theology* is the rock of doctrinal stability.

The other of these men is to be the instructor of our preachers in *Biblical Theology.* It is, to say the least, a striking coincidence that these two should come together—the utterances of the teachers in Systematic Theology and in Biblical Theology. And it is as suggestive as it is striking. The two are the necessary adjuncts, the one to the other. Doctrinal Theology is the fruit stored away. Biblical Theology is plucking the fruit from the Tree of Life. Doctrinal Theology is the digging of the treasure from the inexhaustible mine. The key-question of sound doctrine is the question, not simply "What is the Bible?" but also, "What is in the Bible?" Upon the correct instruction on these questions must depend the soundness and vitality of our doctrinal system. More and more must the preacher of the day be led to apprehend what the Bible is and what is in the Bible. That it is not simply a "text-book of history, a manual of sacred geography, a compendium of religious precepts and customs, a dictionary of theological terms, a directory of good morals." More and more must the preacher of the day be led to lay hold on the vitality of truth in the Bible—the truth as it is in Christ—which alone is to elevate and regenerate and save the race—"the power of God unto salvation."

It is recognized everywhere that we are living in unsettled and unsettling times. The thought of the world is reshaping itself—settling itself to new forms and expressing itself in new statements in science, in literature, in art, in political economy. And our religious thinking is not escaping the trend of these readjusting movements.

Two perils face us in the presence of these movements:—

The one, the peril of being carried away from our doctrinal foundations. The Church is full of sad wrecks—souls that have drifted away from the sure foundations of faith. And the tide is rolling to the very pulpit steps. The preacher stands on sandy ground where doctrinal training has not been given with the soundness and holy enthusiasm of unerring faith—where apprehension and statement of doctrine is not clear.

The other is the peril of a false and fatal conservatism which blindly rejects all the results of progress in the discernment of truth. The statement is a truism that nothing is much deader than dead orthodoxy. We glory in our conservatism, but mere ignorant or thoughtless or narrow conservatism in a restless age gathers about it much of the drift-wood of the streams of thought which eddy about it. By and by it may be nothing but a moss-covered rock. Dr. Stork in his Inaugural Address called attention to the fact that Theology was no longer the queen of the Sciences she once was. That she was come to be regarded as "only a hanger-on at the door of the palace of knowledge." After some telling blows at the presumption of the thought which would thus dethrone Theology, he is yet forced to admit: "I am far from thinking that in this matter of loss of dignity, Theology is altogether blameless." * * * "Perhaps," he says, "the simplest form of indictment which would express the age's complaint against Theology, is that it has fallen out of relation with life." * * * "Now if we analyze this simple complaint into its causes, it means that Theology has lost its hold on the respect and interest of the age, because it has been too speculative, too notional, too much a matter of dialectics." Doctrine is not to be found in dead forms—least of all is "Lutheran Theology a dead, lifeless thing which cannot change." Pure and sincere criticism has its legitimate place. Its results are to be assimilated. After all the drift of religious thought is toward Christ. We would not be willing to admit that Christ has lost his claimed power to "draw all men to himself." A few days ago, in the lecture-hall of one of our great universities, it was my privilege to listen to a great English scholar, a Cambridge man, on *The Present Trend of Philosophical Speculation.* Some of his con-

clusions were astounding. The brief statement of it all was that "the religious pessimism of the old creeds was giving way to a healthy worldliness"—that "it was uncertain whether the outcome would be a new form of Christianity or a new religion." As the audience passed out of the door, from the grave student to the keen reporter, came a common protest against such conclusions—an expressed sense of the need of Christ and his gospel. Human thought in all its struggles is tending to Christ—not so much to the historical Christ—not so much to the Christ who was the Great Teacher of Galilee—but to the Divine Christ, who was "God manifest in the flesh," who lived among men, who died for men, who is men's ever-living helper. Our Theology must bring itself into relation with life by making itself the one satisfactory answer to the seeking of human thought. It needs to be vitalized by appreciating all that Christ is to the world—the Saviour of man—the Redeemer of the Race.

Now out of these conditions, and in the face of these perils, comes the need of keen and discriminating logic on the part of theological teachers. It is this gift in a preëminent degree, that made our beloved Professor of Theology, who now rests among us in well earned retirement, such a tower of strength to the Church. With an intense love for the truth, he combined a logic acutely keen and sharply discriminating—a philosophy which at once detected the false note in the most plausible argument. It is striking how uncertain logic is in its investigation of truth. Recently two important books have been given to the student world. They are on the same subject—the much-mooted Johannine Problem. Both books are by men of ripe scholarship—masters of the voluminous literature on the subject—broad-minded and judicial in tone—each following apparently an unerring logic to his conclusions—the one a Unitarian, the other a Roman Catholic. Strangely enough they reached conclusions directly antagonistic. And yet more strange, it is the Unitarian who came to the conclusion that the traditional view of the authorship should be upheld, and the Roman Catholic, who found that the traditional view of the authorship was irrevocably disproved. It is an evidence of

intellectual integrity, but at the same time of the uncertainty of logic.

So the Church has the right to ask of those who are to be the teachers of its preachers, that they make a statement of the foundations upon which they stand—that they give proof of their equipment for the work and that they make manifest their heart-enthusiasm and devoted love of the truth.

For this purpose we are here this evening. These men are to speak, not only to this limited audience, but to the Church, which centers in this Institution as in no other.

My brother, you are called to the Chair of Systematic Theology in the Theological Seminary of the General Synod. The Constitution makes it incumbent on me to deliver to you a charge. I have not felt like assuming that duty in a direct way. And I can do no more than in this general way remind you of the high and holy responsibility which rests upon you in the trust committed to your hands. And your sense of responsibility can not but be accentuated by the fact that you are called to stand in a place which, through all the history of the institution, has been occupied by men who have towered as giants, and who were towers of strength in the Church. Schmucker, the founder, whose unfaltering devotion and intellectual power made this Institution a possibility; Brown, beloved and honored by the generation of preachers whom he moulded, with thoughts clear as the light, with logic unerring as the needle; Stork, versatile, brilliant, beloved, the charm of whose life remains with all who ever came in touch with him; Valentine, keen and discriminating, devoted and loving—these are the men who have gone before you. Standing in this place, and in probably more eventful times, yours is a position which must command all your best energies, and must call into action all your mental and spiritual powers.

And to you, my brother, called to the Chair of Biblical Theology, I have only to say that your work is one which may well inspire the best faculties of mind and soul. To bring forth the rich treasures from the mine, to lead our preachers to the source of all truth, to open the great Book of inspired Revelation with all its beneficent blessings to the world. It is a com-

paratively new field in the sphere of our work, but a field without let or bound. It is a work high as heaven, far-reaching as eternity.

And so, my brethren, I join your hands to coöperate in the appointed work to which you have been called, praying that the Spirit of Divine Wisdom may be your guide.

ARTICLE II.

THE PROVINCE OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.*

By Professor J. A. Singmaster, D.D.

I desire first of all to express my appreciation of the confidence which the Board of Directors of the Theological Seminary has shown in elevating me to the Professorship of Systematic Theology and the Chairmanship of the Faculty. I do not underestimate the greatness of the task which has been laid upon me, a task which concerns the convictions of the future ministry of our Church, and which pertains to the weightiest problems that can engage human thought. Moreover, I am both depressed and inspired by the memory of the lofty standard which has been set by my predecessors in this high office. In the nearly fourscore years of the history of this Seminary, the Chair of Systematic Theology has had only five incumbents. My personal acquaintance with my four predecessors, and my intimacy with the two who were my instructors, have only heightened my admiration for their intellectual superiority and their nobility of character.

For the first thirty-eight years of the existence of the Seminary the distinguished Schmucker, the profound scholar and prolific author, stamped the impress of his personality upon the Lutheran Church, which was best known to other denominations because of him. Then came Brown with his masterly logic, and power of debate, and great heart which endeared him to all of us who knew him. The brief and brilliant career of Stork, the prose-poet and philosopher followed. Ah, that

*Inaugural address of Dr. Singmaster at his installation as Professor of Systematic Theology in the Theological Seminary at Gettysburg, Pa.

he might have lived to verify our high expectations concerning him! Need I mention the saintly Valentine, whose benign presence we still enjoy, whose kindly ways have won the hearts of the students of the College and Seminary for a whole generation, and whose incisive pen has been a keen sword drawn in defence of the truth?

The vastness of the domain of truth suggested by the term Theology, which treats of God and his relation to the universe, offers for consideration themes which might be profitably discussed by my predecessor, whose ripe scholarship fits him for a task, which is more or less appalling to a younger man. There are, indeed, many questions of an immediately practical character, pertaining to the enlargement of the Seminary which I would prefer to take up. I am enthusiastic in my convictions that our Seminary should, and, by the providence of God will, take rank with other great Seminaries of the land. Yet it is proper that at this time I should say something which more directly concerns the chair which I occupy.

The Board of Directors and the Church have a right to know the attitude of their teachers on the vital and widely discussed questions which involve the very foundations of our faith. While this occasion would not justify the attempt at a profound technical discussion of some phase of theological thought, I may nevertheless endeavor to set forth the leading purposes of the Chair of Theology which I occupy. The theme which I have chosen is,

THE PROVINCE OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

The few words which I shall have time to utter bear particularly upon the character and needs of our own school, as I have learned to know it during the several years of my connection with it as a teacher. While our Church has not been entirely unaffected by adverse theological currents, we may be grateful that our institutions have never been disturbed by serious doubts concerning the fundamentals of the faith. We have had less to fear from the incursions of insidious unbelief than any other historic Church in the land. Whether this be owing to the simplicity of the faith and the close adherence to the word of God, which characterize the Lutheran Church, or

to other reasons, I am not prepared to say. At all events, the type of our teaching has always been constructive rather than defensive.

It has been the function of this school to make preachers rather than theologians, if we may differentiate the two. The demand for the former has always been so urgent among us that the temptation has been to send men to preach even before they were prepared. But now, we are convinced that the time is at hand when our course of study might be profitably broadened for the few whose tastes and natural ability dispose them toward further and deeper inquiries into great questions. The endowment of additional professorships, and the establishment of fellowships and lectureships underlie such a wider movement, which I now commend anew to the Board of Directors and to the wealthy stewards of our Church.

In addressing myself to my theme, I shall consider:

I. THE CLAIM OF SYSTEMATIC THEGLOGY TO RECOGNITION.

Theology is not a very popular study. It does not rank in public esteem with natural science. It is the object of more or less misunderstanding and even obloquy. Christian people, who have given the matter no thought, sometimes speak slightingly of it. The possibility of theology as a science has been disputed by the various adherents of agnosticism. An age of doubt, which denies any rational content to theology, despises it. Yet in spite of all opposition, theology survives, and from its very nature must always be considered in the discussions that pertain to God and man. As long as man's nature remains as it is, with a longing for the infinite, a panting after God, a reaching out for the mysterious and unfathomable, so long will there be a place for theology. In fact, every man is more or less of a theologian. It may be confessed that theology has at times put itself so out of touch with life through a false conservatism or an impractical scholasticism as to merit the neglect with which it has been treated. Yet, in all its aberrations, we submit, whether it has ever sought to palm off upon the credulity of its adherents speculation for fact in the same degree as has been done in the name of science and philosophy.

Theology claims to be a science because of its orderly arrangement of the facts which are the content of the Christian faith. The Bible is not a theology. It sets forth truth by way of law, commandment, history, poetry and parable. Its appeal comes to every age and every walk in life. It is a progressive revelation in contents and in method, through centuries and covenants. Yet through it all there runs a clear purpose and a unity of truth, which it is the province of theology to discover and set forth. We might as well expect a scientific botany in nature as an articulated theology in the Bible. Flowers are more than botany, and man is more than anatomy, and religion is more than theology. But it is for the welfare of man that from facts, principles should be deduced and new truths discovered. Theology is a science which deals with actual phenomena, and employs methods as accurate as any known in the realm of science. Moreover, it treats of matters which, in their intrinsic importance, transcend all others.

Systematic Theology deals with religious truth beyond that directly revealed in the Bible. While it bases all its deductions upon the Scriptures, and always makes them the norm, it takes into consideration the unfolding and developing of doctrine through the centuries. The influence of the Holy Spirit in the Church has led it into a clearer conception of truth. Through long struggles, as is evident from Church history, the true doctrine has become more and more emancipated from error. It is the province of Systematic Theology to summarize, to group, and to formulate the various results derived from Scripture, reason and experience. Thus is held the ground that is gained in the ceaseless conflict with error, and thus is conserved the fruit of the best thought of the Church.

The need of a theology grows also out of the very nature of the Church, which is the community of believers. It is vain to decry confessions, or creeds, or theology. They are as unavoidable as the constitutions, written or unwritten, which bind men in the same society. The Church is not organized on mere sentiment, sympathy or fellowship. It is founded on truth. It is a community of faith. There can be no real fellowship or coherence where there is no common standard as to

the meaning of language or the content of faith. There can be no edifying worship, no consistent teaching in school or pulpit without some kind of a theology.

The idea of proportion also demands a proper formulation of belief. No doctrine or phase of doctrine must be maintained at the expense of another. No unessential feature must be magnified; no abnormal development can be tolerated, for undue emphasis placed upon one idea must obscure others equally important. Theology aims at symmetry. It opposes barriers to "fads" and fanaticism. It strives to present the whole truth in right relations.

It need not be urged that theology is demanded as a means of defence against aggression. The first age of the Church was that of Apologetics in which the Fathers maintained the divine origin and character of our holy religion. Then came the age of Polemics in which the great questions of Christ's divine Sonship were finally settled. Whether the danger comes from heresy within or from assault without, Systematic Theology seeks to defend the faith. The creeds which it has formulated have been the bulwarks of the Church.

2. THE RELATION OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY TO OTHER DISCIPLINES.

Theology has been classified as Exegetical, Historical, Systematic and Practical. The first has to do with the text and its meaning. The second treats of the history of the Church, including History of Doctrine, and also Biblical Theology as a historical discipline. Practical Theology considers the application of doctrine to preaching, organization, and the like.

And now what place does Systematic Theology hold among these great and useful studies? Let me quote from the Inaugural of Dr. Patton, President of Princeton Seminary.

"The cathedral is the synthesis of all forms of art. Its beauty and the impressiveness of its services are largely in the fact that it is the blending of architecture, sculpture, painting and music. What the cathedral is to the arts, Systematic Theology is to the several Disciplines that enter into theological study. The systematic theologian is an architect. Less ac-

complished, perhaps, than others in the knowledge of any one specialty, he must be more accomplished than any in the knowledge of all specialties. Like the professed biblical theologian he gets his doctrines out of the Bible, but his work does not stop with Exegesis. He sees doctrines not only as separately deducible from Scripture, but as progressively unfolded in Scripture. He sees them as the subjects of varying fortunes in the course of history, as defended here and antagonized there. He see them as the subjects of controversy and as the constituent elements in ecclesiastical symbols. He knows, moreover, that while some truths regarding God are found in the Bible and nowhere else, other truths may be seen in the light of nature. But these truths of natural religion stand polemically related to those forms of philosophic thought which deny them. And the truths of Revealed Religion have felt the warping, blighting, compromising influence of a false philosophy. The systematic theologian in the very act of being a systematic theologian must be an apologetic theologian, must be a polemic theologian, must be a student of philosophy, must be a biblical theologian, must be familiar with ecclesiastical history, must know the ins and outs of ecclesiastical life."

In short, Systematic Theology is the sum of all special departments of theological study. It crystalizes and arranges results. The greatness of the task involved appeals to the humility rather than the arrogance of the one on whom the burden falls. He cries out, Who is sufficient for these things?

3. THE BASIS OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

God has not left himself without witness even in the natural world. His impress is stamped on his works. By observation of nature, and also from intuition and metaphysical study men have arrived at some idea of a Supreme Being. But this idea is mixed with error. Systematic Theology has a more substantial basis than that obtained by man's unaided reason. It rests upon Revelation. It believes that the Old and New Testaments are God's message to men.

The ever recurring question is as to the truth of the Sacred Scriptures. Does God speak to us in them? Does our The-

ology accept them or explain them away? The Church is deeply concerned as to the position of its teachers on this point. It has heard something of the claims of destructive criticism. It fears lest her children be deceived by the confident boasts of infidels. The Church itself, as represented by the great mass of believers, is not disturbed as to its own faith, for God's people have the witness in themselves. Yet the Church desires that its teachers be sound in the faith, and that they correct the false impressions which have been circulated about the Book.

But has not the Bible actually suffered at the hands of the critics? We are sincerely of the conviction that the integrity of the Bible is unimpaired. It may be granted that with increasing investigation, false opinions about the Scriptures and faulty interpretations have been given up, and the end is not yet. Let genuine criticism have full sway. It can do nothing but good. Let us not forget that the essential character of the word of God is something beyond questions of grammar, or chronology, or cosmogony. The Bible does not stand or fall with a certain theory of the universe. Its reliability is bound up with the higher and supreme question of human redemption. Does it bring us relief and show us the way out of our sin-cursed state? Is it a revelation of God through Jesus Christ, the professed Saviour? As long as the light of God shines on us through it, and leads us through his Son into life and fellowship it will remain true.

Much has been said of late of the Bible as literature. No doubt it is literature, but it is much more. Its form is literature, but its content is life. The critics who look upon the Bible as finished will naturally dissect it. But the Bible is not finished. The Wod of God is a living force. The Holy Spirit still accompanies it and reveals its meaning. "Were the Spirit that gave the Word to cease to live or to act, the Word would cease to reveal. The essential idea is that in revelation the living God *speaks* not simply has spoken, to living man."

It has been said that the Lutheran Church has no theory of inspiration. It is just as well that our Confession makes no formal definition. Everybody knows where Luther stood at

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Worms. His test of cononicity was always the testimony to Christ. And has not our Church expressed itself unequivocally about the Bible in making it the only rule of faith and practice? Our Theological Seminaries in this country have always maintained that the Bible is the Word of God, and are still in line with the Reformers who made it the "formal principle" of the Reformation. The belief in revelation is fundamental to the Christian faith and life. To abandon it is to give up Christ, whose place in history is assured. Hence, it is absurd to deny revelation. For the individual nothing could be more disastrous than to question the possibility of divine communication. "The man who does not believe that God can speak to him will not speak to God."

4. THE RELATION OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY TO SCIENCE.

The attitude of theology toward natural science may be that of hostility, of indifference, of fear, or of coöperation. The first of these is illustrated by the treatment accorded to Galileo and Newton for advocating discoveries now universally accepted. It can not be denied that as a rule the Roman Church has contested every forward step in science. The attitude of indifference is illustrated by the case of those who deny that the two have anything in common, or by the ultra-conservatives, who imagine that what the fathers did not know is not worth knowing.

The fears of good people lest science should overthrow the Bible are not only groundless but utterly unworthy of an honest man. According to the teachings which we hold, truth is above everything and will prevail. A nervous, over-anxious concern about the Bible betokens a lack of faith. If we have built upon the foundation of the Word of God the wood, hay and stubble of a mistaken interpretation let us welcome a conflagration that we may start afresh. And let us not forget that while theology is a science, its realm is vastly broader than that of physical science.

The attitude of the Protestant Church has always been that of friendliness toward scientific inquiry. It is in a measure under obligations for its existence to the revival of learning

previous to the Reformation. Since then the Church has been the chief patron of learning, and has founded the great schools of the world. As truth is an absolute unit, it is preposterous to speak about a conflict in the realm of truth. Believing that the God of nature is also the God of revelation, we may feel assured that no well authenticated discovery of science can be at variance with any correct interpretation of Scripture. When theology had no scientific method, and so-called science knew only hasty generalizations there was necessarily no harmony. But now that both acknowledge and practice the same method of inquiry the final outcome must be unity. They approach their respective tasks with certain fundamental assumptions, such as, (a) the reality of sense-perceptions, (b) the trustworthiness of mental operations, and (c) the existence of intuitive truths, for instance, that every effect must have a cause. Starting with these postulates they both proceed to perceive, gather, and arrange facts. And, finally, from these facts thus ascertained and classified, they deduce the laws which underlie and control them.

Now in proportion as they are true to their fundamental principles, and accurate in their investigations, and unbiased in their jndgments, will their conclusions be reliable. It is here where flaws and differences are found. Fallible in reason and prejudiced in temper both sides have often erred.

It is to be remembered, however, that the theologian has a very decided advantage in his realm over the scientist in his, inasmuch as the former has a direct revelation and a special promise of illumination. This does not put him out of the category of science, for his reason must decide always as to the character of the evidence.

We need also to observe the caution that rarely can the students of the one be accurate judges of all the steps and processes of the other. The possibilities of the specialist in his department are impossibilities to the general scholar. Hence, there must often be a suspension of judgment until there be a well-founded consensus. Yet, every man of intelligence has the right to reject any apparent conclusion which contradicts well authenticated fundamental principles.

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Scientists are dreamers quite as much as theologians. Literature is covered with the wreck of hypotheses. Stern facts have often disconcerted theories, for which any confident claims had been asserted. Only a few years ago Huxley proclaimed the unscientific, unchristian, unbiblical, and untrue theory of spontaneous generation of life, which has been utterly abandoned as being without proof. When science claims any discoveries that contradict essential accepted beliefs it is bound to make out a clear case or go by default. We are not aware that geology, astronomy, biology or historical investigation has destroyed any part of the Bible, or displaced the omnipotent, life-giving Creator, or robbed Christ of his divinity. A host of leading scientists are devout followers of the Lord Jesus, and hold to the Scriptures with unshaken confidence.

5. THE RELATION OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY TO PHILOSOPHY.

What has been said about theology and science is in large measure applicable also to theology and philosophy. As every man is somewhat of a theologian, so is he also somewhat of a philosopher. Theology and philosophy occupy in part the same ground. They both assume to investigate and to teach what is true concerning God and the world. "There is no province of human experience, there is nothing in the whole realm of reality which lies beyond the domain of philosophy or to which philosophical investigation does not extend. Religion, so far from forming an exception to the all-embracing sphere of philosophy, is rather just that province which lies nearest to it; for, in one point of view, religion and philosophy have common objects and a common content, and in the explanation of religion philosophy may be said to be at the same time explaining itself."—*Caird.*

While the domain and purpose of theology and philosophy are similar, their methods are radically different. Theology relies for its data chiefly upon the sacred Scriptures, receiving them as the true and, therefore, adequate explanation of the universe as the creation of Almighty God. Philosophy seeks to attain knowledge through speculation and induction from data entirely outside of revelation. Rejecting or ignoring the

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latter and relying upon unaided reason, philosophy must fight its way through the deep obscurity surrounding our being and destiny. Moreover, philosophy is largely abstract and impersonal, while theology on the other hand revolves around a living, concrete Personality, Jesus Christ.

Christianity at its birth was greeted with scorn by philosophy. To the Greek the gospel was foolishness. Yet efforts were not wanting to amalgamate philosophy and theology. Philo, the learned Alexandrian Jew, endeavored to reconcile Plato and the Old Testament. Gnosticism tried to do the same with the New. The early Fathers seem to have profited in some ways by their study of philosophy. Nevertheless, it became a blight to the Church in various ways. Whether on the whole Christianity has gained or lost by contact with philosophy is an unsettled question. The Reformers, revolting against the scholasticism of the Middle Ages, held philosophy in small esteem. Luther, with characteristic vehemence, pronounced Aristotle a near neighbor of the devil and a spoiler of pious doctrine. This condemnation is too sweeping. The world holds the memory of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle in high reverence. They were true seekers after light. Plato was a theist. Had he known Christ he would have rejoiced and received him.

There is a true philosophy which is the handmaid of theology, but much that is called philosophy would be rejected even by a heathen Plato were he here today. Toward this the attitude of theology must be antagonistic, because it is practically atheistic. The student of theology must know it chiefly that he may combat and overthrow it.

Under the general term "monism" recent philosophy has reproduced some of the pre-Christian and anti-Christian teachings of the ancient philosophers. This monism, as defined by Haeckel, "recognizes one sole-substance in the universe, which is at once God and nature, body and spirit (or matter and energy), and holds it to be inseparable." This is the materialistic monism of John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer. Matter is everything. "Mind is only a product of organization and a mode of motion. Human thought is, therefore, only a

model function of the brain." There is no personal God. There is no God at all except matter.

Revolting from this form of monism another, larger and more dangerous class of teachers, said to be found in our leading universities, maintain an "idealistic monism," which recognizes mind as the only real substance, and denies the reality of the eternal word apart from the thinking mind.

A third monism is pantheistic in still larger measure. According to this pantheistic monism, mind and matter are only different aspects or attributes of one infinite substance.

Such, in a word, are some of the phases of philosophy which meet the student, and which he will have to understand if he would withstand them and their blighting influence upon the faith of many.

6. THE RELATION OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY TO PREACHING.

Dr. McKenzie, in his recent inaugural address, sums up the task of the systematic theologian to be "to discover and set forth absolute truth, to produce immutable convictions in the mind of those who have consecrated their whole lives to the work of conveying these convictions to the minds of the people at large."

The Seminary is a place where a young man finds himself anew, where he readjusts himself to his larger horizon, where he reaches convictions concerning the truth and his business to preach it. For, the central theme of all theological teaching must after all be the same theme which furnishes the preacher his message every Sunday. The teacher, therefore, must teach Christ, if the preacher is to preach Christ. I agree with Delitzsch when he says: "So firmly am I convinced of the practical aim of all scientific labors that I regard the sermon as the culmination of all theological attainments." I believe that Systematic Theology is, therefore, properly taught when it fits men for the plain persuasive preaching of the word.

Theology for the sermon, for the teaching of the people is, therefore, our end. Theology must be to every sermon what the bony structure is to the body. No man can become a strong, confident preacher who is not a theologian. A correct

theological conception will suggest in clear logical order the saving truths that cluster about every text. It will give him clear-cut and consistent ideas. It will keep him from blundering. He will not misrepresent his Lord, nor mislead the poor sinner. He will have a wider range of truth, and not be forever harping on a single idea. His preaching will be full-orbed and edifying. No oratory or acquaintance with science, art or literature can atone for the lack of a well grounded and symmetrical knowledge of Christian doctrine.

7. THE METHOD OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

By the method of theology is meant the point of view from which it is approached. With what does it start? What is its central doctrine? Around what does it revolve? The central truth is determinative of all the rest. The relations and comparative importance of the various parts of a system are affected by the dominating idea. Its logical coherence and its practical application are involved in the settlement of the method or point of view. The motions of the planets was never understood until astronomy found the true centre of the solar system in the sun and not in the earth.

The method of theology differentiates the two great Reformation theologies, the Lutheran and the Calvinistic. The latter finds its centre in God as a sovereign; the former in God manifest in the flesh. There is truth in both. Nevertheless, it seems most in accordance with the nature of the case that we should approach God as he approaches us, that is, through Christ.

The Christo-centric method of schematizing the doctrines has recently been disparaged by a great Calvinistic divine (Dr. Patton), who likens dogmas to blocks which may be built into any shape without affecting the significance of each. "You may build castles or cathedrals," says he, "but however much you change the relations of these blocks to each other, you do not on that account change the individuality of each." It is true that the individuality is not changed by a mere transfer, but the importance of the block may be thus immensely altered. A block may be removed from a solid wall without

materially affecting it; but the keystone of an arch can not be taken away without causing a collapse.

It seems to us that the whole question of theology is simplified by starting with Christ, for here is a concrete fact, a great Personality. "The doctrine of Christ," says Schaff, "is the soul and centre of all sound Christian theology." Moreover, as in the first centuries the theological conflict waged around the Person of Christ, so in these later years this same question is again uppermost. For, even from a philosophical standpoint, Christ must be the determining element. The historical spirit can not ignore "the Supreme Person of history. He has left the mark of his hand on every generation of civilized men that has lived since he lived, and it would not be science to find him everywhere, and never to ask what he was, and what he did."

The problem of Christ's person involves the settlement of all the related questions of Creation, Mediation, Atonement, Resurrection and the future life. Given the divine-human Personality, all difficulties dwindle, and all doubts vanish.

Fairbairn, the leading Christian philosopher of our day, says: "The Lutheran Theology is essentially a soteriology, a science of the Redeemer's person and work, profoundly conscious of man's sin and the grace by which he is saved. * * * To it two things were necessary—the Scriptures, the source of all of our knowledge of the justifying Person; and the Sacraments, means by which his people communicated with him, especially in the act of his passion and death. The philosophers who have most strenuously handled and most nearly solved the problem [of the Incarnation] have been the sons of the land and of the church of Luther; and the theologians of other lands and churches that have to-day attempted through the Incarnation to vivify theology and relate it to modern knowledge are only paying unconscious but deserved homage to the faith and insight of the reformer and his sons."

As the Scriptures are the "formal principle" of the Reformation so is the doctrine of justification by faith its "material principle." This is Luther's doctrine of "a standing or a falling Church." The question is still discussed, What is the distinguishing doctrine of our Church? Sometimes it is said to

be justification, and again the sacraments. A truer answer is, It is the emphasis which it places on the doctrine of the Person of Christ. For the object of faith in justification is nothing less than Christ, and the union and communion which are set forth in the sacraments are union and communion with Christ, the living Head.

"This is the most important article of the Christian faith," says Luther, "that the Son is true God and also true man, and that he was sent into the world to save it." Concerning this Köstlin says: "Everything is thus made to depend upon the article concerning Christ, the Son of God sent into the world, who has secured forgiveness of sins and eternal life. Whosoever has this Christ has all things. This article and that upon justification are one."

But do we not magnify the Person of Christ unduly in comparison with His Work? Is not the death of Christ the chief thing? And is not the Atonement the central doctrine? The answer is plain, that what he is, is more than what he does. Even his dying was only to the end that we might have life in and through him. His inexpressible work is the exhibition of his unutterable love.

The theology of our Church, we believe, to have the right method; but we can not justify the vain disputations of her dogmaticians who have sometimes endeavored to explain what they confessed to be mysteries. The doctrine of the presence of Christ in the Holy Supper, for instance, has been the occasion of frequent offense, because it has been so bunglingly presented. The precious truth involved is simply that the whole Christ gives himself to satisfy the hungering soul.

The theology, then, which we hold and which we teach is that which revolves about Christ. It is religious rather than philosophical, and didactic rather than polemic. We believe that the world needs now and always the truth as it is in Jesus. As the sum of joy and hope is in finding Christ—the Christ whom the Baptist heralded, whom Philip found, whom Peter confessed, whom John declared, whom Paul proclaimed, so the chief duty of the theologian is to set forth Christ to the end that the young men may go and preach him as the only hope of a dying world.

ARTICLE III.

BIBLICAL THEOLOGY: ITS RELATION TO MINISTERIAL TRAINING.*

By Luther Kuhlman, D.D.

Article I of the Constitution thus defines the object which the fathers had in view when they undertook the founding and equipment of a Seminary: "To provide our churches with pastors who sincerely believe the Word of God as contained in the canonical Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments to be the only infallible rule of faith and practice, and who hold the Augsburg Confession to be a correct exhibition of the fundamental doctrines of the Divine Word, and who will teach them." It is designed that the ministry here trained shall be marked by ability and sound learning; shall exhibit unanimity of views and harmony of feelings, unselfish devotion, and deep, fervent piety; all in order that the Kingdom of the Redeemer may be effectually promoted. It is further enjoined upon directors, professors and pupils, that this design of the Institution shall always be sacredly kept in view.

The Seminary has, then, a high function. In the work and life of the Church it occupies a place of first importance. In view of the many and great differences between the time present and the times former, preaching does not hold the commanding place it once did. Yet it cannot pass away. God will not displace his own chosen instrumentality, and the quality of the ministry will measure the efficiency and progress of the Church in the whole wide field of beneficent activity; will shape and color the religious views, feelings, temper and character of the people, and will largely determine the place of our Lutheran Communion in the household of Christian faith. There is no interest of the Church, no phase of her work which is not directly related to, and affected by, her ministry.

*Inaugural of Dr. Kuhlman at his installation as Professor of Biblical Theology in the Theological Seminary of the General Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in the United States. Delivered in the College Church, Gettysburg, Pa., October 19th, 1904.

With this sentiment before me, and earnestly responsive thereto, the one practical question which concerns alike the Church, the Seminary, the students and myself, is: How can this Chair of Biblical Theology, to which I have been called, and the duties of which I have already entered upon, be made to contribute most largely to the equipment, intellectual and spiritual, of an adequate, efficient, godly ministry? All that the donors, whose generous gifts made this professorship possible, had in view, and all that the Church may rightly expect and ask from this department, is comprehended in this question. And the answer is conditioned upon a number of things, but for this occasion, and for the purposes of this address, the answer will depend upon what this Chair is, and what it shall be made in the work of the Institution. This is the final test of all theological training.

As a clearly defined, independent branch of theology, Biblical Theology is a modern science, and its addition, as it now stands, to the curriculum of the Seminary, dates back only four years. This statement applies only to the form, and not to the substance of Biblical Theology. As to the latter, it is as old as the Bible itself. In its origin and development this science furnishes an interesting illustration of the manner in which a great historic movement, revolutionary in character, in spirit hostile to the Bible, came, in the outworking of divine providence, to contribute to the better understanding, and the firmer establishment of the faith which it sought to overthrow. The Reformation, not to go farther back, was a spiritual revival. Luther and others apprehended the great facts and truths of the gospel with apostolic vividness. The theological results wrought out in this memorable struggle were put into systematic form by the scholastics of the seventeenth century. Then followed the period in which Rationalism held sway. This movement abjured all ecclesiastical authority; divested the Bible of its divine character, and assailed the Bible and orthodoxy in turn. It did great harm, and yet there is some compensation. The assault challenged defense, and out of the investigations necessitated by this attack was born the whole

group of accepted sciences which, in the broad sense, make up Biblical Theology.

The steps of the process through which this science passed in its disentanglement from related branches of theological learning are indicated by Oehler in his standard work on Old Testament Theology. "During the whole development of Church Doctrine down to the Reformation, and also in the old Protestant theology, no distinct line was drawn between the essential contents of revelation as they are laid down in the Scriptures, and the doctrinal formulas developed from them; and still less were the successive stages of revelation and types of doctrine which are presented in Scripture recognized." "The distinction between the law and the gospel, and the difference in degree between the revelation in the Old and the New Testament," were noted, but not sufficiently recognized. Of the early Fathers Augustine alone makes any real contribution to this science. No progress was made during the Middle Ages, the dominant tendencies being unfavorable. Sound hermeneutical principles were wanting, and so the study of the Bible frequently degenerated into wild and fanciful speculation. The Reformation principle of the supreme authority of Scripture, the interpretive principle requiring the expositor to get at the literal sense of the original text, did much in preparing the way for a correct understanding of the Bible. Particularly were the spiritual character of the Old Testament, and its preparatory and educational place in the divine redemptive plan, more clearly discerned. In the older Protestant theology much that should have been gained through the application of the sounder principles of interpretation which were now recognized, was lost because "the unity of the Old and New Testaments was conceived of, not as produced by a gradually advancing process of development, but as a harmony of doctrine." Proof texts for systematic doctrine were drawn alike from the Old and the New Testament. Bengel "insisted on an organic and historical unity of the biblical revelation with strict regard to the difference of its stages," while the Würtemberg school sought "especially to awaken a knowledge of salvation resting on insight into the whole of the divine kingdom." The ad-

vance toward a better understanding of the Bible here observable was hindered by English deism which swept over Germany. This assumed the naturalistic attitude, so prevalent in certain quarters at the present time. It treated the Bible not so much as a revelation from God to man, but as a record of man's striving after truth and his effort to establish religion. Oehler assigns to John Philip Gabler (1787) the honor of being the first to clearly differentiate this branch of study from others, and "to speak distinctly of Biblical Theology as an historical science." Gabler defined the work of Biblical Theology to be "the statement of the religious ideas of Scripture as an *historical fact*, so as to distinguish the different times and subjects, and so also the different stages in the development of these ideas." This definition differs in no essential particular from the one proposed by Oehler, and other accepted ones which will be cited later. The principles thus enunciated were taken up and applied by Lorenz Bauer in his Theology of the Old Testament (1796), Baumgarten Crusius's Outlines of Biblical Theology (1828), and Daniel v. Coelln's Biblical Theology (1836). According to Oehler these latter two "are the first works that make the transition to a thorough treatment of the subject." Other notable authors in this field are Hess, Menken, Hengstenberg, Hävernick, Hofman, H. Schultz, H. Ewald and many others. In the study of the New Testament we have the names of Schmid, Messner, Van Osterzee, Weis and Beyschlag. By no means all that these men have written is to be accepted. Important principles applied by some of them are in unmistakable conflict with the view which the Bible takes of itself, and hence are to be rejected. Yet, by their great ability, their profound learning, and by their unwearying labors and research, they have done much to bring this science to its present status, and so have made all who desire a fuller knowledge of divine revelation their debtors.

Having thus hastily referred to the steps by which Biblical Theology has came to its recognized position, we proceed to state a little more fully what it is, its particular field, and its method. This will enable us to form an estimate of its worth and its relation to theological training.

The phrase "Biblical Theology" is used by writers with some latitude—now in a wider, and now in a narrower sense. This was to be expected. As an illustration of the employment of the term in a comprehensive sense, as well as for a clear statement of the reasons which justify its use in this manner, we may refer to Principal Cave. In his "Introduction to Theology and its Literature," "Biblical Theology" is made the third main division of the theological sciences, being preceded by Natural Theology and Ethnic Theology. He defines it as the "science—or more accurately the group of sciences—concerned with the facts presented by the Bible." It treats, "according to scientific method, of everything pertaining to the interpretation and exposition of Scripture. By collecting, classifying, examining and reasoning upon the data supplied by the Old and New Testaments, an organism of sciences is built up, to which collectively the name of Biblical Theology is given." In the classification of this group of sciences they fall under three heads, such as are preparatory to the interpretation of Scripture, as Canonics, Textual Criticism, Philology, Literary Criticism, etc.; secondly the exegisis of the several books of the Bible; thirdly the sciences resulting from the application of the knowledge gained by Exegisis, such as Biblical History, Biblical Dogmatics, and Biblical Ethics. So broad is the view of Dr. Cave as to what is embraced in Biblical Theology. He admits that this use of the term is at variance with the employment of it by some other writers. It is to be said for this learned and stimulating author that he presents the considerations which lead him to propose the divisional scheme he does, with great clearness and force.

In the narrower sense of the term, and this is the one that was had in mind when this position was designated the "Chair of Biblical Theology," it corresponds almost precisely to what Dr. Cave names the "Inductions of Biblical Theology." The definition of Gabler has been given, and need not be repeated. Oehler says, "the Theology of the Old Testament is the historical exhibition of the religion contained in the canonical books of the Old Testament." Schaff says: "Biblical Theology is a systematic representation of the revealed or Biblical

religion in its primitive form, as laid down in the canonical books of the Old and New Testaments, and as distinct from its subsequent development and comprehension in different ages and branches of the Church." Davidson puts his conception tersely: "Biblical Theology is the science of the religion of the Bible;" and in a way that appeals to the practical mind when he says, "Biblical Theology is the knowledge of God's great operation in introducing his kingdom among men, presented to our view exactly as it lies presented in the Bible." Analysis of these definitions will disclose the main features of this science.

First, the knowledge which it has to offer is drawn exclusively from the Bible. There are other sources of information but Biblical Theology does not consult them except incidentally and as the Bible itself recurs to them. The universe, including man in his rational and moral nature, is the thought and work of God, and to thoughtful and inquiring minds of all ages has evidenced not merely the Divine Being, but made some disclosure of his character and his relations to man. This knowledge is as the twilight, but, so far as it goes, Natural Theology is true. "It has been supposed also that the writers of the Old Testament possessed themselves, and imparted to favorite disciples, an esoteric faith, deeper and more catholic than that which they gave to their countrymen in writing. No traces of such a thing appear in Scripture." "Concurrent external traditions and to some extent coincident with the Scriptures, and for which is claimed the power of aiding, and to some extent controlling, the interpretation of these," the Old Testament Apocrypha, and "the so-called 'antecedents' of Biblical teachings discoverable in the literary remains of other nations, may all, in cases where they exist, and in some instances they do, contribute somewhat to the fuller understanding of the Christian faith," but when the subject in hand is Biblical Theology, they are outside of the field of inquiry. The only text book it recognizes is the Bible. (Davidson).

Second, deriving its knowledge from the Bible, Biblical Theology aims to set forth this knowledge in Biblical form. By this it is not meant that the presentation is in Biblical phrase-

ology, but truth in the order, the degree of completeness, and in the relationship which the Bible as a book, itself discloses. Divesting itself as far as may be of all preconceived notions concerning the content of the Bible, holding in abeyance all inferences and deductions in the creeds and systematic theologies of the Church, it seeks to read not only the divine message, but to read it in the manner in which it was delivered. Oehler quotes with approval the statement of Nägelsbach in his Homeric Theology, namely, that his "object was to give the knowledge which Homer's men had of the Deity; and the effects produced by this knowledge in life and faith." This is to understand Homer's story as he told it—manifestly a fair treatment. Biblical Theology accepts this principle; its religious ideas, convictions and truths are drawn directly from the Bible, and the Bible again is the principle which binds this material into an organic unity. This is to interpret the Bible biblically.

Conforming to this principle, Biblical Theology recognizes two leading features in the revelation which it seeks to set forth.

First, this revelation is in the form of a history extending over a long course of time. This statement is more fully applicable to the Old Testament than to the New. If we were entirely without any knowledge of a divine revelation and were asked to say how one would be given, what form it would take, we would hardly have named the one we find. And yet the more clearly we understand God's character, his attributes, and the end contemplated in revelation, the more are we persuaded that it could take no other form than the historical. These attributes are *moral* qualities, such as holiness, goodness, mercy and love. The end sought in revelation is identical with that in creation. The creative work culminated in man made in the image of God, and in virtue of this divine likeness standing in spiritual fellowship with God. This relationship was broken by sin. It is the aim of the redemptive scheme to restore this relation and bring it to its completion. In this undertaking not only is the advance from the divine side, but from the same source comes the endowment of power for man's participation therein. God takes the initiative by establishing

a covenant between himself and man. And the comprehensiveness of the aim in the divine revelation becomes apparent when it is remembered that Abraham is to be regarded not merely as an *individual*, but as the *head*, the *representative* of a nation, in the final view thereof, coextensive with humanity, and that the covenant, as developed in the institutions of Mosaism, embraces all the spheres of man's life. So in the Old Testament we see God ordaining for this chosen nation not merely ordinances of worship, but social and civil institutions. We have depicted in intense and vivid form a national history, including the "migration of the ancestors of the people from the East," the descent to Egypt, the bitter oppression, the deliverance, the period of the Judges, the Monarchy, the division of the Kingdom, the parallel course of the two kingdoms, the Exile and the Restoration. This story with all its lights and shades of hope and despondency, of prosperity and adversity, together with the Message of the prophets, whose function was not merely to communicate the "Thus saith the Lord," but to interpret for the nation its own history, "thus to impress deep religious convictions upon the hearts of the people, and awaken a strong consciousness in them of a present God in the midst of them, and a deeper longing for fuller manifestations of the Messianic redemption," and the Wisdom, these constitute the Old Testament. In this history, covering more than a thousand years, as well as in Prophetism and Wisdom, is embodied the divine revelation.

Second, This historically communicated revelation observes a law of development. Christ not only teaches, but beautifully illustrates this feature when he says: "So is the kingdom of God, as if a man should cast seed into the ground; and should sleep, and rise night and day, and the seed should spring and grow up, he knoweth not how. For the earth bringeth forth fruit of herself; first the blade, then the ear, after that the full corn in the ear." The day of full-orbed divine truth as contained in the whole Bible, comes to men, as the sun rises. The first indications along the horizon that the dawn is approaching are often so faint as to be scarcely discernable. Gradually they increase in clearness; there are distinct rays rising higher and

higher in the sky; now they are obscured by a passing cloud, but this is only momentary, and now—it is day. Symbol this of the coming of the Son of God, who is the consummation of this revelation. The day that witnesses his advent is preceded by a dawn extending over thousands of years. Nor are we to be regarded as reading this view into the Bible. It is the one it takes itself. The Old Testament does not regard itself as a finality. One of its characteristics is the spirit of eager expectation which pervades it. And when we turn to the New Testament we discover a corresponding note of completeness.

Such, then, being in general the character of Biblical Theology, and the principles which it observes, what of its value and relation to the realization of the purpose for which the Seminary exists, and for which this Chair was endowed? Accepting the legitimacy of this science, that it rests in well established principles, and earnestly pursued, what are some of the benefits which should accrue from its study? Several may be indicated.

1. Biblical Theology begets and fosters soundness in the faith. In one aspect of the matter we have fallen upon troublesome times. Never before, perhaps, have the Bible and the religion founded upon it, been subjected to such rigid investigation as at present. Time was when men's reverence for the Book as an inspired document made them hesitate to subject it to the tests of reason. Whether for better or worse, this is no longer the case. The air resounds with criticism. The authorship of the Bible, its text, its literary character and history, its morals, its doctrines, the Book in its entirety, are brought before the bar of reason, and made to stand or fall according to its dicta. Nor is it unjust to say that much of this criticism seems unfriendly in spirit. While loudly proclaiming its purpose to ascertain truth, the very principles in accordance with which its conclusions are reached, are often the veriest assumptions. Yet these conclusions are frequently put with a literary skill and adroitness, with such show of vast learning and a positive air of finality, as to almost compel acceptance. How, in the presence of this subtle, adverse influence, can the humble minister of the gospel preserve his faith in the

supernatural character of his message, and that in the Bible he has a trustworthy record of God's revelation to man? It is urged that he must meet the critic upon his own field, match skill with skill, argument with argument, learning with learning, and in this way expose the groundlessness of assertions put forth with the boldness and confidence of truth. This is one method of defense, but can the average minister, with his limited facilities for research, be expected to adopt it against an expert? In most cases it will be impracticable. Neither, on the other hand, can he take refuge in the denial of the right of criticism, assuming that the fact of inspiration removes the Bible from the field of investigation. The Bible claims no such exemption for itself. It allow and invites criticism. Its appeal is to man's intelligence, and while there are depths which the mind cannot fathom, sunlit heights which it cannot ascend, in neither aspect is it against reason. The Bible challenges faith, but not a blind and unquestioning faith. It undertakes to settle doubts and fears, to vindicate its high claims before the bar of every candid mind. Here, then, is a safe position. Does any one question that the sun is? Does he undertake to shatter our belief in the unique character and functions of the sun? We do not waste time and temper in dispute with such an one. We put our hand upon his shoulder, turn him about, thrust him through the door out under the cloudless sky of noon, and the sun overwhelms him with a thousand arguments. This is the effective way, and it is the way in which Biblical Theology proposes to assist those whose faith may be disturbed by the hasty, illogical conclusions of destructive criticism. The Bible is its own defense. Its truths are self-evidencing. To the open mind, the submissive will, the believing heart, they carry conviction.

2. Biblical Theology is intimately related to Natural Theology and Ethnic Theology. Recent years have witnessed a greatly increased interest, particularly in the latter subject. It is a superficial judgment which affirms that mankind has been, and is, supremely interested in things material and temporal. Despite the apparent indifference and almost earthiness of the masses, the nobler spirits have always been intent upon high

themes. Wonderful as is the order of nature in which man finds himself, great and rich and mysterious as is his own nature, these do not satisfy him. He seeks God. Without him he cannot rest. We may say, men do not care for God, and yet that truth is the centre about which life and history have been built. Plutarch affirms that "there has never been a state of atheists, and that belief in the gods is the bond of all society, and the pillar of all legislation." With deep insight and fine eloquence Max Müller writes, "the great epochs in the world's history are marked, not by the foundation or the destruction of empires, by the migration of races, or by French revolutions; all this is outward history, made up of events that seem gigantic and overpowering to those only who cannot see beyond or beneath. The real history of man is the history of religion; the wonderful ways by which the different families of the race advance toward a truer knowledge and love of God. This is the foundation that underlies all profane history; it is the light, the soul and life of history, and without it all history would be profane indeed."

While now this quickened interest in ethnic religions is in itself a favorable omen, it also has its own danger. There are not wanting those who in their investigations have reached the conclusion that the Bible is only one of a number of sacred books. In some aspects its superiority may be admitted, but the exceptional character of the Bible in its origin, revelation and truth, this is practically set aside. It is *one* among *many*. Such a couclusion we cannot accept. The Bible admits that there are other sources of knowledge of the supernatural, but in the domain of religion it claims to stand in a class by itself, as a source of complete, full and final knowledge of divine things. This claim Biblical Theology must help to make good and sustain.

3. Still more clearly does the value of this science appear when we note its relation to the studies, the work and the character of the ministry.

a. Whatever scheme of division of the several branches embraced in a full theological course we may adopt, Biblical Theology inevitably gravitates to a central and regulative posi-

tion. This is due to the unique character of the Bible itself. While it is not the only source of religious truth, it is the highest and the final source. Christianity is founded on the Bible, and its perpetuity, its progress and growth until it fills the whole earth are bound up with the ever clearer apprehension of its truth. And so it is that all theological studies find either their goal, or their starting point in Biblical Theology. Biblical Introduction, Biblical Criticism, Biblical Archæology, and Exegesis, and so forth, all have one common purpose, that they may ascertain all the facts necessary to a clearer apprehension and fuller understanding of the entire contents of the Bible. Ecclesiastical theology and doctrinal theology, on the other hand, have their origin in the Bible. This is the living, nourishing fountain whence they flow. "For," says one, "what is ecclesiastical theology? Is it not the scientific study of the doctrines and practices confessedly drawn by the Church of Christ from the Bible, which records the initial stages of these practices and doctrines? How then shall the development of Christendom be scientifically traced if its primary phases be not scientifically known? How shall the Post-Apostolic Age be accurately understood from ecclesiastical writers, if the Apostolic Age be not accurately understood from the writers of the New Testament? How shall the darkness of the Middle Age be depicted except by contrast with the brightness of the days when the Acts of the Apostles were penned? How shall the epoch of the Reformation be satisfactorily delineated, restorative as it was of the primitive Apostolic Age, unless the written records of the Apostolic Age themselves have been laid bare by capable writers of the New Testament times?" So also, creedal developments and doctrinal systems which professedly arise out of the Bible, must consent to return to it for comparison, for correction when necessary. They must be subject to Biblical Theology, not Biblical Theology to them.

b. Again, Biblical Theology bears directly upon the minister's work, and should better prepare him for the same. Among men there is no higher, holier calling than his, and none that entails a more solemn responsibility. His office is to teach, to expound and apply the Word of God. For the high and the low, the learned and the simple minded, he is to declare the

whole counsel of God so that they may hear, believe, and be saved. But how can he teach and enforce that which he does not know? The physician must be competent not only to examine his patient and determine the malady from which he is suffering, but he must also possess a full knowledge of his materia medica so as to be able to administer the proper remedy. The minister is a spiritual physician. He is in a veritable hospital. About him are the sick, the wounded, the dying, all victims of the one terrible disease, the leprosy of sin. But let him not be disheartened, nor turn away from any. There is balm in Gilead. His Bible will furnish him a specific for every spiritual disorder that he may encounter, but he must know where to find it, and how to administer it. Or, to change the figure, the minister's weapon of offense and defense is the sword of the Spirit. But, he must prove it, learn to handle it, to parry and trust therewith, or he will be as helpless with it in his hands as was the youthful David in the unaccustomed armor of King Saul. In the sermon, in the conduct of the order of worship and the administration of the sacraments, and in his pastoral work among his people, the one function of the minister is to bring home to the hearts and lives of men the truth, to bring from this divine, inexhaustible repository, treasures both new and old, so that each under his care may receive his appropriate portion. How can he do this? There is one way, and only one, by the constant, diligent, prayerful and systematic study of the truth. The criticism which may be justly spoken of much present-day preaching is, that it has gone too far afield. It is too much to expect of every one who ascends a pulpit that he shall be learned or eloquent in the ordinary acceptance of these terms, but it is not too much to require of him that he be soundly, earnestly biblical.

c. Important as the better and fuller understanding of the content of the Bible is to each of the particulars thus noted, I venture to say that its relation to the character and spiritual life of the minister is more important. A question debated in ecclesiastical assemblies and elaborated in religious magazines, almost to the point of weariness, is, "a ministry suitable for the

times." Not necessarily perhaps, but practically so, the form of the theme carries the implication that present times are so different, so greatly changed from times preceding, that the ministry adequate and suitable to the latter is not so for the former. It may not be easy to define wherein the deficiency lies, but the inference is that it exists. In the enumeration of the requisite qualities for a suitable ministry, emphasis is laid upon the necessity for more thorough collegiate training, for wider attainments in all the fields of general and special knowledge, a finer intellectual culture. This, on the one hand. On the other he must be a man of affairs, in touch with the spirit and tendencies of his environment, keenly alive to the ills that afflict and the dangers that threaten society in all its forms. He must possess the power of leadership and organization, be eloquent in speech, consummate in tact and common sense in dealing with men and things, a paragon of excellencies. With this standard I have no special fault to find—so far as it goes. The importance of all these qualities may be freely conceded. The underlying requisite, however, of an effective, God-honored ministry is not touched upon. Behind all these qualifications, whether social, executive or intellectual, is character. If this be not constituted in righteousness, and interpenetrated with the mind, the spirit, the devotion, the sympathy, the love, the purpose and faith and ideals of the Master, then the ministry, however gifted, and learned and humanly masterful, will never measure up to the needs of the times, will measurably fail—and I do not hesitate to say that it ought to fail. The Christian man is before and greater than the mere preacher, however accomplished. The upbuilding of the people of our churches, the moral restoration and spiritual uplift of society in all its phases, the steady progress of the Kingdom of God until it encompasses the whole earth—all this will be the triumph of the truth, not truth in the abstract, not truth written or printed so much, as truth in the concrete, the gospel of Christ embodied, exemplified in those who profess it and proclaim it. Given this character, and add thereto the other gifts referred to, and you shall

have a ministry adequate to the demands of this age, and of every age.

If now it be inquired how shall this preëminent qualification be attained, the answer is at hand, through the fuller knowledge of the truth. The study of the Bible according to the methods and principles of this science presents and unfolds God's revelation to man as a gradual process, "a development from less to more, through a series of ascending imperfect forms, each unfolding out of the other up to the perfect form," the fullness of God's face, the brightness of his glory, the express image in the person of Jesus Christ. He is the Alpha and the Omega of revelation, and to grasp this is to possess the key for its understanding. But this, so to speak, is only *half* the purpose. Keeping step with this ever widening and clearing vision of truth is the spiritual transformation of the beholder by the truth. The apprehension, belief and obedience of truth, this lifts men Godward. So writes St. Paul: "We all, with open face beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord." Not merely present advancement in the divine life is conditioned upon beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, but the perfection of character, the fullness of unalloyed happiness and reward in the final consummation, are all predicated upon seeing him as he is.

This, imperfectly wrought out, is my conception of Biblical Theology, and its highest practical worth of in our Seminary. That its students may gain a somewhat completer understanding of the Book as a whole, that he who is its all and in all may stand out before them more distinctly, his life fill them, his truth enlighten them, his zeal inflame them, his love constrain them to place their lives upon the altar of that service to which he is calling them, for this end, God being my helper, I am willing to give my best endeavor.

ARTICLE IV.

DIVORCE AND REMARRIAGE.

By Professor J. W. Richard, D.D., LL.D.

The State regards marriage, primarily, as a civil contract between one man and one woman, and makes large provision for the disannulling of the marriage contract upon the complaint of one or of both of the contracting parties; nor has the State enacted rigid laws against the remarriage of persons who have obtained the legal dissolution of the marriage contract. Rather does she proceed on the principle that it is against public policy to place barriers in the way of marriage. The procreation of a legitimately begotten population is a vital concern with the State, nor is it to be expected that she should place weighty emphasis on the religious and ethical features of marriage. She has to deal chiefly with the civil features of marriage. The attitude of the Church toward marriage is very different from that of the State. The Church regards marriage, primarily as a divine institution—as the union of one man and one woman for life. In itself the marriage bond is indissoluble. "What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder." Matt. 19:6. The object of marriage is the reciprocal support and mutual happiness of husband and wife, and the legitimate propagation and Christian education of the human race. The Church, therefore, must have regard for the religious and ethical features of marriage. And, regarding marriage as a divine institution, the Church is bound to place the religious and ethical features in the ascendant. Consequently, the Church looks with supreme disfavor on divorce, and discriminates in the matter of the remarriage of persons who have been divorced. Indeed, the Roman Catholic Church, which teaches that marriage is a sacrament, and that the marriage relation can be dissolved only by death, does not in any case nor for any cause sanction divorce, nor does she permit her clergy to solemnize the marriage of any person who has been divorced.*

* Sess. 24, Can. 7, Council of Trent.

Protestant churches generally hold that there are two legitimate causes for divorce, and that the innocent and suffering party, when divorce shall have been formally pronounced by a competent tribunal, is free to marry again. To justify this position in regard to these two subjects, divorce and remarriage, they appeal for the most part to Matthew 19:9: "And I say unto you, whosoever shall put away his wife, except for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery: and he that marrieth her when she is put away committeth adultery," and to 1 Cor. 7:15: "Yet if the unbelieving departeth, let him depart: the brother or the sister is not under bondage in such cases." (*Revised Version*).

They generally maintain that adultery, whether committed by husband or wife, because it destroys the oneness of flesh enunciated in the original institution of marriage—"and they shall be one flesh," Gen. 2:24—does, *ex ipso*, disrupt the *vinculum conjugale*. "Or know ye not that he that is joined to a harlot is one body? for, the twain, saith he, shall become one flesh." I Cor. 6:16. A man cannot at the same time be one body with a harlot and one flesh with his wife. The union is of twain, not of three. "Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife: and they shall be one flesh." (Gen. 2:24). When now the husband has joined himself with a harlot, he no longer cleaves unto his wife. He has already separated himself from her and has joined himself to another. In its essence marriage is at an end. The innocent party is free, and shall not be called an adulteress if she marry another man. She cannot be expected to live with the man who has joined himself with a harlot and has become one body. She has the right to demand a formal divorce from such a husband.

In the case of malicious desertion, marriage has already been disrupted in its purpose of mutual happiness, reciprocal office and the lawful procreation of offspring. There is now no bodily union, no personal confidence, no reciprocal relation of giving and taking, no spiritual fellowship, no moral sustentation. The vocation of marriage is vacated absolutely in every one of its

features. The vow made before God and in the presence of earthly witnesses, to love, comfort, honor and keep, has been broken in its very roots. God's holy ordinance has been profaned. The two are no longer "husband and wife," according to the divine intention, nor according to the human need and use of "holy wedlock." The one has *renounced* possession. The other has *suffered* deprivation; that is, the innocent party has *suffered* divorce in the malicious, wanton and unjustifiable diremption of the *vinculum conjugale* by the deserter. Hence, he or she as deserted *sine causa*, has the right to demand formal release from the deserter, since said deserter no longer renders the *debitum conjugale*, no longer loves, comforts, honors, keeps; is no longer the wife of one husband, the husband of one wife, and has relinquished the headship of the family. Or as Dr. Harless has written: "This is that culpable separation which Paul has in view (I Cor. vii), and in which he pronounces one so deprived of possession, without blame on his part, free of the duty of considering himself still bound to the depriver."*

In the case of divorce effected on account of adultery, the words of Christ (Matt 5 : 32; 19 : 9) clearly concede the right of remarriage to the innocent person. In the case of malicious, irreconcilable and final desertion, the words of Paul (1 Cor. 7 : 15) certainly imply that the innocent person, who has *suffered* divorce, has the *right* to marry again. The *οὐ δεδουλωται* is *absolute*. It removes all subjection to former conjugal obligations, and consequently gives all the rights of freedom involved in the premises. For if there be any species of subjection that it does not remove, and any conjugal right that it does not restore to the innocent party, then it is not *absolute*. But *ex vi termini* it is *absolute*. The conclusion is inevitable. In the case of such desertion as is named—and no other is contemplated in the premises—the brother or the sister is not subject to the bondage of marriage. The deserter has forfeited every right comprehended under *what God hath joined together, let not man put asunder*; and the brother or the sister deserted

* *System of Christian Ethics*, Eng. Trans., p. 440.

has obtained absolute freedom—*οὐ δεδούλωται*; and in this lies the fundamental principle: The wife is no longer bound by the law of her husband, and the husband is no longer bound by the law of his wife (Rom. 7 : 1-3.) In the one case (Rom. 7 : 1-3) death has annulled the marriage bond. In the other (1 Cor. 7 : 15), wilful desertion has annulled it, for the deserter has violated the terms of the contract. The cases are parallel in the main thing, namely, in the fact that the essential bond of wedlock has been broken. The dead can not, the deserter will not, have the other for husband or wife. In the one case as in the other the two are no longer husband and wife within the scope and intent of marriage. In the one case God's providence has dissolved the marriage bond, and has set the survivor free. In the other case man's wickedness has dissolved it, and has set the innocent person free. Hence, as in the one case the survivor is no longer *peculium*, no longer the possession of one person; so in the other case the innocent deserted person is no longer *peculium*, no longer the possession of one person; but has gained possession of the body. Therefore, as the survivor shall not be called an adulterer, or an adulteress, should he or she marry again; so the innocent deserted person shall not be called an adulterer, or an adulteress, should he or she marry again. The parallelism that holds in the one case must hold in the other, for freedom is not an empty sound. It has a content. As on the one hand it liberates from the *debitum conjugale*, so on the other hand it confers the *facultas ad contrahendum conjugium.*

It may be laid down, then, as a thesis that there are two scriptural grounds for divorce, namely, adultery and malicious desertion, and that in both cases the innocent party has the *right* to marry again.

Such has been the teaching in the Lutheran Church on the subjects of *divorce* and *remarriage.* This we now proceed to show.

LUTHER.

1. In *The Babylonian Captivity of the Church* (1520) Luther declares that he detests divorce, and that he prefers bigamy to

divorce. He says that "Christ permits divorce only in the case of fornication. Hence the Pope must necessarily be wrong, as often as he permits divorce for other reasons, nor ought any man forthwith to consider himself safe, because he has obtained a dispensation by pontificial audacity rather than power. I am not surprised, however, that they compel a man who has been separated from his wife by divorce to remain single, and if Paul bids us rather to marry than to burn, this seems plainly to allow of a man's marrying another in the place of her whom he has put away. I wish that this subject were fully discussed and made clear, that provision might be made for the numberless perils of those who at the present day are compelled to remain single without any fault of their own; that is, whose wives or husbands have fled and deserted their partner, not to return for three years, or perhaps never. I am distressed and grieved by these cases, which are of daily occurrence, whether this happens by the malice of Satan, or from our neglect of the Word of God.

"I cannot by myself establish any rule contrary to the opinion of all; but for my own part, I should exceedingly wish at least to see applied to this subject the words: 'But if the unbelieving depart, let him depart. A brother or a sister is not under bondage in such cases' (1 Cor. vii. 15). Hence the Apostle permits that the unbelieving one who departs should be let go, and leaves it free to the believer to take another. Why should not the same rule hold good, if a believer, that is, a nominal believer, but in reality just as much an unbeliever, deserts husband or wife, especially with the intention of never returning? I cannot discover any distinction between the two cases. In my belief, however, if in the Apostle's time the unbeliever who had departed had returned, or had become a believer, or had promised to live with the believing wife, he would not have been received, but would have been authorized to marry another woman." *

It will be observed that Luther speaks with some hesitation,

* Jena Latin, II, fol. 295. Wace and Bucheim's Translation, p. 226-7.

as he does at this period on many other subjects. But he sees scriptural grounds for divorce in the case of adultery and in the case of desertion, and he concedes to the innocent person, in both cases, the right to marry again. These two principles he steadily maintained in later and maturer years, and these principles, as will appear as we proceed, set the pace for subsequent Lutheran teaching generally on the subjects of Divorce and Remarriage.

2. In his *Explanation* of 1 Cor. 7 : 15 (1523), Luther says: "Hence the Apostle absolves and declares the husband or wife free where an unchristian husband or wife has departed or will not allow the other to live a Christian life, and he gives to such an one the power and right to marry again. What Paul here says in regard to a heathen husband or wife, is to be understood also in regard to a false Christian, that is, where such an one would force the other to unchristian conduct, or not allow the other to live a Christian life, or departs. The Christian husband or wife is absolved and free to marry another. For if that were not right, then the Christian husband or wife would have to follow the unchristian husband or wife, or against his strength and will live without wedlock, and therefore on account of the wantonness of another, be bound and have to live in danger of his soul. Here Paul says No, and he declares that in such cases the brother or the sister is not bound, and is not personal property. As if he should say: 'In other matters, where married people remain together, as in conjugal duty and the like, one is bound to the other, and is his, so that such an one dare not marry another, but in those matters where husband or wife requires the other to live an unchristian life, or separates himself from the other, then that other is not bound or obligated to follow him. He is not bound, but is absolved and free; is absolved and free, so as to marry again as though his spouse were dead.' How is this? Shall not the Christian spouse wait until the unchristian spouse returns, or dies, according to the spiritual law that has hitherto been in force? Whether she shall wait on him is a matter of her own will, for since the

Apostle here absolves and declares her free, she is not bound to wait for him, but in God's name she may marry."*

3. In 1525 Luther received a letter from the Council and Pastor of Domitsch, asking his opinion on the subject of the remarriage of the Pastor. He replies as follows: "In reference to your letter touching the conjugal life of your pastor, this is my sincere opinion in a word: Inasmuch as his wife demeans herself dishonorably toward him, I cannot make his right either narrower or wider than God himsèlf has made it, who through St. Paul, 1 Cor. 7 : 15, has uttered the following verdict in such cases: If the unbeliever departs, then let him depart. A brother or a sister is not bound in such cases.

"So say I also: If any one will not remain, let him go hence. The other party is therefore not bound to remain unmarried, as I have written more extensively in my little book on this subject. That you can read. And if he cannot remain without a wife, let him marry another in God's name, since this one will not be [his wife.] Adieu." "MARTIN LUTHER."†

The reader will note (*a*) that Luther recognizes the dictum of Paul as the verdict of God, (*b*) that wilful desertion frees from the matrimonial bond and gives the injured party the right to marry again, (*c*) that Luther cannot make the premises either narrower or broader than God has made them.

4. In 1530 Luther published a treatise of some magnitude on the subject of marriage.‡ It was republished twice in 1540, that is, in Bugenhagen's tractate on *Adultery and Desertion*, and in Melanchthon's *De Arbore Consanguinitatis et Affinitatis*. The views expressed in this treatise became influentially normative in the Lutheran teaching on the subjects of Divorce and Remarriage, and are much quoted by the dogmaticians and by other Lutherans who have written on these subjects. Several pages of this treatise are devoted to the discussion of Divorce and Remarriage.

* Werke, St. Louis Edition, viii, 1062–1063. Quoted also in Walther's *Pastoraltheologie*, p. 245.

† Erl. Ed, 53: 326.

‡ Erl, Ed. 23: pp. 91–162.

After quoting Matt. 19:6, and instancing the case of Joseph and Mary, Matt. 1:20, Luther says: "Accordingly when a husband or wife has committed adultery, and it can be proved, I cannot deny that the other is free and may be divorced, and may marry another person, though it were better, if possible, to effect reconciliation, and that they remain together. But if the innocent party will not do that, then he may avail himself of his right in God's name. And before all things such separation should not be made by one's own authority, but should be declared by the Council, or by the Pastor, or by the Magistrate. Then if he wish he may, like Joseph, put her away secretly, or he may leave the country. But if he wishes to remain he should effect the separation publicly."

In this connection Luther urges that the innocent party, in order to avoid giving offense and creating scandal, should not remarry for a year or two. He then continues: "There is also another case, as where a husband or wife leaves the country, etc. May the other then marry again?" He answers that if the husband has gone from home on business or on account of war, or in a case of necessity, the wife should remain faithful to her husband. But where one has deserted his wife and children without their knowledge and consent, and does not provide for them, nor write to them, and remains away for years, such an one has brought reproach upon marriage and upon the State, and "is a thief and a robber of the town and of his wife, house, home, goods, and should he return no one should or can harbor him. There is no scoundrel that I would so soon see hanged or beheaded as such a scoundrel, and if I had the time to paint or sketch such a scoundrel, I would make it evident that no adulterer can be compared to him." He advises that in case such a scoundrel remain away a year or longer, the pastor and the civil authorities advertise for him, "with the threat that he will be ostracised, and his wife shall be declared free," that is, free from the bond of marriage, and rendered competent to contract another marriage, for that, as we have seen, is what Luther means by being "declared free." But in this same treatise Luther declares that incompatibility of temper, or

the disgrace of either party, is not a sufficient cause of divorce.

5. In 1535 the Wittenberg theological faculty, Luther, Cruciger, Major and Melanchthon, prepared and subscribed an *Opinion* on a concrete case of desertion. M. of Nordhausen had been deserted by her husband, B. H. The theologians recommend that the pastor shall first cite him to appear. If he does not appear in three months, they know well how to proceed. M. is to establish her character. "If she can show that H. has been in ill-repute with others, then the case is all the clearer.

"Even if she cannot establish adultery, but if only on account of malicious and final desertion she seeks to be absolved, then according to the rule of Paul, 1 Cor. 7, she shall be declared free from H., since he has wantonly abandoned her, and for three years has not shown that he desires to live with her, and therefore confesses that he has left her finally. By virtue of Paul's declaration M. shall be permitted to marry in a Christian manner, as has been the case formerly in the Christian Church, as Eusebius and Justin cite a case in *lib.* 4, and as is shown by the case of Fabiola." They proceed to say that in case M. should marry again, it is the duty of the civil authorities to protect her against possible injury from the deserter.*

As this *Opinion* is official, and is signed by four members of the Wittenberg Theological Faculty, it must be considered of great value in studying the history of Lutheran teaching on the subject of Divorce and Remarriage. And the value of this *Opinion* is enhanced when we learn that the same year Luther and Melanchthon issued another *Opinion* in a concrete case. Jacob L. charges his wife with desertion and adultery. They recommend that he shall prove his charges against his wife, and also that he has not treated her with cruelty. Then shall the preachers declare him free from his runaway wife "according to the Gospel" and the ancient practice of the Church. "The runaway wife is not again to be admitted, and another Christian marriage is not to be forbidden the innocent husband."†

* Werke, St. Louis Ed. x. 744-5.
† Ibid, 744-6.

MELANCHTHON.

1. In Appendix I (1551) to the *Loci* of the third period, Melanchthon teaches that adultery and desertion are scriptural grounds for divorce, and he concedes the right of remarriage to the innocent party. He says: "In the matter of divorce, the divine word frees the innocent person when the husband or wife has dissolved the bond of marriage by adultery, and it concedes to the innocent person, when the case has been adjudged, the right to contract another marriage, and such is the practice in our consistories. The same is held in regard to a person unjustly deserted, because Paul says, 1 Cor. 7: 'Yet if the unbelieving depart, let him depart: the brother or sister is not under bondage in such *cases*.' Expressly does St. Paul declare that the person unjustly deserted is free, and is not to be forced to follow a vagabond deserter. * * * * If divorce has been effected on account of adultery, no time is prescribed to the innocent person, after the matter has been adjudged. But in the case of desertion, it ought to be held under advisement for years, in order that it may be understood that the person has really been deserted, and is not concealing frivolity and perfidy under the pretext of desertion.

"The law in the Codex concedes to a betrothed woman the right to marry another man after two years, if, without her consent, the betrothed man, who is not out of the country, so long defers the public rite of marriage. * * * I have already quoted the passages of Paul in Corinthians, which sets the innocent person free, and especially also if the deserter is guilty of adultery. By no means then is a halter to be placed on the innocent person on account of the sins of another. But it is understood that in this case liberty is not a mere word. To the liberated person marriage is conceded."*

2. In the *Confessio Saxonica* (1551), under the heading: *De Conjugio*, Melanchthon says: "In the matter of divorces the rule is most firmly maintained, that they sin who either by adultery or by desertion make the beginning of separation.

* C. R. 21: 1066-67.

Adulterers and adulteresses, deserters male and female, are condemned by the voice of those who teach in the churches, and by the voice of the judges in the consistories, and they are severely punished by the civil authority. But when the case has been investigated judicially, the innocent person is declared free, and marriage is not prohibited, in order that he or she may serve God and live a pious life. For since the Lord expressly frees the innocent person, (Matt. 19), when the other has been polluted by adultery, liberty does not exist in name only, but also in reality. And Paul speaks in the very same manner in the case of desertion. Thus our custom agrees also with the ancient Church."*

As the Saxon Confession was composed by Melanchthon to be sent to the Council of Trent, and as it was signed by the representatives of universities, cities and provinces from the north of Germany to the south thereof, it exhibits not only official, but confessional teaching on the subjects of which it treats. It was declared to be in harmony with the Augsburg Confession.

Two things may be noted in our quotation: 1. Melanchthon here affirms that the teaching of Christ and of Paul agree in the main things: Adultery and Desertion are scriptural causes for divorce, and remarriage is to be conceded to the innocent party. 2. At that time consistories granted divorce in case of adultery and of desertion, and conceded the right of remarriage to the innocent person.

In the *Appendix* from which we have quoted above, Melanchthon says that "on account of cruelty, poisoning, and plots laid against life," the lex Theodocii granted divorce. He thinks that where a husband practices cruelty towards his wife "so that life is imperiled," the civil magistrate ought to apply the law of Theodosius. But he does not here speak of remarriage. He denies that divorce should be effected "on account of contagious and incurable diseases, as on account of leprosy." For a misfortune which occurs between the living without fault does not by any means dissolve the conjugal covenant.

*C. R. 28: 432.

THE DOGMATICIANS.

The Dogmaticians were reproducers rather than producers. On the good foundation laid by Luther and Melanchthon they reared splendid dogmatic systems that are characterized by deep knowledge of the Scriptures and by wide and varied learning. These systems will always be of value to the student of Lutheran theology, for here he will find the development, the elaboration and the fortification of the rich norms first exhibited by Luther and Melanchthon.

The literature which the dogmaticians produced on the subjects of Divorce and Remarriage would fill volumes. We must here satisfy ourselves with brief extracts from a few of the most eminent of those venerable theological worthies, who, though dead, yet speak, and whose words of wisdom on practical as well as on dogmatical subjects, the Lutheran Church cannot afford to ignore.

CHEMNITZ, 1522–1586.

In his *Examen Concilii Tridentini* this incomparable theologian of our Church has treated the subject of Divorce with great fullness as over against the position taken by the Council of Trent. He knows of only two scriptural causes of divorce. After expounding Matt. 19, and 1 Cor. 7, he says: "Therefore we have in the Scripture two causes for dissolving the bond of marriage, so that husband and wife may be separated, not as by man, but by God himself. 1. On account of adultery a husband may lawfully, rightly and without sin repudiate his wife. 2. If the unbelieving will not live with the believing, but desert, dismiss and repudiate her without the sin of adultery, but on account of faith, the unbelieving sins, both against God and against the law of matrimony. But the deserted innocent person is not subject to bondage, but is freed from the law of her husband, so that she is not an adulteress if she be lawfully joined to another husband. And these two cases even Chrysostom mentions in commenting on 1 Cor. 7. 'The unbelieving,' says he, 'furnishes a cause, also fornication.'"*

* Preuss' Ed. p. 498.

It is evident that Chemnitz sees no contradiction between the words of Christ in Matt. 19:9, and the words of Paul (1 Cor. 7:15), as regards the two main questions, namely, that Adultery and Desertion furnish scriptural reasons for divorce, and that in either case the innocent party is free to marry again. The reason he gives for allowing the innocent party to marry again is that he or she must not be forced by the fault of another to burn or to live in adultery.

In regard to divorce "on account of cruelty, poisoning, plots laid against the life," and "on account of contagious and incurable diseases, as on account of leprosy," he seems to hold identically with Melanchthon, since he quotes Melanchthon in regard to these matters, and that without note or comment; or, speaking more accurately, he has taken into his Loci, without note or comment, the whole of Melanchthon's *Appendix I: De Conjugio*, thus placing his *imprimatur* on the teaching of his master.

GERHARD—1582–1637.

Gerhard treats the subjects of Divorce and Remarriage with greater fulness than does any of his predecessors. In explaining 1 Cor. 7:15, he defines "the unbelieving" as any person, whether Jew or Heathen, who does not embrace the Christian religion, or the faith of Christ. By "desertion" he means "rash, voluntary, malicious absence." "He must be regarded as a deserter who, with malicious intent, not led by any just and honorable cause, but by hatred of religion, or frivolity, or by impatience of conjugal restraint, or by other unnecessary reasons, departs from his wife, and will not be recalled by private admonitions, or by public citations, but goes away and travels to other countries, leaving no expectation of return or of reconciliation."

"In the third place, we must explain what is to be understood by liberation from bondage according to the words of the Apostle. Some persons think that by the word *bondage* is meant those mutual offices which husband and wife are reciprocally to render to each other, so that the meaning is that the person deserted is in no sense bound to follow the deserter who

has gone into foreign countries, and to render to him the offices of matrimony, but they deny that the way is open to the innocent person to marry again. We say that this explanation is *correct*, but it is *inadequate*, because by liberation from bondage, it is understood, not only that the deserted person is freed from rendering the offices of marriage to the husband or wife, but also that such person is freed from the matrimonial bond, if the malicious deserter will not live with her. 1. Because by no means are we to except from the matrimonial offices that which almost alone deserves the name of bondage, namely, that whoever is bound by the matrimonial bond, *does not have power over his own body.* 1 Cor. 7 : 4. In like manner by malicious desertion of the other party the deserted person is freed from bondage. He therefore receives power over his own body, and therefore after the action of the civil authority, he can marry again.

"2. What the Apostle means by *δουλεία* he himself shows clearly in Rom. 7 : 1 : 'Are ye ignorant, brethren (for I speak to men who know the law), how that the law hath dominion over a man for so long a time as he liveth? For the woman that hath a husband is bound by the law of the husband while he liveth; but if the husband die, she is discharged from the law of the husband. So, then, if while the husband liveth, she be joined to another man, she shall be called an adulteress; but if the husband die, she is free from the law, so that she is not an adulteress, though she be joined to another man.'

"*Δουλεία* has reference to the dominion of the matrimonial law, on account of which the wife is bound to the husband, so that she cannot give power over her body to another. Hence, freedom from *δουλεία* includes this, namely, that by a new marriage she can deliver the power of her body to another.

"3. The malicious deserter, in so far as in him lies, wickedly breaks the conjugal compact and bond, dissolves the unity of the flesh, and by his rash act severs the undivided intercourse of life. Therefore, justly and deservedly is the way opened to the deserted party to marry again. If the right of a new marriage be not conceded to the deserted person, he is deprived of

his right without any fault of his, and he is exposed, maybe, to the peril of harlotry. The innocent party, as Melanchthon says, *is not to be ensnared on account of the sins of another. But it is to be understood also in this case that freedom is not an empty sound. Marriage is to be conceded to the person that is free.*"*

On p. 214 of the same volume Gerhard writes: "Since it has been demonstrated from the words of Christ and of the Apostle Paul, that there are only two causes of divorce, namely, adultery and *malicious desertion*, it is easy to understand what must be determined as to the remaining causes, which others assign:" "Unbelief, heresy, a solemn vow of continence, crime, danger of life, sterility, supervening impotence, incurable disease, madness, relationship to a harlot, flight or banishment because of an offense." In all these cases he denies the right of divorce, except only that of peril of life, which he places in the category with malicious desertion.† "Besides adultery and desertion there are no just, legitimate and sufficient causes of divorce."

But Gerhard, following "Chemnitz, Mentzer and other theologians of our party," makes a very nice distinction between the words of Christ, Matt. 19 : 9, and 1 Cor. 7 : 15, and reconciles them in the chief thing, namely, that the innocent party is free. He says: "Christ speaks *of divorce to be made by the innocent party for just cause.* Paul speaks *of the divorce that has been rashly and unjustly made by the guilty party.* When the question is raised in regard to effecting divorce, the same is, For what causes may a man or a woman repudiate and reject wife or husband lawfully united? To this question the correct answer is, By the exclusive cause of Christ, that is, it is lawful on account of adultery alone. Nor does the Apostle make concession to the believer beyond that sole exception of Christ, so that he may repudiate the unbeliever on account of unbelief or of difference of religion. Much rather does he expressly add that if the unbelieving consent to remain, the be-

* *Loci*, xvi, 202–7, *passim.*

† *Zeitschrift für Prot. u. Kirche* 1858, p. 74.

lieving shall not dismiss him; but if the believing be unjustly deserted, and rejected by the unbelieving, in such a case of malicious desertion, so that the unbelieving cannot be induced to live with him, and he (the believing) cannot restrain himself, the Apostle declares that faith is not servilely bound, but is free. The occasion and the scope of the answer given respectively by Christ and the Apostle explains the whole case." He says that Christ "recognizes no cause for effecting divorce except adultery," but that Paul "consults for the conscience of the innocent and believing person on the presupposition that an unlawful divorce has been effected by the unbelieving. By no means is the deserted person to seek as the first thing, and immediately, to separate himself; rather on the contrary should he bring back the desertrix, and demand that she shall return to conjugal duty. If you say that *Paul concedes to the innocent deserted person a new marriage, therefore the bond of the former marriage ought to be dissolved, otherwise a new marriage could not be conceded by the Apostle, and hence that he presupposed that there are two causes of divorces, adultery and desertion*, we reply that we cheerfully concede this, but this does not detract from the exclusive cause of Christ, which makes adultery the sole cause of divorce, because he does not treat of one and the same question, and of one and the same case, with the Apostle; but Christ shows the cause of effecting a divorce; the Apostle the cause of suffering a divorce and of obtaining freedom on account of unjust desertion; Christ speaks of him who effects a divorce, the Apostle of him who is suffering divorce; Christ speaks of him who turns from his wife, Paul of him from whom the wife has turned. Christ speaks of voluntary separation, Paul of separation against one's will. Much less can it be shown from the words of the Apostle that the civil power can introduce other causes of effecting divorce, because the Apostle, moved by such an inspiration of the Holy Spirit as we do not recognize in other men, cannot adduce any crime that so affects the substance of marriage as adultery. Hence some of our theologians mention only one cause of divorce. Some

mention two, but there is in reality no contradiction, as is evident from the foregoing."*

QUENSTEDT—1617–1688.

Quenstedt has been called "the bookkeeper of the Wittenberg orthodoxy." In his *Theologia Didactico-Polemica* he writes: "*Malicious Desertion.* The bond of marriage is indissoluble. Hence the wife ought not to depart from the husband, nor he from her. But when the malicious deserter has gone, marriage is not denied to the innocent party or person who has been deserted *sine causa.* Here we must observe that not only is he guilty of malicious desertion who abandons his wife, but also he who drives her away by his cruelty and tyranny. Nor is the view of Luther to be rejected who to malicious desertion adds the persistent refusal of that which is due, mentioned by Paul, 1 Cor. 7 : 3.

"*Adultery.* By adultery the bond of marriage is dissolved, so that it is allowed to the innocent party to enter a second marriage."†

SCHERZER –1628–1683.

Scherzer was professor at Leipzig. He composed a *System of Theology Finished in XXIX Definitions.* He defines marriage as the lawful union into one flesh of one man and one woman, dissoluble only by death, adultery or malicious desertion. *Index I.* He says: "Adultery opposes the unity of the flesh, and therefore also the substance of marriage by which two become one flesh. Gen. 2 : 24. *For he who is joined to a harlot, has also become one body with the harlot,* 1 Cor. 6 : 16. Therefore he is no more one flesh with his wife."

"As malicious desertion is very often, though not always, connected with adultery, it is therefore to be referred to adultery. But even if it be not connected with adultery, it is nevertheless cause of suffering divorce unjustly, as adultery is the sole cause of effecting divorce. And by thus making a distinction

* Ibid, pp., 183-4.
† Part iv. c. 14, 1. Th. 10.

between active and passive divorce, the different views of teachers can be reconciled."

That malicious desertion is a just cause of divorce, Scherzer proves from 1 Cor. 7 : 15, and by several other passages of Scripture. Finally he says: "He who is liberated from conjugal bondage has power over his own body, and of rendering obligation to another, and therefore can at will enter into marriage with another person. Unless the right of a new marriage be conceded to the person deserted, he is deprived of his right without any fault of his own, and is exposed to perpetual burnings and to the peril of harlotry and pollution."

In support of these views Scherzer appeals to the older Lutheran theologians, and thus preserves the consensus of Lutheran teaching on these subjects. He declares that refusal of the *debitum conjugale* must be referred to the civil authorities. Impotence anteceding betrothal impedes marriage. "Impotence supervening after the consummation of marriage must be borne along with other misfortunes." "Sodomy and bestiality tear away the substance of marriage, and are to be referred to adultery." "Let no one suppose that the Apostle, 1 Cor. 7 : 15, contradicts Christ, who alleges adultery alone as the cause of divorce, Matt. 19:9. He must understand that the *occasion* and *scope* are different. The Pharisees inquire of Christ whether on account of any cause it is lawful for a man to effect divorce. Christ replies *negatively*, and declares that it is not lawful, except on account of *fornication* or adultery. The Corinthians inquire of Paul, whether on account of unbelief, it be lawful to effect divorce. The Apostles answer *No*, and by this negation he does not contradict Christ. But he subjoins another case, as to what is to be done by the believing, in case divorce be suffered on account of the desertion of husband or wife, and replies: The party unjustly deserted can marry again. There is therefore no contradiction between Christ and Paul," p. 838.

BAIER—1647–1695.

Baier was general superintendent at Weimar and professor in Halle. His *Compendium Theologiae Positivae* is a compend of

the theology of Musaeus of Jena, and of "many other orthodox theologians." It was republished in this country, with very large additions, by the late Dr. Walther of St. Louis.

On the subjects before us Baier says: "*Divorce*, or the dissolution of lawful and valid marriage, so far as regards the conjugal bond itself, can happen in *two* cases: In the case of adultery, without doubt, where *ipso jure* marriage can be dissolved, and is dissolved, and the innocent party is permitted to enter into a new marriage; and in the case of *malicious desertion*, where the deserter rashly and malicious breaks the conjugal bond, and to the deserted party, when a competent judge has made a declaration, belongs the right of entering a new marriage."*

In support of the first proposition Baier refers to and explains Matt. 19:9 and 5:32. In support of the second proposition he says: "According to Paul 1 Cor. 7:15: *If the unbelieving depart* (separate himself and effect divorce from the believing) *let him depart. The brother or the sister is not bound to servitude in such cases*,' so that neither he nor she may marry another. But he or she is free from bondage and from obligation to conjugal intercourse with the deserter or desertrix," p. 774.

It thus appears that Baier also sustains the Lutheran tradition on the subject of Divorce and Remarriage, and it may be added that Dr. Walther supports the propositions of Baier by pertinent quotations from Luther, Gerhard and Deyling, and also from the Schmalkald Articles.

HOLLAZIUS—1648—1713.

"His *Examen Theologicum Acroamaticum* recapitulates with great clearness and compactness the results attained by his predecessors, under the form of questions and answers."†

Hollazius says: "There are two just causes of divorce, adultery and malicious desertion." Like Scherzer he makes a

*Walther's Ed. III, 773.

†Schmid's Dogmatik, Translation by Hay and Jacobs, First Ed. p. 678.

distinction between active and passive divorce: "The only cause of active divorce is adultery; malicious desertion is cause for passive divorce. The former goes against the very nature of marriage, and therefore dissolves marriage and opens the way for the injured party to marry again. Matt: 19:9.

"That malicious desertion frees the innocent party is proved (1) by 1 Cor. 7:15. '*If the unbelieving separate himself, the brother or the sister is not subject to bondage in such cases*,' so that neither he nor she may marry another, but he or she is free from the bond and from the obligation to conjugal intercourse with the deserter or the desertrix. (2) From the nature of divorce. Whatever directly injures conjugal faith and the usus thori dissolves the marriage bond, and therefore jure ipso opens the doors of a second marriage to the injured party. But malicious and incorrigible desertion, etc. Therefore. (3) Ex absurdo. Unless the right of a new marriage be conceded to the deserted person, he is deprived of his right without any fault of his, and is exposed to perpetual burnings and to the peril of harlotry and pollution, which conflicts with justice and with the divine law. Now for the purpose of avoiding fornication, let each one have his own wife."*

WALTHER. 1811—1887.

Dr. Walther was unquestionably *the* Lutheran Dogmatician of the nineteenth century. He was, in no mean sense, a *Hutterus Redivivus.* He is distinguished for his rigid adherence to the Confessions of the Lutheran Church, and for his familiarity with the old Lutheran *Dogmatik.* His motto might have been simply *Nihil novi.* He sought to apply the old teaching without change to new conditions.

In his *Pastoraltheologie* Dr. Walther lays down the following thesis: "Although according to the Word of God there is only one legitimate cause of *effecting divorce*, namely, adultery (Matt. 19:9), yet according to the plain declaration of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 7:15: 'If the unbelieving departeth, let him depart, the brother or the sister is not under bondage in such cases,' there

*Examen, pp. 1380—2.

is another case in which the innocent party, though he dare not effect divorce, yet suffers divorce, namely, when an unchristian spouse *wickedly abandons* the other (malitiosa desertio), that is, leaves with the evident purpose of not returning again to the abandoned spouse, and that too when means applied to effect his return have been unavailing. In this case *remarriage* at the proper time is not to be refused the *innocent* party (of course when the legal separation has been obtained) since he or she is no longer 'bound,' that is, not bound to the former spouse (compare *ου' δεδουλωται* Rom. 7 : 1—3)."*

This thesis is defended by Dr. Walther through seventeen octavo pages—chiefly by quotations from the older theologians.

To the testimony of Dr. Walther may be added that of his colleague, Professor Günther: "Pure doctrine of the evangelical Lutheran Church: Divorce in the case of adultery is allowable, and the innocent party is permitted to marry again. Proof from God's Word: Matt. 5 . 32; 19:9.

"False doctrine of the Romish Church: Divorce is not allowable in any case, and the innocent party is not allowed to marry again.

"God's Word says the opposite. 1 Cor. 7:15: 'If the unbelieving departeth, let him depart: the brother or the sister is not under bondage in such cases,' vs. 10, 11. (If the innocent is allowed to marry in the case of wilful desertion, much more should he be allowed to marry in the case of adultery)."†

We thus see that the teaching of the great theologians of the Lutheran Church on the subject of Divorce, and of the Remarriage of the innocent divorced party, is remarkably concurrent. They all agree that there are "two just causes of divorce," and that the right of remarriage is to be conceded to the innocent party, whether divorce has resulted from adultery or from malicious desertion. When they, perchance, mention other causes, as "peril of life," or "sodomy" it is because such, as individual instances, clearly and lawfully can be grouped under one or the other species. The marriage of an impotent person is not

*P. 246.

†Symbolik, third Ed., p. 417.

marriage within the scope contemplated by "the divine institution," as the union for life of one *man* and one *woman*, and that, for the simple reason, that an "impotent" is neither man nor woman. The languages of the world have another name for such a person.

Our theologians are also agreed that there is no contradiction between Christ, Matt. 19:9, and Paul, 1 Cor. 7:15. Paul, they hold, speaks under inspiration, and therefore speaks authortiatively. The scope and occasion of the two passages are different. Christ, as Gerhard says, "shows *causam divortii faciendi;* Paul, *causam divortii patiendi.*" This is a just and wise distinction. The deserter has dissolved the *vinculum conjugale*, and has destroyed marriage in its purpose and intent as a divine institution. Freedom is not an empty sound. It restores power over the body, and gives the right of remarriage to the innocent party, who must not be allowed to suffer on account of the sins of the guilty party.

If now it be asked whether the practice of the Lutheran Church accorded with the teaching of her theologians, the answer is not far to seek.

KIRCHENORDNUNGEN.

The *Kirchenordnungen*, or *Church Orders*, contain, *inter alia*, rules and regulations for the administration of church discipline. They were composed by the lawyers and the theologians, and were introduced by order of the rulers. They are of special value for determining the practice of the Lutheran Church in matters of Divorce and Remarriage.

1. The *Goslar Consistorial Order* (1555) concedes to the innocent party, in the case both of Divorce and of Desertion, the right to marry again, after a decree of divorce shall have been obtained; but it urges that every effort shall be made, both in the case of adultery and of desertion, to reconcile the parties, so that they may live together.*

2. The Brandenburg *Consistorial Order* (1573), after urging

*Richter, II, 166.

that every effort be made in the case of adultery to effect reconciliation between the parties, says: "But where reconciliation cannot be effected, and divorce is desired by the innocent party, the case shall go to the Court, and divorce shall be declared according to law. Also to the innocent party, according to the purport of the Holy Scriptures, permission shall be given to marry again: In the case of malicious desertion the remarriage of the innocent party after from one to four years is permitted. In the case of *impotence* there shall be no divorce, but only the declaration that there never had been true marriage between the parties;" In the case of intolerable tyranny the guilty party shall be imprisoned until he gives assurance that he will do better. But where life is endangered by poisoning, or in any other way, by either party, "the assessors shall turn over such case to the civil authorities, who shall proceed with the accused as the criminal court of the Holy Roman Empire and the law require."*

3. The *Braunschw—Grubenhagen Kirchenordnung* (1581) says: "On no account shall divorce be allowed or undertaken except for the two causes permitted by Christ and Paul in the Gospel. First, when one is clearly convicted of adultery, and it has been legally established, and if the innocent party cannot and will not be reconciled, the sentence of divorce shall be declared according to Christ's word, Matt. 19. Secondly, in case of malicious desertion, according to Paul, 1 Cor. 7. In such a case the abandoning party shall be three times summoned. If he does not appear and bring satisfactory reasons for his desertion, the divorce may then follow, and the innocent party may marry again, but the guilty party shall be punished with banishment and with prohibition of another marriage."

Anger and bitterness are to be punished by the ban and otherwise. "In other unusual cases, which cannot be brought under general rules" care shall be taken not to give offence, and not to wound consciences.†

*Richter, II, pp. 382—4.

†Richter, II, p. 456. †Sehling, K. O. I, pp. 243-4, *Dresdener Ehe—Ordnung*. Von Scheurl, of Erlangen, one of best authorities, says

Other *Orders* that we have examined have regulations of identical import. We have not examined any that have regulations differing in import from those quoted above.

We thus see that our Lutheran fathers of the sixteenth century did not teach one thing and practice another. They were consistent. No doubt "unusual cases" did sometimes occur, as they are likely to occur in any and every court, both civil and ecclesiastical, and which must be settled according to the principles of equity. They had fixed laws and regulations, and they applied them in so far as they were applicable.

We also know what was the *official* teaching, and what the practice of the Lutherans in the seventeenth century. There lies before us a great quarto volume, known as the *Concilia Theologica Wittebergencia*, containing a collection of opinions rendered by the Wittenberg Theological Faculty, from the time of Luther to 1664, on Religious, Ministerial, Moral and Matrimonial questions. This useful book was published by Calovius, Meisner, Quenstedt and Deutschmann, who as a matter of course placed their *imprimatur* on its teaching.

In 1623 the Wittenberg Faculty was called on to render an *Opinion* on a concrete case of divorce. After rehearsing the facts or the case, they say: "If then he remains away it would be proper for the complainant, as the innocent party, to be released and absolved from him. And although indeed the canonists in the papacy, still following the Council of Trent, do not permit the absolved innocent party to marry again, so long as the deserter lives, yet the evangelical theologians and Reformed Consistories hold that the innocent party is not to be burdened in conscience, because by reason of lawful divorce she can no longer live with her deserted husband. On the contrary not only must all occasion and appearance of evil be avoided, but it must be prevented. And this goes along with

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"Adultery and malicious desertion are most undoubtedly scriptural grounds of divorce, and are for the most part expressly and exclusively recognized as such by the Evangelical Kirchenordnungen of the Reformation period." *Real Encyc*, IV, 98. Also in *Zeitschrift f. Prot. u. Kirche*, 1859, p. 19, 20.

divorce, in which the innocent party is absolved from the guilty, and is permitted to marry again, just as in olden times the wife who was put away might marry. Lev. 21 : 7 ; Deut. 24 : 2; Ezk. 44 : 22. Such is the opinion of Luther, not only in the *Tractate on Marriage*, Tom. VI. Jen. Germ. fol. 225 ; but also in Matt. 5. fol. 5 : 388. [Quoted by us on p. 43.] This opinion of Luther's exactly fits the present case. We hold also that this our opinion is in harmony with the facts and is approved by the evangelical theologians and is confirmed by the practice of the spiritual consistories."*

This *Opinion* is subscribed by the Dean, by the Senior and by the other Doctors of the Holy Scripture and Professors at Wittenberg. Comment is unnecessary.

We have before us also Dedekennus's *Thesaurus Conciliorum et Decisionum.* It contains opinions on Divorce, Separation and Remarriage. We here quote an *Opinion* of the Theological Faculty of Jena, given Dec. 10th, 1606. Eva N. had run away from her husband "without any given cause." They counsel that she shall be cited to return by a certain time. If she does not return, "then she is to be declared a *malicious slanderer* of her husband, and her husband is to be absolved from her, and he is to have permission, as he has opportunity, to marry another person."†

On the same page we find an *Opinion* of the Wittenberg Consistory in a concrete case of desertion by a husband. They counsel that if the deserter does not appear after having been cited, the complainant "is to be advised not to burden her conscience, but to marry again."

Opinions of this kind are numerous in this book, as given by theological faculties and consistories. There are also cases reported in which separation is allowed on account of deception and on account of impotence. Deception is treated as *casus adulterii*, and *impotence* as conflicting with the fundamental purpose of marriage.

And now that we may show that we have fairly represented

*Part IV, p. 91.
†Vol, III, p. 494.

the teaching and the practice in the Lutheran Church on the subjects of Divorce and Remarriage, we give a few authorities which will carry weight with the jury. Dorner: "He (Luther) considers wicked desertion (*desertio malitiosa*), to which also the *denegatio debiti* is to be added, as a sufficient ground of divorce, as well as the *πορνεία*."*

Friedberg: "Luther designated Adultery and Desertion as causes of divorce, and also recognized that for other cogent reasons the state might pronounce Divorce."†

Martensen: "The Lutheran Church decrees the lawfulness of actual divorce, and allows the innocent party to remarry. Holy Scripture names two cases in which divorce and remarriage are allowable. It says: 'Whosoever shall put away his wife except it be for the cause of adultery; and whoso marrieth her that is put away committeth adultery, (Matt. 5 :25). And again XIX: 9: 'Whosoever shall put away his wife, *except it be for fornication* and shall marry another, committeth adultery.' The Apostle Paul adds another case, namely, that of malicious desertion (*desertio malitiosa*), when one leaves and of his own accord forsakes the other: 'If the unbelieving depart, let him depart. A brother or a sister (i. e. the Christian partner) is not under bondage in such cases' (1 Cor. VII, 15). He here concedes to the forsaken, the suffering one, the privilege of remarriage. * * * And we cannot but acknowledge, that Lutheran divines are fully justified in including among valid reasons for divorce, continued cruelty, personal ill-usage (*saevitiae*), and plotting against one another's lives (*insidiae*). So Melanchthon, and after him the Danish Theologian N. Hemmingsen. To these reasons others were subsequently added, e. g., refusal of the *debitum conjugale*."‡

Köstlin: "He (Luther) then treats of divorce, which he regards with horror. * * According to Matt. V, marriage can be dissolved only on account of adultery. * * * and, still further, that, as Paul in 1 Cor. VII, allows the person for-

**Hist. Prot. Theol*, Trans. I, 270.
†*Kirchenrecht*, pp. 270–1.
‡*Christian Ethics* (*Social*), Eng. Trans., pp. 41–2.

saken by an unbelieving partner to give up the latter and marry another."*

Schmid's *Dogmatic* (Eng. Trans.): "As, however, marriage constitutes the closest bond of spiritual and bodily communion, it is also in itself indissoluble, and a divorce of those who have entered this estate can take place only when one of the parties has already practically rendered the continuance of the married life impossible by adultery or malicious desertion."† Schmid supports his statement by pertinent quotations from the Dogmaticians.

Meusel: After stating that the evangelical [Lutheran] Church always permitted divorce on the conception that the civil power must protect the innocent, and that neither the wilfulness of one nor of both parties, nor any supervening misfortune can justify divorce, and that remarriage was not allowed the guilty party without a dispensation, this reliable Lutheran authority says that "there were yet different opinions as to the question, What charges, according to the Scriptures, form a justifiable ground for dissolving the marriage covenant? The stricter view, proceeding from Luther and Bugenhagen, limited the causes of divorce to those named in the Scriptures, (Matt. 5 : 32; 1 Cor. 7 : 15) namely, adultery and malicious desertion, that is, the arbitrary sundering of the life-communion by escape to a place that could not be reached by the judicial arm, with which latter (desertion) was also catalogued the obstinate refusal of the conjugal duty. The milder view, following Melanchthon (*De Conjugio*), recognizes also intolerable abuse and plots laid against life as causes of divorce. At first the more rigid standpoint prevailed by extending the Scriptural grounds to unnatural carnal crimes, and to socalled quasi-desertion, that is, the obstinate and absolutely unconquerable refusal to return to the one abandoned, or to conjugal duty. But since the close of the seventeenth century when jurisdiction in marriage was turned over to the civil courts, and was brought under the influence of the natural-rights conception, there was a change,

**Theology*, Eng. Trans., I. 405.
† First Ed., pp. 636-7.

which in the Prussian Constitution went so far as to allow mutual consent to be a ground for divorce."*

These testimonies, to which others of similar character might be added, show that we have not misrepresented the Lutheran teaching on the subjects of Divorce and Remarriage. Said teaching recognizes only two Scriptural causes of divorce, viz: Adultery and Malicious Desertion. That there was a milder and a more liberal tendency does not imply any contradiction or any fundamental difference of view.† Unnatural crimes are absolutely inconsistent with the idea of marriage as "one flesh," and can easily be catalogued with adultery, without even straining the letter, to say nothing about the spirit of Matt. 19:9. Cruelty and plots against life can easily be catalogued with malicious desertion. Such conduct renders marriage null and void in its spirit, its aim, its content. Such conduct not only endangers the life of the suffering one, but it interferes with the service of God and endangers salvation; and this is the reason, as understood by our great teachers, why Paul says: "Let him depart. The brother or the sister is not under bondage in such cases." If the unbelieving husband requires the wife to commit crimes, or to abandon her religion, or to bring up her children as heathens, or plots against her life, then he has dirempted the marriage covenant, then he has destroyed the *individuam vitae consuetudinem.* Then the two are no longer

* *Handlexikon*, II. 310.

† After citing the views of Gerhard on the causes of divorce, Dr. Von Scheurl says: "If we compare Gerhard with the other theologians of our Church it will appear that there is really absolutely no, or at least a very insignificant, difference. All agree that adultery and desertion are the two sole lawful causes of divorce. Where they speak of other causes of divorce, there we have only a loose way of speaking, and the cases are always those that are subsumed under adultery and divorce. The sole difference is that a few theologians regard divorce as permissible where there are sins as great as adultery; and to the questions, Whether divorce dare be effected on account of cruelty, and, When should *desertion* be looked upon as *malicious*, some have given a milder, and others a more rigid answer, in which we see that they do not treat of fundamental principles, but only of their application." *Zeitschrift für Protestantismus und Kirche*, 1858, pp. 73-4. See also Richter's *Kirchenrecht*, Eighth Ed., pp. 1177 *et seqq.*

in essence "one flesh." The wife has *suffered* divorce. She can appeal to the civil law for protection. Shall the Church, whose calling it is to guard and nourish the Christian life of her members and to assist in training children in the nurture and admonition of the Lord, be less humane, less provident, than the State?

And as to the right of the innocent deserted party to marry again (after a competent judge has made the declaration), based on 1 Cor. 7 : 15, there is no difference of opinion among our standard teachers, and the practice as shown by the regulations found in the *Kichenordnungen*, and by the extant deliverances of the consistories in concrete cases, evidently corresponded to the teaching of the theologians and of the faculties.

We now sum up the Lutheran dogmatic teaching on divorce in the language of Hollazius: "The just causes of divorce are adultery and desertion. Adultery is the sole cause of active divorce. Malicious desertion is the cause of passive divorce." We know of no Lutheran dogmatician who opposes this teaching; and we find that this teaching is sustained by Harless in *Christian Ethics*,* by Martensen in his *Social Ethics*,† by Luthardt in his *The Moral Truths of Christianity*,‡ and by Wuttke in his *Handbuch der Christlichen Sittenlehre*, II, p. 481, all Lutheran Theologians of the highest rank.

We exhibit the Lutheran confessional teaching on the remarriage of innocent divorced persons in the words of the Schmalkald Articles: "Injusta etiam traditio est, quae prohibet conjugium personae innocenti post factum divortium."§ German: "So ist dies auch unrecht, dass, wo zwei gescheiden werden, der unschuldig Theil nicht widerum heirathen soll." That is, to translate the Latin: "Unjust is also the tradition [of the Roman Catholic Church] which prohibits the innocent person from marrying after divorce has been made." These articles were subscribed by no less than thirty-three "doctors and

* Eng. Translation, p. 440.
† Eng. Translation, pp. 38, *et seqq.*
‡ Sec. Ed. English Translation, p. 133.
§ Müller, *Symb. Bucher*, p. 343.

preachers." We are not aware that they have been formally repudiated by any part of the Lutheran Church. And that the Lutherans did not limit this confessional teaching to cases of divorce on account of adultery, but applied it in other cases, we prove, first, from the Prussian *Consistorial Order* of 1584: "Desertion. The deserter shall be cited and summoned. If then he does not appear, the case shall be finally and definitely settled and the innocent party shall be permitted to marry another;" and, secondly, from the Würtemberg *Marriage Order* of 1687: "Quasi-desertion. We allow that the innocent party shall be completely separated from the finally renitent, and shall be allowed to marry again." II, 13, 32.

We cap the climax by quoting from the *Jurisprudentia Ecclesiastica seu Consistorialis* of Benedict Carpzov, consistorial councilor, and professor of ecclesiastical law at Leipzig, who fortifies his "definitions" by quotations from the theologians and illustrates them by the *verba decreti* of the consistories. He writes: "Is it lawful, then, for the deserted party to contract a new marriage? According to the teaching of Paul, 1 Cor. 7 : 15, where he says: 'If the unbelieving depart, let him depart; the brother or the sister is not subject to bondage in such a case.' This Andrew Osiander explains as follows: 'The deserted party is not bound on account of the malicious absence of husband or wife to abstain further from marriage.' Although the Apostle speaks specifically of the desertion of the believing by the unbelieving, nevertheless the theologians most rightly extend this to every kind of malicious desertion, relying on the words of Paul, 1 Tim. 5 : 8: 'But if any provideth not for his own, and especially his own household, he hath denied the faith and is worse than an unbeliever.' And we must care especially lest, if the right of contracting a new marriage be denied the innocent party, a snare be laid for his conscience by the crime of another, whereas sins ought to bind those who commit them. And let no one suppose that this cause of divorce is disapproved by Christ, since adultery alone is mentioned by him as the cause of divorce, Matt. 5 : 32; 19 : 9. Christ speaks of the person who rashly rejects husband

or wife, which is by no means allowed. But we must hold differently in the case of a person who has been unjustly deserted, whom the magistrate ought to assist by allowing him a new marriage, in order that he may live a pious and peaceable life. Christ speaks of him who effects divorce; the Apostle, of him who suffers divorce."*

And now with these facts before him, the reader cannot be in doubt as to what is the teaching in the Lutheran Church on the subjects of Divorce and Remarriage. If there has been any material dissent from this teaching by standard theologians in the Lutheran Church, we have not happened upon it in our investigations, which have extended over a much wider field than may be indicated in this essay. And what is more, and indeed of the highest significance, is that this teaching is based on the Word of God. Our teachers have had no scruple in regard to the inspiration of 1 Cor. 7 : 15, nor do they see any contradiction between Paul and Christ, nor do they hold that verse 15 in 1 Cor. 7, must be explained by verse 11. They quote verse 15 as decisive and in the premises final.

Such are the facts. We do not here raise the question whether this old Lutheran teaching is correct, is scriptural, is in accord with the fundamental principles of right and honor, is salutary for the conscience, is promotive of Christian virtue; but we say that the Lutheran theologian, who denies that it is scriptural, etc., and the Lutheran Synod that resolves to modify it, whether by abridgment or by expansion—both are morally bound to show wherein it is not scriptural, and is dangerous to the conscience, and to society, and are bound to show cause why a Romanizing, or the Greek, or some other doctrine of Divorce and Remarriage should be substituted for it. Lutherans will not be found forward to forsake Lutheran doctrine and Lutheran practice without asking *Why?* And should a con-

* *Liber* II, p. 187, Edition of 1685. Pufendorf is of opinion that divorce does not arise "from any positive law of God," but that if we regard barely the law of nature, adultery and "base desertion" are sufficient causes for divorce. *The Law of Nature and of Nations*, VI, I., 21. His annotator, M. Barbeyrec, elaborately explains 1 Cor. 7 : 15 as unquestionably furnishing ground for divorce.

test arise in view of possible disciplinary action, it will be found that prescription—"ancient and immemorial use and enjoyment"—is quite as potent in ecclesiastical as in civil cases; and it will also be found that Lutherans who have not been convinced that the Lutheran teaching and practice on these subjects are wrong, are not likely to be deterred by synodical resolutions.

But so far as we have observed no Lutheran Synod has undertaken formally to show that the old Lutheran doctrine of Divorce and Remarriage is unscriptural, and therefore is wrong; that is, we do not know a single instance in which that doctrine has been formally and by name renounced, by any Lutheran body competent to act in the premises. Just what limitation may have been imposed on the Church in Europe since the matter of Divorce was turned over to the State, we are not informed. But in this country where the Church is free in her own legitimate sphere, the full Lutheran tradition, so far as we can ascertain, has been departed from by only one general Lutheran body—we mean the General Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in the United States. In Canton, Ohio, 1893, the said General Synod passed the following resolution: "This Synod understands the divine law as allowing no dissolution of the marriage bond except for the one cause specified, viz: adultery, and consequently as not permitting remarriage of persons divorced on other grounds, or of the guilty party in the case of a legitimate divorce."* (Matt. 19:9 is referred to).

It is needless to say that this resolution is not an adequate expression of the Lutheran doctrine of Divorce and Remarriage. Perhaps it was not intended to be such. But the time has come when the General Synod should reconsider her action, and should either place herself on the unabridged Lutheran platform on these subjects, or give full and clear reasons for ignoring 1 Cor. 7:15, and consequently for her abridgment of the Lutheran, and indeed of the generally accepted Protestant, doctrine of Divorce and of the remarriage of the innocent

*Minutes, p. 84.

divorced party.* (We here take no account of the new Episcopal canon.). And especially will such reconsideration become necessary when it is learned that other Lutheran bodies in this country recognize that there are *two* just causes of divorce, and that the innocent party in *both* cases has the right to marry again. For instance:

1. Of the Joint Synod of Ohio, Dr. F. W. Stellhorn writes:

COLUMBUS, OHIO,
Oct. 20, 1904.

REV. PROF. J. W. RICHARD, D.D., Gettysburg, Pa.

Rev. and dear sir: In reply to your letter of the 15th inst., I beg to say that to my knowledge our Synod has never *officially declared* its position on the question whether in case of divorce on account of malicious desertion the innocent party should be allowed to marry again; but as far as I know the *universal practice* in our Synod is to permit such marriage, as in my opinion Paul does undeniably permit it. For so I understand 1 Cor. 7 : 15, agreeing in this respect with the great body of our Lutheran theologians of all times. St. Paul here speaks of the case when a Christian has to *suffer* a separation and in consequence is no more bound by the former marital ties, hence also is free to marry again. Christ, on the contrary, speaks of the case when, in consequence of the adultery of the one spouse, and as a punishment for it, the innocent one may legally *bring about*, or *inflict*, the separation. So there evidently is no contradiction between Matthew 19, 9 and parallel pages on the one hand, and 1 Cor. 7, 15, on the other. They speak of entirely different cases and supplement each other.

Yours truly, F. W. STELLHORN.

2. The Iowa Synod has never taken formal action on the subject of Divorce. But Professor M. Fritschel, of the Wartburg Seminary, writes that said Synod holds that there is *only one* lawful cause for effecting Divorce, namely, adultery, Matt. 19; 9, and that the Church cannot refuse marriage to the innocent party. "But where one spouse has left the other with the

*See Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, III, 393-7. A. A. Hodge, *Com. on Conf. of Faith*, pp. 415-7.

evident intention of not returning, and has resisted all means used to change his mind, the innocent party, who in this case does *not effect*, but *suffers* divorce, according to 1 Cor. 7 : 15, is not bound to the former spouse, and therefore when a legal separation shall have been obtained, is not to be denied remarriage nor refused it by the Church." But the pastor must assure himself that it is a genuine case of malicious desertion, and not desertion in anger, or flight on account of crime, or a case of abuse of the spouse.

3. The Missourians have not taken any action on Divorce, but "the Missouri pastors, one and all, are governed by the rules laid down by Walther in his book on the subject.* Consequently we solemnize marriage of the innocent party in case of malitiosa desertio if such desertio is fully proved and is a fact. In that case the former marriage tie is actually broken, and no longer exists—cannot therefore bind the innocent party any longer." So writes the Rev. H. H. Walker, a Missouri pastor.

4. The General Council has published *Theses on Marriage and Its Relation to Divorce*, of which the third, fourth and ninth read as follows: *Violations of the Marriage Covenant*, completely disrupting it, are (*a*) adultery, Matt. 5 : 32; 19 : 5, 6. (*b*) malicious desertion, 1 Cor. 7 : 15.

"While the language of the passages in Matthew seems to restrict divorce to but one ground, 'adultery,' St. Paul, in 1 Cor. 7 : 15, shows that desertion is the essential principle of adultery.

"Where the marriage covenant has been broken and the judicial decree has made public and formal declaration of the fact, the innocent party is freed from all obligation assumed, and stands in Divine Law as though such covenant had never been made. To the innocent party belongs, therefore, the right of remarriage."†

In regard to these theses Dr. Krotel writes: "While, therefore, the General Council has not yet taken final action in regard to the matter, it is altogether likely—nay, I might say

* *Pastoraltheologie*, 326, quoted by us on a preceding page.
† Minutes, p. 218.

certain, that the position taken by the theses presented by the committee, will be adopted at the next Convention."

Thus it will be observed without further investigaon that far more than half of the Lutherans of this country uphold the traditional Lutheran teaching on the subjects of Divorce and Remarriage. Hence it is not likely that the four Lutheran bodies above named will fall in with the "denominational comity" scheme headed by the Episcopalians, which aims to abate the present iniquity and excess of divorces by recognizing only *one* cause of divorce, "adultery," and by refusing the Church's blessing to the marriage of all divorced persons, except of those who are the innocent parties in cases of divorces for adultery. Whether the General Synod will finally abandon the full Lutheran doctrine and practice in the subjects under discussion, and will follow the hegemony of a Church with which she has very few things in common, and will say, "We will do as you do," remains to be seen. But it is safe to predict that she will be required to give clear and unanswerable scriptural reasons for her abridgment of the Lutheran doctrine and practice, before she can succeed in binding the consciences of her clergy to the essentials of the new Episcopal canon, and in inducing them to bind themselves by a "comity" scheme to try to abate an evil by a method which touches that evil only in one of its least baleful effects. Besides, there is a well-grounded suspicion that the new Episcopal canon points toward Rome, and that it may be but the preliminary to the acceptance of the Roman Catholic doctrine of Divorce. A few of our sons and daughters may prophesy Roman alliances, and a few of our old men may dream Catholic dreams, and a few of our young men may see Episcopal visions, but the great majority of all classes are far more likely to cling to the saner, nobler traditions of their fathers.

And, looking at the Episcopal canon in its practical features, and also at certain resolutions recently promulgated by certain Lutheran Synods in regard to the remarriage of divorced persons, we cannot repress the conviction, that said canon and resolutions exhibit a lack either of insight or of courage, or of both. Either the clergy do not see the core of the iniquity, or

they are afraid to attack it in its roots. Remarriage of divorced persons is only a remote phenomenon. Divorce itself is but an effect. The clergy have to do primarily with "the hardness of heart" (Matt. 19:8), out of which divorces proceed. The lancet should be driven into the core. There is the place to show one's self valiant. To refuse to bless the marriage of certain divorced persons is to touch the evil with the tips of the fingers, and that too at a safe distance. It looks like salving the conscience to atone for the neglect of the paramount duty.

How many of the readers of THE LUTHERAN QUARTERLY have ever heard a sermon preached on the sixth (seventh) commandment, or on the divine institution of marriage, or on the indissolubility of the conjugal bond, or on the reciprocal duties of husband and wife? How many? The writer has never heard a sermon preached on any of these subjects, and inquiry reveals the fact that very few other persons have ever heard sermons preached on these subjects. This shows an almost criminal dereliction on the part of the clergy. As a consequence, in large part, of this dereliction, it may be safely affirmed that scarcely one marriageable young person out of twenty understands that marriage is a divine institution, that God created them male and female unto that end, that marriage *cæteris paribus* is a Christian duty that has its roots in the ethos as well as in the pathos of human nature, and that marriage is indissoluble, except as the result of the commission of a grave crime against society, and that marriage is divinely intended to be the complementing and the perfectioning of man and of woman in this earthly life.

As a consequence of the prevalent ignorance of young people on these subjects the great majority of them enter on "the holy estate of wedlock" with scarcely a thought that marriage in its inner significance is spiritual and ethical, is "only in the Lord" (1 Cor. 7:39). Hence it may be safely assumed that too often "holy wedlock" is contracted under the inspiration of love songs and erotic poetry, or under the impulse of "the lust of the flesh," or at the instance of a bank account, or in the delusion of social distinction. The result will be a bodily conjunction rather than a spiritual union. Disappointment and

disgust are inevitable; divorce and separation are probable. And now for the clergy, having neglected the paramount duty, to resolve that they will not marry the divorced is about as wise and as philosophical as it would be to try to purify the waters of the Mississippi River by casting the healing branch into the Gulf of Mexico instead of into the fountains and tributaries of the mighty stream. The place for the clergy to operate is in the home, in the Sunday School, in the catechetical class, but preëminently in the pulpit. The hardness of the human heart must be broken by the word of the Gospel. The boys and young men must be taught that when they become husbands they "so ought to love their own wives as their own bodies" (Eph. 5 : 28), and not to kick and cuff, choke and beat them until they are black and blue (ask the law judge); and girls and young women should be taught that as wives, they are to be "chaste, workers at home, kind, being in subjection to their own husbands" (Tit. 2 : 5), and not to be insolent, fretful, nagging and wasteful. The divine economy of marriage must be expounded, and its ethical principles must be inculcated as the foundation of that personal communion of life and vocation to which holy wedlock invites man and woman, for it is notorious that the great majority of unhappy marriages and *mesalliances* come from ignoring, or from violating the moral restraints and obligations that the divine Word and the law of nature and the principle of congruity, have laid on husbands and wives.

One ounce of prevention is worth more than many pounds of cure. Hence *Obsta Principiis* is the best motto for the clergy. And yet it is just here that the clergy have been most derelict. Often it is too late when the husband has turned with brutal violence upon the wife and imperils her life. Often it is too late when the wife has become suspicious, malicious, spiteful, vindictive. But still worse. Many a Christian woman finds herself "polluted" (Oh, horror!) almost from the very hour of her marriage (ask the physician), and knows that in fulfilling her vocation as mother she must transplant her husband's physical and moral *virus* to her children. This is hell, and shall such have two hells, one here and one hereafter? And if the innocent party escape the hell on earth, shall she be

denied the benediction of the Church in a second marriage? Is there not sometimes adultery before marriage, as well as after? Or is adultery only *post conjugium?*

But what shall we say of those who are without? Are they entitled to "benefit of clergy"? Do they marry in the Lord? Can they be addressed as "*Beloved in the Lord*"? It is from this class chiefly that divorces come. Christian men and women will not grow weary of each other, and will not give fatal occasion for separation, but will be ever acquiring fresh love and esteem for each other, for as Luther says: "Christians should be pious from their hearts. Such need no law. They retain their wives while life lasts. But where there are no Christians, it might be well even now to keep this law (viz., the Mosaic precept of giving a writing of divorcement), and to let them separate from their wives and take others like the heathen, lest by their discordant lives they should have two hells, one in this world and one hereafter. But let them know that by reason of such separations they are no longer Christians, but heathens and in a state of condemnation."*

But we forbear, except to say with the old Roman Jurisprudence: *Summum jus, suprema injuria.*

The State has *her* function in the matter of marriage. She is bound by the law of self-existence to regulate marriage and to guard the happiness of her citizens. But she cannot be expected to give moral and religious instruction on "holy wedlock." The Church has *her* function in regard to marriage, but this comes chiefly *before* marriage. Her teachers must get men and women *ready* for "marrying in the Lord." They must face the *causes* of adultery and malicious desertion, and not satisfy themselves by playing valiant round the effect, for scarcely one clergyman out of three will ever have occasion to play valiant by refusing to solemnize the marriage of divorced persons. But all can show the more excellent way, and can labor to bring into vogue the New Testament standard in re-

* Erl. Ed., 51. 37. Dr. Luthardt says: "It is true that national legislation may, like the law of Moses, have occasion 'for hardness of heart,' *i. e.*, because of the prevalence of immorality, to make some concessions." *Moral Truths of Ch.* Sec. Ed. p. 324.

gard to "holy wedlock." The clergy are not ignorant of the fact that according to the marriage ceremony, "God has laid upon this estate many a cross and affliction," and that it is still written over the gateway to connubial life that "man shall eat bread in the sweat of his face," and that the woman "shall bring forth with sorrow, and that her desire shall be to her husband, and he shall rule over her." It is the duty of the clergy to preach and to teach on these subjects, line upon line, and precept upon precept, for these things are the natural attendants of wedlock. They enter into its very essence. They help to make it a discipline for this life, and a preparation for heaven. And all the more is it the duty of the clergy to preach on these subjects, because the days are full of evil. The frequency of divorces and the facility with which they are obtained and the frivolous notions entertained by many persons in regard to the institution, nature and purpose of marriage, are imperiling the sanctity of the home, degrading the tone of society and endangering the stability of the State—"race suicide."

Synodical resolutions and ecclesiastical canons directed against a remote phenomenon of the abuse of marriage, can resist this tide of evil about as a handful of bulrushes can resist the tides of the ocean. The evil is a moral one, and must be met by moral resistance. The people must be educated on this subject. The laxity of views now widely obtaining in regard to marriage must be expelled by the inculcation of a better sentiment, and the laxity of legislative action and of judicial administration in regard to divorce must be overcome by showing legislators and judges that divorces granted for any reasons except for those noted in the New Testament, or for such as can be grouped under principles clearly involved in the words of Christ and of Paul, are degrading to society and injurious to the State.

And in these matters the way of the Lutheran clergyman is clear. His Church has always laid stress on teaching, and especially on the teaching of the young. He cannot afford to barter away this instrument of strength for a resolution that is the very incarnation of weakness. Only when he has taught

and inculcated and testified against the iniquity of the causes that lead to divorce, can he consistently say that he will not bless the marriage of divorced persons. Only when he has magnified the divine law of wedlock, has rebuked the passion of men, and has reproved the frivolty of women, can he deign to lay hold on a synodical resolution as an instrument for extirpating this moral cancer that is preying on the vitals of the American people.

Besides, the Lutheran clergyman has before him the historical teaching of his Church as touching Divorce and Remarriage. That teaching is to be his guide in theory and in practice. But even that teaching may not be held and applied as were the laws of the Medes and the Persians, for all teaching, all legislation, all practice, in order to be both humane and effective, must live and operate in the spirit rather than in the letter; since, as the old Church Order says, "there may be unusual cases which cannot be brought under general rules."

But Bishop Martensen, in treating of this very point, wisely writes: "We are aware that *analogy* is in this matter a dangerous way, and one which has led to that so much discussed, and certainly lamentable laxity of legislation, which is, however, surpassed by the laxity with which authorities administer the law. But *abusus non tollit usum, i. e.*, the right use is not obviated by abuse. The reaction, which has from time to time arisen in the Protestant Church against this pernicious laxity, cannot be declared unjustifiable. But when individual clergymen have either refused to marry the divorced in general, or have only consented to marry those to whom the reasons expressly stated in Scripture apply, we can only see in such conduct a non-evangelical partiality, which, besides, can never be carried out in a national church, and is opposed to the old consistorial practice of the Lutheran Church. If the saying of Christ is taken as a literal law, intended for direct and literal observance in the Church, the great difference existing between the social circumstances of His time, against which His words were directed, and those which subsequently prevailed in Christian States, is utterly lost sight of. In the time of Christ, a divorce pronounced by the authorities was unknown; and it was left

to any man to give his wife a writing of divorcement. It was of this that Christ said, 'Moses, because of the hardness of your hearts, suffered you to put away your wives; but from the beginning it was not so' (Matt. xix. 8; Mark x. 5). It was against the frivolous and capricious use of this concession which prevailed in His days, that our Saviour's words were directed. If it had been His purpose to institute a law literally binding upon all, for His Church and for all times, we should have reason to complain that this law should have been communicated in so very incomplete a form. For the words in question, especially as reported by that evangelist who was at the same time an apostle (St. Matthew), speak exclusively of the right of a husband when his wife is guilty of a crime, but contain nothing at all concerning the rights of a wife—an omission which could not possibly occur in an actual law. This circumstance, in particular, calls upon us to direct our attention to the principle involved in the occasional, and to a certain degree incompletely expressed, words of our Lord."*

The danger from the present Protestant reaction is, that it will lead to "a non-evangelical partiality" which cannot command the respect of the saner portion of the community, and which will tend to the secularization, that is, to the degradation of marriage, by turning over its official ratification to aldermen and justices of the peace. There must be place left for discrimination. Evangelical principles, rather than ecclesiastical inhibition, must sometimes be allowed to decide. Consciences must not be burdened. "For it is better to marry than to burn." 1 Cor. 7:9. The preëminent function of the clergy is to strive to elevate the public conscience, and to hold up the moral aud religious features of marriage. When they shall have done this faithfully, they may then also avail themselves of the proper kind of resolutions.

* *Social Ethics*, pp. 43-4.

ARTICLE V.

GRACE AND FREE-WILL.

By Professor W. VOLLERT, PH.D.

Rightly has the *relation of the divine action* to the *human will* been regarded as the greatest problem of theological science. On the difference of attitude to this question rests the different doctrinal positions of the Evangelical, the Reformed and the Catholic Churches. If we deny to man the *posse resistere* we fall into the Calvinistic Predestination. If we give up the *capacitas mere passiva* we fall into Semipelagianism. "Men are not able to be justified before God by their own powers, merits or works, but they are justified freely for the sake of Christ by faith, and this faith God imputes for righteousness before himself. Rom. 3 : 4." In this confession in Article IV of the Augustana we have the simple doctrine of the justification of the sinner before God alone out of grace for Christ's sake. Around this, its life-principle, has the Lutheran Church of the Reformation grouped all her symbolical definitions. "We hold fast to this chief article, and will not depart one iota from it, though heaven and earth and everything perish." He who thus bases salvation wholly on the free grace of God, involves the presupposition that the human race, which is to be redeemed, is in a condition in which it cannot comply with the will of the Holy God. Guilt must rest upon the sinner, so that by nature he is a child of wrath. Eph. 2 : 3. Thus Article IV requires Article II, that of *Original Sin.* But because the question of the relation of the divine activity to human freedom is likewise here not clearly stated, Article XVIII and XIX became necessary.

Eck had actually affirmed, so says Melanchthon, that God is the cause of sin—though this is contrary to John 8 : 44, where the devil and man's perverted will are named as the cause of sin, where the holiness of God is guarded, and where the guiltiness of man is asserted. The further objection, that the new doctrine of justification renders all good works impossible, is

meant to be rejected by Article XVIII, *De Libero Arbitrio*, which is the explanation of Article II. The question of the relation of Free-will to divine grace after the Fall is its subject. Articles II, XVIII, XIX belong together, and receive their light also from Article IV, *De Justificatione*. Here is found nothing more of the earlier Determinism of the Reformers, but also nothing of the later Synergism of Melanchthon. This result was not reached without a long and severe conflict.

Luther at the beginning, still under the influence of Mysticism, confounded the question of the relation of grace to the sinner with that of the relation of God to the creature. Consult his theses of the years 1517 and 1518, and his *Commentary on the Psalms*. The consequence was an absolutely *predestinarian* view. Consult his *Commentary on Galatians* and the explanations of the Psalms of the years 1520 and 1521, and also his *Preface to the Epistle to the Romans*. The *De Servo Arbitrio* of 1525 formed the culmination. Here Free-will is regarded as a lie, and God's decree as unchangeable. Subsequently the matter was very much clarified. The great evangelical principle of the decisive significance of the *Word* as the special organ for the divine manifestation and action, and of the Sacrament as also the bearer of the saving activity, preserved Luther, on the one hand, from the Zwinglian absolute conception of the idea of God and from the disregard of the sacrament as "a vehicle of the Holy Spirit;" and on the other hand, from making, with Calvin, Predestination, and not man's *servum arbitrium*, the center.

In his letter to the Christians of Antwerp, in his *Trostschrift*, 1528, in his letter to Aquila, 1530, and his *Commentary on Genesis*, 1536, the pure evangelical doctrine is stamped. Man's will is indeed unfree. He brings nothing to grace but indifference, yea, hostility. External reverence he can furnish, but he cannot know, love, reverence and fear God. Yea, he does not inquire after God, for he is corrupted and blinded by the devil. By God's grace alone is he to be brought to conversion, "to hear Christ, to be baptized in his name, to love his Word, to be made certain of his salvation, for Christ is the foundation and the mirror of salvation" (*Trostschrift*, 1528). In its ripest form

Luther's faith is stamped also in the Small Catechism, when in explanation of Article III it is said: "I believe that I cannot of my own reason or strength believe in Jesus Christ, my Lord, or come to him. But the Holy Spirit has called me through the Gospel."

Melanchthon also had to overcome *predestinarian* views before he could gain that clear knowledge which he placed in the Augustana. In his *Loci* of 1521 and in his notes on Romans of 1522, to him the natural substance of man is only sin. "There is nothing in us except death and sin. Therefore nature can do nothing but sin." As the fire has an internal power by which it blazes upwards; as in a magnet there is a peculiar power by which it attracts iron; so in man is there an indwelling impulse to sin. "Since all things happen necessarily according to the divine predestination, there is no freedom of our will." Opposition to the Catholic conception as it had been established by the Scholastics, drove him to these excesses. It was a means of protesting against the *meritum de congruo*, according to which a person can dispose himself for the reception of grace, and against the *meritum de condigno*, according to which, by means of the grace received, he becomes further qualified *for doing good, and for enjoying God.* No wonder, since original sin is *the least of all sins* (Andradius), that, *original sin* is properly only a *fomes peccati*, which after baptism no longer has the character of sin. Then also Free-will is in a condition to do that which is morally good, yea, *to love God above all things by its own powers*, and grace makes this good also a *bonum meritorium* (Biel). Melanchthon rightly did all in his power to reject this doctrine, since it looked upon man's sinfulness as a weakness of nature, or as a necessity of nature. Both he and Luther are concerned to restore its central position to the grace of God in Christ. But the proposition that God is the absolute Lord who does whatsoever he pleases, and the discussion of the relation of God to the creature instead of that of the relation of grace to the sinner, necessarily led them both into error. From the year 1525 on a marked change took place also in Melanchthon. This changed position first appeared in his *Visitation Articles*, and in his *Commentary*

on Colossians in 1527. In *the Instruction to the Visitors* it is said: "Man has not the power to purify his heart and to work divine gifts, as also Paul says in Romans 8: The natural man cannot do the things of God. This freedom is hindered by the devil, for when man is not protected and governed by God, the devil impels him to sin, so that he does not even maintain outward piety." The *Commentary on Colossians* (1 : 15) goes further: "We must distinguish between the natural life and the relation of the human will to the activity of God in the natural life, and the Christian life, the relation of the human will to that which is good before God." God's general action in all creatures is, nevertheless, in the case of men, determined by the human personality, by the different nature of each individual, that is, by the natural freedom of choice which he himself has given to man. Therefore man can abstain from murder, theft and the like, and can perform civil righteousness. On the contrary only the person who is converted by the Spirit of God through repentance and faith, can attain to true spiritual willing, can do the truly good. God does, indeed, according to his mercy, effect the election of men, but by the *word* and the *sacraments* he makes the heart fit for believing; and thus a basis is given for the distinction between legality and morality. The sacraments also preserve their character as *seria et efficacia,* because now the whole matter is looked at, not from the absolute will of God, but from the conscience of man. Both the interest of Christian morality, and that of the alone-activity of grace, and of the newness of the Christian life, are now preserved. The "external works" and "the internal affections" of Article XVIII of the Augustana are kept distinct. "The human will has some liberty for performing civil righteousness and for choosing the things that are subject to reason, but it does not have the power to perform the righteousness of God." Thus perishes the scholastic distinction between actions good in themselves as man can perform them, and those that are acceptable to God as they are conditioned by grace. Freedom of choice is limited to the *accidental of acts;* it has no reference to the *substance of acts,* which is the fear of God and the love of God, and which takes place only when the Holy Spirit

works faith through the means of grace. Consequently the *liberum arbitrium* in spiritual things is out of the question. As the Christian's justification is objectively founded in the grace of God in Christ, subjectively conditioned on his part by faith, so he knows that he does not have this faith out of his own reason or power, but that he has been brought to Christ by the Holy Spirit. Consequently if in conversion man holds himself *pure passive* ("he does not have the power without the Holy Spirit of performing the righteousness of God or spiritual righteousness, because the carnal mind perceiveth not the things that are of God, 1 Cor. 2,") so nevertheless on the other hand we will have to say that man is enabled to *coöperate* with grace, and to decide for it, because the center of gravity of the nature has been changed by the working of God. On this subject the Confession does not contain any more accurate definition, as likewise on the question, Whether the idea of *civil righteousness* comprehends all that is made possible to man; Whether even in the sphere of the natural life a relation to God mediated through the religious moral consciousness of man, may not be possible. Justification has delivered the Christian from the deep moral corruption ("after the fall of Adam all men are born with sin, Ps. 51:7; Gen. 6:3; 1 Kings 8:48; John 3:6; Eph.: 2:3") which consists both in the "want of righteousness, or of integrity, or of original obedience (*vitium originis et concupiscentia* Art. II), and has brought him to a condition in which he can fully and tenderly love God (reverence and fear of God, and confidence toward God, Arts. II, XVIIIb), and has given him power to fear God, the failure to do which things, according to the Apology, constitutes the essence of that deep corruption. Even concupiscence, which consists in "our seeking not only the pleasures of the body, but also carnal wisdom and righteousness, and in confiding in these things, and in contemning God, is now broken in its destructive effect. Even real, positive sins in thoughts, words and deeds, are by the believer rightly characterized as follows: "And though I sin through weekness, yet sin doth not *reign* in me." Of course (*Si Deus non adjuvat*, Art. XIX), that is, when he permits a person to go his own perverse way, without interfering, then

the devil through the perverse will dwelling in man (*voluntas malorum*) causes him to turn away from God wholly (Art. XIX), so that he is lost in consequence of his own guilt.

The *Form of Concord* speaks with great fulness on these subjects, which had not yet been settled. Its Articles I, II, XI, form a *parallel* and *supplement* to the corresponding Articles II, XVIII, XIX, of the *Augustana*. On the one hand it rejects the Manichaean extreme of Flacius, who taught that original sin is the substance of man. While the confession makes a distinction between "nature and sin, substance and accident (S. D. I: 1-4; 26-30), it nevertheless holds on to the *justitia civilis* of man and to his capability of being converted (S. D. II: 9; I: 33-46). On the other hand, Strigel's doctrine of the *modus agendi aliquid boni in rebus divinis* is rejected as an error; the reality and intensity of original sin according to the definitions of the earlier confessions is copiously repeated (S. D. I: 5-25), and is even *sharpened* by the definition that man now as regards the good is wholly corrupt and dead (S. D. II: 7), the servant of sin and the slave of Satan. From this it follows that not a spark of spiritual strength remains in man (S. D. II: 7). Man is so corrupt that he does not understand the Word of God, is alienated from God and is turned to all evil. The Holy Spirit alone must work all in him if he is to be saved. He must give him new spiritual powers and faculties and a new heart (S. D. II: 48; 61-64; 69-71). The human will is thus not *causa efficiens*, it suffers, it does not work. The Scripture proof is taken from 1 Cor. 2: 14; Gen. 8: 21; Rom. 8: 7; Eph. 2: 5; 2 Cor. 3: 5 ("that we are fit to do anything good is from God"). The conversion of man results when the Holy Spirit, by means of the Word and sacrament, operates upon him. Man can hear this word *externis auribus*, but God must open man's heart and bestow his grace, if conversion is to be wrought in him. The preaching of the Word and the hearing of the same on the part of man are the means by which God wills to convert him, Rom. 10: 17. Man is in so far not like a stone that he can receive an impression from the divine Word (S. D. II: 52-55; 69-72). Conversely, if man despises the means of grace, he remains the "dead block," the "unhewn stone,"

that he is, and is lost of his own fault. "For God compels no one." But in him who has become a subject of grace the *servum arbitrium* is changed into an *arbitrium liberatum.* By means of the new powers the will, renewed by the power of the Holy Spirit, works sanctification, though amid many weaknesses (S. D. II: 35-39; 65-66). "As soon as the Holy Spirit, through the Word and the sacraments, has begun in us his work of regeneration and renewal, then by the power of the Holy Spirit we are able and we ought to coöperate, though much weakness still persists."

In Article XI the Form of Concord makes a sharp distinction between God's eternal prescience and the eternal election of his children to salvation. Prescience extends to all creatures, good and evil. God does not work the evil. That comes from the devil and from wicked men, though God so directs it that it redounds to the honor of his name and to that of the elect. On the contrary, Predestination has for its object only the pious, and is the cause of their election. But who belongs to these? In order to know that we must not trouble ourselves with the secret, unsearchable counsel of God (S. D. XI: 9), but we must look back to the revealed Word. That points us to Christ (S. D. XI: 13-26, 52-65). "In him hath he chosen us before the foundation of the world," Eph. 1: 4. Christ now calls all to himself. It is not his will that any be lost, Ezek. 18: 32; 2 Peter 3: 9; 1 John 2: 2. It is God's will to save all who believe in Christ, but no others. Epit. 13; S. D. XI: 65. This revealed will of God is the same as his secret will, because between the two no contradiction is conceivable, unless we "assign contradictory wills" to God, S. D. XI: 35.

1. God's *will of grace* is thus *general*, but it is embraced in Christ: "No one comes to the Father except through me." 2. It is *serious*. We are "not to regard the call of God through the Word as a delusion, but we should know that through it God has revealed his will for the purpose of enlightening, converting and saving men," S. D. XI: 29. On this rests the Christian's joy and comfort, S. D. XI: 45. 3. It is *not irresistible*, but is conditioned by man's conduct (*Verhalten*). The reason why many are called but few chosen (Matt. 22: 14), lies

in the impenitence of so many. God has resolved to reject the impenitent, as conversely he has resolved to accept the believing. God bears long with the former as vessels of wrath (Rom. 9:22), but finally he inflicts upon them the punishment of hardening. *Conf.* Pharaoh, S. D. XI:84. Hence it is said of Israel: "Oh, Israel, thou hast brought thyself into distress, but thy salvation is alone in me." Hos. 13:9.

So far the Confession. In recent times these articles have *become* the subject of lively controversy, in so far as the Missouri Church in America, especially under Professor Walther, has brought out a conception of the matter which differs essentially from that of the Evangelical Lutheran theologians of Germany. Even in Germany some theologians side with the Missourians, and have felt constrained to leave the State Church, inasmuch as it "teaches Semipelagianism." The best view of the Missouri doctrine is given by Pastor Brauer of Dargan, Mecklenburg, in a pamphlet entitled: *Public Testimony against the UnLutheran new Doctrine of the Theological Faculty of Rostock.* It was written when Dieckhoff was at the head of that Faculty. It is also necessary to read many articles in *Lehre und Wehre* which discuss the same subject. According to Brauer, there is in us, according to the teaching of the Form of Concord, no ground of God's election, not even foreseen faith as our act of faith, for God first himself works faith. The ground of election is alone God's gracious will. On the other hand, God seriously wills that all men be saved. These two propositions: "God's will of grace is general," and: "The election of grace is unconditionted and particular," must remain unreconciled with each other. Over against this mystery the understanding must hold itself captive under the power of faith.

In the pamphlet entitled: *Professor Dieckhoff's Doctrine of Conversion and The Form of Concord*, it is said: "If the will of man is so set at liberty by grace that he has the capability of deciding for or against God, then there is an inner contradiction in saying that this neutral position of freedom of choice has been given to man by the Holy Spirit, who, nevertheless, draws him to God. If we speak of a voluntary decision on the part of man, then there is always meant a *facultas in*

viribus naturalibus, since the Holy Spirit can give to man no indifferent position toward God. But then falls the star of our Church, the *sola gratia*. Finally: Grant that God does indeed offer salvation in Christ to all, yet he sees to it that only the elect lay hold of it, and do not lose it. An elect person can indeed fall from grace, but he cannot die without having first come into full possession of it again. God works according to his good pleasure in a man even though he resist him—though man is lost of his own fault if he be not converted by grace. To reconcile this with the alone-activity of grace is impossible, and the attempt leads to a Semipelagian aberration from the Confession." Such is the Missouri conception of our articles.

The *reconciliation* of the universal will of grace with the particular election of grace, must not be made to bring in the working of the Holy Spirit in such a way as Martensen does, who says that "Freedom can surrender and open itself to prevenient grace as the flower opens itself to the rays of the sun." "The susceptibility for grace," it is further said, "is in all men, but it is made fruitful by the impulse of grace, which either bursts through the natural hardness of the heart, or lures the spiritual seeds as with a gentle warmth." (*Dogmatic*, §220). Or as Julius Müller (*Lehre v. d. Sünde*, S. 207) says: "In the consciousness of the law of volition we have a witness of our moral imperfection, but also a witness of our formal freedom, by virtue of which obedience to grace proceeds from our own decision in such a way that also the possibility of resistance lies in us. Consequently it is by the consciousness of this law of the will that the person comes necessarily to the consciousness of the possibility of evil." There is thus in man both a tendency to resist and a tendency to incline to the divine Word. This leads to Erasmus's and Strigel's *facultas se applicandi ad gratiam*, and the doctrine that conversion is only an awakening, not a new creation. With the proposition of the irresistibility of the will of grace in the predestinated, is given the unconditioned predestination, for only when the predestinated, by reason of the freedom that has been given them, can also resist, does the ground of their possible destruction lie with them-

selves, and not with God. This freedom that has been given them is the freedom restored by the Holy Spirit. The Form of Concord in its Articles II and XI under these circumstances means nothing more than to exclude all human merit from conversion, and to vindicate for grace alone the glory of the salvation of the sinner. In this connection, not that "given freedom," but God, is *causa efficiens*. In so far God alone is the factor of salvation. But through his call, which is proclaimed to man, and which works energetically in him, the will of man is in so far delivered from sin, that now by a decision of the will he can accept grace, or he can thrust it off. Salvation is thus made ready for us *sola gratia*. Prior to the call man is dead in sins. Grace causes him to believe, that is, it causes him to consent to the grace that draws him. But that grace works in him is possible only when he lays hold of it, and that is *his* act. Synergism does not come into the question, because grace has first given him all that is needed to save him. But he must be able to consent, because he can also resist, and because otherwise the ethical factor would be removed from the whole process, and a magical change would be effected. Hence J. Gerhard is right when he says: "It cannot be denied that in conversion the mind of man assents, and the will longs for grace (*Conf. Cath.* III, 1331). Take away Free-will and there will be nothing to be saved. Take away grace, and there will be nothing by which to be saved. The work of conversion cannot be effected without both. God is the author of salvation. Free-will is only susceptible of salvation. Only God is able to give it (salvation); only Free-will is able to accept it." Only on the basis of this decision of man's will, which is made possible through grace, will man be saved or not. This is the reason why God has ordained some to salvation, the others not. (See Dieckhoff, *The Missouri Predestination and the Form of Concord*). So teaches also the Confession, for it teaches that God will perfect the good work in those in whom he has begun it, provided they do not turn away from God, but abide in the goodness of God, that is, the perseverance or the non-perseverance of those in whom God has begun the good work, depends upon their own conduct (Verhalten). Also the Form of Con-

cord says that God has ordained in his counsel that the Holy Spirit shall call the elect through the Word, enlighten and convert them, and shall justify and save all those who by a proper faith accept Christ. On the contrary if grace is irresistible, then we are led to Predestinationism.

This is one point. The second point has reference to the situation of man as over against *grace.*

If we speak of man in his purely natural condition and estrangement from God, then there is no question about a *causa efficiens*, or even about a *desiderans* of man. But who will say to what extent the heathen even are blown upon and touched by the breath of God's grace? Nor are we yet to exclude the fact that the Word of God preached by every Missourian finds a different kind of soil, a greater or less inclination, that is, resistance. Who will say whether the *capacitas* here is not already sometimes *actus?* Hence the Form of Concord is *not* to be approved, when in its articles it assumes an equal disinclination of all to the Gospel, in so far as this is said to be *equally great.*

The third point has reference to *conversion itself.*

According to the Confession, conversion is not the same as infant baptism, but it includes the motions of the new life. Here, now, there is *synergia*, the *liberum liberatum*, on the basis of that first impression. Hence Chemnitz says, *Loci*, I, 184: "After the movement made from above, the human will is not absolutely passive, but, moved and assisted by the Holy Spirit, it asserts and becomes *συνεργὸς Dei.*" The person is restored to the condition of the first man. Just as the first man did not occupy a neutral position in regard to good and evil, but was determined toward God, so it is with the converted person. As Adam, by free self-determination must keep himself in the condition created by God, so must also the regenerate. Only when the being-laid-hold-on by grace and the full decision are identified do we get out of the right way. The long process of conversion, extending through the entire life of a person, the daily laying-hold on grace, is conditioned by the fact that I have been won by Christ: "Thou hast been too powerful for me, and I have suffered myself to be won." This is the *Deus*

hominem non cogit of the Form of Concord. Finally, as regards the "block and stone and pillar of salt," to which the rational man is likened, we reply calmly with Chemnitz: "The will, moved and assisted by the Holy Spirit, does *not* receive an impression like a block, but it *begins to will and to work. There is no such struggle in a block.*" In a word: "It cannot be shown by a mathematical point where the liberated will begins to act" (*Loci*, I, 184). But if we rightly understand by "block" the unconverted heart, we have nothing else than what the prophet says of the stony heart which God supplants by a heart of flesh. The Scriptures teach the total inability of man for good in the spiritual sense. They characterize conversion as a work of grace, both as an *act of God* and as an *act of man.* God works to will and to do, Phil. 2:13; makes man alive, John 5:21; Eph. 2:1 *et seqq.*; 2 Cor. 5:17, and works the factors, repentance and faith, which constitute conversion, Acts 5:31, 11:18; 2 Tim. 2:25; Eph. 1:19, 2:10. The beginning and the progress of the entire process is from God, Phil. 1:6. On the other hand, conversion even as a work of *man*, is *demanded: Μετανοεῖτε*, Matt. 3:2;=*Καὶ πιστεύετε*, Mark 1:15=*Καὶ ἐπιστρέψατε*, Acts 3:19; Conf. 9:35, and reception of the divine Word can follow with greater or less willingness, 1 Thess. 1:6. Faith is obedience of man rendered with absolute freedom, Rom. 1:5. "Turn yourselves to me," says the prophet, "and I will turn myself to you," Mal. 3:7. *Ἐπιστρέφεσθαι*, is used passively only in Peter 2:25. Elsewhere it is used in the active and middle sense, Matt. 13:15; 2 Cor. 3:16. That man can also resist is often enough emphasized. The Saviour's lamentation: *οὐ θέλετε ἐλθεῖν πρὸς ἐμέ*, John 5:40: *οὐκ ἠθελήσετε*, Matt. 23:33, and that of the apostles: *ἀτωθεῖσθε τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἀξίους κρίνετε ἑαυτοὺς τῆς αἰωνίου ζωῆς*, Acts 13:46, throw upon man the entire responsibility of his conduct (Verhalten) as over against the working of grace. To what extent man has freedom of choice is shown by all the persons to whom salvation has been brought nigh, especially in the New Testament, as for instance the rich young man, Matt. 19:46 *et seqq.*; the scribe, Mark 12:28 *et seqq.*, especially verse 34; and Felix,

Acts 24:25. "Convert thou me and I shall be converted," Jer. 31:16. This is the theme of the whole Bible.

Let us sum up: The Form of Concord identifies the secret will of God with the will of God revealed in Christ. Its exclusive purpose is *to secure to grace alone the glory of saving the sinner.* But there is no *reconciliation* of the two attested truths: The *universal will of grace* and *particularistic election of grace.* In so far as this *reconciliation* fails we have to *supplement* the Confession; but in so far as it assumes an *equal* disinclination toward the gospel, and quotes only passages of Scripture which prove the corruption of the human heart, we have *to rectify* and to complete it. Man, despite the Fall, possesses the *capacitas passivas, aptitudo naturalis* to salvation. Grace works in him an appropriating *Verhalten* without taking away his natural freedom, in that the Word comes to him. Man can hear the Word when it addresses itself to him. Whether he then longs for it is decided according to the preceding course of his life, and according to the greater or less morality existing in his natural disposition. The *Word* works in any case. By this the old bondage of the will is broken. The *freedom of choice* which he possesses in the sphere of the *natural* life *is restored* to him even for the sphere of the *spiritual* life. The Spirit of Christ bestows on him the *possibility of receiving salvation.* This working-of-grace is irresistible in so far as it takes place unconditioned; but it does not act magically, and is *resistible* in so far as the process is decided in the self-consciousness one way or the other in consequence of the position taken by the human personality. Only now does man have spiritual freedom. The *new affections created by grace are intimately connected* with the moral nature of man, and with the concrete stage of his development. Through the regenerating power of the *call* thus mediated, the *activity* and *spontaneity of man* are *restored*, and now in continued conflict with the remaining *sin* they work a *new spiritual life. This process* is called *conversion. At every point on this line the initial condition of being-laid-hold-on, and of laying-hold-on, is repeated. Grace alone holds the new Ego fast to the way that directs to God, but ever according to the measure in which man's arbitrium liberatum cooperates with it.**

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ARTICLE VI.

THE PROBLEM OF THE WILL.

By THEOPHILUS B. STORK, ESQ.

Perhaps we might better say the puzzle of the will; for to your philosopher it is as fascinating as a game to hunt down with logical engines this paradoxical element of man's personality. It may well be asked if after such endless discussion another word can be added. At the mere mention of the will one name occurs to every mind. Of Jonathan Edwards, it might be said, if of any one, not *solvitur ambulando*, but *solvitur equitando;* for that great expounder of the freedom of the will is said to have ridden forth like some philosophical knight errant to think over his intellectual problems and to have come home laden with the spoils of his metaphysical chase in the shape of strings tied to each coat button and representing every one some conclusion reached, or rather ridden down in the course of his excursion. The dispute over the Freedom of the Will as set forth in his great book on the subject seems to centre upon two points, one upon the manner of reconciling its freedom with its government by motive, the other upon the impossibility of thinking the Ego or the will as a self-determining entity capable of originating, in and by itself, an action without cause precedent. Both points are essentially the same, they simply present the one fundamental difficulty in two different aspects.

This fundamental difficulty, expressed as abstractly and generally as possible, is the incapacity of the human mind to escape in its thinking from the category of causality as Kant expressed it.

That is to say, the Ego, no matter how free it *feels* itself with respect to itself and its will, when acting, is constrained when it thinks of itself or of its will, to think them under the category of causality; for when it makes itself or its will an object of thought, it makes them like all other phenomena that come into consciousness from the external world, subject to space and time and to the categories of thought. It must

think them in the only way it can think objects, in space and time and subject to all the laws of thought.

Indeed we might, taking a Hegelian view of the matter, declare that the Ego, acting [as subject] is part of the Absolute Ego, the one infinite mind, and its conviction of freedom when acting, is an attribute of that infinite mind, while the Ego, as an object of thought, [the Empirical Ego] is finite, and therefore subject to all the errors of the finite mind and its limitations in space and time and under the categories of thought.

In acting the Ego does not feel these; it is conscious of no restraint, but feels itself and its will to be free. It may be that in so doing it is correct; its feeling that it is under no restraint may be more truly representative of the reality than its thinking. This feeling is as much a deliverance of consciousness as thought itself.

It may be that there is a knowledge of reality obtained by it in this way, which is impossible by thought; what a knowledge of reality is we cannot tell, for we have no means of testing such knowledge. It has been guessed by some that reality must be known, if at all, directly, immediately, with no intervening channel of sensations, of qualities and attributes that somehow and mysteriously affect our hearing, seeing, feeling, and so on. It may be that such a confidence as we have when willing, when acting, that we are free to act, may be the result of some direct knowledge such as has been guessed as the possible way of knowing reality, say by the Divine mind for example. At any rate we have no more reason to distrust this feeling because it may be suspected of not correctly representing reality to us than we have to distrust that process of thought by which we learn the grounds of our suspicion. Because we cannot think ourselves or our will as free, is no conclusive reason for declaring that they are not. At most it presents us with a contradiction between the conclusions of two different Egoistic processes; between our conviction of freedom when acting and the impossibility of thinking it. Both processes are equally genuine, equally entitled to respect *prima facie*, indeed of the two, our thinking is the more open to suspicion, for our feeling of freedom is clear, constant, direct, self-consistent, and

is only impeached by the process of attempting to think it, which on the contrary is self-contradictory, and confused and justifies, not so much the assertion that our thinking is contradictory of our feelings in this respect, as that it is unable to think the freedom of the will or of the Ego intelligibly. It is not that the verdict of thinking is against the freedom of the will so much as that thinking is unable to reach a verdict. It is a jury that disagrees, and the longer it is kept locked up the more impossible does any agreement seem. For what is the verdict of our thinking? The Ego finds itself confronted, let us say, with a vast variety of phenomena, objects, the manifold in intuition, its endeavor is to think them intelligibly so that it may understand them. And its first effort to understand is to unify them in some way; why this renders them intelligible is elemental; there is no reason for it. Causality is one of the corollaries of that effort at unity; it thinks them as united to each other by the relation of cause and effect. Its instinct for uniting them to make them intelligible forbids its thinking each item of phenomena as independent. And so, as already remarked, it must think the will and the Ego when it places them with phenomena, among the objects of its thought; it cannot think them as free and independent of other objects of thought, phenomena, etc. It must think of them also as cause and effect in order to unite them with the rest and render them intelligible to itself. Such a thing as a self-determining will or Ego is unintelligible and therefore impossible to be thought. It thinks them, therefore, as mere results of precedent and as causes of precedent, phenomena, etc., with the rest. But again, the Ego having applied, or if you choose invented this category of causality under the impulse of its instinct for unity to all the objects of its thought, is now cast upon the horns of a new difficulty.

It is a matter of accepted experience that new phenomena, objects of thought, manifold in intuition, or however you choose to designate the sensations presented to consciousness by the external world, are constantly arising. Everything as presented to consciousness is changing; there is nothing that remains permanent or stable for a single moment. It is im-

possible for the Ego, under its law of causality, to think these changes as really new realities in the sense of a new creation arising out of nothing. *Nihil ex nihilo fit* forbids this. It cannot think of anything beginning to be out of nothing, but only as something the result of a cause precedent. Its corresponding inability to think anything as always existing, never beginning to be and never ceasing to be, while equally imperative upon its thinking is not here in question. Because it is impossible to think anything as never beginning to be does not render any less imperative and compulsory the impossibility of thinking it as beginning to be or ceasing to be. The two impossibilities or Kantian antinomies, while mutually contradictory, are each equally imperative and compulsory. The Ego is compelled, therefore, to think all things as existing unchanged from the beginning—wherever and however that was—that the creation and destruction of things are equally impossible. When, therefore, it beholds the appearance of the new or the disappearance of the old, all the change of phenomena known to experience, the growth of plants, change of the earth's surface, destruction of planets, it is compelled to declare them mere appearance, it explains them as mere modifications in qualities, attributes of the permanent, never changing substance or matter of the world which it invests and endows with the permanence the indestructibility, all the qualities that it cannot find in its only actual experience, phenomena, but which is imperatively demanded by the law of its thinking the category of causality. For the category of substance is made necessary as a corollary to that of causality. By the mental contrivance "substance" the Ego is enabled to reconcile the inconsistent demand of causality that no creation of non-existing reality or destruction of existing reality shall take place with the apparently constant occurrence of new and disappearance of old phenomena. By supposing that there is a substance, a something permanent, unchangeable, indestructible, that *stands under* like a silent depth of ocean below the waves of superficial appearance, a reconciliation may be effected and we may understand how substance and causes may always exist unchanged, while appearances are constantly changing.

But how imperfect and unphilosophical is this reconciliation by the contrivance "substance."

We are compelled to posit this substance, this matter of the world, as something existing forever and itself always the same, yet producing, notwithstanding, all the changes of which our experience makes us aware in phenomena as presented.

In other words, the same matter or substance at different times produces different results, has different qualities. But the same substance or matter must, under our laws of thinking, always produce the same results. Given in the beginning a certain mass of matter constituting the world or the universe, and presenting certain qualities or attributes by which it makes itself known to our consciousness, there can be no change of attributes qualities without change in the matter the substance. They are to each other cause and effect, and cannot change their mutual relationship. To overcome this objection some philosophers consider the original matter not as stable but in a continual state of flux, of becoming, of passing from one state into another. They thus account for the endless changes in phenomena—that is in that by which alone we may know matter—by attributing it to this flux, this continual movement in matter itself. This posits matter as the same in quantity, but changing in its form; if it is intelligible it assumes some identical atom, and that these atoms, identical in shape and qualities, by different arrangement with regard to each other, produce the changes we know in phenomena.

But this plunges us into new difficulties; whence comes the cause or causes which set this flux of matter in motion? We must suppose that these causes, whether separate or inherent in the matter, produce certain kinds of motion or fluxes which produce the various changes in phenomena. We must, however, always suppose, in obedience to the laws of our thinking, that these causes of motion in matter always produce the same kind of motion. If they produce different motions or arrangements we cannot consider them as the same causes. So that by this hypothesis of the flux of matter we have simply substituted one puzzle for the other. For we must now suppose either that the causes of the motion change in order to produce this dif-

ferent arrangement of the atoms or that some other cause comes in to modify the first cause of motion. For we are not more able to think a change of motion without a cause than to think a change of matter itself. Either supposition is forbidden by our laws of thought; we cannot think of an original cause changing its nature or its effects of its own accord, without some external other cause, and we cannot think of any other cause coming in to work this change, for such cause must be a new cause, and therefore a new creation, which is forbidden, or it must be an old original cause doing something, having an effect which it did not previously have, which is equally unthinkable, since the same cause can never without cause change its effects or its nature and do something entirely different from anything hitherto done by it.

Thus we are utterly unable, under the laws of our thinking, to think either that the changes we see in phenomena can be caused by a permanent substance that is always the same, nor can we think that the apparent changes in phenomena are real changes in matter that is something new in reality; for we feel compelled by the laws of thought to think that no really new things ever can be. An ingenious reasoner might even add an unexpected clincher to the argument with the objection that any really new thing or reality however minute would run the risk of possibly increasing the weight of our planet to such a degree as to throw the whole stellar system out of balance. And yet we know by the only means of knowledge that we have of the external world that new things of some sort do appear, changes are continually taking place which we can neither think intelligibly nor deny as facts of perception. In no possible way can this obvious and patent contradiction between the facts of experience and the necessities of thought be reconciled philosophically.

For the sake of clearness it may be worth while to put our problem in still another way. By the laws and constitution of our mind we cannot think of the world save as always existing, we must think that all matter, all causes of motion have existed as they are now unchanged from the beginning. We cannot think of any change except such as may be brought

about by cause; but we cannot think any new cause as coming in *de novo* any more than we can think of any new matter intruding itself into the world. All matter and all causes therefore remaining unchanged the same as when originally created or launched or placed—however and wherever the origin, the beginning of the world took place—how are we to think the various changes in phenomena presented to us? How can something that never changes produce or exhibit changes? The possibility of making changes by new combinations of the same matter, new combinations of the same causes is unsatisfactory unless we are content to simply juggle with words. For new combinations cannot take place without a cause of the new combinations. In short, we cannot think how what is thought as always identical can produce, without any new cause, different results—changes of appearances, of attributes, at different times. It will not suffice to style the changes merely development, growth, the working out of the original cause in matter, for development growth is only a name for a succession of changes, and for every change there must be a new cause or new combination of old causes. To conceive any cause or any specific thing with its bunch of qualities tied together like a bouquet of flowers by the metaphysical ribbon—substance, changing its qualities, its attributes of itself without external cause, exhibiting first one and then a different set of results, is to make such cause, such matter, in effect as self-determining as a Free Will or free man. A cause or substance, unchanged itself, which is conceived as first producing one and then another and different set of results, which is capable in other words of changing its effects without changing itself, is a self-determining thing, the very thing which we cannot think.

Thus we see the impossibility of thinking a will or an Ego as absolutely free, self-determining, is nothing more than the general impossibility, general inability due to the same laws of thought which compel us to think not only our will and Ego, but the facts of the external world in a way that is self-contradictory and unintelligible. We cannot explain the indubitable facts of experience any better than the freedom of the will and for the same reason.

We have now considered our problem from one point of view and developed some of the reasons for our inability to think a will, a man, or anything as free, *i. e.*, self-determining, and the contradiction of this inability of our thinking by the facts of our experience. Let us next take up the other aspect of the problem, namely, the difficulty of reconciling the freedom of the will with its government by motive. The will must act as the stronger motive dictates. Of this Jonathan Edwards remarks: "If self-determining power in the will be necessary to moral agency, praise, blame, etc., then nothing done by the will can be any better, praise or blame worthy than so far as the will is moved, swayed and determined by itself * * * None will deny that bias and inclination may be so strong as to be invincible and leave no possibility of the will's determining contrary to it and so be attended with necessity * * * Therefore, if necessity be inconsistent with liberty, than which fixed inclination is to such a degree of strength, it utterly excludes all virtue, vice, praise or blame."*

To emphasize this position he cites as an instance the freedom of the will which we must concede to be God's. God's will and God Himself must be free to act as it and He pleases, yet we cannot assume that God's will can be so equally poised that it is free to choose with entire indifference either good or evil. We must assume by reason of the inherent goodness of God's nature that His will would do the good act always and never the evil compelled by His goodness, and, if you please, robbed in like manner by that quality of its freedom to do the evil act.

Had that acute thinker pushed his reasoning to its logical conclusion, it would at once have been evident that here again we stumble upon the limitations which on every hand fetter our thinking. We cannot think any man or thing except as qualified, limited; the absolute, which is the man or thing without quality, is an impossibility of thought. We must think man and God Himself as a being composed of qualities, as having character of some kind; thus, and thus alone, are we capable of knowing them. Such an abstraction as a man without these

* Edwards' Freedom of the Will, Vol. II, p. 112, Wark's Edition, 1857.

would be to thought a mere blank. He would be much like a thing, a substance without qualities, unknown and unknowable. Our knowledge of man, of God, of ourselves being thus a knowledge of qualities of character, those qualities, that character, for us is the man himself. When, therefore, we say a man's will is coerced by a motive or desire or feeling so overpowering that it allows of no choice we are simply saying that the man's will is coerced by his own character by himself. This character of the man is himself, makes him an individual, if he had no feelings, no desires, no preferences, he would be a blank, an abstraction. These feelings, desires, making up his character, are his will, himself. We posit a will as a sort of machine by which the Ego acts; it seems a superfluous sort of article, a relic of mediaeval thinking, an abstraction of the particular desires or feelings that prompts each particular act. A man chooses, exercises his will, as we say, to take one thing and refuse another, according to his particular character; there is no coercion of motive or desire that compels any one choice, for the desire for one thing as preferable to another is part of himself. It is as reasonable to say that the man coerces himself as to say that his desires coerce him, these desires are himself, go to make up his individuality as distinct from all others.

To think of a person or character, with all that character implies of traits, qualities, limitations, inherited or otherwise acquired, and then to think of that person as free to act under any given set of circumstances with perfect indifference, is critically examined, a contradiction in terms. Every trait, every quality is, by its existence or limitation, a fetter upon that person's freedom of action. The only intelligible conception is to look upon these limitations as forming part of the person, not as constraining but as constituting the individual. A man without such limitations, without desires to dictate his actions, without character, might be perfectly free, perfectly unconditioned, it is true, but he would be an intellectual monstrosity, a blank, a void, an empty shell utterly unthinkable and unknowable. Moreover, a person possessing such a theoretical ideal freedom of the will, would not be a good man, could not be, since the positing goodness is the positing of limitations, of qualities,

characteristics which would forbid his deliberating or hesitating between a right and a wrong act.

This view does not avoid the difficulty that a man, with his character, his likes and dislikes, his qualities, good and evil, is formed, shaped and moulded by external influences beyond his own control, and that thus the real difficulty is only put one step further back. For underneath this problem of the will, and giving it that importance which has made it the battle-ground of contending theologians for centuries, is the vital question of man's moral responsibility for his acts and the justness thereof. If a man has free will, is a self-determining individuality, can, as he pleases, choose good or evil, then it is just according to our human ideas of justice that he should be punished or rewarded for his acts; if he is not free, then it seems to us most unjust that he should suffer either good or ill for acts over which he has no real control.

It is in this respect that our putting the difficulty further back has advanced the discussion; for it enables us to understand the justice of Almighty power even according to our human standards. For it is now become the question asked by the Scriptures: "Shall the thing formed say to Him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the the clay of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor and another unto dishonor?"* To this there is but one answer: the maker may do with the made as he will; and there is no just ground to complain that He has made it of one sort rather than of another. There is no obligation laid upon Him to make it in any particular way. Our sense of injustice upon this question of the freedom of the will and the punishment of men for their acts arises from a confusion of thought. We may concede that the Almighty might have made men as he pleased without any reproach of injustice; that they, like the pottery in the Scriptures, had no right to complain of the fashion of His making. But if, as we posit, the Almighty made men and endowed them with power to be, not as pottery without self-determining power, but creatures with self-determining power, capacity to act as they pleased,

* Rom. 2 : 20–21.

to choose good and ill; that if He then, by the act of creation impeded, fettered with the bond of circumstance this self-determining power, so that it was a mere delusion, so that apparently free, they were really bound hand and foot, and if He held them responsible for the exercise of a freedom of will which was mere illusion, that then He was open to the charge of injustice.

It may be noted here in passing, that, so feeble is our grasp upon these high matters, we cannot think how any creative act could so create either man or thing without qualities, attributes, characters which would in the very creating fetter his freedom. To satisfy our human thinking man would have to be created without any character, a blank existence empty of all meaning, in order to render him perfectly free. This by the way.

But we confuse two different methods by which man may suffer good or ill with entire justice. Either like the pottery he may be created without this self-determining power, and may, like it, be made either good or ill. Or as we conceive, he may be made with self-determining power, and only suffer for what he himself freely does or is. These are two distinct grounds upon either of which he may be held to suffer justly what he does suffer. It is a contradiction in terms for us to assume that the Almighty power created man with freedom to do as he pleased and held him responsible for the exercise of that freedom, yet at the same time so handicapped him with qualities, conditions and circumstances, as to make that exercise impossible, and the responsibility for his acts thereby entailed, unjust.

Man is created either with or without freedom of the will, either with or without self-determining power; in either case he suffers justly for his acts although on different grounds.

We may summarize our conclusions, therefore, somewhat in this wise: That men are free to will as they please, we have the direct evidence of consciousness; to witness that in our acting and willing we cannot recognize any restraint except under special circumstances of fear, of physical pain, of compulsion, evidently exercised and known to us, and which we distinguish

as such from the freedom of our ordinary acting. The contradiction of this evidence of our consciousness to our freedom by our thinking is confused, not consistent with itself, nor with other facts of our experience which it contradicts just as it contradicts this feeling of the freedom of our wills.

Upon the injustice of inflicting rewards and punishments upon men we see with even greater clearness that upon either hypothesis of freedom or of fatality the matter is without difficulty. For if they are free and morally responsible, the reward or punishment of their acts is no more consistent with justice than if without freedom, and therefore without moral responsibility, their reward and punishment follow simply as a result of their creation like the honor or dishonor of the pottery made by the master potter.

Against the justice of this last position it has been urged that even conceding that God, the great and Almighty potter, has the right to make his pottery as He will, yet that God owes it to His own character of justice, love and mercy not to create men miserable or unhappy. To which there are two replies: first, that we cannot conceive an Almighty bound by any rules save its own, and, of course, having power, always to dispense and abolish them, otherwise we have presented to us the inconsistent and impossible conception of an Absolnte, an Almighty, which is not Absolute and Almighty, but an Absolute and Almighty, controlled and limited by the finite ideas of justice and right formulated by the finite mind of man.

But passing this difficulty, and yielding full weight to the argument that the mind of man demands for its moral satisfaction that God's acts should appear to it just, loving, merciful; that this is necessary to its conception of the Almighty then it may secondly be urged that our finite ideas of justice, love and mercy are not competent for application save to finite objects. We cannot know what infinite justice, love and mercy are. What we may conceive in the universe as conflicting with these finite ideas may not do so in reality, but be perfectly consistent therewith. This does not impeach the truth or validity of our ideas of these qualities so far as we are called to apply them to ourselves or to our acts, but restricts their meaning to

those finite realms for which alone they were intended as guides.

All of which it may be said are arguments of imperfection, of human impotence, finite limitations, and really are negative rather than positive; a sort of *non possumus*. This is in large measure true, but it is no more true of this moral difficulty than of many intellectual difficulties. It defines our limitations and shows us a reason for them.

But again, and finally, we may be asked how can we have any feeling of responsibility for the exercise of a will of whose freedom we have no intellectual assurance except in a negative way; whose freedom we cannot understand or think clearly. To which the reply may be made that we have no more assurance and can think no more clearly the existence of the external world, yet notwithstanding, we all, philosophers and ordinary men, not only accept the existence of the external world as true, but are compelled to accept it just as men from the earliest times have accepted as true and acted on the freadom of the will and their responsibility therefor.

ARTICLE VII.

PETER'S SERMON TO CORNELIUS.

By C. F. Sanders, A. M., B. D.

The experience of Simon Peter in connection with the Baptism of the Centurion, Cornelius of Caesarea, as recorded in the tenth chapter of the Acts, is of far-reaching importance for the study of the founding of Christianity. It is one of the turning points of history. Something new is happening—something determinative of vast consequences. Old traditions are breaking down. Thenceforth the policy of the Apostles is regulated by a much broader principle. Not only so, but the conception of salvation itself suffers an elementary change. The resulting change is so radical as to lend a more than ordinary interest to the inquiry into the causes producing it. The problems it contains have a direct bearing upon vital points in the philosophy of history at present agitating among scholars. It is therefore with an exceeding interest that we enter upon this little study. We may not attain a final solution of all the problems. If only we can indicate certainly the direction in which the solution lies we shall be satisfied.

The Tradition. The Jews hated the Gentiles bitterly. During long centuries they had felt themselves the sole subjects of Divine favor. God had chosen them. Jehovah had blessed them. To them had been given the Divine testimonies. To them was the promise of the Messiah made. The promised Messiah was *for them.* The disciples were among the Jews. Entering upon the Apostolate, their traditional exclusiveness clung to them. They offered the Gospel or redemption to the lost sheep of the house of Abraham. Jesus' teaching had not broken their exclusive conception of His mission to the world. It was the Holy Spirit who would take of the things of Christ and show them unto them.

The Time. It is of utmost importance that we fix the chronology of this event with certainty. It may be true that the

writer of Acts is recording events "without any necessary implication of historical sequence."

But narration in detail implies the relative proportion of decisive importance pertaining to the events narrated. All agree that the baptism of the Ethiopian Eunuch, Cornelius, and of the Gentiles at Antioch followed the dispersion consequent upon the persecution which reached its climax in the martyrdom of Stephen. But this leaves room for much speculation. Nevertheless this one point of agreement is significant. Stephen had been stoned to death for his rebuke of Jewish formalism from the viewpoint of the spiritual religion of the Gospel. This fact would enjoin caution. If there had been any slightest disposition to reckon lightly with the prevailing conservatism, it would be by such an experience. The Apostles had above all else learned to trust their Master implicitly. Pentecost had justified their obedience and trustfulness without making them presumptuous. After this demonstration of hostility they could not but seek Divine guidance for every advance step. With this fact in mind let us proceed to locate the order of events.

In the matter of chronology the priority of the Baptism of Cornelius as against the Baptism of the Gentiles of Antioch is of chief significance. The time of the Eunuch's Baptism is of little consequence as we shall see farther on. If, according to Grieve, the "events are dovetailed into each other without regard to any implication of historical sequence," the fact that Peter gives his experience in the case of Cornelius in evidence, when the matter of the status of the Antioch Gentiles is before the Jerusalem council for settlement, renders it conclusive that Cornelius' Baptism held the priority. Furthermore the account Peter gave of the Cornelius affair, when called to account, shows that his act was without precedent.

Cornelius. Of greater importance than the time of the event is the status of the man. Upon this point the investigations of Shürer have brought decisive light. In the Acts he is called *εὐσεβὴς καὶ φοβούμενος τὸν θεὸν*. The question, therefore, is, what was the religious status of one so designated. Neander says: "There is scarcely any room to doubt that he be-

longed to the class of Proselytes of the Gate." Harnack, writing at a much later day and under much fuller light, passes over it with exceeding deftness. After pronouncing definite judgment upon the status of the Eunuch, he goes on: "This man was not a Jew, but belonged to the '*φοβουμένοι τὸν θεόν*,' furthermore he could not as a Eunuch become a Jew. In that he was inducted into the Christian congregation, he, the 'half' Proselyte and Eunuch, one rigid barrier had fallen down. One event alone does not yet decide, neither can a second similar event—Peter baptizes the '*φοβούμενος*' Cornelius in Ceasarea—have had the principal significance which the author of the Acts gives it. As long as it concerns Proselytes, even though they belong to the outer circle, even the strictest Jew could find a viewpoint which would permit him to regard the acceptance of such permissable." Thus does the great historian pass over the middle term in his logical process, permitting his great name, presumably, to supply it. It is an example of getting rid of a fatal obstacle to his theory most dexterously. A point so important to Harnack's theory of history demands detailed proof or a reason why such proof is not necessary. Ramsay learnedly tells us that "Cornelius was a God-fearing proselyte." He then proceeds to describe the position of Proselytes of the Sanctuary, and of the Gate, relatively to the Jews, and then informs us that "in Acts the second class is always described as they that *fear God*." He further tells us of the Mosaic regulations which these God-fearing Proselytes were bound to observe. But this very explanation of the ceremonialism under which the Proselyte of the Gate was placed, upon the evidence afforded by Peter's vision of the clean and the unclean, throws his assertion, viz., that Cornelius is a Proselyte of the Gate, into very great doubt.

McGiffert says: "Though a pious and God fearing man, Cornelius was neither a Jew nor a Proselyte, and therefore his admission to the Christian Church was a distinct violation of the principles that had hitherto controlled the action of the disciples. It is in this light that Luke pictures the event. He evidently regarded it as an occurrence of the very greatest sig-

nificance, as nothing less, in fact, than the official recognition by the apostles and other Christians of Jerusalem of the Christianity of the Gentiles, and of their right to enter without passing through the door of Judiasm." Nösgen says: "For not only the invitation of Cornelius, but the vision which was vouchsafed to him, made known to the Apostle that he should proclaim the Gospel in the home of a heathen and administer baptism to him. Just the method by which Peter justified his step before the congregation, proves irrefutably that a revelation of God alone led him to it." "It (the case of Cornelius) proves that the kingdom of God is open to Gentile and Jew upon equal terms (in völlig gleicher Weise) and it is not necessary for the former to enter through Judaism."

We will now give Shürer's argument which resolves the difficulty and decides conclusively in favor of the idea that the "*σεβόμενοι*" *are not Proselytes of the Gate.* "With those two classes, the *σεβόμενοι*, on the one hand, and the *προσήλυτοι* properly so called on the other, Christian scholars are uniformly in the habit of identifying the two categories of an apparently kindred character that are met with in Rabbinical literature. It is quite usual to say that the *σεβόμενοι* correspond to what in Rabbinical language are called 'proselytes of the gate,' and on the other hand, to what in the same language are known as 'proselytes of righteousness.' In point of fact however it is only this latter part of the statement that is correct, the *σεβόμενοι* and the ger hasshar have nothing whatever to do with each other. Those Rabbinical designations are as yet entirely foreign to the usage of Mishna, where the only distinction met with is that between the 'ger,' pure and simple, and the 'ger toshab.' The former means a Gentile who has been converted to Judaism, the latter again corresponds to what in the Old Testament is understood by a ger, namely, a stranger dwelling in the land of Israel." "This can only mean that one who was not a Jew, but who lived permanently in the land of Israel, had at least to observe those precepts that were equally binding on the whole human race. * * * * From this therefore it is evident that the

'ger toshab' have no connection with the σεβόμενοι τὸν θεόν, just as it is further certain that what we know from history regarding these latter is utterly incompatible with the Rabbinical requirements in regard to the 'ger toshab'." This is the solution from the facts. In view of the facts which Shürer produces it is the only consistent solution. And it is this solution alone which will fit the case of Cornelius in a manner which will harmonise all that we know about him. This gives the case the importance necessary to account for Peter's hesitancy on the one hand, and the challenge of his act on the part of the Jerusalem Church on the other. Cornelius, therefore, was a Gentile, and he was baptised before the Antiochians.

The Eunuch. This man from far-away Ethiopia, we are told, came to Jerusalem to worship. When Philip found him he was reading the prophecy of Isaiah. His admission into the Christian community occasioned no criticism. The case does not come in evidence when the new departures of Caesarea Antioch come under discussion. It is never regarded in the light of a new departure, nor as establishing a new precedent. Modern scholars are agreed that the Ethiopian Eunuch was a proselyte of the gate.

Peter. Among the apostles, Peter was always the most ready to undertake radical steps. His impulsive nature may serve partly to explain this fact. But even an impulsive nature has causes behind its motives. Behind Peter's impulsiveness there was an implicit faith. If he was uncalculating, it was because he so completely trusted his Master. If he appears reckless, it was because an absolute confidence assured him of safety where others only saw disaster. If he dared, he also demonstrated. Peter was an indispensable factor in that period of transition. Furthermore, we find him in possession of a leader's personality. Whatever may have been the cause, he at least had the respect of his fellow disciples to the extent of submission to his judgment. To his every act where he takes the initiative we find the apparent inference that it is inspired by the feeling that his Lord would justify (except where he is driven as in the case of his shameful denial). In the case be-

fore us Peter takes the initiative, and deliberately takes a radical step in advance.

The Event. Peter has his scruples nullified by a vision (scruples which he would never have had in the case of a Proselyte of the Gate), and enters the Gentile home in Caesarea with the declaration of having attained to a broader view of the Divine plan: "I perceive that God is no respecter of persons." The fortune of Jewish birth and the ceremonial rite of circumcision, fortuitous though this now seems, were until then regarded the indispensable prerequisites of Divine favor. The occasion is momentous. Peter's feeling must have been intense. He has, as it were, thrust himself forth to walk on another untried path (as he did on Galilee). The Lord had incited him to it. His intense spirit was watching to note the justification of his act. Like on Pentecost, but with greater brevity, he relates the great facts concerning Jesus Christ. The assuring hand of his Lord is extended to him, as "while he yet spake the Holy Ghost fell on all them which heard the word." (Acts 10, 44). The admission of the Gentile was justified, not by the vision at Joppa, nor even by it in connection with its counterpart in Caesarea, but by the outpouring of the Holy Ghost.

The Doctrine. The Trinity of the Divine Being is the clear theology of Peter's sermon to, and baptism of, Cornelius. It is in the matter of Christology and Pneumatology that there has been difference of view. From the time of Arius onward verse 38 has been used by those who have been busy to show that Christ was only man. "But here again exegesis is a higher thing than grammar. Grammar may be a valuable servant to theology: but the earth is disquieted for a handmaid that is heir to her mistress." If one would arrive at the truth he must do justice to the thought of the text. *Οὗτός ἐστιν πάντων κύριος*, the close of the verse 36, expresses an independent thought. Every suggestion which attempts another explanation is strained and artificial. This parenthetical sentence gains in emphasis by its very position. It attracts attention. It defines an idea. By it Cornelius is informed that Jesus Christ, whose name has just been mentioned, "is

Lord of all." Thus the word *κύριος*, in the given connection becomes of decisive importance. And we find it is the New Testament term applied to God to express the idea of Adonai in the Old Testament. Applied to Christ it expresses of Him a relation between Him and us identical with that of Adonai of the Old Testament. Christ is Adonai. He is Lord of all. His deity could not receive stronger expression.

Verse 38 has also been the center of much discussion. *Ἰησοῦν τὸν ἀπὸ Ναζαρέθ, ὡς ἔχρισεν αὐτὸν ὁ θεὸς Πνεύματι Ἁγίῳ καὶ δυνάμει.* These words express the fact that Jesus of Nazareth possessed the Holy Ghost and power, and the difficulty arises over how He came by it. Hence *ἔχρισεν* must contain the distinctive idea. The verb *χρίω* "is used of the symbolical anointing with holy oil, whereby men ordained of God to special service in His economy of grace were not only set apart and consecrated, but gifted and endowed for that holy service which demanded powers above and beyond those naturally belonging to men." It is used of various offices such as prophet, priest and king. The office determined the character of the duty, and the power given corresponded thereto. Going back to the parenthetical sentence which defines the name Jesus Christ, we have "this Jesus from Nazareth is anointed Lord of all." The only question remaining is whether he is Lord *by* the anointing. To which there is nothing in evidence which can in any wise justify an affirmative answer. It is something of a parallel case with the first verse of the Fourth Gospel, "the Word was with God, the Word was God." He was the embodiment of what anointment symbolized. The symbolism He had not experienced, but He had the office and the power of Lordship—He was Lord of all. The idea impressed by ages of symbolic ceremony here attains personification. "To this one bear all the prophets witness." The existing fact goes begging for language in which to express it. *Anointed* is the best term the Apostle can use, and even it reveals our poverty of language. But, properly studied, permitting all true light to enter into the solution, the result is beautiful. Peter has crossed the boundary from Judaism into Heath-

endom for the first time and in the sublimest eloquence proclaimed the *Divine Christ* to the *Gentile Cornelius.* He there furnished the figure of speech which sacred history had prepared for that occasion and transmitted it to all after time. *Jesus Christ, the Anointed, is God.*

We have yet to do with the Pneumatology contained in this event. Harnack and his school are very anxious to get rid of the Holy Spirit. They must succeed if they would make good their presuppositions. For their theory that Christian doctrine can be accounted for by or from Greek philosophy, the priority of the admission of Gentiles at Antioch is far better adapted. But as we have seen above, that has not been established. Furthermore, it is the witness of the Holy Spirit which furnishes the final argument leading the Apostles to conclude to admit Gentiles into the Christian community.

It is also worthy of notice that the Holy Spirit came upon all while Peter yet spake. It was not in connection with the laying on of hands. It did not follow, nor did it happen in connection with, baptism. It was immediate. It came together with faith in Christ *after Christ had been preached.* The preached word is the bridge upon which the Holy Spirit crosses into the soul of man.

The condition of salvation here set forth also marks the definite advance which Peter made over the traditional idea. He takes it wholly out of the realm of rites and ceremonies, wherein it wholly consisted before, and makes it consist entirely of spiritual factors. At the consummation this Anointed Lord will judge "quick and dead." Then "through His name every one that believeth on Him shall receive *remission* of sins."

Resumé: This event marks a revelation. Without precedent, Peter admits the Gentile Cornelius into membership with the body of Christ by Baptism; he administers Baptism upon authority of divine certification of acceptance through the gift of the Holy Ghost; the divine authorization succeeded the preaching of Christ and accompanied the acknowledgment of faith; this is the decisive transition factor in the passing of the Gospel mission from Judaism to the Gentile world.

ARTICLE VIII.

THE CHANCEL AND ITS FURNISHINGS.

By Geo. H. Cox, D.D.

By way of introduction, it is but fact to say that a more enlightened understanding of our subject is both necessary and desirable, not among laymen, only, but among ministers, as well. Church buildings have often been erected, furnished and used for years, without a thought as to fitness, historical correctness, scriptural significance, meaning or symbolism; just as if God had never given any directions with regard thereto; that there is no meaning attached to them; and that individuals and congregations are to be guided solely by their own taste, or want of taste, as the case may be. As a consequence, it is not unusual to behold a great lack of churchliness in the buildings themselves, as well as in the furniture thereof, and the arrangement, use and adornments of the same.

In considering the subject that is before us, it will be well for us to remember that magnificent church buildings, artistic furniture, impressive ceremonies, gorgeous rituals, elaborate liturgies, costly robes, and the like, are not essential to true worship, any more than that a simple, plain, unpainted house, with inartistic furniture, and a bald, puritanic form of worship is any bar to acceptable approach to God. But let us also remember that appointments of artistic beauty and refinement are pleasing and acceptable to God, and appeal to the very highest instincts in man; and that barrenness and ugliness are not, and never can be, synonyms for holiness, godliness or spirituality, nor at all after the pattern that God gave to his people, in the beginning of what we may call church-life.

One has but to read the minute directions, entering into the very smallest details, that God gave to Moses relative to the erection of the tabernacle, its furniture, its arrangement, its service, and indeed everything connected with it to be convinced that they were not artificial nor arbitrary, but that each and

everything meant something; or, in other words, were shadow pictures, or object lessons, devised by God, and intended to teach men how they were to approach and worship Him, and through which their religious life was to be developed. And although the people of that day and time may not have grasped the lessons that they were intended to convey, yet, when we come to the study of them, under the searchlight of the centuries that have since passed, we cannot fail to recognize their profound spiritual significance.

The Christian sanctuary of to-day is in regular and uninterrupted line of descent from the ancient tabernacle, and is, in all of its parts, as fully significant as was its predecessor. No detail pertaining to it is unimportant.

The design of this paper is, in its humble way, to assist in the study of these things. No time shall be wasted in discussing the far-fetched symbolisms that have been attached to everything pertaining to the chancel, but the effort shall be to endeavor to ascertain the most accurate historical and scriptural conception and significance, and apply the same to our day and times and circumstances. In doing this, it will not be expected that all the arguments and reasonings by which conclusions have been reached, will be given in detail, but only the principles governing the arguments, and the results reached.

The worship of God, from the very beginning, has always been associated with the altar, it always occupying the central place in worship, the place where God meets with man, and where man comes into communion with God. In the beginning, the altar was very crude and simple; but was exactly adapted to the necessities of the people, and was sufficient for the accomplishment of its purpose.

The first altar of which we have any mention in Scripture, was that built by Noah on leaving the ark; though it is not unreasonable to suppose that there were others prior to that time, as was evidently the case with Cain and Abel, who, in the very first divine service of which we have any record, must have erected altars upon which they presented their offerings to God.

There are numerous references in Scripture to these monuments of piety, in the form of altars, erected by Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, during their sojourning in the land of Canaan; the most remarkable being the one erected by Abraham, upon which he fully expected and intended to offer his son, Isaac.

So, too, we are told that Moses built an altar at Rephedim, and another at Horeb.

Usually these altars were built upon certain spots that had been hallowed by some religious event or association, and often in places where the Lord had appeared to them, or where He had, in some way, communicated with them. Sometimes they were erected at the express command of Jehovah, while at other times they were the voluntary expression of a desire to worship Him.

At first the altar was but a small, rude structure made of earth and unhewn stones; but as time advanced and the race increased in numbers, and became more and more enlightened and devoted to the service of God, there was a gradual, yet steady development of the altar as to its form, size and material, as well as in the form and character of its service; the evolution always being in the line of advancement, as well as enlargement.

Then God gave directions for the establishment, erection and maintenence of the Tabernacle, together with all its forms and ceremonies. In this advancement the altar was not succeeded by the tabernacle, as if it had accomplished its design, and was no longer needed, but it was carried over into, and became a part of, the tabernacle, still continuing to occupy the central place in worship.

Then, in due time, the tabernacle was followed by the temple; without, a veritable mountain of marble and gold, and precious stones, shining and glistening in the light of the sun; and within, adorned in incomparable splendor and magnificence; and served by the accredited priests of the most high God, arrayed in the brilliant robes and paraphernalia that He had Himself prescribed. As before, however, the temple did not abolish the altar, but both altar and tabernacle, still following the line

of development, passed over into and became a part of the temple.

Since then the temple has been succeeded by the Jewish synagogue, and it by the Christian church, in which the central and essential object still is that with which worship first began; the altar, the place where God meets with man, and where man comes into communion with God.

Thus tracing the teachings of God in the development of the altar, tabernacle, temple and synagogue, down to the Christian church, it is not difficult for us to understand that every part of the church, together with its furniture and the arrangement and adornment of the same, all have a definite purpose, use and significance, which we should carefully study if we would understand the mind of God in their establishment and preservation.

Taking the tabernacle as the pattern that God has given us, let us examine its parts somewhat in detail; and, making a full allowance for the changes of times and circumstances, let us study it as the original pattern for the house of the Lord.

And first there is the tabernacle itself: "The House of the Lord," the "Tent of Jehovah," the "Dwelling-place" of the most high God. No building has ever, relatively speaking, approached the grandeur and magnificence of that for which the divine Architect Himself, furnished the plan and specifications. It was a structure of incomparable splendor for the age in which it existed, of wonderful significance; and was the visible centre of the whole fabric of the religion of Jehovah; the one place in all the world where the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob had promised to dwell and meet with His people and hear their prayers, and accept their praise, and bless them; the one great distinguishing feature always being that it was dedicated and consecrated to the pure worship and loving service of Jehovah.

So, too, the Christian sanctuary of to-day, is the "House of the Lord," and whatever its style of architecture may be, it must be in perfect harmony, and must exhibit the sacred purpose to which it is dedicated. It may be the grand, magnificent cathedral of the densely populated city; or it may by the

rude log-hut of the wilderness; or it may be any intermediate between these two extremes; but whatever the style of architecture, however rich or poor, or spacious, or limited, its distinguishing feature is, and must always be, that it is "lovely unto the Lord," dedicated and consecrated to the pure worship and the loving service of God, and from which all things else are to be rigidly excluded.

The tabernacle always stood with its ends east and west, with its entrance at the east end, and the Holy of Holies at the west end.

When the temple was erected, it was placed in the same way; that is, east and west, with the entrance at the east end. But when the Jewish synagogues came into use, they were placed so that the worshippers therein should be facing toward Jerusalem, whether that should be east, west, north or south; thereby teaching that while the original and historically correct position for the "house of the Lord" was east and west, yet when circumstances required, either or any position is acceptable to God, and no bar to acceptably approaching him.

The Holy of Holies, in the west end of the tabernacle, was where Jehovah had promised to dwell, and where he actually did dwell, between the cherubim, on the mercy-seat that rested upon the ark of the covenant, that contained the tables of stone upon which God Himself had written His law. Shrouded in darkness and mystery, and inaccessible to all except the high priest, it was a type of God's abode, heaven, which is clothed in deepest mystery, invisible to mortal eyes, and inaccessible to sinful man except through the mediation of the great High Priest, the Lord Jesus Christ.

To this Holy of Holies there was but one way of entrance: that was through the outer "Court," standing for the nave of the church, directly by the "altar of Burnt Offering," representing the great sacrifice offered for our sins; thence by the "Lava," representing the sacrament of baptism; thence through the "Holy Place," standing for the chancel of the church, between the "Table of Show-Bread" and the "Golden Candlestick," representing the Word of God; thence by the way of the

"Altar of Incense," representing the sacrament of the altar: thence into the "Holy of Holies," thus symbolizing for us that the way into heaven, our "Holy of Holies," is through the Church, in the use of the ordinances of God's appointment.

The "Holy Place," with its furniture, was the prototype of that which we now call the church, and occupied one fifth of the floor-space covered by the "whole" of the tabernacle. Letting the "Court" of the tabernacle represent that which we now call the nave, or auditorium, of the church, therefore, will give us some idea of what should be the relative size of the chancel; and while it is not claimed that it must always be in that exact proportion, yet we are thereby reminded that, in the erection of our houses of worship, ample space should always be given to the church, and that there is little or no danger of giving it too much.

Without for a moment tolerating the many fanciful and far-fetched symbolisms that men have attempted to connect with the chancel and every article of its furniture, and rejecting the superstitions that Rome so strenuously insists upon, we cannot fail to recognize and admit that the chancel is that which gives character to the whole structure. From here the Word of God is to be preached, and from here the Holy Supper is to be administered, and therefore it, the chancel, is, indeed, the "Holy-Place" of the church, where everything is connected with the deep mysteries of meditation and access to God. It should, therefore, receive our closest and most intelligent attention in its furnishings and arrangements, as well as our watchful and constant care that it be not used otherwise than that for which it is designed.

It is good form to have the front part of the chancel elevated at least one step above the floor of the nave; that part where the pulpit and lectern stand, a step higher, and that part where the altar stands, still another step, thereby making the altar at least three steps above the nave.

Standing in the "Court" of the tabernacle, just in front of the entrance to the "Holy-Place," was the "Lava," where the

priests performed their ablutions of purification, and which stands, for us, as the representative of our baptismal font.

The ancient churches had what was called the "baptistery," or the place where baptism was performed, which was, most generally, a separate building from the church. In the sixth century the movement began to return the "baptistery" to the church itself; and from then, and gradually, the baptismal font was introduced.

As time has passed, the place or location of the baptismal font has been subject to many changes. Sometimes it was inside the chancel; sometimes outside; sometimes on one side, and sometimes on the other; and sometimes in the middle; but wherever it was placed, it was always kept as near to the people as possible.

Where the entrance to the chancel is at the side, as it is in most of our churches, the most appropriate place for the baptismal font is at the side opposite that occupied by the pulpit, so placed as to be easy of access, and in plain view of the congregation: and if the pulpit occupies the middle position, as it does in most of our churches, then the baptismal font should be on the left side, as you face the chancel.

Where the steps leading into the chancel are at the front and centre, as they should be whenever practicable, the baptismal font should stand outside the chancel, immediately in front of the steps, with its base resting upon the floor of the nave: thus making it most conspicuous, and most convenient for pastor and people, and indicating that baptism meets us upon the level of our natural lives, to bestow upon us the blessings that it brings.

Passing from the "Court" of the tabernacle into the "Holy-Place," one would see the "Altar of Incense" immediately in front of him, midway between the north and south walls of the "Holy-Place," and near to the veil hanging between it and the "Holy of Holies," but not touching it. Thus placed it was in plain and unobstructed view. This altar, both as to form and position, was the prototype of the altar as we have it in the church to-day.

Many superstitious beliefs, and many gross errors and flagrant abuses have, at different times and places, been held and taught regarding the altar, of which we need not speak at this time; but it is a great satisfaction to know that the Lutheran Church has never yielded to either, but has openly and emphatically condemned and rejected all and everything not clearly taught in God's Word, and has, and does carefully guard her altar as that which stands for her as the representative of the Holy Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, or, as the fathers loved to call it, "The Sacrament of the Altar."

With us the altar is recognized as something more than a mere table, placed in the church for the sake of convenience, even though the words "Altar" and "table" are in the scriptures sometimes used interchangeably.

There is a deep significance in the altar, whatever its form may be; though the inclosed form, in imitation of the "Altar of Incense" of the tabernacle, is, undoubtedly, the most historically correct form. It stands for us as the representative of the Holy Supper of the Lord, even when the sacrament is not being administered. It speaks eloquently to us of a communion with the Lord, in which we draw nearer to him, and he to us, than at any other time or place.

For some reason, that I have not been able to ascertain, it has become quite common to place the pulpit near the centre of the chancel, with the altar immediately in front of it; but this is, undoubtedly, a mistake. According to the arrangement of the tabernacle, as already shown, it should be in the back-centre of the recess of the chancel, with absolutely nothing between it and the nave. This arrangement was also followed in the ancient church; and even when the altars were multiplied in numbers, the "High Altar," that is the chief altar, occupied this position, whatever positions the others might occupy.

The altar should be elevated at least one step above the floor upon which the pulpit and lectern stand, so as to be plainly visible to the whole congregation; in fact the central and most conspicious object in the whole church.

The size of the altar may be governed by the size of the

church, and particularly of the chancel; but care should be taken that it be not too small.

Its form should be that of an oblong, usually about twice as long as it is wide, and of sufficient height to be convenient; and, as already said, should be closed on both sides and ends.

An ordinary table is often used as an altar, but the regular altar is more churchly, and should be used in preference to all other forms.

Sometimes the altar is placed against the wall, and sometimes fastened to the wall, as if it were a mere shelf; but such an arrangement is never churchly, nor Lutheran, and should not be permitted.

The altar may be as elaborate as desired, but its carvings and other adornments should all be chaste and pure, and only such as would indicate its holy purpose.

It should never be used as an ordinary table. It is not unusual to see a pitcher and glass, containing water for drinking: Sunday School library books; lesson literature, etc., upon the altar. All such is eminently improper, and has a tendency to lessen the thought of its sacredness as the place for the celebration of the Holy Supper.

When there is no lectern in the church it is not at all improper for the minister to stand at the altar to read the gospel and epistle lessons. In such a case it would be appropriate to have the Bible upon the altar, but it would be better for the lessons to be read from the pulpit.

In like manner, when there is no baptismal font in the church, the vessel, containing the water for baptism, may be placed upon the altar, but it should be removed so soon as the baptism has been performed.

The altar is the proper place for the offering of our sacrifices of prayer and praise, and the gifts of our devotion: hence the minister, upon receiving the offerings of the people, is directed to "Place them upon the altar."

Natural flowers are always apppropriate upon the altar, and artificial ones may be used, in seasons when real ones cannot

be procured; but it is better to have none, rather than artificial ones.

A cross, or crucifix may be placed upon the altar, and in some Lutheran churches candles are used.

It is in good form and Lutheran custom, to drape the altar with what are known as "Altar Vestments," these being cloths of different colors and ornaments illustrating and emphasizing the lesson of the different parts of the Church-year. The colors of these are, from the beginning of advent to Christmas, violet. From Christmas to the first Sunday after Epiphany, white. From the second Sunday after Epiphany to Quinquagesima inclusive, violet. From Easter to the evening before Pentecost, white. Pentecost and Trinity Sunday, red. Sundays after Trinity, green. Minor church Festivals, Harvest, Reformation day, etc., red.

When a full set of vestments cannot be had for all the seasons of the church year, the vestment for constant use should be either red, crimson, or green.

The designs of the embroidery upon these vestments may be as simple or elaborate as may be desired, but should always be some one of the familiar Christian emblems, or some suitable text of the holy Scriptures; but, whatever they are, they should always be large enough, and distinct enough, to be seen, read and understood from any part of the church.

These vestments may be made of any desired material, but broadcloth is by far the best, because it is durable, easily embroidered, does not soil easily, and always looks well. Strong, fast colors should always be used, and the embroidery should always be of such color and material as to harmonize well with the material and color of the vestment.

It is proper to have vestments for the pulpit and lectern, but they should always be of the same color, material and design as those for the altar. No vestments should be used upon the baptismal font.

In addition to these it is Lutheran custom to have what are called "Altar Linens," consisting of the "Altar Cloth," "Cor-

poral," "Pall," "Purificators" and "Veil." These are all made of smooth, white linen.

For the protection of the altar, there should be placed upon it a cover made of some thick, woolen stuff, cut to exactly fit the top of the altar. Over this should be placed the "Antependium;" that is, the colored vestment for the season of the church year, or the one constantly used. It is placed upon the altar so as to hang down in front, and be wide enough to cover about the middle half of the front of the altar, leaving one-fourth its face exposed upon either side. That part of the vestment hanging down in front of the altar may be richly embroidered, and may bear the symbol of the season of the church year. Over this, covering the whole top of the altar, and hanging slightly over the front and about half-way to the floor, at the ends, should be the "Altar Cloth." It is made of fine, white linen, never in colors, and is to be always on the altar; thus signifying that the altar is the "Table of the Lord." This cloth may be perfectly plain, or it may be embroidered with some suitable device; but it must be immaculately white.

When the sacrament of the Lord's Supper is to be administered, the "Corporal" is used. It is a square of fine, white linen, almost as large as the top of the altar, upon which the communion vessels are placed. It must be perfectly white; its edges may be delicately embroidered.

The "Pall" is a piece of heavy cardboard, about six inches square, covered with white linen. It is used to cover the top of the chalice to protect from flies or other foreign matter, and should be kept in its place except during the acts of consecration and administration. A suitable design for embroidery would be the letters "I. N. R. I." worked on the top side, surrounded by a crown of thorns, or either the letters or crown alone.

The "Purificators" are small, white napkins or towels, used for cleansing the rim of the chalice during the administration.

The "Veil" is made of the finest white linen, or of mull, and should be sufficiently large to cover all of the communion vessels, but not large enough to hang down below the edge of the altar. Just before the act of consecration it should be re-

moved from over the vessels, carefully folded and laid upon the altar, and replaced over the vessels after all have communed.

The "Dosel" is a cloth kept always hanging above and behind the altar. It is a piece of tapestry, designed as an ornament, and may be as elaborate as desired, provided, always, that the designs upon it are appropriate to the place and in harmony with its surroundings.

During the act of consecration the minister should stand facing the altar, with his back to the congregation. The Pope, in the Sistine Chapel, at Rome, stands behind the altar, facing the people; but such is contrary to all Lutheran custom.

In pronouncing the benediction, the minister should stand before the altar, facing the people, and not at either the pulpit nor the lectern; the pulpit being especially for the preaching of the Word, and the lectern for the reading of the lessons; while the altar is the only proper place for sacramental and sacrificial acts.

The altar should always stand crosswise of the building; that is, with its long side facing the people. It is the custom in the Protestant Episcopal Church, and it is not unusual in the Methodist Episcopal Church, for the minister, during the act of consecration, to stand at the end of the altar, facing the other end, with his side to the people; but such position is incorrect and unLutheran. It probably has been caused by the fact that, during the Puritan ascendancy in England, the altar was brought down into the body of the church, and set lengthwise with the building, and the minister stood at what we might call the back end, with the altar between himself and the people. When the altar was restored to its proper place and position, the custom of standing at the end was continued. In a Methodist church, when the pastor had a brother minister to assist him, I have seen them stand at opposite ends of the altar, facing each other during the consecration, and then, in the same position, kneel and administer to each other, reaching across the altar to do so.

Standing in the "Holy Place" of the tabernacle, with the "Altar of Incense" immediately in front of him, one would see the "Table of Show-Bread" upon his right, and the "Golden

Candlestick" upon his left; these were prototypes of our pulpit and lectern. The arrangement of these, in the temple, was analogous to that of the tabernacle.

In the ancient church, the Bishop's cathedra, or in other words, his chair of office, in which he sat, and from which he spoke, was in the apsis, back of the altar. On the right and left, corresponding to the "Table of Show-Bread" and the "Golden Candlestick," were two "Ambos," or pulpits, from one of which, the one on the left, the Epistle was read, and from the other the Gospel. The platforms, upon which these "Ambos" stood, were slightly elevated, and placed as near to the people as was possible, that the reading and preaching might easily be heard. Whenever the Bishop did not preach, as was often the case, a deacon read a homily, standing at the left or "Epistle Ambo."

On account of the distance of the "Bishop's Cathedra" from the people, and the consequent difficulty in hearing, it very early became the custom for the Bishop also to preach from the "Epistle Ambo." This, no doubt, explains the left position of the pulpit in many prominent churches. At the present time there seems to be a growing practice of placing the pulpit on the right side, where the "Gospel Ambo" stood; and while this is contrary to the custom of the Church, followed for many years, yet there can be no serious objection to it, and in fact, very good reasons for it; still if we wish to be historically correct, the pulpit should be placed at the left side, as near as possible to the people, upon a platform slightly elevated above the floor of the nave, so as to be in easy hearing distance, plainly visible, and not high enough to render the position of the hearers uncomfortable.

The lectern is the complement of the pulpit, and, as already stated, is of very ancient origin, corresponding to the Gospel Ambo of the ancient church. Thus placed it gives symmetry to the arrangements of the chancel, and brings the reading of the service and lessons within easy hearing distance of the people. It should always stand on the side opposite that of the pulpit.

When there is no lectern in the church the service and lessons may be read from either altar or pulpit; but preferably from the pulpit. When read from the altar, the minister should stand with his back to the altar, and facing the people.

It is pertinent to remark here, that no portion of the service demands more dignity, gravity and thoughtfulness than the reading and expounding of God's Word from both pulpit and lectern. The minister should never permit himself to be betrayed into a hurried or thoughtless manner. The sacred volume should be touched and handled with the very greatest show of respect. Roughly turning the leaves of the book; pushing the book about upon the lectern or pulpit; pounding the book by way of gesture, while speaking; slamming the lids of the book together when closing: should all be carefully avoided. The book should never be closed until the reading or speaking is completed, and then, gently and quietly.

It may be well to remember, in conclusion, that all of these things, of which we have been speaking, belong to the adiaphora; that is, neither a sin to use them, nor a sin to abolish them; and that they may be used freely, provided that we do not abuse them, or so use them as to cause them to become stumbling blocks in the pathway of weaker brethren.

Rightly understood and properly used, they may become a source of great comfort and joy, and add much to the beauty and solemnity of the services of the church.*

* The Editors give wide scope to discussion by contributors, but feel obliged to express their dissent from the view presented in the above Article, especially with respect to the significance and place of the altar.

ARTICLE IX.

CURRENT THEOLOGICAL THOUGHT.

I. ENGLISH AND AMERICAN.

By Professor M. Coover, A.M.

Recent study of the term, *Ashteroth Karnaim* (Gen. 14:5), "Ashtaroth of the two horns," brings considerable light to the Old Testament student in explanation of the character and attributes of Astarte. This goddess was widely worshipped. At Ninevah she was the goddess of love, lust, and generation. The code of Hammurabi represents her also as the goddess of war. In Canaan she is known as "Ashtaroth of the two horns." It was first thought that the horns referred to two mountains, the chief places of her habitat. And again the horns are regarded as representing the crescent moon. In Babylonia Ishtar appears frequently in astro-theology.

The late Prof. Robertson Smith identified her with the cow-Astarte of Sidon, or with the sheep-goddess. In Deut. 7:13 the produce of the flock is called "Ashtaroth of the sheep."

The excavations at Gezer seem to corroborate the opinion of Prof. Smith. A bronze statuette four and one-half inches in height, a nude, ill-proportioned figure of a female, apparently symbolizing Astarte, has been found. Just above the ears of the too-largely figured head horns coil downwards very similar to the horns of a ram, though they possibly represent cow horns, since other figurettes of cattle have been discovered on the same site.

From these findings the indications are forcible that the Canaanites worshipped Astarte symbolized as a cow, just as they worshipped Baal under the symbol of a bull.

—*The Expository Times* for December.

In the same number of *The Expository Times* Professor Tasker makes allusion to the ancient custom of laying founda-

tions of buildings in blood. After the custom of human sacrifice at the laying of the foundation stone was abandoned, ransom money in the form of coins was substituted. Newspapers and coins bearing the date of the erection of modern public buildings are now placed in the cornerstone. The coins are a relic of a significance long forgotten.

The history is a long and interesting one, and a brief summary may be added to the allusion made by Prof. Tasker.

The history begins with the sacredness of the threshold. When wild men lived in caves the door was both entrance and altar. There the fire was kindled, and there was the hearth which was also altar. Sacrifices were offered at the altar, which was likewise the threshold. In the tent the entrance was both fireplace and altar.

The altar of burnt offering was not in the Hebrew temple, but just over the threshold of the temple court. Medieval weddings took place at the cathedral door; and there also stood the baptismal font. David chose the most sacred spot when he said he would rather be a doorkeeper in the house of his God than dwell in the tents of wickedness. Mosaic legislation directed the master to take the servant, who, at the opening of the Sabbatic year after six years of service, chose to be a perpetual bondservant to his master, and bore his ear against the doorpost that the blood might trickle on the threshold as a covenant between them, the seal of their agreement. *Babel* means "door of God;" the Sultan of Turkey is called the "Sublime Porte." When the ancient Romans marked the cite for city or temple the plow that drew the line was not to desecrate the space reserved for door or gate; so they carried (portare) the plow over the threshold, which was designated *porta*, door or gate.

The whole of some Shinto temples consists of a magnificent gate. The doorway of great ancient temples is the most architecturally grand feature of the structure.

The threshold is too sacred for anything contaminating to come into contact with or to pass over it. The dead may not be borne over it to sepulture. In Alaska the sick at the near approach of death are carried out on their cot to expire in the

open air to obviate the bearing of the corpse over the threshold.

Korea's capitol has a little door in the rear city wall used solely for the exit of the bier at the burial of the dead.

The old houses in Italy have at the side of the door of common use a small door for obsequial use only, called *porta di morti.*

Jesus said the thief digs through the wall. The oriental robber does not burglarize the door; he reveres the threshold. Our Scandinavian settlers in the west leave an unbarred door by night.

In ancient Babylonia according to Dr. Hilprecht the sacredness of the threshold extends to the corner of the building. The cornerstone and the threshold may at one time have coincided, or the corner was regarded as the limit of the threshold. Blood covenants were most sacred at thresholds. God directed Moses to make the seal of the covenant of Passover at the doorway of Israelitish homes in Egypt. Jewish tradition says that the Hebrew people observed the Passover immediately after the passage of the Jordan into the promised land, as a threshold covenant upon entrance into the land of their inheritance.

When General Grant made his tour around the world, he received a covenant greeting of oriental character at Assioot. As he stepped off the boat to land on Egyptian soil, he was met by the American Consul at that port, who was an Egyptian. A bullock was sacrificed so that the blood flowed over the gangplank just where it touched Egyptian soil, and General Grant in stepping over the covenant seal entered upon sacred privileges and assured safety in Egypt.

As the threshold was deemed conterminous with the corner stone, the blood sacrifices appropriate at the threshold were also regarded as essential for the sanctification of the walls of the building, and the blood covenant was observed at the laying of foundations.

A human sacrifice, at first alive, afterwards slain, was buried under the wall to give it permanence and to sanctify the structure.

The sacrifice of animals was later substituted for human vic-

tims, and in eastern countries animals and fowls are still slaughtered at the laying of foundations. The blood sacrifice of an animal was observed at the institution of the new railway from Joppa to Jerusalem. In Thuringia the human sacrifice is still deemed most fitting. But instead of the human victim being buried alive or slain, a casual passer-by has his shadow quickly and clandestinely measured by the builders, and the measuring string is placed under the foundation stone with the expectation that the man whose measure is thus taken will soon be a shade, and his sacrificed spirit become the sanctification of the building.

But humaner becomes the sentiment when the man is no more a victim of human sacrifice, and a ransom is acceptable and satisfactory.

His worth in ransom money is placed in or under the corner stone of the structure, which substitute makes the building duly sacred and stable.

The coin placed in the corner stone of the modern public building has lost its ancient significance, but its history is traceable.

If Abram and Hammurabi, or Amraphel, were contemporaries, then Abram left Ur of the Chaldees in the 23rd century B. C.

How does this aspect of chronology affect the early history of the Hebrew people? The progress of the idea of development cannot let the civilization of Israel pass by. The same forces and slowly developing conditions that fostered the growth of other great world kingdoms certainly were not altogether lacking in the history of the Hebrew people, though the immediate causal force of Israel's progress was divine. The idea of development applied to God's chosen people seemed at first to sweep away the divine factor; but now this element of gradual growth takes on another aspect, which in its working coordinates the history and chronology of early Israel in substantiation of the divine record.

The period of the Judges, from the old standpoint of chronology, reckoning Abram's departure from Ur in the 19th cen-

tury, and the exodus from Egypt in the latter half of the 14th century, was too meagre for the development of the political and religious institutions of the Hebrews before the period of the monarchy.

It also gives too much time for the patriarchal age if we reckon the period of Hammurabi as the date of Abram's exit from the far East and allow 430 years as the time for the sojourn of the children of Israel in Egypt and place the Exodus so late as the 12th century B. C., as by McCurdy.

"When did Israel enter Canaan?" This question is asked and answered by Mrs. Louise Seymour Houghton in *The Bibliotheca Sacra* for July, 1904. Mrs. Houghton dates the Exodus in the latter half of the 15th century.

The factors which enter into the reckoning of the chronology of early Israel are the following:—

"*First.* The data found in the Bible.

1. The statement in 1 Kings vi: 1 that the fourth year of Solomon's reign was the 480th after the Exodus.

2. The claim of Jephthah to Israel's right in the country east of the Jordan, namely, that they had been in possession 300 years (Judges xi: 26).

3. The notes of time in the book of Judges, which, added together, give 410 years from the death of Joshua to the death of Samson.

4. The fact that to this period must be added the time of the wilderness wandering (forty years), of the Conquest under Joshua (an unknown period), the judgeships of Eli (forty years), and of Samuel (an unknown period, as is also the reign of Saul), the reign of David (forty years), and the first four years of Solomon, making a total of 530 years besides the unknown periods.

5. The statement of St. Paul (Acts xii: 20) that the Judges' period before Samuel was 'about 450 years.'

6. The statement in Gen. xlvii: 11 that Joseph settled his father and brethren in the land of Rameses.

7. The statements in Exodus I and II that the Israelites built for Pharaoh the cities of Pithom and Rameses, being

forced a part of the time to make bricks without any provision of straw.

"*Second.* The data from Archeology.

1. The somewhat recent discovery by Edward Naville of the long-lost treasure-city, Pithom, with a number of bricks made without straw.

2. The tablets found in 1887 at Tel-el Amarna, on the Nile.

3. The so-called Merenptah stele found in 1896, bearing an inscription in which the name *Israel* occurs.

"*Third.* 1. The general agreement of scholars, especially since Naville's researches in Pithom (Succoth), that the Pharaoh of the Oppression was Rameses II of the 19th dynasty, and the Pharaoh of the Exodus, his son, Merenptah, or, more probably, his grandson, Seti II.

2. Recent astronomical calculations, especially by Mahler, by which the dates of Egyptian kings of the 17th, 18th, and 19th dynasties have been fixed with approximate accuracy, and that of Solomon's accession almost certainly at 990 B. C."

In consideration of these data what must be the approximate period of Israel's entrance into Canaan?

Professor Mahler, from his astronomical investigations, and from the tradition of the Jews that the Exodus fell on a Thursday, reckons that the people of Israel went out from Egypt Thursday, March 27th, 1335 B. C.

But the Amarna tablets (1587–1340) mention Canaanitish towns bearing the names *Jakob-el Joseph-el*, towns already under the regnancy of the children of Israel. And more important still is a stele of Merenptah, the commonly supposed predecessor of the Pharaoh of the Exodus, which among its inscribed victories contains the following statement: "The people of Israel is devastated, it has no grain."

To meet this early date of Israel's occupancy of Canaan some scholars postulated the breaking away from Egypt of the clan of Asher, and probably of Judah, and their invasion of Canaan by way of the isthmus and the Negeb several centuries previous to the full exodus of Israel.

So early an invasion of Canaan by the whole Hebrew race as is indicated in the stele of Merenptah was deemed impos-

sible owing to the prevalent and strong control of Egypt over Syria till the close of the 19th dynasty of the Pharaohs.

But the 18 dynasty was pitifully weak, and was unable to cope with the rebellious political revolutions taking place in Canaan, as is recorded in the Amarna letters.

Moreover, Ebed-Tob, king of Jerusalem, in his correspondence with Amenophis IV, the weak Pharaoh of the 18th dynasty, recounts the victories of the Habiri over certain towns as Bethel, Bethaven, and Gath-rimmon, in Canaan, and as threatening his own capitol.

These Habiri were at first regarded as "Confederates," allied clans of unknown origin; but now they are recognized as the Hebrews. Thus in the days of the Amarna correspondence the Hebrews were already in Canaan making conquests under Joshua or other of their leaders.

The victorious career of Thothmes III. of the 18th dynasty in its extension over Assyria and Canaan had weakened the inhabitants of the land and broken their spirit. The Hittites were temporarily subdued, and the smaller collective powers, such as the Jebusites and Perrizzites, were demoralized. But the glorious reign of Thothmes broke down under the weight of military conscription and the zeal of despotism, and when Israel reached Canaan the inhabitants had not rallied from their demoralization and political dissolution, and Egypt under the weak rule of Amenophis IV. was unable to give assistance to the dependencies in Canaan against the invading Hebrews.

Thothmes III, being regarded as a Pharaoh of the oppression, and Thothmes IV the Pharaoh under whose rule the Israelites made their exodus, places the exodus in the year 1423 B. C., forty years before the reign of Amenophis IV.

These coincidences satisfy many biblical data, but leave unexplained the statements respecting Israel's relation to the city Rameses, and the bricks without straw. Mrs. Houghton's solution of this difficulty is scarcely satisfactory, though there are plausable probabilities of a reconciliation with the coincidences and dates which bear so forcibly toward the early settlement of Canaan by the Israelites. The period of the Judges is thus favorably prolonged, and the development of the politi-

cal conditions into a monarchy receives appropriate recognition.

The history of the celebration of Christmas on the 25th of December is a "Tale of Three Cities." The Christians of the first two centuries paid no regard to Christ's nativity in the form of a public festival. This sacrosanct day appears first in the history of the Church in Jerusalem, Antioch, and Rome. It was in the first half of the fourth century before significant stress was laid on Christ's natal day. At Rome the pagan festivals were transformed and given a Christian meaning. The feast of Saturnalia (December 17–25) was a celebration in which for one week the slave was as good as his master, and assumed all the privileges of a freedman.

This was followed by the feast of Brumalia (December 25) in celebration of the birth of the sun. Now the day began to lengthen, and the sun regained his strength. Light and life were returning.

Then followed the feast of Sigallaria at which festival parents presented dolls to their children. The true sun is the Sun of righteousness; and why should not his natal day be observed in lieu of the feast of Brumalia? The Roman Church substituted the Christian festival of Christmas for this pagan feast. According to John Chrysostom the Christmas festival began to be observed in Antioch about the year 376 A. D.

But in the East the spiritual birth of Christ was the significant festival, observed on the 6th of January, the feast of Epiphany. His spiritual birth was at his baptism in the Jordan; and this baptism by John was regarded as taking place on the thirtieth birthday anniversary of Jesus according to Luke 3, 21-23.

Therefore in Jerusalem the Epiphany festival took the place of Christ's *birth after the flesh.* But the Christmas celebration was growing prevalent, and was being regarded as a necessary feature of appropriate reverence by the Church.

In Jerusalem, however, this celebration could scarcely well coincide with the sacrosanct festival of the holy Epiphany.

A letter purported to be written by Cyril, bishop of Jerusalem, to Julius, the Pope at Rome (337–352), asks for counsel

in respect of the difficulties involved in the observance of the double feast of Christmas and Epiphany on the 6th of January. It was with great inconvenience that Christians observed Christ's *birth after the flesh* which must be celebrated in the cave of the Nativity at Bethlehem, six miles south of the Holy City, and then that they hurry back for the feast of Christ's *birth according to the Spirit* to be observed eighteen miles away on the banks of the Jordan where John baptized Jesus.

Cyril asks Julius to examine the books taken by the Jews to Rome in the age of Titus for information that might settle the difficulty. Julius discovers the books of Josephus, and finds that Zacharias had his vision in the temple at the feast of Tabernacles, and calculating from this date decided that Jesus was born on the 25th day of December. This solution of the difficulty, however, was not readily accepted, for in the middle of the sixth century the Jerusalem Church still observed the double festival at the feast of Epiphany. The Christians of Armenia still to this day observe Christmas on the 6th of January, Christ's spiritual birthday and thirtieth anniversary of his birth after the flesh.

The Baptist Syrians still observe the direction of Paul of Samosata and are baptized on their thirtieth birthday anniversary.

When the 25th of December as Christmas day became comparatively universal, the Lenten festival of forty days, which originally followed immediately the holy Epiphany, January 6, was set forward to the forty days preceding Easter eve, and the Epiphany festival became the feast of the visit of the Magi and the manifestation of Jesus to the Gentile world.

The early Church regarded Jesus as born the Christ in the waters of Jordan. Eastern art depicted the baptismal scene with little fish swimming about the feet of Jesus in the water; and in the catacombs at Rome Jesus is symbolized as a large fish because he was born in the water, and Christians as little fish-born Christs at their baptism. A happy coincidence was discovered in the Greek word *ἰχθύς*, which contains the initial letters of *Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς θεοῦ υἱὸς σωτήρ*.

The early Church gave special significance to the spiritual

nativity of Jesus; we pay special regard to his miraculous conception and physical birth. The first framers of creeds, however, make mention of the miraculous conception and Virgin birth, and then pass to Christ's experience at the hands of Pontius Pilate, without allusion to his baptism. The incarnation was at first widely regarded by a large part of the Church as Jesus' reception of the Divine at his baptism, at which time he was thought to become the Christ.

Though the Church at Rome set great store by Christ's humanity, the human sympathetic Jesus ere long became so spiritually enthroned and separate from men, so unapproachable in his divinity, so inaccessible to prayer, that the Holy Virgin and numberless saints must needs become intermediaries between Saviour and saved.

A fierce battle is now on over the significance of the incarnation. Which shall the Church deem the more important, the Virgin birth, or the spiritual Jesus? the spiritual conception, or the spiritual baptism? What was the original significance which the Church gave to Christ's person? The history of Christmas is not necessarily the history of an inspired Church.

Stress must be laid on both of two things, a human, and a divine nature in Christ, else we have no divine incarnation.

Disagreement over the temporal point of juncture between the natural and the divine in Jesus does not destroy the fact of the union of the two; but it does affect philosophically and ethically the aspect of each man's possible relation to the spiritual and divine.

The error of the early Church in deeming the spiritual birth of believers at their baptism to be a birth of the baptized into Christs, into lesser incarnations of the divine, takes on today the philosophical aspect of a divine immanence in every man amounting virtually to a divine incarnation.

Christ becomes less the Christ when all men may become Christs. The divine incarnation in Jesus, if it be but the effect of a mere spiritual baptism, becomes simply the possible and rightful immanence of God in all men. So we have and need but an ethical Saviour, an evolutional type of what we all are destined to become.

God saves by immediacy in man, and there is need only of a mediator of knowledge, a revealer of lofty but imitable character, who is a type of manhood realizable by all. Virtue is knowledge; and sin is but ignorance. God is knowledge, light. Illumination saves man. Baptism is a symbol of awakened intelligence.

The history of Christmas is a serial story of the Christian centuries. It has become a tale of a thousand cities.

II. GERMAN.

By Professor S. G. Hefelbower, A.M.

Just three days before the death of Prof. Volck of Rostock, which occurred, May 30th, 1904, there appeared from his pen, in the *Theologisches Literaturblatt*, a review of the second edition of Prof. Guthe's *Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, which was published earlier in the year. The article is of interest, not merely because of the importance of the book reviewed, but more especially because it is the last utterance of this venerable champion of a conservative Old Testament Higher Criticism. He does not attempt in this brief review to give a full statement of all the objections that he might have to offer, but takes up just one cardinal point of dispute and treats it in such a way that the fundamental difference between his position and that of the writer, whose book is criticized, is at once apparent.

According to Guthe, the writers of the Old Testament chose family histories and genealogies as a means for expressing ethnology and the history of peoples, tribes, and places. Volck denies this unconditionally, and energetically defends the traditional view, i. e., that the characters named in the Old Testament were real men and not peoples or tribes. Guthe classifies the legends of the patriarchs among the materials appropriated and adapted from Canaanitish sources. Israel simply took up along with the civilization of the country, characters that had been known in Canaan from the earliest times, and so enveloped them with their own recollections and experiences that they became theirs. Accordingly, Israel owes Canaan not only their primitive history, as we were taught during the *Babel–Bibel* controversy, but also the remaining portion of Genesis.

Of course, according to Guthe, the Israelites transformed these characters, and made them the bearers of divine gifts and virtues. But, Volck comments, suppose that such were the facts, how strange it is that even the picture of an Abraham, who has become the ideal of Christian piety, shows, according to Genesis, great faults. And the history of Jacob and his house, with which, according to biblical accounts, the family of Abraham begins to be a people, is full of sin and shame; in fact the only great thing that we find there is the faith of Jacob, which clings fast to the promise. And if we inquire further of Guthe as to what these patriarchs really were before their transformation and adoption by Israel, we are informed that our means do not suffice to answer the question. However, it looks as if they stand in close relation to the worship of ancestors, of which we find remnants among the Canaanites.

Many portions of like character could be cited. Of course Volck rejects all such positions, and adds that such a rearrangement of history was to be expected from one who handles the sources according to the principles laid down in Kuenen's *Critical Method.*

"I have given the above from Guthe's book in order, first, to show an example of the way in which he handles the sources, and, secondly, to show that his presentation moves wholly in the direction pointed out by Wellhausen. This can be noticed especially in his declarations concerning the beginnings of the Israelitish religion, which agree with that which we read in Wellhausen's works. According to the latter, the decalogue is from the time of Manasseh; according to Guthe, in its present form, it is a work of a deuteronomic period." Guthe also agrees with Wellhausen in teaching that the prophets of the eighth and seventh centuries laid the foundation for a higher "conception of God, in so far as they placed the moral and spiritual content of the idea of God higher than all His other attributes, which was contrary to the opinion generally held."

By the death of Prof. Volck Germany lost a strong and aggressive advocate of a conservative higher criticism. He is generally classed with Koenig of Bonn and Hommel of Muenchen, though he differs from them on many points.

Zahn of Erlangen has again placed the theological world and the Christian Church in general under obligations to him by the publication of his commentary on Matthew. (Kommentar zum Neuen Testament, herausgegeben von Prof. D. Theodor Zahn. Band I. Leipzig, 1904. A. Deichert. M. 14.50). It is part of a New Testament commentary edited by Zahn, for which he plans to write the volumes on Matthew, the Johannine books, Romans and Hebrews. Probably profiting by the examples of his predecessors in Erlangen, Olshausen and von Hofmann, who died in the midst of the preparation of their great commentaries, he assigned the other volumes to students or friends of his. The purpose of his commentary is quite different from that of Olshausen and also from that of Von Hofmann, from whom he learned so much. Olshausen wished to present archæological and grammatical material for the student of the New Testament. Von Hofmann undertook an investigation of the entire Bible, examining from all sides the hidden meaning, in the hope that such an investigation would scientifically prove it to be the Holy Scriptures. Zahn simply gives an exhaustive explanation of the text.

The theological conditions of Norway are, as a rule, unknown outside of Scandinavian countries. Here in America we read a great many items of church news from that far away Lutheran country of the North, probably because the practical rather than the scientific interests of the Church are discussed. However, changes of great importance are about to take place, in fact are now taking place, which have been discussed at length in foreign journals, from which we condense the following:

The Church of Norway, until very recently, has been entirely free from the so-called "modern theology." This conservatism is, to a great extent, the result of an intelligent rejection of the new and an intelligent adaptation of the old to new conditions; but there are many Norwegian pastors—some writers claim that the majority are of this class—whose conservatism is secured only in their ignorance of present day theological thought, which conservatism is the most dangerous

and discreditable that can exist; dangerous because it is incapable of self-defence; discreditable, because it is generally the result of intellectual indifference or bigotry, or perhaps of both. And yet it must be acknowledged that the Lutheran Church in America has considerable of this sort of conservatism.

A brief historical retrospect is necessary if we would understand present theological conditions in Norway. At the beginning of the last century Rationalism reigned in the Norwegian Church as elsewhere. Then later, as in Germany, a confessional tendency made itself felt, in which the pietistic spirit of the great lay-revivalist, Hauge, exerted great influence. Then came the revival which swept over the country about the middle of the century under the leadership of the conservative Prof. Johnssen, who exerted great influence over the students of theology for almost half a century. Caspari exerted a like influence, and the same can also be said of Profs. Bugge (later bishop of Christiania,) Petersen and Bishop Heuch. The result of the life work of such men was the building up and the strengthening of a very pronounced type of orthodoxy in the Norwegian Church. Petersen was probably the most liberal of these leaders and Heuch was the most conservative. Petersen saw a time of crisis coming, when the Norwegian Church would have to reckon with the modern thought, and tried to prepare his students for meeting it. Heuch would have nothing at all to do with the results of modern investigation and even hesitated to approve Petersen's course, whom he regarded as a good Lutheran, but his teaching might lead to rationalism.

Under such conditions it was unavoidable that a transition of some importance should take place. A certain feeling of unrest began to be noticed here and there. Ritschlianism and Old Testament Criticism began to modify the views of many. There was a general feeling that the Church was confronted by grave difficulties. This change was most marked in the old doctrine of inspiration. Perhaps the first noticeable tendency toward a division of the Church into two parties appeared about 1895, when Heuch severely criticized a thesis, submitted by Pastor Brockman for attaining the doctor's degree. The

thesis was rejected, and many believed that its rejection hinged wholely on its supposed rationalistic tendency. Brockman's error was that he made righteousness depend on sanctification. There were many who defended at least the liberty of its author, but the devout laity agreed with Heuch and saw in it a threatening tendency. However, Brockman and all those who disagreed with Heuch held firmly to the divinity of Christ and the reconciling power of his death, and all of them subscribed to the Lutheran confessions. But the first stage in the defining of two theological tendencies in the Norwegian Church had been reached.

The first real cause for division came in the Fall of 1901, when Harnack's "*What is Christianity?*" was reviewed and discussed. One would have expected it to find no sympathetic readers in this land of severe orthodoxy and conservative liberalism, for Norwegian liberalism was by no means liberal in the sense in which German liberalism is liberal. But there were some who, because of its apologetic spirit, thought they saw in it a means of overcoming for the Church the anti-Christian materialism of the times. But it was different with Pastor Klaverness. For some time he had advocated the teaching of the results of modern criticism to the young, so that later they might not find themselves estranged from that which they had learned and thereby be led to doubt everything. In a word, his slogan was, Christianity must adapt itself to the culture of today. Accordingly, the theme of his address at the Lutheran conference in Lund was: *The Increasing Religious Indifference among the Cultured, and how the Church is to remedy it.* This became then the motive of his preaching in Christiania. Later he published a volume of sermons under the title, *The Gospel Preached to the New Age.* He charged the clergy with using obsolete forms of expression, and urged them to seek their *terminus a quo* in religious and moral truths that are found among men of culture, e. g., belief in a merciful God the Father in heaven, the dictates of conscience, etc. Such truths should serve as a starting point from which the clergy might lead them on. Then for more than a year, from the Fall of 1901 to the Spring of 1903, there was a controversy as to what is meant

by "the Gospel," in which Klaveness's foes charged him with having chosen another center for the Gospel than the person and work of Christ.

At a large conference in Christiania, in the Fall of 1901, Tanberg read a paper on, *Is Our Church Threatened by a New Rationalism at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century?* which he answered in the affirmative. Then about a year later the aged Heuch took up the same question in a pamphlet, which bore the suggestive title, *Against the Stream*, in which he condemned almost every leader of consciously or unconsciously fostering rationalistic tendencies. Then the storm broke. For a long time there were earnest discussions in both the secular and the religious press. And after the smoke of the battle had cleared away there were two well-defined theological camps where there had been but one before; the one, extremely and uncompromisingly conservative; the other with various shades of more liberal tendencies, some conservatively liberal, others, radically so. The laity, with very few exceptions, agreed with Heuch.

Just at present the interest centers in the appointment of a professor for the only chair of Systematic Theology in the only university of Norway. Dr. Ording had successfully passed the competitive examination, but was found to be Reformed in his doctrine of the sacraments. The discussion has disturbed the whole Church, and such great pressure has been brought to bear upon those who have been entrusted with the duty of appointment that a new examination has been ordered, to which competitors from Sweden and Norway have been invited. The other members of the faculty, with the sole exception of Odland, are indignant, and ask what has become of academic liberty; but Prof. Odland threatens to resign from the faculty if Dr. Ording is appointed. And since Prof. Odland is active in all practical work of the Church, and consequently is widely and favorably known among the very conservative laity, his threat has back of it a power that will probably prove irresistible for the appointing authorities, who, in a land that is democratic rather than autocratic in spirit, will probably yield to the voice of the people. All of which means that the very conservative party is still on the throne in the Church of Norway.

ARTICLE X.

REVIEW OF RECENT LITERATURE.

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, NEW YORK.

Union Seminary Addresses. By Thomas S. Hastings. 12mo. Pp. viii and 266. Price $1.50 net.

These addresses were published by Dr. Hastings upon the written request of his colleagues of the Faculty of the Union Theological Seminary in New York. The first address is Dr. Hastings' Inaugural, delivered, September 22, 1881, and is entitled, *The Minister and his Work.* The real theme, however, is: *Self—Its Meanings, and its Relations to the Work of the Christian Minister.*

The author insists that personal Christian character is the basis of power, influence and success in the Christian ministry. The minister must be a student, a preacher, a pastor. As a student the minister must seek knowledge in books, in men, in things, but primarily in Jesus Christ, the Incarnate Truth. He must be saturated with the spirit of God's Word. This will enable him to forget himself and to think only of God and of his hearers in preaching. The minister must so cultivate his manner of preaching, his voice and gesture, that people will forget the preacher in listening to what he says. "Fine speaking is the broadest and finest of the fine arts; it is architecture, music, statuary and painting, all in one." It is *summa ars artem superare.* The minister must be also a pastor. Here the author utters strong words against place-seekers and self-seekers. The honest self-sacrificing worker will find doors open for him. "A stone that is fit for the wall will not be left in the road-way."

There is a short address on Luther as a Preacher. Here Luther's physical, intellectual and spiritual qualifications as a preacher are considered. In all these respects Luther excelled. Surely no follower of Luther could have said more or better things of Luther as a preacher than Dr. Hastings has said in these few pages. He has undoubtedly studied the great Wittenberg master.

The third address seeks to answer the query: *How does God call his Ministers?* The call comes through various instrumentalities, and is variously made known according to the differences in men. But behind all and in all is the Holy Spirit. But when God calls man must recognize the call. Moses and Isaiah at first excused themselves, but the Lord said to the one "Go," and when the seraph had touched the lips of the other with a live coal from off the altar, he said: "Here am I, send me." Paul conferred not with flesh and blood, which the author thinks implies that he conferred with the Lord.

Another address of special excellence is entitled, *Man in the Image of God.* This image of God appears in all of man's faculties; and it is because man is the image of God, that the divine revelation and personal communion with God, and the incarnation of the Son of God, are made possible. In Dr. Hastings' estimation man is a creature of grand endowments and of lofty possibilities. Even in his ruin he is great.

The book also contains numerous addresses to the graduating classes of the Seminary, and numerous prayer-meeting talks. All these are models of their kind—tender, wise, spiritual, evangelical. Every theological student ought to read this book, and we should think that every student who graduated from the Union Seminary during Dr. Hastings' incumbency would procure a copy of it. The book possesses rare literary charm. The illustrations are gathered from an extensive course of reading, and the whole is enriched by the choicest flowers of poetry. We have read the book with profit, and have read paragraphs of it before our own classes, for the purpose of illustrating important points in ministerial culture.

J. W. RICHARD.

A Dictionary of the Bible dealing with its language, literature and contents including the Biblical Theology. Edited by James Hastings, M. A., D. D. With the assistance of John A. Selbie, M. A., D. D. *Extra Volume* containing Articles, Indexes and Maps. Pp. 936. Price $6.00.

This is the *crowning* volume of the great Hastings Bible Dictionary. We use the word "crowning" advisedly, for the reason that this volume supplements, completes and crowns the entire work; and a magnificant work it is, consisting now of five huge double-column quarto volumes, each volume equivalent in the amount of its matter to ten or more ordinary duodecimo volumes, the whole constituting the most comprehensive and learned work on the Bible, in existence. This comprehensiveness is shown by the fact that it embraces almost every subject contained in or in any way connected with the Bible. The learning that it exhibits is not that of any one man, but that of all the great biblical specialists in the world, both Jewish and Christian. No less than one hundred and ninety-four names are found in the *Index of Authors.* We doubt if so many names of equal significance for any other science can be brought together as contributors to the composition of a dictionary, or of an encyclopedia, of the science to be named, and no doubt the reason for this is found in the closely associated facts that the Bible is the King of Books and that Theology is the Queen of Sciences.

This work is also up-to-date. It exhibits the very latest conclusions in regard to the Bible—for some things in regard to the Bible are definitely settled—and presents the newest theories about subjects contained in and connected with the Bible—for some biblical subjects are

yet under strife awaiting evidence that may lead to conclusions. The articles connected with the Old Testament are all constructed from some standpoint of the so-called Higher Criticism. But this is exactly what was to be expected in a biblical work of so comprehensive a character as the one before us, for, whether we will or will not, we have to accept the fact that there is probably not a single first-class O. T. scholar in the world who does not stand somewhere on the line of the Higher Criticism—who has not accepted some of the conclusions and theories of the so-called Higher Critics. The sciolists and scholars in O. T. criticism have before them a nobler duty than that of complaint. Let them enter the arena and with that weapon which is proverbially mightier than the sword, let them strive for a victory which, when won, will make the field more glorious in the annals of Christian warfare than Marathon and Waterloo are in the annals of carnal strife. It is not the office of dignified scholarship, conscious of its strength, to complain and to philosophize. This is the age of the pick and shovel, and of hard digging among dry roots. Falsehood must be overthrown by truth, fiction by fact. If the traditional views of the O. T. are to be restored—and we hope they will be—let the O. T. traditionalists make it plain to scientific apprehension and to intelligent faith that the six days of creation enumerated in Gen. I, are six literal days of twenty-four hours each, that the Pentateuch is an absolutely original composition of Moses, that the book known as Isaiah is, in all of its sixty-six chapters, the prophecy of one man, and that every Psalm that in our English Bible is designated *A Psalm of David*, was actually composed by the great Shepherd King of Israel. The minds of Christian people which have been unsettled by the work of the Higher Critics will be glad to find rest again in the traditional views, provided the facts marshalled in support of these views are stronger and clearer than those advanced by the Critics. The Christian mind and faith, long since emancipated from the thraldom of mediaeval scholasticism will not receive religious instruction merely on authority. There must be good and sufficient reasons for it. A sound Protestantism emphasizes the objective as well as the subjective factor in the Christian religion. The *credo ut intelligam* and the *intelligo ut credam* must be reconciled. Bernard triumphed at Sens, but Luther triumphed at Worms: "Unless I be refuted by scriptural testimonies, or by clear arguments," etc. Popes and councils have erred. Clear arguments have their place in the Christian religion.

But what has all this to do with the Hastings Bible Dictionary? Much in every way. The most comprehensive and learned biblical work in Christendom has thrown down a challenge on the line of the so-called Higher Criticism. This library of biblical and theological information and discussion has gone into the hands of tens of thousands of ministers and theological students. Its influence reflected in

sermons, in Sunday School teaching, and in discussions, will be felt in every part of the English speaking Church. Until its fundamental tendency is refuted, or until it is supplanted by another similar work of equal comprehensiveness and learning, but of opposing tendency, it will be accepted as a standard. Vast numbers of teachers in the Church will guage their understanding of the Bible, and regulate their teaching more or less, according to its *dicta*. It will avail nothing that objectors hump up the back and shrug the shoulders and pout out the lips. The so-called Conservative Scholarship must either refute the fundamental tendency of this work, or it must accept it, and must adjust itself to the new situation. Which will it do? *Sit lux.* It will avail nothing to say that the ark of God has fallen into the hands of the Philistines, for these men also inquire at the ark of God. It does not follow necessarily that Uzza must put forth his hand to hold the ark because the oxen have stumbled. The Christian world will accept the fundamental tendency of this work unless the refutation be forthcoming. *Grammatici certant, et adhuc sub judice lis est.*

And now to this *Extra Volume.* 1. *The Articles.* Of these there are only thirty-seven, some of which do not belong directly to the contents of the Bible, but all of which are in place in such a work as this Dictionary claims to be. The first is the *Sermon on the Mount*, forty-four pages, by C. W. Votaw. It is simply exhaustive. The *Religion of Greece and Asia Minor*, pp. 109-156, by W. M. Ramsay, has interest for the classical as well as for the biblical scholar. There can be no doubt that the Hellenistic Religion and Worship helped to prepare the world for the final and perfect religion and for the reception of the only proper object of worship. Dr. Ramsay is at his best in this article. The *Religion of Egypt*, twenty pages, by A. Wiedemann, has both religious and secular value. *Textual Criticism* (of N. T.) pp. 208-236, by J. O. F. Murray, is written from a very comprehensive and thorough knowledge of the subject. The author belongs to the "critical school," and ably defends the position of that school—Tischendorf, Tregelles, Westcott and Hort, Nestle *et al* as over against the position of the "traditional school"—Burgon, Miller *et al*—though the article is didactic rather than polemical. It is written for scholars, and not for beginners in the science of N. T. Textual Criticism. It is admirably done.

Another article of great value in the study of comparative religious history, pp. 531-584, by Morris Jastrow, Jr., is that entitled *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria.* The author thinks that the Babylo-Assyrian religion "represents on its best side the high-water mark of ancient thought," and says that "the general thesis may be maintained, that an understanding of the Hebrew religion is impossible without a constant consideration of the religion and culture that were developed in the Euphrates Valley," p. 581.

The *Code of Hammurabi*, pp. 585-612, is comprehensively discussed

by C. H. W. Johns. Two hundred and eighty-two statutes of that Code are given. The parallelism between this remarkable piece of legislation and the early Hebrew is sketched. The article closes with these words: "The presumption that Babylonia had a prominent influence on Palestine long before Israelite codes were drawn up, is one that grows stronger as time goes on."

Professor E. Kautzsch, of Halle, writes on *Religion in Israel*, pp. 612–734. In extent of matter this article is quite equivalent to an ordinary book of from five hundred to six hundred pages. It is in all probability the most important treatise on the subject in the English language. We are not prepared to give either an outline or an analysis of this article. We prefer to characterize it as learned, comprehensive, reverent. It is a pleasure to note that the author has written "that this religion called for supplement and completion—a completion which came in the fullness of time through Christ, who is the end of the law." The article is sure to evoke dissent as well as consent. 2. *Indexes.* I. *Index of Authors*—their residences, titles, official positions, and the articles written by them for this work—eight pages. II. *Index of Subjects*—pp. 735-890. III. *Index of Scripture Texts and other References*, pp. 890-919. IV. *Index of Hebrew and Greek Terms*, pp. 919-933. V. *Index of Illustrations*, pp. 933-936. VI. *List of Maps*, thirteen in number.

By means of these Indexes every part of the great work becomes easily available. "And now the work of this Dictionary of the Bible is at an end." It has been a pleasure to the present reviewer of this Dictionary to give some account of each volume as it appeared. Though compelled to express dissent from some views contained in this work, we nevertheless set a high value upon it. It is truly worthy of a place in every public library and in the library of every student of the Bible. We wish for it a wide circulation and hope to see it give place to something greater and better. Excelsior!

J. W. RICHARD.

The Theology of the Old Testament. By the late A. B. Davidson, D.D., LL.D., Litt.D., Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis, New College, Edinburgh. Edited from the author's manuscripts by S. D. F. Salmond, D.D., F.E.I.S., Principal of the United Free Church College, Aberdeen. 12mo., pp. 553.

Dr. Davidson was recognized as a master in Hebrew, and in Old Testament Theology. It is deeply to be regretted that he did not live to apply the finishing hand to this book, though the editor says: "I have not thought it right to take liberties with my departed friend's work. I have given it substantially as he left it, adding only an occasional note where that seemed appropriate or needful." We thus have Dr. Davidson's work in its material content, though cast in its present form by Dr. Salmond. We file no objection against the form, and we

are delighted with the material content of this book. It is thorough, on many subjects fairly exhaustive, sound and orthodox from a moderately Calvinistic standpoint, and a standpoint, a fundamental principle, every book must have in order to have character. The author may be said to occupy the position in regard to the authorship, date of composition, etc., of the Old Testament books, known as that of the so-called "conservative Higher Criticism." He regards Old Testament Theology as a historical science, and as having a development. He divides the subject into three heads: Theology, Anthropology, Soteriology. His general soundness is vouched for by his adoption and expansion of the Augustinian motto that the New Testament is concealed in the Old, and the Old is revealed in the New. He says: "There is perhaps no truth in the New Testament which does not lie in germ in the Old Testament, and conversely, there is perhaps no truth in the Old Testament which has not been expanded and had new meaning put into it in the New. The Old Testament contains the same truths as the New Testament, but in a less developed form, and we must avoid two errors which are rather common. The one is the mistake of separating the Old Testament from the New in such a way as leaves us with no authoritative truth in the Old. The other is to confuse the New and the Old so that we shall find the Old equally advanced with the New. The difference between the New and the Old is not that the same truths are not found in both, but that in the one the truths are found in a less degree of development than in the other. The Old Testament is as good authority for a truth as the New; only we must not go beyond the degree which the truth has yet reached in the Old Testament," p. 10.

The different names of God are carefully distinguished. "The pronunciation *Jehovah* has no pretence to right. It was not introduced into currency till the time of the Reformation, about 1520." "Various reasons conspire together in favor of the pronunciation now current, *Ya'we'* (variously spelled *Jahve*, *Yahveh*, *Yahweh*, etc.)." The personality and the spirituality of God are clearly vindicated.

The book is very comprehensive in its discussion of Anthropology. The author favors the view that the Old Testament teaches Dichotomy. Sin, both in the individual and in the race, is ably discussed. "Sin has reference to God the Person, not to His will or His law as formulated externally." This seems to be one-sided. Does not sin have reference to God the Person and to the will of God as that will is expressed in His law? We agree with the author that the Old Testament favors *Traducianism*, and this view of man is certainly sustained both by psychological and physiological science. We are especially pleased with the following: "All institutions were an expression of religion. The Sabbath expressed a *religious* idea—the acknowledgement that *time* was Jehovah's as well as all things. The day was *sanctified*, that is,

dedicated to God." The *Doctrine of Redemption*, the *Messianic Idea*, *Immortality*, receive ample discussion.

A quality of this book that especially pleases us is its cautiousness, or better, the cautiousness of its author, who seems disposed to interpret the Old Testament as it is, and to draw authoritative conclusion only where the Book has spoken definitely. He finds no place for speculation. His attitude toward the so-called Higher Criticism may be inferred from the following: "I cannot help thinking that this kind of criticism has gone to extremes in recent times, and has had the effect of discrediting the criticism which is legitimate," p. 30.

We commend the book as containing a wise and intelligent handling of the subject of Old Testament Theology.

J. W. RICHARD.

HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY.

Balance the Fundamental Verity. By Orlando J. Smith. Houghton, Mifflin and Company. The Riverside Press, Cambridge, 1904.

We have here a very original and interesting effort to solve the problem and show the harmony of science and religion. The solution is sought and alleged to be found in the scientific reality of cause and effect or the absolute equivalence between action and reaction. Nature is formally viewed as evolutionary movement, matter and force as indestructible and persistent. Effects follow causes in unbroken sequence and equipoise, and so the conclusion is reached that "*balance* is the fundamental verity, and rules the world." "It is supreme in the small as well as in the great processes of nature—every physical transformation includes exact equivalence and compensation."

In a sphere of physical nature the author has traced the supremacy of this truth of balance or equivalent consequences as a law of advance, with skill and great force. When, however, he comes to the domain of moral life he is obliged to concede that the law of balance is not found in full dominion, but largely disappears in irregularity and confusion, in uncompensated virtue and unpunished wrong. He says: "At the end of our reasoning concerning the fundamental questions of life we must choose between two alternates—either (1) all things are in process of being righted, or (2) the world-order is hopelessly wrong." The former alternative is taken: "The processes of compensation in human affairs involve a cycle of beginning, development and conclusion—as seed-time, growth, and harvest—for completion." The belief in a future life is, therefore, accepted as a part of nature's truth. "The only basis for the belief that justice will be completely established in human affairs is the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. This conclusion sheds much light upon the universality, persistence and rational meaning of religion."

The author makes much of "man's feeling of accountability," found to be inherent in both the moral and religious life. "The belief that the

soul survives the body, is the recognition that accountability does not end with the death of the body; that the wrongs which are not righted here must be righted elsewhere; that the good which is not rewarded here must be rewarded hereafter; that there can be no break in the processes of accountability. As science assumes that cause and effect, action and reaction, motion and transformation, are ceaseless in the physical world, so religion assumes that cause and effect, action and consequences, are ceaseless in the soul of the individual. The religious doctrine of ceaseless moral accountability is identical with the scientific doctrine of ceaseless cause and effect."

The interpretation is carried further. The necessary corrollary of the two preceding beliefs is declared to be "*belief in a supreme power that rights things*"—or, put more briefly: "*right rules the world*," this latter form of statement being put as a particular embraced under the generic universal verity "balance." "Balance *includes* order, right and justice. Balance is an active, governing principle, supreme, central, automatic." "Balance is single and supreme, without a mate or rival."

The book throughout gives evidence of Mr. Smith's ability and learning, and is an interesting and suggestive contribution to the current discussion of the world-problem. Its value will be found to consist in its emphatic maintenance of the truth that both moral law and religious obligation have legitimate and necessary peace and reality in the world-system and human life. We cannot feel, however, that he has satisfactorily proved the proposition presented in the title of the book. "The fundamental verity" seems to be a synonym for the ground of the entire world-system, its full explanation. The abstraction "balance," which at best designates only a mode or feature of cosmic movement, is put as a real causal entity, "The Regulator," "Supreme," automatic. The efficient source of this fact or law of balance, marking the ongoings of nature, are neither sought nor found. That cause must lie back of the phenomenon. Though the words Theism and God are a few times used, a personal God is not recognized. So the logic of the discussion necessarily falls back upon the monistic (pantheistic) idea, of impersonal deity, in self-evolution. But monism, offering only an impersonal Supreme Power "that rights things," even though this be capitalized, is as far from furnishing a scientific solution of the world as it is from explaining its moral and religious problems. A similar use of the term "right" as "ruling the world," carries on the illusive, illogical method, putting a mere concept to do the work of a moral ruler, which involves personality. But this failure of the author to establish his distinct thesis does not destroy the value of the work. Its worth, which is large, is in its clear and logical support of the fundamental moral and religious verities, and as an original and interesting presentation of the cosmic problem, for which speculative science is striving after a new solution.

An *Appendix* containing critical reviews by scientific and religious

writers and a *Reply* by the Author to his Critics, adds to the value of the volume.

M. VALENTINE.

Rich as the December number of the *Atlantic Monthly* was, the January number is equally attractive. It would seem as though with its clean, new type it has taken a new lease of life. A long list of literary favorites are among the contributors of this number. As an introduction to Thoreau's Journal the initial installment of which appears in this number, Bradford Torrey contributes a paper on Thoreau as a Diarist. T. W. Higginson writes of the American Audience; Charles M. Hurger, of The Country Store; Andrew D. White, of the Warfare of Humanity, and Marguerite Merington, of Ethics of the Street. Elizabeth Robins Penwell begins The Leland Papers. A beautiful story by Lafcadio Hearn will be read with pathetic interest. Two Stories, Thurston and The Enamel Bug in Black Canon are quite up to the *Atlantic's* high grade of fiction. The fifth installment of Isidro is of the same character as the strong chapters that have preceded it. These other fine papers, choice poems, appreciative and discriminating bookr-eviews complete one of the best number's of the always acceptable *Atlantic.*

CONCORDIA PUBLISHING HOUSE, ST. LOUIS, MO.

Gospel Sermons. By Henry Sieck, Pastor of Mt. Olivet Lutheran Church, Milwaukee, Wis. Part II. Pp. 187.

The volume before us is Part II of a series of sermons on the gospels of the church year. Part I, containing the sermons from Advent to Trinity Sunday, was published several years ago, and was noticed in this place. The present volume containing the sermons for the Trinity cycle together with a sermon for St. Michael's day, a Reformation day sermon and one for Thanksgiving day.

These sermons, thirty in all, are hardly fair subjects for criticism on the score of homilitical or literary merit, but they are good specimens of plain, simple, earnest addresses, conveying the glorious gospel message. They present the truths of the gospel from the standpoint of the Lutheran confession, and are well calculated to build up the believer in his most holy faith.

Pastor Sieck has a clear insight into the plan of salvation, and of the leading and abiding principles of the Christian life. Whilst true to the doctrines of God's Word these sermons are not barren theological abstractions, but they represent religion as a thing of life and power, the one thing needful to man. It is to be regretted that the author's style is catchy and abrupt. The sermons read as if they had been originally written in German, and then had been translated into English by an unpractical hand. But for all that, these sermons, full of the gospel, are

vastly superior to a great many of the empty, flashy, meteoric things published in these days under the name of sermons, and they will accomplish vastly more good.

R. H. CLARE.

Manual of Physical Exercises for School and Home. Arranged by F. Rechlin. Pp. 145.

The physical exercises in this Manual are based on the acknowledged necessity of intermitting the unavoidable tedium of school hours, by such bodily movements as will infuse into the pupils, fresh spirit and physical vigor. The time which the manual suggests should be devoted each day to physical exercises, is but ten minutes, five in the middle of the forenoon and five in the middle of the afternoon. The amount, although small, is yet sufficient for stimulating and healthful relaxation. The exercises directed are presented from a practical rather than from a scientific standpoint, and can easily be handled by teachers who are interested in this kind of work, and who may yet have no experience in technical physical culture.

The work is arranged for primary, intermediate and grammar grades, and consists of varied exercises, composite drills, marching and songs with calisthenics. Flag drills and games are also included.

The directions are clearly given, and all the exercises seem well adapted to meet the laudable purpose in view.

G. D. STAHLEY.

PERRY MASON COMPANY, BOSTON, MASS.

The Youth's Companion still holds its enviable place as prince among the secular periodicals for the young. It leads in so many particulars that it well deserves to lead also in circulation.

To summarize in this space the many and varied attractions announced for this year would be impossible. With more than two hundred men and women enlisted to write for it, the *Companion* represents the largest variety of talents and callings.

A series of articles planned to interest especially the forty-five millions of Americans who look directly to the soil for their subsistence will treat of "New Fields for Young Farmers," "The Sanitation of the Farm," "The Future of American Cotton," "How Women Make Money on the Farm," etc.

Seven serial stories and two hundred and fifty short stories by the most talented and popular American writers of fiction will form part of the contents of the new volume for 1905.

The *Companion* is an excellent help in cultivating a taste in young persons for wholesome literature. We heartily commend it. Its address is 144 Berkeley Street, Boston, Mass., and its price $1.75 per annum.

LUTHERAN PUBLICATION SOCIETY, PHILADELPHIA.

History of the Pittsburg Synod of the General Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church. 1748–1845–1904. By Rev. Ellis B. Burgess. Pp. 448.

The poet is born. The historian is made. To write history well, to make an entertaining and profitable record of the deeds of men of former years, the historian must collect all existing materials, must sift the same with impartiality, must enter into the spirit and conceptions of the past and must draw his picture with lively imagination tempered by good judgment and sound sense. In all these respects the author of the book before us has succeeded admirably. He has given us a narrative of struggles, contentions, alienations, toils and triumphs, that, taken together, exhibit a philosophy of Christianity that teaches by example. We believe, however, that his history would be more instructive, had he included a larger portion of the shadows that beclouded the horizon after the separation in 1867. Posterity has a right to know everything. The past can yield its full and proper lesson only when all of its events, good and bad, have been made known. The mistakes of good men serve as warnings to others. Our historian has probably erred on the side of *Irenic.* But enough is given, both of light and of shadow, to furnish a most excellent and instructive book. It ought to have a wide circulation, both within and without the bounds of the Pittsburg Synod, and ought to stimulate other synods to have similar histories written. The Lutheran Church in America is still in its formative period. Correct local histories will prepare the way and furnish much of the material for that general philosophical history of the American Lutheran Church which awaits the coming of the man of broad vision and of impartial spirit, who can create one picture by skillful combination of many local studies.

J. W. RICHARD.

GERMAN LITERARY BOARD, BURLINGTON, IOWA.

At the Deathbed of Darwinism. By E. Dennert, Ph.D. Translated by E. V. O'Hara and John H. Peschges. Pp. 146, 75 cents.

Those people whose opinions on the theory of Descent, or organic Evolution, were made some 30 or 40 years ago, and who have not taken the trouble to follow the subsequent discussions, or revise their opinions as then formed, will get a wrong idea from the title of this book. Darwin was such a dominant figure in evolutionary thinking, that his explanation of the theory of Descent by "natural selection" and the "survival of the fittest," was accepted with very great unanimity, and hence "Darwinism," (meaning Darwin's explanation) was, for a time, synonymous with Evolution itself. But many biological students, during the past 15 or 20 years, are disposed to discredit Darwin's ex-

planations, and hence "Darwinism" is losing ground, although the theory of evolution is still maintained as a working hypothesis. Instead, however, of attaching primary importance to Darwin's explanations, other laws are being discussed and recognized.

The book furnishes very interesting reading and is deserving of a wide circulation. In view of existing opinions, the term "deathbed" is rather a strong word to use, and yet it may eventually be the appropriate one. With the exception of an occasional exhibition of undue anxiety in proving positions taken, the arguments and judgments given, are, in the main, fair and convincing.

The author acknowledges that "it is easier to criticise than to do constructive work." He objects to the law of "natural selection" and the "survival of the fittest," as advocated by Darwin, because in such a scheme "chance reigns supreme," no Creator is recognized and no purpose can be detected in the process. Man, both as to his body and mind, is only a highly developed animal.

He very properly insists that all evolution proceeds by definite plans to definite ends; that there are law-controlled factors and no chance; that coöperation among organisms is more important than contending struggle, and that the soul of man is an independent substance.

Christian evolutionists, and there are multitudes of them, can heartily endorse these views. Evolution is certainly "not a purely mechanical process," and the more recent views on the subject indicate that much weight must be given to "internal forces of development."

G. D. STAHLEY.

HINDS AND NOBLE, NEW YORK.

Songs of All the Colleges. No expense of effort has been spared to gather into this collection many of the old and all of the new College Songs. No alumnus is too far removed from the scenes of his college life to be insensible to the ringing cheer of the songs of old college days and this collection will be very welcome to the student. It includes the popular Yale Boola Song. Next to familiar hymns college songs are the greatest favorites with young and old, and to those now in Colleges and Universities as well as to the men who have long quit the college life this very complete collection will be well received.

THE

LUTHERAN QUARTERLY.

APRIL, 1905.

ARTICLE I.

THE OLD LUTHERAN DOCTRINE OF FREE-WILL.*

By Professor J. W. RICHARD, D.D., LL.D.

The *Lehre und Wehre* for March and May, 1904, contains an article entitled, *The Doctrine of Free-will and Conversion in the General Synod.* The opening paragraph of said article, translated into English, reads as follows: "In the January number of the Gettysburg QUARTERLY Prof. Richard, in a violent and arrogant manner, has condemned the pamphlet of the undersigned ["F. P."]: *The Fundamental Difference in the Doctrine of Conversion and Predestination*, and has in addition presented his own views of the subject treated. We take special notice of Prof. Richard's performances, because we assume that upon the whole they represent the *state of theological knowledge in the General Synod.* We say, 'Upon the whole.' We think we know of individuals in the General Synod who have a clearer knowledge of the fundamental doc-

*In this article the word, Free-will, is used to represent the *Liberum Arbitrium* (Mind and Will united) of the older theology. No doubt much confusion arose from this unfortunate combination. Mind as intellect is the soul's faculty for knowing. The Will is the soul's faculty for choices. But the Will cannot choose until the intellect has known or cognized an object. But whenever the soul acts in knowing it at the same time acts in feeling and in willing, for it is the one identical soul that acts, though now the soul may act predominantly as knowing, now predominantly as feeling, now predominantly as willing. These facts are of fundamental importance and should be kept in view throughout this discussion.

trines of the Christian religion than Prof. Richard has shown in his QUARTERLY article. But in general the theological, or rather the untheological, standpoint of Prof. Richard's article is characteristic of the General Synod. A proof of this is the review of Richard's article in *The Lutheran Observer*, the chief organ of the General Synod. This paper can scarcely say enough in praise of Richard's performances, and regards them as a splendid refutation of the teaching of the Synodical Conference."

Our answer to this paragraph from the pen of Prof. Pieper is that so often made by the schoolmen to similar "performances": *Transeat.*

To our surprise Professor Pieper has made no effort to refute our criticism of his misinterpretation of Melanchthon's doctrine of Free-will; nor has he undertaken to show that our parallel between the teaching of Melanchthon and that of Chemnitz on Free-will, is untrue; nor has he tried to overthrow our conclusion that the Missouri teaching on the subject of Predestination is essentially Calvinistic. It is very significant that Professor Pieper should pass over the more important parts of our article, and entertain himself with filing objections to certain purely incidental parts, and especially with making a long harangue against "modern theology"—not the theology of Ritschl and Harnack, who "stand outside the Christian Church," but against "the Richtung which still holds fast to the chief doctrines of Christianity, the doctrines of the Person and Work of Christ, of sin and grace, but wish *so to fashion* and *shape* them, as to make them acceptable to human reason, namely, to the reason of people of culture,"—meaning, we suppose, the Richtung represented by such Lutheran theologians as Thomasius, Frank, Luthardt, Dieckhoff, Cremer, for whose theology we confess, as Professor Pieper charges, "admiration and endorsement." We have admired those distinguished teachers as men, and, having studied their works, we very heartily endorse in general their presentation of the Lutheran teaching on the "chief doctrines" of our most holy faith. But we do not feel called upon to defend these teachers of "modern theology." They need no defense. Their praise is

in all the churches, except in those that wear the collar of Missouri; and their works, we venture to predict, will stand as milestones on the highway of Lutheran history when the "performances" of their detractors shall have been relegated to the forlorn limbus of forgotten lore. In a word, we have but small interest in Professor Pieper's article as a whole, inasmuch as it cannot be considered an answer to the chief points embraced in our discussion; only the second paragraph specially interests us. It reads as follows: "Prof. Richard aims chiefly to prove two things: First, that Melanchthon's Synergism was the *genuine Lutheran doctrine* of the sixteenth century, and that by a transformation—'within less than twelve months'—it was shoved aside by the authors of the Form of Concord. Secondly, Prof. Richard wants also to show that Melanchthon's doctrine is also the doctrine of the Scriptures."

We object decidedly to the manner in which "F. P." has summarized our article, entitled, *The Lutheran Predestination Controversy.* But we pass this by also, and, accepting the challenge implied in "F. P.'s" article, we proceed to set forth *The Old Lutheran Doctrine of Free-will,* or rather, the doctrine of Free-will that prevailed in the Lutheran Church from A. D. 1530 to the death of Melanchthon in A. D. 1560. Nor can a discussion of this theme be rightly regarded as untimely; since for more than a quarter of a century a divisive controversy has raged between sections of the American Lutheran Church on the subject of Predestination and Free-will. This controversy has excited great interest in Germany; and that for the reason that it involves the pivotal doctrine of justification by faith alone, and is to decide ultimately whether the Lutheran Church is to remain Lutheran at its center, or is to become essentially and fundamentally Calvinistic by having its center transferred to the doctrine of Absolute Predestination with its corollary of irresistible grace.

Hence it is presumed that every Lutheran theologian and clergyman in America will welcome a discussion of any principle that underlies or is essentially connected with said controversy, especially when we announce that our treatment is to be *historico-thetical,* rather than controversial as against Pro-

fessor Pieper, inasmuch as we could have no expectation of convincing him that the position of the Synodical Conference has no proper foundation either in the history of the Lutheran Church, or in the Word of God. And we are moved to make the following presentation chiefly by our profound conviction that the estranged and warring parties of Lutherans in this country can never become reconciled to each other, and can never become generally united in one body, until all shall have made a more thorough study of the *origines* of Lutheran history and doctrine, and also a deeper imbibition of the spirit of charity and of mutual respect and confidence, that animated the lives and regulated the conduct of Luther and Melanchthon toward each other. That is, before the different Lutheran bodies in this country can come to a better understanding with each other, they all must come to a better understanding as to what is *primo-fundamental*, *central*, and *determinative* in Lutheranism, and as to what is relatively *secondary* and *peripheral* in Lutheranism; and all must learn to exercise more of that love that "beareth all things; believeth all things; hopeth all things; endureth all things" And it behooves all to recognize the fact that Lutheranism is not a mathematical quantity, nor a fixed point, but a system of doctrines having some freedom of motion within certain metes and bounds; and all must sooner or later come to realize that it is as psychologically impossible to make all Lutherans think alike and hold alike on all doctrines embraced in the Lutheran system, as it is physically impossible to make all clocks tick alike and strike alike in marking the passing hours of the day.

It is in part with the hope of making at least a small contribution to the inculcation of the principles stated above, that we now advance to the discussion of the subject placed at the head of this article, and we begin with the year 1530; for prior to that time there was no Lutheran Church, but only *Lutherans*, who were united in opposition to the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church, rather than in a distinct positive programme of their own. Indeed, prior to the year 1530 there was no general confession of faith among Lutherans, no single bond that held them together and constituted them a Church. Hence

the year 1530 and the Confession delivered at Augsburg in that year must be regarded as normative for Lutheranism and for the Lutheran Church. The Apology of 1531, which proceeded from the author of the Confession, and was approved by Luther and by contemporaneous Lutherans generally, must be regarded as the most important exposition and defense of the Confession. The Schmalkald Articles have value as exhibiting the testimony of many Lutheran teachers against the characteristic teaching of the Papacy and of papal scholasticism, though their violently polemical character imparts to them features of one-sidedness, and correspondingly diminishes their value as an abiding testimony in the Lutheran Church. The Form of Concord did not arise out of the warm, pulsing, generative heart of the original Lutheranism nor did it proceed from the pens of those who stood face to face with the great crisis out of which the Lutheran Church was born. It is manifestly the child of a reviving scholasticism, and was the production of men who had begun to construct systems, and who thought that they could reconcile or remove existing differences of view by exclusions, concessions and compromises. Hence, and also by reason of the prolixity of its presentations, it in many places lacks in distinctness and definiteness of statement, while its breadth is no broader than the scholasticizing philosophy that underlies it and determines its form could permit it to be; for every system of theology, every *Dogmatic*—and the Form of Concord is to no inconsiderable extent a system of theology, a *Dogmatic*—takes the size and shape and form of the mental scheme, logical or philosophical, that is employed in handling the materials, even though the materials be taken from the Word of God. Hence, the Form of Concord, by reason of the date of its origin, and because of the rank of its authors as epigoni, and because of the mental scheme that determined its construction, does not lie within the normating bounds of Lutheranism, and cannot be regarded as strictly normating for the Lutheran Church, at least not in the sense that a man's Lutheranism must be tried, tested and determined by its deliverances, though it may be highly prized as a theological treatise, and as exhibiting the sense in which

certain theologians of the second generation of the Lutheran Church were brought, under great pressure from within and from without, to profess to understand the earlier Lutheran confessions, though it is certain and demonstrable that in previous years, and in the Torgau Book and its antecedents, they had expressed themselves on some subjects very differently from what they did finally in the Form of Concord;* particularly is this the case in regard to the doctrine of Free-will, as is clearly shown by reference to the private and official writings of at least four out of the six authors of the Form of Concord —a fact we stand ready to demonstrate when called on so to do, but meanwhile we ask the reader's attention to a study of the doctrine of Free-will that prevailed in the Lutheran Church from A. D. 1530 to A. D. 1560.

I. IN GENERAL.

It has never been maintained by any Lutheran theologian that Luther's doctrine of Determinism and his doctrine of the "hidden God," as the same are exhibited in *the Assertion of All the Articles* and in the *De Servo Arbitrio* found place in any Lutheran Confession of faith. Neither does his description of Free-will (*Liberum Arbitrium*) as "a downright lie," a "name without reality," and of man in spiritual matters, as being "like a pillar of salt; like Lot's wife; yea, like a block and a stone; like a dead image that does not have the use of eyes, mouth, senses and heart,"† find place in any of the older confessions of the Lutheran Church, not even in the Catechisms, nor in the Schmalkald Articles, written by Luther's own hand. And no person by reading and studying those confessions in their own *verbis ipsissimis*, would or could suppose that the persons who composed and set forth those confessions had ever taught, or meant that those confessions should teach, any such doctrine as is both implied and expressed by the words and sentences quoted above. This statement is so much a matter of fact, that no argument is needed to prove it. The reader can verify it by consulting the documents in question,

* See THE LUTHERAN QUARTERLY, January 1904, pp. 58 *et seqq.*

† *Form of Concord*, Art. II.

the while abstaining from reading into them what is not in them. Moreover, it is well known that during the year 1524 Melanchthon began to doubt the tenability of his own and Luther's deterministic views; and it is also known that his view in regard to Free-will underwent a radical change before he wrote the Augsburg Confession and the Apology, and that subsequently he positively and energetically rejected the words, "stone," "statue," and the like, as applied to man or to his will in relation to conversion. We know also that he purposely kept the doctrine of predestination out of the Augsburg Confession and the Apology, because of the perplexing controversies to which it leads, and that he then already professed to teach habitually that Predestination *follows* faith.* And while it is true on the one hand that Luther did not formally revoke the predestinarian teaching found in the *De Servo Arbitrio*, it is unquestionably true on the other hand that he let it drop completely into the background, the longer the more, until finally, toward the close of his life, "in his explanation of the 26th chapter of Genesis he materially corrected and modified his earlier statement."†

The knowledge of these facts is of fundamental importance as we enter on the study of the Lutheran doctrine of Free-will, as that doctrine received form and expression in the oldest Lutheran confessions, and as it persisted so long in the Lutheran official and private teaching.

II. THE AUGSBURG CONFESSION.

In the eighteenth article of this confession we read as follows: "Of Free-will it is taught that in some sense man has Free-will outwardly to live honorably, and to choose among those things which reason comprehends; but without the grace, assistance and operation of the Holy Spirit man is not

*C. R. II, p. 547.

†Frank in *Die Theologie der Concordienformel*, I. p. 130. Kahnis says: "It can be proved that with him (Luther) this doctrine more and more fell into the background." *Christentum und Lutherthum*, p. 163. Philippi declares that Luther "recalled his earlier utterances on the subject," *Glaubenslehre*, 2 Ed. 4. 1. p. 37. See THE LUTHERAN QUARTERLY, April, 1903, pp. 193 *et seqq*.

able to become pleasing to God, to fear God heartily, or to believe in him, or to cast the inborn evil concupiscence out of his heart; but such things are effected through the Holy Spirit, who is given through the Word of God." Here we have the fundamental teaching of the Lutheran Church concerning Free-will (*Liberum Arbitrium*, mind and will conjoined,) in its relation to external morality, and also in its relation to God; and this is the only confessional teaching on the subject that is catholic in the Lutheran Church and that is universally accepted by the Lutheran Church.

Now let us analyze this first, this only universally accepted, confessional statement of the Lutheran doctrine of Free-will.

First. In the first sentence it vindicates the essential freedom of the human will, in that it declares that man, that is the natural man, has the power of choice. The human will can of its own power, and by its own determination, accept or reject a thing made known by the human reason. This power, more than any other, constitutes man a personality. In a sublime sense the Will is the personality, not that it is the whole of the personality, but it is the culmination of the personality, and is the most important power of the human soul. It is the power to which all other powers of man point, as it is the power which directs and employs all the other human powers. It is the power by which man becomes an ethical factor in the world, and becomes responsible for his use of all his other powers. It is the power by which he determines to hear and to meditate on the Word of God, which is the *conditio sine qua non* of his becoming a Christian. Melanchthon, in his *De Anima*, says: "The Will is the supreme appetent power, and acts freely when an object has been made known by the understanding. Its actions are to accept and to reject (velle ac nolle). Between these is the suspension of action. It wills what is, or what seems to be, good. It avoids what is, or what seems to be, evil."* He defines freedom as "the power of the will which is able to act, or not to act, or to act thus or otherwise." He unqualifiedly rejects the "Stoic necessity," and insists on the ability of man to regulate his ex-

* *C. R.* 3: 153.

ternal actions. But it is not said, nor is it implied, either in the Confession or in the *De Anima*, nor in any writing of Melanchthon's after 1525, that man, or the human Will, is, or is like, a block, a stone, a statue, or a pillar of salt; and much less is it said or implied in the writings in question that man is worse than a block, a stone, a statue and the like, and no person can read these words *into* the Confession or *into* any writing of Melanchthon's after 1525, without committing an act of sheerest interpolation; nor should the ideas conveyed by those words be required of any one as a test of honest subscription to the Augsburg Confession, since such ideas are not generic nor catholic in the Lutheran confessional system, and only that which is generic and catholic in Lutheranism can be required as a test of Lutheranism. It is therefore Lutheran to affirm that the human Will possesses the inherent power of choice in things made known by the understanding. And it is to be noted also that Melanchthon in his *De Anima* is in perfect accord with the Confession on this subject.

Secondly. When it is said that without the grace, assistance and operation of the Holy Spirit, man cannot become acceptable to God, etc., the plain implication is that by such grace, assistance and operation, he *can do* those things that are required of him in his relations to God. The underlying idea is that grace imparts strength and power to the Will, and this it does both by illumining the understanding and by impact as of personality upon personality. Or, as Melanchthon says in the *De Anima*: "The Holy Spirit does not take away the freedom of the Will, but corrects it and turns it to God, according to the maxim: *But he who draws, draws him who is willing.* Joseph's will had power to shake off the Holy Spirit; but when assisted it recovers itself and yields to the Holy Spirit." *

The grace and *assistance* of the Holy Spirit are *precedent* and *operating*, as Augustine says; that is, they anticipate the Will and are active, stimulating and energizing upon the Will. They do not destroy the natural faculties of the human soul, the inherent power to know the truth and the inherent and es-

**C. R.* 13: 162.

sential power to act in view of the truth, but they quicken and strengthen these faculties and arouse them to competency for actions which by reason of sin they are able neither to begin, nor to accomplish by the powers of nature (peragere). Such at least must be regarded as the plain commom-sense meaning of the passage. Certain it is that the *absolute passivity* of the Will under the operation of the Holy Spirit is neither expressed nor implied in the eighteenth article of the Augsburg Confession; but the *activity* of the Will under such divine operation is clearly implied, otherwise there would be no meaning in the word "assistance," and conversion would be *per modum coactionis.* And this conclusion in regard to the activity of the Will under the conceded divine operation is strengthened when it is said: "But this takes place through, that is, by the agency of the Holy Spirit, who is given through, that is, by means of the Word of God," or as the Latin has it: Haec fit in cordibus, quum per verbum Spiritus Sanctus concipitur—*taken*, or *laid hold of*, or *taken to one's self*, as the word *concipitur* is defined in the dictionaries—which can be done only by an action of the Will. When the Holy Spirit takes the things of Christ and shows them to men, and by his gracious activity stimulates the Will, a struggle is inevitable, and the Will must decide; it must obey the truth, or it must reject it. Otherwise, conversion is left without ethical content, and the abiding in sin is without responsibility. The Will under the operation of the Holy Spirit cannot remain in equilibrium, and the Holy Spirit cannot decide for it. Its own conduct (Verhalten) now determines its destiny. No other meaning can be extracted from the eighteenth article of the Augsburg Confession without first reading into it words, or thoughts, or conceptions, that are foreign to it.

Moreover, this interpretation, or one of identical import, was placed on the Article at Augsburg in 1530. The following facts are matters of official record: (a) In the first *Confutation* (Ficker, p. 60) the Confutators say of this article: Sana et catholica est haec assertio principum, and warn the princes against the Determinism expressed in Luther's *De Servo Arbitrio* and in the first edition of Melanchthon's *Loci*

(b) In the Confutation of August 3rd the Confutators say: Quae confessio acceptatur et approbatur. In both cases they state how they understand the article *De libero arbitrio*, that is, essentially as Melanchthon had explained in his private writings of 1527–30. (c) August 18th, the Lutheran seven (Duke John Frederick, the Margrave of Brandenburg, Drs Brück and Heller, Melanchthon, Brentz and Schnepff) of the famous committee of reconciliation, after a two days' conference with the Catholics, reported: "In the sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth articles there is no difference." And Eck from the Catholic side reported: "Article eighteen agrees in regard to Free-will." *

It is simply preposterous to conclude (after having read the two confutations and after having noted the fact that Melanchthon in the first draft of the Apology makes no reference to Article XVIII) that such perfect agreement on said Article could have been effected on the basis of the *absolute passivity* of the Will, or on the the theory of *truncus* and *lapis;* and if the Lutheran seven, here acting in an official capacity falsely interpreted the Article, or acquiesced in a false and mistaken interpretation by the Catholics, and thus betrayed their friends and hoodwinked and deceived their opponents, then it is impossible to shield their names and their memory from the imputation of falsehood, treason and hypocrisy. Moreover, the Confession (Art. 21) boasts that "there is nothing in it which is discrepant with the Scriptures, or with the Catholic Church, or with the Roman Church, in so far as it is known from writers." But every tyro in the History of Doctrines knows that the *lapis-truncus-mere passive-subjectum patiens-subjectum convertendum* theory of Free-will and of man does not have the consensus either of the Catholic Church, or of the Roman Church, as it is known from writers.

Then were the Confessors at Augsburg insincere? Did they equivocate? Did they hide their convictions? Did they mutilate and obscure their own faith and that of their churches? Or did they faithfully witness and heroically defend that faith? Which horn of the dilemma will Professor Pieper take?

*See *The Lutheran Quarterly* for July, 1900, pp. 374–384.

LONGE FUGE: FENUM HABET IN CORNU.

And now when we bring all these facts together we get a total impression that is simply irresistible. Hence we may confidently say of the Article: (a) The idea of the *absolute passivity* of the Will in conversion is excluded. (b) The idea of the activity of the Will in conversion is not excluded. (c) The idea of the activity of the Will in conversion is clearly implied by the German word *Hilfe*, and by the Latin word, *concipitur*. But it must not be concluded that Melanchthon intended to ascribe to Free-will the *beginning* of conversion, or to hint at any justifying merit on account of the activity of Free-will in conversion. These things were never taught by Melanchthon, as we shall hereafter demonstrate.

Nor was the doctrine of Free-will as set forth in the Confession new among Lutherans. Already it had been taught by Melanchthon for three years before he wrote the Augsburg Confession. In an *Excursus** to his *Scholia on Colossians*, published in 1527, he asserts the natural or essential freedom of the Will in the most unqualified terms. He says: "The Will has freedom in choosing those things that belong to nature, as to choose this or that kind of food, to put on this or that kind of clothes, to go hither or thither, to restrain the hand from murder, to abstain from another man's wife. * * * Paul calls these the deeds of the law, which men do without the Holy Spirit, when they obey the law." But Melanchthon also says: "It must be maintained that the nature of man by its natural powers is not able to produce the true fear of God and true confidence toward God, and the other spiritual affections and emotions. * * * We have need of the Holy Spirit to renew and to purify us. * * * What need is there of the Holy Spirit if human nature by its own powers is able to fear God, to trust in God, to lay aside concupiscence, to love the cross? * * * To man God imparts reason and choice. That choice he does not take away, but he imparts life and motion, while we *choose* and *act* (italics ours,) as it is written: '*In him we are, live, and are influenced.*'" The fact is, Melanchthon simply

* Quoted in Galle's *Characteristik Melanchthons*, pp. 277–8. The *Scholia on Colossians* is not reprinted in the *C. R.*

condensed in the Confession what he had taught in the *Excursus* to the *Scholia*. The sentiment is the same; the species of doctrine is identical. To prove this and to make it patent even to the eye, we place the characteristic passages of the *Excursus* and Article XVIII in parallel columns:

Excursus.	*Article.*
De Liberi Arbitrii facultate. Habet libertatem voluntas humana in deligendis his, quae ψυχικά sunt, ut hoc aut illud cibi genus eligere, hoc aut illo genere vestitus uti, huc aut illuc ire, habet et vim carnalis et civilis justitiae efficiendae.	De *libero arbitrio* docent, quod humana voluntas aliquam libertatem ad efficiendam civilem justitiam et deligendas res rationi subjectas.
Qaeritur an sine Spiritu Sancto possumus Deum timere ac credere Deo et crucem amare, etc. Item ut discimus, Spiritu Sancto nobis opus esse, qui renovit nos et purificet.	German: Von frien Willen wird gelehret, dass der Mensch etlichermassen einen freien Willen hat äusserlich ehrbar zu leben und zu wählen unter denen Dingen, so die Vernunft begreift; aber ohne Gnad, Hilfe und Wirkung des heiligen Geistes vermag der Mensch nicht Gott gefällig werden, Gott herzlich zu fürchten, oder zugläuben, oder die angeborne böse Lust aus dem herzen zu werfen; sondern solchs geschicht durch den heiligen Geist, welcher durch Gottes Wort gegeben wird.
Quid enim opus est Spiritu Sancto, si humana voluntas suis viribus potest timere Deum, fidere Deo, deponere concupiscentiam, amare crucem. Denique quae est ista arrogantia, non petere auxilium Spiritus Sancti; cum promiserit eum Christus, sed magis jubere, ut a viribus nostris auxilium petamus? Habes igitur, quae non possit efficere ratio per se.	[See English Translation of German text p. 159.]
Cum humanae mentes audiunt verbum Dei et non repudiant, Spiritus Sanctus simul movet eas, ut perterrefiant et rursus erigantur.	Sed non habet vim sine Spiritu Sancto efficiendae justitiae Dei seu justitiae Spiritualis, quia animalis homo non percipit ea, quae sunt Spiritus Dei; sed haec fit in cordibus quum per verbum Spiritus Sanctus concipitur.

This parallel shows that the thought of the *Excursus* and the thought of the Article are identical. The German Article, *mutatis mutandis*, might pass almost as a condensed translation of the essential points of the *Excursus*. In the Latin we have the pivotal words and sentences of the *Excursus* transferred almost unchanged to the Article. Hence we may lay it down as demonstrated that the *Excursus* is the antecedent and pre-

conception of the Article, just as several of the Schwabach Articles are the antecedents and preconceptions of several of the first seventeen articles of the Confession. Melanchthon had the *Excursus* before him, either in print or in his memory, as a familiar and matured conclusion *de libero arbitrio.* In the *Excursus* the doctrine *de libero arbitrio* is presented in elaborated form, as is befitting the nature of an excursus. In the Confession, the doctrine is presented in the most condensed form, as is befitting the nature and purpose of a confession. In both instances the author affirms the essential freedom of the Will, its power *to choose.* In both instances he affirms the need of the Holy Spirit; in both he speaks of the "help" of the Holy Spirit; in both he employs the instrumentality of the Divine Word; in both he declares the natural impotence of the Will for effecting spiritual righteousness. "The human will does not have freedom to perform Christian or spiritual righteousness. There is need of the Holy Spirit.": *Excursus.* "It (the human will) does not have the power without the Holy Spirit to perform the righteousness of God, or spiritual righteousness:" *Confession.* Identity in the main things could hardly be more identical. The teaching of Melanchthon *de libero arbitrio* has (1527–1530) undergone a radical change. It is now as different from the teaching on the same subject found in Luther's *De Servo Arbitrio* and in the first edition of the *Loci* as the light of the sun is different from the light of the moon. It is fundamentally a different kind of doctrine. Melanchthon no longer affirms that "all things occur necessarily according to the divine predestination, and that there is no freedom of our will." On the contrary he now affirms that "God has given man *reason* and *choice*," and that "we *choose*, we *act*." Man is not in any sense compared to a block, or to a stone, or to a dead image. "God moves trees in one way, cattle in another way, men in another way, according to the nature of each." "God imparts life and motion, while we *choose* and *act*." All beginning is from God. "The grace, help and operation of the Holy Spirit" are absolutely necessary; but they not only do not *exclude*, they *include* the idea of consequent *activity* on our part. The Holy Spirit acts that we *may be enabled* to act. He

supplies the conditions and imparts to us the power of acting aright. And now we, as essentially free personalities, cannot help acting, choosing, determining. The Holy Spirit, by his operation, has changed the center of gravity in our souls. He has put a new perception into our understanding, a new thought into our mind by means of the truth. A psychical change has been wrought. Henceforth and forever we will carry a new impression. And now by that law of mind, according to which when one faculty of the mind acts, all the faculties act, there results some form of volitional action. The will either advances toward, or it recoils from, the object of perception, of thought. That it should do so is the necessity of consequence. The divine *auxilium*, *Hilfe*, has made it psychically and morally necessary for us to act, otherwise there is no meaning in these words. We are helped *to act;* the acting we cannot avoid; but by the power of self-determination, which is the climax of our personality, we can assent to the truth that has been made known to us and has been urged upon us, or we can resist it. By assenting we gain ampler knowledge of the truth and larger freedom in obeying the truth.

Thus conversion has a God-ward side and a man-ward side. It is an effect wrought in man by the Holy Spirit, but in the man who *apprehends* the truth when it is divinely made known, and who by an act of his own will, divinely assisted, assents to the truth, and does not resist it. Hence repentance is called *μετάνοια, a change of mind;* and faith, *πίστις* (from *πείθω*), *a persuasion* in regard to something—both are gifts of God, but both are acts of man. The command to repent, and the command to believe, which come to us by divine grace and attended by the divine energy, would be but mendacious imperatives, were there no power in us, under the given conditions, to make response, that is, to determine ourselves for or against the commands. Moreover, having posited the essential freedom of the Will, as Melanchthon did, as the power *to choose* and *to act*, volitional action, since knowing, feeling and willing always coexist, exists whenever the soul comes to know an object which is at the same time an object for choice and decision. By the Word of God the soul comes to know the

truth, and to perceive a duty in the divine commands, *Repent, Believe.* Therefore, etc. To conclude otherwise is to conclude against the teaching of Scripture, against the facts of experience, against a fundamental law of the mind; is to conclude that we are automata in the hands of God, "worthless links in an adamantine series of causes and effects"; is to glorify the sovereign will of God by annihilating the self-determining will of man; is to find the ultimate ground of salvation in the particularistic divine decree and not in God's universal will of salvation; is to push the Lutheran *fides specialis*, which requires not only knowing, but also willing, from its central position, and to put the Calvinistic *gratia irresistibilis* in its place; is to print the love of God in the margin, and to chuck man, the image of God and the subject of salvation, into a pigeon-hole; is to change the center of gravity of the Lutheran system, and to build the Order of Salvation on an abstract proposition, and not on "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have eternal life."

III. OTHER WRITINGS.

1. In the *Saxon Visitation Articles*, formally endorsed by Luther and Bugenhagen, we have an exhibition essentially of the same doctrine of Free-will. It is affirmed that the Will is free to do the works of the law, but that "spiritual righteousness must be *accepted* from above."* The words, stock, stone, statue, are not used, and the understanding and the will are not spoken of as "the subject to be converted." And yet it was on the basis of these articles that the Saxon churches accepted the Wittenberg teaching and were reformed according to the Lutheran conception of doctrine and practice.

We now quote from Melanchthon's *Annotations on the Epistle to the Romans*, 1529: "When we have conceived faith, now truly we know that God cares for us, that we are protected by God, and we venture to call upon God and to seek assistance. Nor is faith obtained without a *struggle*. In the whole course of life, we must contend with our unbelief and *must arouse* the

* *C. R.* 26 : 27, 78, 79. Italics ours.

sluggish conscience by the Word and by faith."* And on p. 478 *ibiem:* "The prophet speaks of another Word, which preaches the remission of sins, and freely offers righteousness to those who believe. But he teaches that faith is attained in this wise, if we hear the Word, even though it be preached by the human voice. Therefore the efficient cause of faith is the Word, by which God *persuades* and *moves* hearts to believe. Without the Word the Holy Spirit is not given." It is evident that in these passages Melanchthon views conversion as an ethical process, in which God uses ethical means—"*persuades* and *moves*"—and in which man uses his Free-will. Attention may be called specially to the declarations that "faith is not attained without a *struggle*," and that as long as we live we must *resist* our own unbelief. And that the salvation of the individual does not depend on particularistic predestination had been already declared in *The Scholia on Colossians:* "When human minds hear the Word of God, and *do not reject* it, the Holy Spirit at the same time moves them so that they are alarmed and then comforted,"†—in which again we have an action of the mind and of the will, a *Verhalten*—"Do not reject it," which implies the power to accept it.

Now if we take all these passages together, we find in them not merely a distinct foreshadowing, but a clear expression, of a doctrine of Free-will that is in essential—almost in verbal—harmony and identity with that contained in the Confession. In other words, Melanchthon's new doctrine of Free-will, which first appeared formally in 1527, and was still further developed during the next two years, has now become, and in 1530 is officially declared to be, the *Lutheran* doctrine of Free-will. The same ethical feature that manifestly characterizes this doctrine in Melanchthon's private writings has been retained in the expression of it in the Confession. The author undoubtedly means to remove all excuse of indifference, and to awaken a sense of responsibility. For in the *Visitation Articles* he says that "men must be admonished to *arouse* themselves to seek assistance from God. Thus God will even *assist* the natural

* *C. R.* 15 : 444. Italics ours.

† Quoted from Herrlinger's *Die Theol. Melanchthons*, p. 79.

gifts."* In the Confession it is taught that in becoming acceptable to God we have the grace, *assistance* and operation of the Holy Spirit. But in the *Annotations on Romans* he had denied, as to the end of his life he denied, that our works are in any sense meritorious, or are the cause of election.†

IV. THE APOLOGY.

Next to the Confession the Apology is Melanchthon's noblest monument. That he so often associated the two and reconfessed them as long as he lived, is proof positive that he saw nothing in either that conflicts with the other, and that his views underwent no material change during the last thirty years of his life. And the fact that in the last year of his life, while discussing the doctrine of Free-will, he appeals to his *Loci*,‡ is also proof positive that in his consciousness there is no difference between his own dogmatic teaching on Free-will and the teaching of the Church on the same subject. That is, at the same period of his life he reaffirms the teaching of the Church and his own dogmatic teaching. This fact assists us in interpreting the Confession and the Apology, for it is a principle universally recognized that creeds and confessions must be interpreted by the private writings of those who composed them and continue to reaffirm them.

In the Apology the article *De Libero Arbitrio* is treated rather cursorily, though "our adversaries" are impliedly condemned for teaching that "without the aid of the Holy Spirit men are able to love God and to keep his commandments as regards the substance of actions, and to merit grace and justification by works which reason effects *per se* without the Holy Spirit."§ It is also said: "Moreover if any sophist should cavil that righteousness is in the Will, therefore it cannot be assigned to faith, which is in the understanding, the reply is easy, since those in the schools also confess that the Will

* *C. R.* 26 : 27.
† *C. R.* 15 : 473–5. Italics ours.
‡ *C. R.* 9 : 767.
§ Müller, 218, 68.

directs the understanding so that it assents (ut assentiatur)* to the Word of God. And we say more plainly: As the terror of sin and death are not only thoughts of the understanding, but also dreadful agitations of the Will fleeing the judgment of God, so faith is not only knowledge in the understanding, but also confidence in the Will, that is, it is *to will* and *to accept* that which is offered in the promise, viz., reconciliation and the remission of sins." † (Italics ours).

The first passage quoted above is, as regards the sense of it, in strict accord with the second part of the quotation from the Confession. The passage clearly implies that what men cannot do without the aid of the Holy Spirit, that they can do by the aid of the Holy Spirit, for the *doing* is that of men, but it must be steadily kept in mind that neither here nor elsewhere has Melanchthon taught that works can merit justification, or are in any sense a cause of justification. His doctrine of justification is *solifidian* from the beginning to the end of his theological career.

In the second passage quoted we have the declaration that the understanding "*assents* to the Word of God," and this is exactly what Melanchthon teaches in the *Loci* when he says that "the Will assents to the Word of God," for it makes no difference in the essence of the meaning whether it be said that the *Will* assents, or that the *understanding* assents. In either case it is the responsible *Ego* that *assents*, and every tyro in theology knows that there is no *saving* assent to the Word of God, except that which is both of the understanding and of the Will. In fact it is impossible to make a clear distinction between the faculties of understanding and Will, as acting separately and apart from each other, in the matter of faith. Faith is an action both of the understanding and of the Will. And it is also proper to note here the fact that in the Apology Melanchthon uses the same words, *assentiatur verbo*

*Says Harpers' *Latin Dictionary*: "Assentio=sentiendo se applicare, designates a friendly joining of one's self to any one. * * * So of conduct, *to yield*." Thus clearly the word designates not only an action of the mind (*mens*), but also an action of the will (*voluntas*).

†Müller, Art. III, 183.

Dei (and in the very same sense) that he uses in the *Loci: Assentiens verbo Dei.* Why should Professor Pieper strain out the one and swallow the other? Why should he repudiate the *assentiens verbo Dei* of the *Loci* as "synergistic," and accept the *assentiatur verbo Dei* of the Apology as orthodox, and hold it as confessionally obligatory? We should like for him to answer these questions with arguments from the Scriptures. We say, "from the Scriptures," for Professor Pieper professes to prove his positions from the Scriptures alone.

But what will Professor Pieper do with the *velle et accipere hoc quod in promissione offertur, videlicet reconciliationem et remissionem peccatorum?* * For here it is evident that the Apology defines faith as *to wish* and *to accept* grace or the remission of sins. Is *velle* passive? By no means. According to Harpers' *Latin Dictionary* it is equivalent to "Germ. wollen; Engl. will, expressing an exercise of volition, and corresponding in most cases to German wollen; in Engl. mostly rendered *to wish, want, intend, purpose, propose, be willing, consent, will*"—all acts of that faculty of the human soul which chooses and determines. The word does not merely imply action; it *expresses* action. In this instance it means *to wish, to want,* the remission of sins. So also with the *accipere hoc.* To accept a thing is to act with reference to that thing; first to put forth a *volition* for that thing, and then to appropriate that thing to one's self. The influences and incentives leading up to the volition and the appropriation may be very powerful, but the volition and the appropriation are personal *acts,* and are so regarded by the self-consciousness, the court of final appeal in the premises, and are so treated by every legal tribunal in the world. In the case before us, faith, which is described as both knowledge in the understanding and confidence in the heart, "wishes and accepts reconciliation and remission of sins." In reality it is the human *Ego* that *wishes* and *accepts.* It is absurd to suppose that God or the Holy Ghost wishes and accepts *for* us, and it remains to be proved that they determine *our* acceptance as the vernal sun melts the snow, merely by affecting us with-

* Müller, Art. III, 183, where the Apology says that "faith is not only knowledge in the understanding, but confidence in the will."

out any action or volition, without any *Verhalten*, of our own. And it is deterministic to suppose that God determines the action of the Will, or the volition of man, in any other way than by personal influence exerted on the understanding and on the Will according to the fundamental laws of each, in cases like that under consideration, by drawing and persuading us, not by dragging and pushing us as blocks of wood are dragged and pushed, but by causing us to "know the truth," which truth, according to Lutheran teaching, has its own energizing efficiency, and is the instrument by which the Holy Spirit is given, "who, in his own time and place, works faith in those who hear the Gospel," but so that "conversion"—and there can be no conversion without faith—"is in part a work of grace, and in part a work (Leistung) of man," as the venerable Dr. Luthardt expresses it.* Or as described by Thomasius: "Faith denotes the decisive moment in which the salvation-applying activity of the Divine Spirit becomes the salvation-appropriating activity of the human spirit. It is the act of the human personality brought about by the Holy Spirit, by virtue of which the human personality turns itself to the grace of God in Christ in order to take it (grace) over to itself; consequently it is the point of union of the divine working of grace and of the human self-determination called forth by grace, God's work and gift, and at the same time man's own act, his own, free, personal Verhalten (I believe.")†

In describing faith as *velle et accipere reconciliationem*, etc., and as *obedientia erga evangelium*‡ Melanchthon is not supposed to be juggling with words, nor to be ignorant of the meaning of the words used by him. The just, not to say the charitable, supposition is that he used words according to their grammatico-historical meaning, and that he knew that meaning. It devolves upon Professor Pieper and his theological *confreres* to show that by the *ut assentiatur verbo Dei* and the *velle et accipere hoc* and the *obedientia erga evangelium* Melanchthon meant to teach the *absolute passivity* of the human understand-

* *Kompendium der Dogmatik*, seventh Ed. p. 254.
† *Person und Werk Christi*, II, third ed. p. 385.
‡ Müller, Art. III, p. 187.

ing and Will in conversion, and in believing (including the *prima initia fidei*), and in the appropriation of salvation; or rather, that he meant to teach that there is no such thing as the *appropriation* of salvation, only an *application* which overcomes the most obstinate resistance. As to what Melanchthon means by the *assentiens verbo Dei* in the *Loci*, Professor Pieper professes to know. He ought therefore to know what these words mean in the Apology. Dr. Thomasius, who will be accepted as good authority wherever THE LUTHERAN QUARTERLY is read, except in the Missouri camp, quotes with approbation from the Apology the passages we have quoted, especially the *assentiatur verbo Dei*, and the *velle et accipere* italicized, and says: "The identical propositions are repeated by Melanchthon in the *Loci* in the following definitions: 'Faith is assent (*assentiri*) to the entire Word of God as it is set forth to us, and to the promise of gratuitous reconciliation as given for the sake of Christ, and is confidence in the mercy of God as promised for the sake of Christ the Mediator;' *—thus at once identifying the teaching of Melanchthon in the Apology and the teaching of the same Melanchthon in the *Loci* of the third period (1543–1559) on the all-important subject of Free-will in its attitude (Verhalten) toward the Word of God and the promise of salvation. And it is also worthy of note that in this same connection Thomasius defines *fiducia* as "special, personal *appropriation* of the promised salvation" (italics ours). Hence: Inasmuch as the Apology is a formal exposition and defense of the Confession, it must follow that the *assentiri verbo Dei* and the *velle et accipere reconciliationem* tell us what Melanchthon meant by the *Hilfe* and *accipitur* of the Confession; otherwise the Apology is a fraud and a deception. But the first pair of words given above as clearly and as unmistakably set forth volitional action as does the *uxorem velle ducere*.

THEREFORE, ETC.

The only difference is this: In the *uxorem*, etc., the Will acts by its natural powers. In the other case the Will acts under

* *Person und Werk*, 3 ed., II, p. 402.

the influence of the Word and of the Holy Spirit. But in both cases the Will *acts*.

The dilemma in which this conclusion places Professor Pieper needs no explanation.

V. THE PROMOTION THESES.

In 1537 Melanchthon wrote *The Disputation* for the examination of a candidate for promotion in theology. The promotions, as they were called, were official transactions conducted under the auspices of the theological Faculty, and were attended by immense crowds, consisting of theologians, professors, superintendents, preachers and students.* The candidate on this occasion defended *inter alias* the following theses composed by Melanchthon, and officially submitted: "Our will is not active without the Holy Spirit, but when by the Gospel it arouses and comforts itself, it is assisted by the Holy Spirit.

"For it must be truly established that we acquire the benefits of the Gospel, in which also is the gift of the Holy Spirit.

"Since we begin with the Word, men must be taught to resist their natural unbelief.

"I do not approve the Manichæans, who attribute no activity to the human will, not even when assisted by the Holy Spirit.

"I am pleased with the dictum of Augustine, who says: He assists those who receive the gift of calling with becoming piety, and preserve the blessings of God in them, as far as man can.

"Therefore also the blessing of God must be recognized, in that the promise is general, and that it is the will of God to save all. And care and diligence must be aroused in us, so that we do not indulge our natural unbelief, but resist it."†

Here is "Synergism" full-fledged, "set forth and faithfully explicated in the school by Philip Melanchthon," and defended by some candidate in the presence of a multitude of witnesses. What does all this signify? Does it signify that the doctrine

* Haussleiter, *Aus der Schule Melanchthons*, p. IV.
† *C. R.* 12:481.

of Free-will contained in the Form of Concord dominated Wittenberg in 1537?

VI. THE VARIATA.

In the year 1540 Melanchthon issued a new edition of the Augsburg Confession, which is now generally mentioned as the *Variata*. It is an established fact that no one found fault with this edition of the Confession so long as Melanchthon lived.* It was used by official authorization at diets and colloquies from that of Worms in 1541 to that of Worms in 1557. It was ordered, revised and approved by Luther, and was called by him the "dear Confession." Melanchthon, acting in an official capacity, declared that the meaning was not changed, "though in the later edition some things have been either more mildly expressed or have been better explained." Even Melanchthon's most violent enemies, the Flacianists, used it without hesitation. At the Naumburg Convention of Princes in 1561 it was endorsed as "the same Confession somewhat more stately and elaborate, repeated, and also explained and enlarged on the basis of the Holy Scriptures." † Its title page declared it to be the "Confession delivered to the Emperor Charles V at Augsburg, anno MDXXX." There can be no doubt, then, that what it teaches was endorsed both privately and officially for at least twenty years as the doctrine of the Lutheran Church.

In the eighteenth article of the *Variata* we read as follows: "Concerning Free-will they (the churches) teach that man's will has some liberty to work civil righteousness, and to choose such things as reason can attain unto; but it has no power without the Holy Spirit to work spiritual righteousness, because Paul says: 'The animal man perceiveth not the things of the Spirit of God,' and Christ says: 'Without me ye can do nothing.' Now spiritual righteousness is wrought in us when we are helped by the Holy Spirit. Moreover, we receive the Holy Spirit when we assent to the Word of God, so that

* See Strobel, *Apologie Melanchthons*, p. 94. Weber, *Kritische Geschichte*, *A. C.*, II, pp. 508-9. THE LUTHERAN QUARTERLY, Oct. 1898.

† Weber, II, *Beilage*, II.

through faith we are comforted in terrors of conscience, as Paul teaches when he says: 'That we might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith.' "

The teaching especially to be noted here is embraced in the words: "When we *are helped* by the Holy Spirit," and "when we *assent* to the Word of God." The first quotation reminds us of the words, "grace, assistance, operation of the Holy Spirit," found in the so-called *Invariata*. Such a declaration does not imply absolute passivity in us. When I am *helped* to do a thing, or to attain to an end, or to become what I have not heretofore been, I am supposed to be in some sense *active*. I am supposed at least to *accept* the help that is proffered. I am ill beyond the reach of self-restoration. I learn of a sovereign remedy. I am visited by a competent physician. I must at least *accept* the remedy, I must *submit* to the operation of the physician, and must follow his counsel, otherwise restoration to health will not be effected in me. All this involves the action of my will, though all the merit of my restoration is due to the physician and to the efficiency of the remedy. At least so much is involved in the *usus loquendi* when it is said that something is wrought in us by the *help* of another.

And as for the second quotation: "When we assent to the Word of God," here we have the identical words used already in the Apology, and employed subsequently by Melanchthon in the *Loci: assentiri verbo Dei.* The *assenting* is a personal act. *We* assent, and our assenting to the Word of God is the condition upon which we receive the Holy Spirit. Beyond question this is good Lutheran doctrine. Why should Professor Pieper object to it? It was accepted by all Lutherans so long as Melanchthon lived, and it was only after he was dead and gone that a few fanatics scented heresy in this eighteenth article of the *Variata* which *in singulis et in omnibus* had been preëminently *the* Lutheran Confession. It is still good Lutheran doctrine that spiritual righteousness is wrought in us when we are *helped* by the Holy Spirit; and we receive the Holy Spirit when we *assent* to the Word of God. We cannot conceive that the theologians—Melanchthon, Brentz, Andreae, Runge, *et. al.*—who met each other at Worms in 1557 and

made their declaration of abiding adherence to the Augsburg Confession (*Variata*) and to the Apology were not Lutherans, or were Lutherans in every doctrine except in that of Free-will. Nor can we suppose that these men did not know the meaning of the article in question, or that they consciously or unconsciously read into it the doctrine of *absolute passivity*. If Professor Pieper thinks they did, let him prove it, and thus make an end of controversy on this point.

VII. THE CONFESSIO SAXONICA.*

In the year 1551 Melanchthon, in obedience to a command of his Elector, prepared *The Repetition of the Augsburg Confession*, commonly called *Confessio Saxonica*. In the first paragraph of the preface the author declares: "We mean simply and faithfully to reiterate the sum of the doctrine which is preached in all the churches that embrace the Confession of the Reverend Dr. Luther, and we repeat the doctrine of the Confession which was presented to the Emperor Charles at the Diet of Augsburg in the year 1530, although some things are here more fully recited."

The name under which this Confession is exhibited at once inspires confidence. It is not a new confession, but simply the Augsburg Confession *repeated* and amplified. In a convention of Lutheran theologians assembled at Wittenberg this Confession was subjected to the most rigid scrutiny, and was then signed and endorsed by synods, universities, superintendents and theologians (including John Brentz)† from Pomerania to Strassburg. It was often published separately and again and again in connection with the Augsburg Confession, the Apology, and the Würtemberg Confession of 1552, and in various *Corpora Doctrinae*.‡ It is a genuine Lutheran Confession

* *C. R.* 28 : 327–468.

† Salig, I, 671–3, who very correctly remarks. "Many princes and counts had sent their theologians to Wittenberg. These carefully perused the Confession, pronounced it to be in harmony with the Augsburg Confession, and subscribed it as a genuine symbolical book. If Melanchthon's doctrine at that time had not been recognized as the genuine Lutheran doctrine, it would not have been approved. But the evidences were yet there, and they could not be denied."

‡ *C. R.* 28 : 346 *et seqq.* Subscriptions, *Ibid.* pp. 457–468.

and was so regarded by all Lutherans of the time except that after a long while Flacius* found some fault with its definition of righteousness, but not with the teaching on Free-will.

In the article on Free-will the *Saxonica* says: "Man is by no means able to free himself from sin and eternal death by his natural powers, but this liberation and conversion of man to God, and spiritual renewal, are effected through the Son of God who quickens us by the Holy Spirit, as it has been said: 'If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his.' And the Will when the Holy Spirit has been accepted is not now inactive."

There can be no reasonable question as to the meaning of this passage. The subject treated is conversion. This is effected by the Son of God and by the Holy Spirit, but the Spirit must *be accepted.* The sentences, "When the Spirit is given," "When the Spirit is conceived," "When the Spirit is accepted," "Drawn by the Spirit," are of frequent occurrence in Melanchthon's treatment of conversion. When the Holy Spirit is given through the Word, and is accepted, the Will is not now, is not under these circumstances, *inactive*, *jam non est otiosa*—this last sentence being also of frequent occurrence in Melanchthon's treatment of conversion. And that the last refuge of doubt as to Melanchthon's meaning in this passage may be removed, we now quote the paragraph that immediately follows the one quoted above: "We do not therefore speak of an inactive (*otiosa*) knowledge, and they err who think that remission of sins occurs in the inactive (*otiosis*), without any action of the mind, without any struggle and without any perception of consolation in real terrors, in that age which is now able to understand the Word of doctrine, as is said: 'Faith comes from hearing, hearing from the Word of of God.' And because we set forth consolation to consciences in penitence, we do not here add questions about predestination, or about Election, but we lead all readers to the Word of God, and we bid them learn God's will from his Word, as the Eternal Father has expressly enjoined: 'Hear ye him.' Let them not indulge in other speculations. It is most certain

* *C. R.* 9:105.

that the preaching of repentance appertains to all men and accuses all men. So also the promise is general, and offers remission of sins to all, according to those general (*universalia*) declarations: 'Come unto me all ye that labor and are heavily laden, and I will give you rest,' and in John 3, 'That whosoever believeth on him might not perish, but have everlasting life,' Rom. 10, 'Whosoever believeth on him shall not be confounded.' Also: 'The Lord of all, who is rich toward all who call upon him.' Rom. 11: 'God hath concluded all under disobedience that he might have mercy on all.' Let each one include himself in this general (universalis) promise and not indulge in unbelief, but strive that he may assent to the Word of God, and obey the Holy Spirit, and pray for assistance, as thus it is said: 'By how much more will he give the Holy Spirit to them that ask him!'"

Then immediately follows the article on Conversion and the Will, from which we first quoted. In the longer quotation it is clearly affirmed that remission does not occur in those who are *inactive*, without an *action* of the mind, without a *struggle*, without *assenting to the Word of God* (assentiri verbo Dei) without prayer, without obeying the Holy Spirit. Activity is affirmed in almost every sentence. In addition the *Saxonica* is explicit and pronounced on the subject of the all-inclusiveness of the divine promise of redemption. The will of God is an open will. It is set forth in the Divine Word. It is not limited by any secret decree of particularistic election. It offers remission of sins to all men. It makes salvation dependent upon faith, and "by faith is meant confidence acquiescing in the Son of God, the Propitiator, for the sake of whom we are received, and we do not please on account of our own virtues or the fulfilling of the law."

We say now for the sake of emphasis that this Confession was most widely received in the Lutheran Church. It professes to be "the consensus of the true Catholic Church of God," "to recite the meaning of the Augsburg Confession and the common consent of these churches." The Brandenburg theologians declared it to be "in words and sentences not only Christian, pure, correct and in harmony with our sacred Augs-

burg Confession and the *Loci Communes*, but also somewhat clearer and stronger." John Wigand, who later became a Flacianist, and Andrew Theobold, both legates from Mansfeld, "find, thank God! and confess that this writing is in harmony with the Augsburg Confession, and states thoroughly and clearly the doctrines of the most important articles of the Christian faith." The ministers and professors at Strassburg testify, each one with his own hand subscribing, "that it is in accord with the one true doctrine of the essence and will of God." The Synod of Hither Pomerania "affirms before God and all Saints in heaven and on earth that our Confession is the true and perpetual consensus of the Catholic Church of the Son of God."* In a word, it is the Augsburg Confession repeated and expounded. It shows how the Augsburg Confession was understood at that time, and what it was believed to teach.

Certainly this leaves scarcely anything to be desired in our contention. But inasmuch as some of the subscribers refer to the *Loci*,† and speak of Melanchthon in the most affectionate terms as "our beloved preceptor," we turn now to the private teaching of the great Preceptor during two decades before the appearance of the *Saxonica*.

VIII. MELANCHTHON—1530–1550.

In *The Commentary on Romans*, (1532) to "the scruple of particularity" Melanchthon opposes "the general promises," and declares that we must not judge of the will of God by the reason without the Word of God. "They are justified who believe, and they are elected who do not resist the call, but believe the Gospel, and persevere to the end," thus clearly making election dependent on faith. Again: "Let no one scrutinize the secret majesty of God, but let him behold the God who calls by the promise, and let him lay hold of his will in the Word, which is general. As Paul says: It is not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth, but of God who showeth

* The Commendations and Subscriptions are found in *C. R.* 28: pp. 457–468.

† *Ibid.*, p. 462.

mercy, that is, mercy is the cause of election. It is not ours to will and to run, and yet these things take place in the Will, in him who runs, and does not resist."* And in the argument of the Epistle he says: "Faith is not only knowledge, but assent, for which also an action of the Will is required, which is to desire (vellē) and to accept the promise, and to acquiesce in it. But this faith is conceived when we assent to the promise of the Gospel, with which the alarmed mind comforts itself, the Holy Spirit at the same time by the Word moving the heart to believe."†

Clearly enough this passage posits an action of the Will in the appropriation of salvation, but of the Will as moved by the Holy Spirit, who through the Word moves the heart, but the motion is that of the human Will, and consequently possesses something of that ethical content which Melanchthon, beginning in 1527, constantly ascribed to Conversion.

Already in 1533 Melanchthon had established the closest connection between predestination and justification: "When we inquire concerning justification we begin with the Word, so when we inquire concerning predestination we must begin with the Word and the Gospel," says he in the *Loci* of 1533.‡ Much stress is also here laid on the universality of the promise, until at length it is said: "Since it must be affirmed that the promise is indeed general as regards the Will of God, so that *a posteriori* in justification we say that there is some cause in the recipient, not worthiness, forsooth, but because he lays hold of the promise, with which, as Paul says, the Holy Spirit is active. Faith comes by hearing. So also in regard to election we judge *a posteriori*, that beyond doubt those are elected who lay hold of mercy, and persevere in that confidence to the end." It is evident that Melanchthon opposes all thoughts of particularistic election. He connects predestination with faith in a causal, though not meritorious relation. He denies that there are contradictory wills in God, declares that mercy is the cause of election, denies that God is a respecter of persons. No-

* *C. R.* 15: p. 680.
† *Ibid.* p. 544.
‡ *C. R.* 21: 330.

where, indeed, does he connect election with any secret activity of God, but always with faith and with perseverence in faith.

Now the bearing of all this on Free-will is evident, since Melanchthon never tires of affirming that man must *assent* to the Gospel.

But all these books were published, and this teaching was delivered *ex cathedra* at Wittenberg, years before Luther died, and yet we look in vain for a single word of protest from the great man who ruled things at Wittenberg as with a rod of iron. On the contrary, not only by his silence, but by his laudations of Melanchthon's books he in effect endorsed those views of Free-will and of Predestination, even in extravagant terms. Of the *Loci* of 1535 he said to the Wittenberg students: "Read Philip's *Loci* next to the Bible. In this most excellent book the pure theology is taught in a quiet and orderly way. Augustine, Bernard, Bonaventura, Lyra, Gabriel Biel, Staupitz, have much that is good; but Master Philip can explain the Scriptures and present their meaning in brief compass."* Think of it! "Next to the Bible!" and then he lauds Melanchthon above the greatest theological doctors of all preceding ages. And that is not all. Only a couple weeks before his death he wrote: "Should Philip be taken from the University half the students will leave on account of his absence."† Still more: In the Preface (1545) to the first edition of his own works he he extols "Philip's *Loci Communes*" above all other works on systematic divinity, saying finally of his beloved friend: "What God hath wrought through this instrument, not only in literature, but in theology, his own works sufficiently testify." And yet in the editions of the *Loci* of 1535 and 1543 Melanchthon had written in regard to conversion: "Three causes are conjoined: the Word, the Holy Spirit, and the Will not wholly inactive (*non sane otiosa*), but resisting its own weakness," and had said: "Only will, and God anticipates," and: "God draws, but draws him who is willing," and in the latter edition had used the *assentiens, nec repugnans verbo Dei*

* Matthesins, *Twelfth Sermon.*

† *C. R.* 6 : 10; De Wette, 5 : 774.

(which is so repugnant to Professor Pieper), and had declared that "the Will is not as a statue, and that spiritual emotion is not impressed upon it as though it were a statue"

Well, we leave Professor Pieper to make the proper comments. Perhaps he will say that neither Melanchthon, nor Luther at that time, was a good Lutheran; that both had forsaken the pure doctrine, and had begun to anticipate "modern theology, which is through and through *dishonest*," while its "entire standpoint is a *huge lie*."* Perhaps he will say in addition, "Had I been at Wittenberg I would not have held common prayer with either of them. Away with them! Give me Flacius."

But while awaiting Professor Pieper's comment we may be permitted to say: The doctrine of Free-will that now (1530–1551) prevailed in the Lutheran Church and was accepted by the Lutheran Church, is found in the official documents, and in the private writings of Melanchthon, quoted on the preceding pages. Against this doctrine no Lutheran voice was raised during the period. All alike subscribed the Augsburg Confession and the Apology, and all alike praised and lauded the *Loci*. "In June 1549 Flacius wrote Melanchthon: 'As little as I can wish my own destruction, so little do I wish that of your *Loci*.' And Tilmann Hesshusius said in an address: 'As in his commentaries on the Scriptures Philip has surpassed all other writers of the Church, so in his *Loci* has he surpassed himself.' Calvin seems to be the only person who was not satisfied with Melanchthon's teaching on Predestination and Free-will."† In 1559 Melanchthon wrote to his elector: "During the life-time of Luther and afterwards I rejected those *Stoic and Manichaean deliria*, that Luther and others had written, namely, that all works, good and evil, in all men, good and evil, must occur as they do. It is evident that such speech is contrary to God's Work, is destructive of all discipline, and is blasphemous toward God."‡ And in order to show that Luther had in practice abandoned the absoluteness of his

* "F. P." in *Lehre und Wehre*, May 1904, p. 198.
† Dr. Carl Schmidt, *Philipp Melanchthon*, p. 574.
‡ *C. R.* 9: p. 766.

theory of Predestination, he refers also to his (Luther's) *Trostschriften*, and letters, and says: "I and others in his presence have often heard him comfort others thus: You must hold to the promise, which is *universalis*, and we must not exclude ourselves."*

What shall we say then? The Lutheran Church had now passed beyond its formative period. It was established; it was organized; it had a distinctive confessional system; it had commentaries on the Scriptures, and it had a hand-book on theology which had almost the authority of a confession of faith and was often called *opus sacrosanctum*. Its doctrine of Free-will was as clearly defined and was as universally accepted by its members as was its doctrine of the Person and Work of Christ. But in this doctrine of Free-will the harsh expressions employed by Luther in the heat of controversy do not appear. Luther did not make any part of the *De Servo Arbitrio*, nor any part of the Commentary on the ninetieth Psalm, confessional, nor is he known to have uttered one word of complaint against anything that Melanchthon wrote on the subject of Free-will after 1527. On the contrary, as it is conceded, he materially modified his earlier views in the interest of practical Christianity. More and more he emphasized the doctrine of the *Deus revelatus*, and of the *vocatio universalis*, and the article of justification by faith alone,† so that in his riper years his theology is represented pre-eminently by these three principles just now named. His earlier doctrine of Free-will is practically supplanted by what Melanchthon, in the interest of the ethical content of conversion, has for many years taught on this subject. His own earlier teaching on this subject, as already shown, though not formally revoked by him, has been allowed to fall into the back-ground—rather, to be thoroughly superseded in practice.

We now ask, is it just, is it honest, is it honorable, toward Luther to force into a Lutheran confession, words and phrases about Free-will, and in reality a doctrine of Free-will in its relation to conversion, which Luther did not desiderate in the

* *Ibid.* p. 769.

† See *The Lutheran Quarterly*, April, 1903, pp. 195 *et seqq.*

Augsburg Confession and in the Apology, and which he did not place in his Catechisms, nor in the Schmalcald Articles, and which he did not rebuke his followers for rejecting? Is it obligatory upon us to-day, in order to insure our standing as Lutherans, to affirm that in spiritual matters man is like a block, a stone, a pillar of salt, a lifeless image, which has neither organs nor senses, and that in conversion he is even worse than a block or a stone, and is "absolutely passive," when no such descriptions and conceptions appeared in any Lutheran confession until half a century after the Lutheran Church was established, not until long after those who had written and those who had subscribed her earlier confessions and Catechisms, had ceased from their labors on earth—not until after some vengeful scholastics had fought over Luther's dead bones and had sought to canonize the very clothes that he wore? Is it un-Lutheran to express the wish, with Thomasius and other good Lutherans,* that "the Flacian truncus and lapis, as endangering moral responsibility"—and we add, that such a Flacian conception of Free-will, as a whole†—had not found place in the Form of Concord? These questions we place before our readers in all seriousness, and to this we are specially moved by the fact that Article II, *De Libero Arbitrio*, of the Form of Concord, is to a very large extent responsible for one of the most violent controversies, and for some of the most hurtful schisms, that have distracted and are now distracting the American Lutheran Church. It is idle to say that *truncus* and *lapis*, and the theory of Free-will for which these words stand, and which they represent, are reconcilable with the older confessions. Such reconciliation was attempted by the framers of the Form of Concord, but their procedure was like that of placing the cart before the horse. They tried to reconcile the

* See. Herzog's *Real-Encyc.* 2 ed. XV, p. 112.

† In the year 1561 Flacius published a book entitled, *Warhafftige und bestendige Meinung und Zeugniss von der Erbesunde und dem Freien Willen.* In this book we have essentially the same doctrine of Free-will that we find in the Form of Concord. The doctrine and the particular and characteristic phraseology of the two works are so strikingly alike as to make it morally certain that the former is not only the presupposition of the latter, but that it furnished not a little material for the latter.

older confessions with the Form of Concord, and this they did after they had posited an extract from Augustine's *De Praedestinatione*, and certain extracts from and references to Luther—the like to which are not found in the Augsburg Confession, nor in the Apology, nor in the Catechisms, nor in the Greater Confession, nor in the Schmalkald Articles—as an authoritative standard, and had made premises of their own; or rather, had accepted the Flacian premises as normative.* In other words, they read a strong affirmation of Augustine's about grace, and some of Luther's most extreme dicta about Free-will, and "the Flacian view of things," into the older confessions, and thus tried to force a meaning into those confessions, which, when they are interpreted historically, they are found incapable of bearing.

Who for one moment can suppose that Melanchthon meant to put the characteristic Form of Concord doctrine of Free-will in the Augsburg Confession and in the Apology? Who can suppose that when near the close of his life he reaffirmed his

* Thomasius says that the expression, "stock," or "stone," 'belongs very particularly to the Flacian view of things," and that notwithstanding the effort of the F. C. to guard against misunderstanding, nevertheless it "threatens to lead back to the conception that the subject of conversion is impersonal." He says "that Luther used the expression only incidentally." *Das Bekentniss*, p. 144. Schmidt says that the Flacianists took "Luther's fundamental principle of Free-will, and consequently of absolute necessity as their chief dogma; from which they developed their system, not psychologically and ethically as Melanchthon did, but purely in a dialectic way. They inquired more for the logical consequence than for the needs of the heart," and went "not further than to scholastic definitions and rigid formulae." *Philipp Melanchthon*, pp. 574–576. Luthardt says that the word "block," as applied to man in conversion, belongs characteristically to Flacianism. He regards its selection as unfortunate, though the Form of Concord could not avoid referring to it; "but it ought to have declined and counselled against its continued use." *Die Lehre von Freien Willen*, p. 272.

G. Frank says: "The Form of Concord settled the (synergistic) controversy essentially in the sense of Flacius." Herzog, 2nd ed. XV., p. 111. Flacius wrote several tractates on Free-will, in which he gave dogmatic and systematic form to Luther's harsh, but often rhetorical, statements. It is Luther partizanized by Flacius who speaks in Article II of the Form of Concord, rather than the true, genuine Luther; though there is still a Melanchthon element in the article.

adherence to those confessions he did so knowing or believing that they contain the *truncus* and *lapis* doctrine of Free-will, or even the germs of that doctrine, since in his *Loci* and elsewhere he had so persistently repudiated that doctrine? And who can suppose that Luther meant to place that doctrine in the Catechisms and in the Schmalkald Articles, since in those writings he did not employ either the language or the *ratio disserendi* which are peculiar to that doctrine, and which are made so prominent in the writings of those who insist on the *truncus-lapis* doctrine? And who can conclude that when Melanchthon and others signed the Schmalkald Articles in 1537 they did so knowing and believing that said Articles teach and are intended to teach that doctrine about Free-will which is found in the Form of Concord?

Upon him who affirms rests the burden of proof.

[*To be Continued.*]

ARTICLE II.

THE NEGLECTED FACTOR IN POPULAR EDUCATION.

By Professor David H. Bauslin, D. D.

Every age, it is to be presumed, has at the time appeared to be an exceptional age. Every chapter of history that marks an epoch has its own caption, which while it may not be definitely announced, is always evolved in the progress of the narration. Each era works at the solution of its own problems. It is the plainest of truths that the men of this generation are striving to solve the problem of life on the material side and multitudes of people are accordingly occupied, primarily and continually, with things that can be reduced to rigid and accurate demonstration. Sometime possibly in our national development we shall be obliged to learn that a real man is something more than his money or his office or his trade. But as matters now look absolute secularism is commended by many as the only true basis for the organization of human society, and as the only sort of a line along which a man should make his thinking, his planning and working to proceed. It is the dominance of this spirit that induces many of our most gifted men to hitch themselves to the drays of commerce and the machinery of manufacture where they are goaded on, and driven to death by the tyranny of competition and ceaseless exaction.

It would be surprising did not this dominating and remorseless spirit invade other spheres than the distinctively commercial. It has done so; and we are today in the midst of a contest between the religious and the non religious or secularist view of life's meaning and ideals. There is even danger that our state schools, a most important and fundamental factor in our national life, shall become nurseries of this secularism. In the popular estimate the public school system of this country is looked upon as something like unto the ark of the Lord in the days of Uzza and Obededom, a thing not to be touched. But if we love our country, we should not be afraid to speak even

unpleasant truth in a time when it has grown to be something of a fashion to at least cajole the people, as in a former time men lied to kings. Though the maxim of John Winthrop in its literal sense may no longer be true, and especially in our country, that the civil state is reared out of the church, yet the principle involved is eternally and unchangeably true, for in the life of the civic state and social community complete secularism is both ruinous and suicidal. The spiritual and temporal can never be entirely divorced without disastrous consequences. Men may do away with an established church, as we deem them wise in doing, but they can never emancipate themselves from the restraints and incentives of pure and undefiled religion in the spheres of either commerce, community life or pedagogics without involving themselves in direful calamities as the resultant of their folly. To hold that there is no God and no immortal human soul, and yet for purely utilitarian purposes, to educate men to believe in God and in the soul only because such teaching has a social value, that is a gross outrage and a world-wide imposture. But on the other hand to hold that God is, and that the soul is the man and is forever enduring and yet to decline to make your system of public education conformable to this belief, that too is a fatal pedagogic blunder and an outrage. Education is any effort to assist the development of an immature human being toward social adjustment and efficiency. But we cannot rest in this definition unless we are willing to say that the proper goal of life is simply social adjustment and efficiency and nothing more than this. But certainly in any proper definition that is comprehensive enough to include all that is involved, education cannot accept as its end anything less than the highest destiny that a man is capable of. It must necessarily have something to do with the goal of life, whatever that goal may be. "The true end of teaching," as one has said, "is one with the true aim of life." Our schools have frequently been eulogized as the source of our strength and glory. The little red school house and the big city high school have been complacently contemplated as doing wonders, and the college and university as crowning the high

range of intellectualism. But notwithstanding all this, distinguished college presidents and educators in the land are constantly lifting up admonitory voices and speaking of certain tendencies with alarm. They seem to be haunted by the fear that in certain of its features our educational development is going heels over head into some new ways which will not end in producing the man for the hour. It is not at all clear to many of the best informed men on the subject that the vast amounts of money which the public is spending on its schools are bringing a proper return in increased security from crime, improved citizenship and purification of politics. From our large cities boys just out of the schools are going in squads to the reformatories or penitentiaries, and some to the gallows. It can do no harm to make at least some induction into the facts in a case of such fundamental importance.

Modern democracy had its origin in the revolt against political and religious tyranny. Altruistic revolutionists imagined that the overthrow of mediaeval theology was the end of all religion. The religious reformers, however, aimed their blows at papal supremacy only and still clung to the idea that some sort of union between democracy and religion was essential to civilization. In this country the limits fixed by European reformers were finally disregarded and the separation of church and state achieved and in consequence of this divorcement there has been a steady movement toward the secularization of some of the most important factors that are at work among us. Dividing the world into the secular and the sacred there has come to pass the denial of the religious factor in the industrial, political and educational affairs of the country. True it is that the philosophy and ideals of the secularists entirely fail to grasp the unity of the moral, intellectual and material elements of all true progress. Nevertheless the divorcement is insisted upon. The need of our times 'as it seems to us' is not any formal and organic reunion of church and state but a more hearty recognition within our borders of the importance of the religious factor not only in the church but in the training accorded at great expense, to the coming citizenship of the country.

We do not ask for the transfer of trades unions and public schools to the priest to mold and control them according to mediaeval standards, but for a recognition of the religious factor as a thing of primary importance to the civic and industrial life, to the material as well as moral welfare of organized society. The line of safety lies in the recognition of the unity of man's life, so much so at least, that the secular be not permitted to entirely crowd out the sacred. The broadening relation of the state to the citizen makes the ethical side of education far more important than in other years. The educated men and women who will be called to share in the duties of the state and citizen should be more than clever and bright. They should also be philanthropic, benevolent, altruistic with a deep sympathy with the moral and spiritual needs of society. A true education will proceed upon the truth and principle that the foundation of all genuine culture must be moral character which is grounded in the spiritual nature. A leading article of its faith will be this—that the interests of society are not conserved by a system which turns out trained or stuffed intellects minus conscience and an intellectual athlete who is a moral dwarf. It will plead for a curriculum that mediates, renovates and furnishes the nature of the student from the physical, up through the social, commercial and ethical to the full height of the religious, evolving him into, not a segment of a man, but a full orbed man. It differs from the "intellectual" education of Herbert Spencer as the civilization of Rome and Greece differs from modern christian civilization. It differs in its broadening fulness and the sweep of its purposes in respect to the character of the student. It is not to be mistaken for theology, for that is only one of the scientific grooves in which the mind of man runs. It is not Homiletics; for that is an art of a particular vocation. It is not a training in church creeds, not instruction in "Evangelism," not a course in Bible study in a special sense. These not unimportant tasks belong to their special schools of instruction. The education of which I speak works to develop every faculty, to call out every power, and perfect every possibility that is in man. It emphasizes its work in proportion to the

importance of its aim. If it accentuates religious and ethical culture it is because a good man is of more value to the world than a clever or a smart man.

In harmony with these principles what, we may ask, is education? It is the drawing out or development of man's powers harmoniously and in due proportion for his complete living in relation to himself, to society and to God. Plato says that education is "the perfection of man's powers;" Herbert Spencer that "it prepares man for complete living;" President Hyde, of Bowdoin College, says: "It fits one to earn his living by the exercise of trained powers, to support the institutions of society by intelligent appreciation of their worth, and to enjoy the products of art and civilization through the imagination and taste." President Butler says: "It is the adaptation of a person, a self-conscious being, to his environment, and the development of capacity in a person to modify and control that environment." This environment to which allusion is made in President Butler's definition may be separated into two divisions, including the physical and the spiritual. Under the last named division then would be included that accretion in knowledge and its resultant in habits and in conduct to which, in turn, when society is considered in it corporate aspects, we assign the name of civilization. This spiritual environment may further be divided into a five-fold classsification viz., the scientific, the literary, the artistic, institutional life and religious beliefs. A man's education in the comprehensive sense includes all of these, and drop out any one factor in the classification and your training is defective, partial and lop-sided. Says Prof. George Albert Coe, who has written much recently on educational topics: "The ethical end is not thought of as the far-off culmination of one's education, but as an idea that is to be realized in every step of the educational progress. The child is to grow continuously in the moral, as in the intellectual life, and these two aspects of life are regarded as being properly inseparable." "There is a larger sense of the term education, according to which it designates everything that enters into the process of shaping the character of the child, and finally every-

thing that shapes mankind in the large." Again Prof. Monroe, the author of "The Educational Ideal," says: "The question to be asked at the end of an educational step is not, what has the child learned? but what has the child become?" According to John Henry Pestalozzi, the great Swiss educator, and one of the strongest figures ever prominent in the school room, education is a primary means for the regeneration of society, and that it reaches society through the individual and that it means for the individual the promotion of a normal development. "Sound education" he said, "stands before me symbolized by a tree planted near fertilizing waters. A little seed, which contains the design of the tree, its form and proportions, is placed in the soil. See how it germinates and expands into trunk, branches, leaves, flowers, and fruit! The whole tree is an uninterrupted chain of organic parts, the plan of which existed in its seed and roots."

Education accordingly, as defined and described by these and other great masters among pedagogues, includes the development and training of all man's powers and factors, the physical, the psychical and the religious. It comprehends the acquisition of all the kinds of knowledge needed for growth and guidance, enjoyment and character and the attainment of skill in the application of this power and knowledge of all the purposes of life. A true education seeks to call out the whole man in his highest harmonious development. That it often falls short of this highest aim, must of course be granted; but to this ideal it must nevertheless be held, and any education must be regarded as defective in just that degree in which it fails to accomplish this lofty aim.

Education is thus to be regarded as something more than the cultivation of the power of attention, the tension or stretching of the mind towards any subject; that concentration of all the powers of the mind on the one thing before it and the making of that the luminous burning focus of its thought.

Again it is to be regarded as something more than the development of accurate observation, keen perception, that focusing of the mind on a subject it must learn so that it may see

what is there, the clearing up into order of the confused field of fact into sharp outlines and definite relations.

And so again true education is to be looked upon as something more than training in correct reasoning. Perception sees the facts; reason sees relations. This relating power of the mind finds the threads of connection that bind all things into a system and traces events back to their causes and forward to consequences. It puts things together and frames judgments. From the known or the visible it leaps to the unknown or the hidden. This is something of education but not all of it. If one has acquired these three things, attention, accurate observation and correct reasoning, he has acquired some of the fundamentals of education, but not all of them.

The question then recurs, what provision is made in our popular educational methods for the discipline of that other part of a mans complex nature, the dominant factor which we call the spiritual? It raises the old question whether or not the Bible and the elements of theological truth should be taught in the public schools? Those who answer this question in the negative, and advocate a pure secular system of education, do so always upon one of two assumptions. The first is that the state is a purely secular body, which has no sort of business with religion and, therefore, cannot in any measure teach it; the second that instruction in such matters, including the reading of the Scriptures, must necessarily possess a certain character, and should be excluded as an offence to at least the minority of the community. But this secularist theory of national existence is false from the start. Just as truly as God made man so truly did He make the state; and just as truly as He calls men to him in relations of covenant responsibility with him, He does so with nations also. This secularist theory of the state is a thoroughly un-American theory, in spite of the loudness with which it has been proclaimed as being implied in our separation of the Church from the state, and our perfect freedom of religious convictions and worship. It is also in defiance of American history, as any one may discover who will examine the declarations of our national authorities on the subject, from

the Fast day and Thanksgiving proclamations of the Continental Congress and the general orders of George Washington down to our own time. The only notable utterances to the contrary are found in the treaty negotiated by a deist with a Moslem state, and in Thomas Jefferson's refusal to appoint a day of national thanksgiving and fasting. This one-sided theory of the state is in defiance also of the declarations of those state constitutions under which by far the greater part of the American people live. It is in defiance of the decisions of the national and state courts, which declare in substance that a tolerant christianity is imbedded in the public policy of the country and that whatever antagonizes christianity is illegal. It is in defiance of the solemn acts by which the national and the state authorities have invited the people of the land to return thanks to God for His goodness, or to deprecate the severity of His judgments by fasting and prayer. It is in contradiction of the public policy, which provides for the religious instruction of the soldiers of our armies and the sailors of our navy, for that of the dependent classes in public asylums, and for that of convicts in our prisons. It is contradicted by the action, not only of Congress and the state legislatures, but also the great political conventions, in inviting ministers of religion to open their sessions by invoking the blessings of Almighty God Neither can it be brought into harmony with the practice of our courts, which make the rendering of a verdict and the giving of evidence an act of worship, by requiring of witness and juryman an oath "in the presence of Almighty God, the searcher of all hearts." In whatever direction we turn we find the American repudiation of this idea that the knowledge, the service and the kingdom of God are to be entirely divorced from all other provinces as outlying and separate provinces apart from God and entirely secular and profane. Certainly many people within our borders need a revival of a sense of universalism that will prevent them from looking upon knowledge as something restricted and foreign to religion. That they are not thus to be divorced is doubtless a divine ordination for guiding us to sound results. The plain and unmistakable historical fact is this, that

out of the Church and its teachings have issued successively all the other organizations of society, systems of constitutional government, education, art, the festivals and jubilees of social intercourse. The Church begot them all and for a long time they remained under its tutelage. It is not surprising considering our antecedents that the older, the more settled and conservative, the more thoroughly American any part of our great country becomes the more numerous are the evidences that the wise separation of the Church from the state means no sanction for the sundering of the state from God in the educational and other factors of our well being.

But aside from the historical aspect of the subject, the question arises as to the safety of this secular divorce of popular education from religion. That a system of public instruction is indispensable to the welfare of every nation, and in an eminent sense to ours, is a fact undisputed, but the question is as to the safety of this instruction when moral and religious instruction is separated from a wholesome and wisely adapted intellectual training. May not the mere Lord Brougham "schoolmaster" be ever so "much abroad among the people" and yet do them about as much harm as good? Is it not one of the most monstrous of solecisms that the popular education of an alleged christian nation should be organized—if not with an atheistic forgetfulness that there is a God, yet—with such a studied avoidance of about everything that is distinctively christian as to mean about the same thing? If there are dangers we shall surely neither diminish or avoid them by shutting our eyes to the facts or stigmatize the full and frank statement of them as the croaking notes of pessimistic alarmists who despair of the republic. None of us have any right to feel that there is anything in the human nature of the twentieth century, or any peculiar charm in the frame of our government that can insure us against the fate that has fallen upon other nations which in theory or practice have nullified the laws of right training or living.

Prof. George Frederick Wright, of Oberlin College, whom many of us reverence, both because of his scientific attainments and his christian character, has been writing recently on "The

Scientific Bases of Religion." His concluding sentence is of interest here:

"The facts of Christianity are as worthy of being taught as any other historical facts are. Indeed, no other facts of past history are so well substantiated by so great a variety of evidence as are those pertaining to the nature, the life and the work of Jesus Christ. We shall be indeed in a strange condition if we teach nothing in our schools but what the individual can 'demonstrate and verify.' Ninety-nine one-hundredths of what every one believes he receives on authority. We believe the theories of astronomy because expert mathematicians and observers tell us that they believe them. How does an Eastern investor learn that it is safe for him to invest in a mine in the Rocky Mountains or Alaska? It does not take long reflection to see that for the most of our practical knowledge we depend on 'expert testimony.' Such witness we have in that of the apostles and the early Church, who were the contemporaries of Christ, and who preserved their faith in the face of every possible opposition; and their testimony has been supported by the results."

In the New York *Sun* of December 7th, last, Principal Campbell, of the Wentworth School of Chicago, said: "We are bringing up all over this broad land a lusty set of young pagans, who, sooner or later, they or their children, will make havoc of our institutions." It was that sturdy Presbyterian scholar of great endowments and equally great attainments, the late Dr. A. A. Hodge, who bore this testimony:

"Every intelligent Protestant ought to know by this time, in the light of the terrible Socialistic revolutions which are threatened, that the danger to our country in this age is infinitely more from skepticism than from superstition." "In view of the entire situation, shall we not all of us who really believe in God give thanks to him that he has preserved the Roman Catholic Church in America to-day true to that theory of education upon which our fathers founded the public schools, and from which they have been so madly perverted?" "The system of public schools must be held, in their sphere, true to the claims

of Christianity, or they must go, with all other enemies of Christ, to the wall."

Bishop Johnson (Protestant Episcopal), of Texas, writes of "the trying days to come, when we are threatened with the overthrow of all we hold dearest, because of the influence of a godless education upon the rising generation."

President Stryker, of Hamilton College, in his inaugural address of January 17th, 1893, used these words: "Profoundly I believe that society must either become Christian or must collapse." But the question recurs, when will society become Christian while the schools "ignore all religion?" Mr. Bourke Cochran, of New York, is a Catholic, and in the debate recently conducted between him and President Schurman, of Cornell, the sympathies of the writer were largely with the latter. But aside from the conclusions drawn who will doubt the correctness of Mr. Cochran's premises in statements such as these, that the public schools are not Christian, because they ignore religious teachings. "Agnosticism," said he, "doesn't deny God, but ignores him That is what we are doing in our public schools. Ignorance of God is the very basis of agnosticism." "I have no enmity for the public schools, said he, but object only as to the manner in which education is imparted. Every page in the history for 1900 years attests the progress of the world under Christianity. Shall public opinion in this country be Christian or agnostic? Shall the state expect the triumph of Christianity or will it continue to penalize it? That is the question. Shall the state dam up the fountain from which the moral law has sprung?"

These men are not unpatriotic, nor are they pessimistic, but representing various schools of Christian thinking, they all seem to have reached the same conclusion based upon a wide induction into the facts, viz., that an education without religion imperils things that we cherish most ardently and hold most dear as our inheritance from the wisdom, devotion and foresight of our fathers.

Japan has unquestionably gained much in the way of national progress by joining hands with Western nations, but somehow

she has not gained much in her moral character. The old religions had to a large extent become discredited and exerted but little moral influence. At the "Restoration" the government had recourse to Shintoism to improve the moral condition of the country, but Shinto could do nothing. Lessons in patriotism and loyalty, unaccompanied by a strong sense of individual responsibility for commercial probity and personal purity, had a baneful effect upon the people. Education advanced but morality declined, until in 1890, the Emperor, alarmed by the low moral condition of the schools, issued a rescript on the subject of education in which he laid stress upon the necessity of ethical training; but the effort made to encourage morality without religion was not encouraging. Dr. Seely, of the State Normal School of New Jersey, has recently paid his tribute to the German system of education. He said:—"The Germans hold that morality cannot be taught apart from dogmatic religious instruction. Religion is accepted as the corner-stone of German pedagogy, and more time is given to it in the curriculum than to any other subject.

"What is the result of this religious instruction, especially that of the great mass of children? After living with the German people for years, and carefully studying them, in spite of evils that certainly exist among them, there is love of home, respect for and obedience to law, honesty and integrity, diligence in business, conscientious regard for duty, practice of the Golden Rule, freedom from municipal and national corruption, love of country, belief in God, soundness of faith by the masses as a whole and the practice of righteousness."

Thus, despite the serious defects of a state church and the spread of rationalism and religious indifference in seats of learning and in the greater cities, it must be said that no such divorce between education and religion as has been permitted to come about in this country has thus far been possible in either Germany or Scandinavia. In our generation we shall not likely encounter a more sturdy unbeliever than the late Prof. Thomas Huxley, but it was Huxley who said: "I have been seriously perplexed to know by what practical measures

the religious feeling, which is the essential basis of conduct, was to be kept up, in the present utterly chaotic state of opinion without the use of the Bible."

"I hold," says he, "that any system of education which attempts to deal only with the intellectual side of a child's nature, and leaves the rest untouched, will prove a delusion and a snare, just as likely to produce a crop of unusually astute scoundrels as anything else. In my belief, unless a child be taught not only morality, but religion, education will come to very little."

It would seem then that our conception of religion will be in accordance with our conception of life. If a man looks upon the acquisition of things as the matter of supreme interest he will no doubt think of education in narrowly utilitarian terms. To such an one it will mean the learning of a trade, the mastering of manual and mental tools, the acquisition of such facts and the cultivation of such habits as will enable one to utilize nature's resources and get the better of one's fellowmen. On the other hand the man who thinks of life in ethical terms will think of education in ethical terms also. To him as has been said "the most practical education is that which imparts the most numerous and the strongest motives to noble action." The man who thinks of religion as every man ought to think, as the thing that stands first in the files of the world's passionate wishes and equally of its most strenuous endeavors, is not likely to contemplate education as dissociated from this factor. In such a view education becomes a means of introducing young life to its proper place in the social organism. If a man's spiritual capacities are his supreme endowment, as is almost uniformly admitted, then the unquestioned subordination of the moral and spiritual to the intellectual in all plans for the training of our youth needs to be reversed unless our aim be merely the training of the "clever" man, the "smart" man of the club, the street and the market place. "Thus," says Carlyle, "like some wild-flaming, wild-thundering train of heaven's artillery, does this mysterious mankind thunder and flame in long drawn, quick-succeeding grandeur through the unknown deep. Thus like a God created, fire-breathing spirit

host, we emerge from the inane, haste stormfully across the astonished earth, then plunge again into the inane." It this theory of rushing forth from nothing back into nothing be the true theory of man, then the purely secular theory of education may have some basis. In that event the business of the schoolmaster is merely this, to prepare a man to make this stormful haste across the astonished earth in the most becoming manner. If a man, like Carlyle's hero, is to walk wearisomely through this present world, having lost all tidings of another and higher, to the inane, the geography and topography of which are of course unknown, then it is grim mockery to contemplate education in other than in its strictly utilitarian aspects.

But man is a unity, as we have learned. Hence it follows that the neglect to give any factor its due attention must result in distortion. Education in a word must be symmetrical. Its supreme end is to make a man, not merely to make him physically strong, not merely intellectually well disciplined and well furnished, not merely sensitive in his spiritual relations, responding quickly and accurately to the claims of duty to self, to fellow-men and to God, but rather a man fully rounded and well balanced, physically, mentally and spiritually ready for action in any department of human life for which he may have individual aptitude and for which he may specifically furnish himself. Recent discussions of the educational problems before us as a people and movements that contemplate better organization along such lines of work, furnish us with a notable recognition of the fact that there is this inseparable unity in man's endowments, and that the neglect of any essential element of his constitution, and especially of the supreme element in any scheme of educational development, will surely avenge itself sooner or later upon the individual, the community or the commonwealth guilty of such neglect.

The neglect of the religious factor in our popular education looked at from another standpoint also carries its own admonition. From time to time our newspapers startle us with such headlines as "A reign of lawlessness," or "A saturnalia of crime." We are indeed moved, especially if our house has been

robbed or we have been waylaid in a populous and presumably well guarded city. But alas! these conditions are not peculiar to the community which we honor by our residence and suffrage, and which we may even complacently think to be so badly governed by a political party other than our own. These conditions are national, ominous and terrifying. The serious increase of crime in this country is something that ought to arrest the attention of every good citizen, and one that should be kept constantly before us until there is a turn in the tide, which may not yet be reached for years. One cause certainly is the lack of distinctively moral and religious teaching. There has been a great amount of emotional teaching in recent years; but there is a very different attitude to fundamental moral questions. Mr. S. S. McClure, a man courageously committed to the welfare of his country, published recently in his magazine a statistical synopsis on "The increase of lawlessness in the United States." In brief, we Americans are law-breakers in the following extent and ways:

In 1881 we killed one another unlawfully at the rate of one person in each 40,534 of population. In 1902 there was a murder or homocide to each 8,955. Between 1881 and 1903 we violently took the lives of our fellow Americans to the number of 129,464; but had we continued during this period relatively as self-restrained as we were in 1881 we should have killed but 35,109. So, for causes that the humblest and the mightiest of our people should take under instant and prayerful consideration, our homicidal activity has increased in twenty-three years at a rate represented by the difference between 112 and 24.7, the former being the number of murders and homicides for each million of people in 1903 and the latter the number of these crimes to each million in 1881. Within this same period the total number of suicides has increased from 605 to 8,597; and whereas corresponding with the 1,266 murders and homicides of 1881 there were ninety hangings, there were corresponding with the 8,876 capital crimes of 1903 but 124 hangings. So much for the volume of crime. Now for its classes. Between 1894 and 1900, both inclusive, and it is

to be noted that crime rises in hard times, there was a total of 68,812 murders and homicides, nearly one half being the result of quarrels. Causes behind 17,120 other cases are classified as unknown, but the remaining classifications are as follows: Jealousy, 3,313; liquor, 2,845; by highwaymen, 2,310; infanticide, 1,819; resisting arrest, 1,096; highwaymen killed, 841; strikers, 365; self defense, 440; rage, 188; riots, 152; insanity, 827.

There must be some far reaching cause that this shame of crime lies thus heavily upon us. The fact that we are killing more people in three years than the British army lost in the Boer War is a fact too ugly to be looked in the face with complacency. The feeling is coming over the country that something must be done about it; that there should be less hanging of juries and more hanging of murderers; that higher courts should see something more than loop-holes for bad men to get through; and that the public should look somewhat into the moral training of the young.

The high record was reached in 1896, when there were 10,654 murders and homicides in a population of 70,000,000. In 1899, conditions improved some, but since then they have steadily grown worse. This is worse than war, worse than railroad accidents and their dreadful slaughter, worse than yellow fever or the plagues of the tropics. In Paris during the year 1903, there were fifteen murders or attempted murders. In the city of Chicago during the same period there were eight times as many murders as in Paris, and, with less than one third of the population and area covered by the London police, six times as many murders as in that great city.

When we seek for the primary causes, the fundamental sources of this doleful stream of lawlessness, it is always rather confidently suggested that much of it is traceable to our foreign born population. But there is no palliation for the native, hereditary, constitutional American here. In 1900, we had a foreign born population of 10,356,644. Excepting 426,096 from Russia—and in Europe, these were victims rather than aggressors—all these people came from countries having not

half as many murders and homicides as there are in the United States. True Americans therefore, men who have received what training they possess in this country, are the leaders of native and immigrant in defying and breaking our own laws. Granting then that we are, as alas! it must be said, a law breaking people what are the social and political conditions that make thus for the practice and tolerance of crime, petty and great? Certain forces that menace popular government, certain sources of corruption and the non-enforcement of law in city, state and nation have been adduced. They are represented, and no doubt rightly, as habitually condoning, fostering and flagrantly committing lawlessness. But does the training received in our public schools, from which all that is distinctively religious and ethical is so rigidly excluded in many cases, have no share of the blame for this deplorable exhibit? Not so, think those who have made investigation. The examination of the public schools in various parts of the country which Miss Marie Shaw has been conducting for the *World's Work*, was ended in the November last number of that magazine with her general conclusions under the title "How successful are the public schools." After speaking of the meagre results physically and the mental showing hardly less meagre, she says: "Morally, the school showing is poorer still. There are, of course, in great cities, many influences that suggest the getting of money without work. The schools do not counteract these influences as they might."

Writing in the *Independent* of December 31st, 1903, President Hadley, of Yale, says: "Few of us who have looked into the statistics of education and crime are optimistic enough to deny that they are quite disappointing." * * * I confess that I share some of the apprehensions of these advocates of Church schools; but I am far from agreeing with them as to the proper remedy."

Certainly we have adduced enough to show that the contradiction between the religious and secular view of life is fundamental and irreconcilable. It may be possible, as some who are specialists on the subject advocate, to divide the labor of

teaching between the family, the church and the state, and to assign to each some functions that are not assumed by the others, but it should always be remembered that the child is one and indivisible, and refuses to be thus classified and divided. The whole of him is present in the state school and that for a large proportion of the time in the most formative period of life. There, as well as in the church and the home, he is forming his notion and his attitude with respect to the problems of life, responsibility and law.

It was considerations such as I have adduced that led Stubbs, the author of the "Constitutional History," to say: "The Church cannot engross the work of education without some danger to liberty; the state cannot engross it without some danger to religion; the work of the Church without liberty loses half of its value; the state without religion does only half its work." That is, religion has to do with instruction on its ethical side, and on that side she ought to speak with authority, while recognizing that there is another on which the qualified and equipped pedagogue has a right to speak with authority also.

We believe that the church and state ought to be separated as they are in this country, and as they should be throughout Europe. But the state depends in the last analysis largely upon religion to aid her in keeping the people in proper relation to the state and to each other. Suppose that the state says, you shall not kill because it is not right? But who says it is not right? says the boy. God says so. But where? In the Bible. Oh, but says some secularistic iconoclast, that is teaching religion. But the question is, ought not the state to teach religion sufficiently to teach her subjects that the laws have their foundation in the divine mind, and are not simply police expedients devised by the state? The home and the church have each their proper sphere for the teaching of religion. But the state can never depend with safety upon either the home or the church for the training of her subjects in whatever is essential for her own well being. President Eliot, of Harvard, is right in saying this that is fundamental: "Nobody

knows how to teach morality effectually without religion. Exclude religion from education and you will leave no foundation on which to build a moral character."

In our country it is peculiarly necessary to counteract the overgrowth and dangerous tendencies of the commercial and political spirit. The overgrowth of these and other dangerous influences in other countries may be checked somewhat, not only by venerable institutions both of religion and learning, but also by ancient dignities, more imposing forms of government and various other causes which have no place in this country. The only counteracting influences that can be brought to bear in this country are to be found in religion and mental training, and religion left as it is to take care of itself, will be entirely inadequate unless the intellectual spirit of the nation be elevated by an alliance with it. The freest government is the one exposed to the greatest perils. If it works not well it must work worse than others. Our form of government presupposes that the capacity of self-government is commensurate with the right and consequently it is fit for us no longer than we are fit for it. Universal suffrage in the hands of an unenlightened and corrupt people is like a deadly weapon in the hands of a mad-man. You can give the people the right of ruling only on the supposition that they have the goodness to rule well. The enactments of a majority will never be a whit wiser or better than the wisdom and virtue of the individuals that compose that majority. It is coming to be an increasingly grave question whether the people of this country have not already shared in a one-sided political education in a false and overweening sense of liberty, by which multitudes in our borders mean simply this, the doing by every man of that which is pleasing in his own eyes. All of this and more makes it of fundamental importance in a country intensely democratic, and where religion has no fixed and settled institutions, but is left with other things, to the determination of the popular will, that its voice shall be heard in the direction of the intellectual energies of the people.

Education alone will not transform a young Slav into a true

American but religion with education has done it effectually. A successful democracy demands that the rulers, *i. e.*, the people, shall be intelligent, but it also requires that they be good.

The question now recurs as to what provision is made for this higher factor in popular training and what tendencies are beginning to manifest themselves in this matter of such vital concern? I have not been able to examine the courses of study of many normal schools, nor many of the examination papers set for applicants for teachers' certificates, but my information is that at present training in morals of the higher order is nowhere recognized as a part of a teacher's preparation. That the teacher is expected to be of good moral character, and that he is so almost uniformly goes without saying: that our public school teachers are recruited from the ranks of the very best Christian people in the community, and whose personal influence is almost uniformly of a good order is a most agreeable fact. But this also is a fact that the possession of personal morality no more qualifies for teaching morality, than does the fact that I personally—so far as anybody knows—possess a perfect outfit of bones, muscles, arteries, veins, lungs, stomach, liver and all the rest of a complete anatomical equipment, qualify me to be a demonstrator in anatomy in a first class medical college. Certain it is that formal text books in morals have never been successful in schools in this country. The instruction must come all from the lips of the teacher, and that is all the more the reason that we should see to it that the teacher is given a fair chance at the hands of the boards of school management. Direct religious exercises in public schools seldom go further than the reading of the Bible. In most of the States of the Union the law gives no authority, as a matter of right, to use any portion of the regular school hours in conducting any religious exercises, at which the attendance of pupils is required. In many cities of the country any sort of religious exercises is forbidden. In Iowa for example the matter is left entirely at the judgment of the teacher. Washington prohibits the reading of the Bible in the schools, while in Arizona they revoke the certificate of any teacher who con-

ducts any sort of religious exercises in school. In 1890 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin decided the reading of the Bible in the public schools to be unconstitutional. In 1869 the Cincinnati School Board was upheld in forbidding the reading of the Bible. The same action was taken in Chicago in 1875, and in New Haven in 1878. The law on the subject ranges between absolute prohibition of Bible reading; permitting it when no one objects but not otherwise; leaving it to the opinion of the local authorities, either trustees or teacher; and requiring it, either leaving the amount and method to the teacher or prescribing a very limited amount of reading daily. At the best this is not much, not much of the Bible, and almost nothing in the way of effective teaching. If there is not more direct religious teaching in our schools, at least it is not the fault of the teachers, nor can there be more than there is now unless the laws are changed.

It may be recalled that President Eliot in a well known address made a somewhat sweeping arraignment of the public schools because of the great prevalence of drunkenness, gambling, rioting, misgovernment and almost every form of vice and crime. However much we resent the arraignment we must all feel and know that in some way the public school has not touched and quickened the heart and conscience of the nation as we had hoped it would do. Is it not possible that in our progress and prosperity we are forgetting the God of our fathers? In discussing the great anthracite coal strike President Roosevelt said in substance: we do not need a new philosophy to solve this problem; we only need to put into practice the well known and ott tried precepts of the Bible, the doctrine of the Golden Rule. And so our people are realizing more and more that the practice of Christian virtues is the one thing most needful in the solution of our most perplexing problems, social, commercial, political, public and private. Men and women everywhere are looking about, endeavoring to find a better way to develop a higher type of manhood, how to disseminate and perpetuate the nobler Christian virtues. And so we are asking the government, if it cannot do more. We are

asking the same thing of the home and of the Church, whether through all its varied agencies it cannot do more to make men morally better. Have we not a right, also to ask of the school, the youngest child of democracy, whether it too cannot do more? vastly more considering the possibilities before it, to promote the religious and moral education of the people.

At the time that the lamented President McKinley was murdered at Buffalo, and when this great country, bowed in a common sorrow over the pathetic and untimely end of the life of that noble man, was holding memorial services throughout all our borders, I saw the program prepared for such a service under authority, by the superintendent of public instruction in Chicago. It recounted the birth and stations filled in succession by Mr. McKinley. It spoke of his devotion as a son and husband. It recounted the unexpected villiany at Buffalo. It recited about how that the assassin's regicidal act had failed of its end because the vice-president in due process of law, and quietly, became the head of the nation. Not one word however was discernable about the real basis of such a life of transparent excellence as that lived by the lamented and much loved president. And all this in the face of a fact as luminous as the sun that a man of McKinley's order cannot be accounted for by any analysis that leaves out a big estimate of the religious factor. Such men are not grown in an atmosphere other than that in which as babe, boy and young man, Mr. McKinley lived and passed from one stage of his splendid career to another until, crowned with the respect and affection of this great people, he had passed beyond.

It is to be feared that this studious and almost grotesque avoidance of the religious factor, is characteristic, and in some cases enforced. In such performances the schools are certainly not doing their share in developing a regal manhood for the coming days. It has been urged, with Pretorious, that fear first made the gods, and, with Fenerbach, that religion is man's most terrible ailment. It would seem to be otherwise in Chscago, where at least prompt and radical precautions are taken by the school board against its spread.

It would be interesting to see in detail what the other great civilized nations are doing in this matter of moral and religious training in the public schools. In England there has been established a system of religious instruction, denominational in the church schools, and undenominational in the public schools, which reaches almost every child in the land. In France, we find a country predominantly Roman Catholic in confession, although both Protestant and Jewish religions enjoy state support. In a country in which all large religious bodies are subsidized by the state, it would seem to be natural and easy to have a regular system of religious instruction in connection with the day schools. This, however, is not the fact, and no religious instruction whatever is given in connection with the public schools. The history and moral standards of this people would hardly commend their system as the ideal one in pedagogics. Turning now to Germany we find that very much of serious religious instruction is imparted in the day schools and predominantly by the regular teachers employed for secular instruction. Probably in no country in the world is the religious instruction so systematically and thoroughly given as in that country. The principal function of the German school is officially declared to be the making of God fearing, patriotic, self-supporting citizens. The Germans would no more think that religion could be omitted from the program of instruction than that mathematics or languages could be left out. Every teacher in that country receives religious training for his work, although not every teacher gives religious instruction in the schools. A comparison with the time given to religions training in Germany and several other countries of Europe shows that our own country is far behind the demands of the case and serves to reveal the gravity of the situation. In discussing this point in the December last issue of the *Heidelberg Teacher*, a Reformed magazine for teachers and Bible classes, the editor, Dr. Rufus W. Miller, says:—

"In Germany four or five hours per week are given to religious instruction in the public schools. The first places on the curricula are taken by this subject. The first hour in the

morning is given to religious instruction. In addition, one afternoon each week the pupils meet for religious studies, usually in the church, but in many instances in the school building. For some time before confirmation they meet two or three times a week. Many in Germany consider the amount of religious instruction to be too small.

"In France no religious instruction is given in the public schools. Thursday is set apart by the law as a holiday and the denominations provide religious instruction on this day. In the Reformed churches the sessions are usually an hour and a half long. When the lesson on Thursday is in the Old Testament, then the lesson on the Sabbath is in the New Testament, and vice versa.

"In England opportunity for religious instruction is given in the week-day schools. And most churches on the Sabbath have two sessions of the Sabbath-school."

Such facts adduced, not by a foreigner, but by a patriotic American Christian teacher, ought at least to quicken reflection among us. The writer from whom I have just quoted goes even further and asks this question: "Why should not the public schools omit the Wednesday afternoon sessions and allow the churches to take that time for religious instruction, each denomination seeing after their own children and as many other children as can be reached?"

It may be alleged that while the suggestion is a good one, it would be found difficult of accomplishment in this country as it seems to be impracticable even in France. But the mere fact that the question is raised indicates the unsatisfactory situation at present, and the demand alike of Christianity and patriotism that something be done, ere both state and church suffer incalculable harm.

Of all the elements that go to make a country great and strong, none is quite so essential as conscience. Men must trust one another if they are to get on well in the relations of trade. Commerce without conscience is impossible. In the last analysis every business house, every banking institution, every manufacturing enterprise owes its existence and stability

to conscience. Conscience counts in the matter of dollars and cents. It is really the ligament that binds society together; and without it all our social and political institutions would go to pieces. Archbishop Ireland is neither a fanatic or an alarmist, but on the contrary a well-poised, level headed, far-seeing man, and this is what he said in an address to the business men of Cleveland some five or six years ago: "Take away conscience on election day, let voters, like the populace of old Rome, scramble for food and pleasure, and democracy will have given up the ghost and either an imperator wlll trample upon American liberties, or anarchy will fill the land with lurid flames." The words of the great prelate are not too extravagant, for the thing that makes our property, our liberties and our homes secure is conscience, the feeling ingrained into the hearts of the people that right is right, and wrong is wrong, and that somewhere, sometime and somehow, men will have to answer for their conduct at a bar where justice cannot be bought and the judge cannot be bribed.

After all our eulogies have been spoken and our applause for our system has died away, the fact remains that the instruction given and the influences eminating from our public schools are intensely secular. However humanizing and useful their work, they do not make the training of the conscience and the kindling of the moral sense prominent enough for safety. The instruction does not touch the deep places of the moral nature. On these important lines it is too weak and colorless to command the will and turn the life currents upward.

To teach ethics without the enforcement of divine sanctions has about as much power to purify and ennoble character, as paint on the pump has a purifying influence on the well. Leave the masses to the leadership of unprincipled agitators, of unscrupulous office-seekers, of doctrinaire social reformers, of arragant walking delegates, and it is a little painful to think about what the outcome will inevitably be. Unless they are led by men with quickened consciences as well as trained heads the present unrest will go on to issues which it is not pleasant to contemplate. It cannot cease to be deplored by all right

minded people that in this matter of popular education, we have receded also from our own original ideals.

When the public school was first established in this country, and for a century and a half afterwards, definite religious instruction was an important part of the school curriculum. The fathers and founders of the various commonwealths believed in the public school because they believed as they declared that instruction in "religion and morality, and knowledge was necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind." To-day specific religious instruction is practically banished from every public school in the land. As to the provision in the Constitution, in virtue of which the American people are supposed to be irrevocably pledged to neutrality in this matter, any body with half an eye can see that the neutrality so pledged was as between the various religious sects, and not at all between religion and irreligion. It should not be forgotten that the men who made the Constitution were making a constitution, not for a people who had no religion or who were averse to religion or who needed legislation on the subject, but for a people who were very religious, and whose ideals were not those of the Moslem or of the French commune. The convention left religion out of the Constitution, not that it might be trampled under foot of men, but in the belief that in leaving the whole subject of religion to the governments of the several commonwealths composing the confederation, its ultimate prevalence would best be promoted.

The makers of the Constitution never dreamed of being neutral, and had there been the slightest suspicion on the part of the people that Christianity was being repudiated, the infant nation would no doubt have never been federated. The commonwealths entering into that federation had all been planted upon a distinctively Christian basis. The Pilgrims and Puritans who made the early settlements in New England, the Germans, Swedes and Quakers who came to Pennsylvania and Delaware, the Dutch who settled the valley of the Hudson, the Cavaliers in Virginia, and the Catholics in Maryland, were all ardent believers in the Christian religion. Chief Justice Kent,

in rendering a decision in the case of a man indicted for aspersing the character of our Lord, ruled that the people of this country profess the general doctrines of Christianity for the rule of faith and practice, and that to scandalize the teacher of these doctrines is a gross violation of decency and good order. Daniel Webster has said: "There is nothing more certain than that Christianity is part of the law of the land-general, tolerant Christianity, independent of sects and parties," while Justice Story has said: "One of the beautiful traits of our jurisprudence is that Christianity is part of the common law from which it seeks the sanction of its rights, and by which it endeavors to regulate its doctrine." Such has been the practical construction of American constitutions with few exceptions during the entire period of our history. Many such acknowledgements led Mr. Justice Brewer, of the present supreme court, to say: "There is no dissonance in these declarations. There is a universal language pervading them all, having one meaning; they affirm and reaffirm that this is a religious nation." Again: "If we pass beyond these matters to a view of American life as expressed by its laws, its business, its customs and its activity, we find everywhere a clear recognition of the same truth." Then referring to oaths, etc., he says: "These and many other matters which might be noticed, add a volume of unofficial declarations to the mass of organic utterances that this is a Christian nation." That the representatives of commonwealths sharing in such pronounced Christian antecedents, when they come together to weld those several commonwealths into a greater and combined commonwealth, should have entirely divested themselves of their most sacred beliefs and turned traitors to their religion, is something incredible in American character and history.

Certain old vanquished heresies pertaining to this subject still limp about the field of controversy. They have been made to do service for a generation or more. Dead they are, in every intelligent court of appeal, but revamped into life from time to time, they are led forth to bolster up what we have found

to be unsound in pedagogics and dangerous to the public well being.

There is, for example, the old plea that the teaching of religion in the schools of the country is an invasion of the rights of that part of the community which wants no sort of religion at all, and is particularly insistent upon the divorce between religion and education for other people. In reply to this specious plea, it might be said that there is no adequate reason that can be assigned why the rights of society, in its corporate aspects, should be subordinated to the rights of any individual, even though that individual may feel called upon to suffer martyrdom, in his own mind, for conscience sake. In securing to every individual his constitutional rights, the state does not contemplate the whims and caprices of every man, woman and child, balanced and unbalanced, within its borders, nor pledge itself to respect all the peculiar beliefs and disbeliefs of Jew and Moslem, Mormon and agnostic, anarchist and socialist, infidel and atheist, and order the state's education according to the standards of paganism and superstition.

Another objection that has been answered a hundred times, but is nevertheless yet used in behalf of the secularist propaganda, is this, that the teaching of any sort of religion in state schools necessitates sectarian education. To this it might be replied that the Bible is not a denominational book, nor would anybody, excepting a Romanist, contemplate any such use of it. The great outlying data in Biblical ethics constitute something that is unmixed with contention.

The objection to the multiplicity and the differences of the sects is the old vanquished, secular infidel, story—the argument of prejudice and misinformation. There are certain grand, basic principles and certain great religious truths which are amply supported by a consensus of all the creeds. The existence and rulership of God, the immortality of the soul, the brotherhood of man, the fact of sin and responsibility for conduct in this world—these and kindred truths are fundamental, they mount up above all controversy and stand upon the basis of universal acknowledgement.

There can be no wide difference of opinion about the truth that the virtues required in the law of Moses and commended in the beatitudes of our blessed Lord are good and wholesome principles to live by whether a man be a Jew, a Catholic, a Protestant, and that a lie is a lie, whether it be told, practiced, or enacted at Jerusalem, in the Vatican or on Wall Street. This is one only of the great outlying facts of biblical ethics. Every man, be he Catholic, Jew or Protestant, or even informed and fair-minded agnostic knows that the dangers which threaten, lie not in the region of sectarian antipathy and rancor but rather in that of avowed and dangerous secularism and hostile unbelief.

Since the earlier part of this paper was written there has come to the writer's table Prof. Coe's latest book on educational themes, and he is glad to adduce here in proof of the foregoing what that able writer has to say on the subject in hand. "Religion or irreligion," says he, "is present in the schools just as surely as teachers are present. The notion that the state school can be strictly neutral with respect to the great problem of life and destiny is simply illusory; it has no basis in psychology or in the principles of education. It is incumbent upon us therefore to take one side or the other, either the religious or the secularist, and then—not by any insincerity or indirection, but frankly—let our actual principle be incorporated into the state school." Such truths need to be dinned into the ears of our people until they shall refuse to be reconciled to this perilous banishment of religion from our common schools which were founded upon a basis that promised great good to our cherished country. Knowledge after all is a weapon that may be used by a saint or by a rogue. Reading, writing, and arithmetic, ability to interpret the laws of nature that govern the life of the tiniest animaculæ as well as the sweep of the great planets on the outskirts of space, all these are good and desirable, but they are safe possessions only as they are inspired by sound religious and ethical principles. A boy who has mastered the secular curriculum of our schools may be armed, but the question is whether he is so full panoplied as not to be vul-

nerable at some most vital points? And in the discussion of this and associated problems we should keep our eyes steadfastly upon the vital connection between religion and morality. A forcible writer in a recent newspaper article has expressed it finely: "There can be no true religion without a lofty morality, and no more can there be a lofty morality without religion. there can be manners without religion; but manners such as cleanliness and courtesy are a matter of soap and sandpaper. The difference between manners and morals is as wide as the difference between clean clothes and a clean heart. Morality is a spirit and a life. It is a living of the moral law. And what is the moral law? Moses wrote it in full in the decalogue, and Christ condensed it in the gospel—thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and soul, and mind, and strength, and thy neighbor as thyself."

Our national institutions have had no more sympathetic and intelligent critic and interpreter than Mr. James Bryce in "The American Commonwealth." Speaking in part six of that work of christianity, Mr. Bryce says of it that "though not the legally established religion, it is yet the national religion." And speaking of our people he says in the same connection, "They deem the general acceptance of Christianity to be one of the main sources of their national prosperity, and their nation a special object of the divine favor." All the other moral systems of the world excepting that begotten and fostered by the religion which Mr. Bryce declares to be ours have broken completely down. "There has never been a great moralist from Confucius to Seneca," says an authority on the subject, "who was able to reform the street on which he lived." Such being the case how do we propose to keep getting on well, and as well in the future as in the past, if we propose to take the beating heart out of an educational system planned to reach every boy and girl in the land? How do we propose to escape the destiny of all things godless, if we propose to go on making concessions to infidel and agnostic, and excluding that which we have found to be essential to national virtue and safety? This is what we have come to in the United States and

in France as regards religious training in education, that democracy has completely secularized the schools. The school therefore gives an incomplete education. The religious aspect of civilization and the place and influence of religion in the life of the individual are excluded from its view. This is the important fact to be reckoned with. We want no Romish policy to reinstate mediaevalism and teach dogmas and claims that are unhistorical and unscriptural, but the time has come when that secularism and infidelity which work disorganization and death should be resisted as the enemies of free government.

We need to ponder carefully the words of our versatile and noble President in his message to Congress in December, 1904. Mr. Roosevelt said: "If a race does not have plenty of children, or if the children do not grow up, or if when they grow up they are unhealthy in body and stunted or vicious in mind, then that race is decadent and no heaping up of wealth, no splendor of momentary material prosperity, can avail in any degree as offsets." And his other words spoken elsewhere: "Back of the material and greater than the material lie the moral and the spiritual."

Patriotism has a right to demand something of education. When Phillips Brooks preached his great Fourth of July sermon in Westminster Abbey, he said that the cry of one nation to another the world over was this, "Show us your man." That is the cry which ought to run as a challenge from every part of the working life of the nation to every other part, from industry to commerce, from commerce to education, from education to religion and back again. The man whom we would like to show we were in the business of educating, should not be a segment of a man, but a complete man. We shall not likely produce him, and produce him long, if we leave out of our system of pedagogics one of the most important and fundamental factors in the making of manhood.

The only reason why matters have not gone worse in some communities is that most of the teachers have maintained a strong sense of the sacredness of their high calling and have managed to keep up the standards and quickened impulses to

thought and righteousness, such as can come up from a living soul. This have they done, while other and able men, busy with questions of finance, have played the part of the shirk, while dolts and dullards sometimes have dictated educational policies. Speaking of this country the late Dr. Hastie, author of "The Theology of the Reformed Church in its fundamental principles," says: "It is not clear whether Protestantism or Romanism or utter secularism is yet to win in this unfenced field." Most Americans would feel obliged to dissent at least from the suggestion implied in the metaphor of the "unfenced field," but the more thoughtful among them would feel some reasonable apprehensions regarding the possibility of secularism.

If certain regretful tendencies that have gained widespread recognition in recent years, and which have induced us to recede from the higher educational ideals of a former time, are permitted to go on unchecked, we may expect an increase of that hard commercial and worldly spirit which is always and everywhere less heroic, less reverent, and less influenced by the enthusiasm of high spiritual ideals and unselfish interest. Whenever our land becomes a mere Sahara of secularism it will be as worthless as any other moral sandheap. May we not be drifting toward the inevitable day of disaster upon the rocks on the leeward side? If so shall we be able to cast out some of our secular impedimenta and wear off upon a safer tack? The answer may depend very much upon our attitude in the matter of the neglected factor in our popular education.

ARTICLE III.

ST. PAUL AS A WITNESS TO THE SUPERNATURAL.

By Professor Luther A. Fox, D.D.

Religion is slowly growing in favor in philosophic circles. Epicurus, grieved by the religious fears of his mother, undertook to deliver the world from the slavery of superstition by undermining all religion. With the revival of Epicureanism it became fashionable to sneer at the Church, and science claimed as its special mission the emancipation of men from the bondage of the priests. Religion was decried and religious people were pitied or held in contempt. But scientific men are speaking more respectfully of religion, and philosophers like Paulsen are bold enough to claim for it a permanent place in human life. "Religion will never die out; it satisfies the innermost and deepest needs of the human soul."

This change in training is due to two things. The first is that religion is such a prominent fact in history that it refuses to be ignored. It must be accounted for in any complete explanation of the world. There was an attempt to minimize it by ascribing its beginning to natural causes, but it failed. Even if it did have its starting point, as Weber says, in the childish transformations of physical conditions into an enchanted world, *i.e.*, naturalism, or, as Spencer thought, in the dreams of the earliest barbarians and in the emanation of dead ancestors, *i. e.*, animism, it nevertheless must have had a deeper origin. It has survived the age of the humanity child and has grown stronger as well as clearer with advancing civilization. Men everywhere and always have been religious. The most enlightened as well as the lowest savages have had their objects of worship. The Aryan has long, long ago, ceased to deify the air, but he bows before the infinite God. Religion is one of the deepest instincts of our nature. We may define man as a religious animal. We can no more deny his religious than his rational nature. Every

philosophy of the world, under the penalty of incompleteness and consequent failure, must include religion.

The second reason for the more respectful training of scientific men towards religion is found in the strenuous efforts of many prominent ministers to accommodate doctrines to the latest scientific opinions. The claims of religion are lowered to make it more palatable to the scientific taste. Some of these Churchmen are vain and ambitious and want to be regarded as fully abreast with the most advanced thought. They are in a hurry to embrace its latest utterances and they greedily swallow the most recent statements. They forget that the newest is not always the truest, and that there is a difference between a hypothesis and established fact. Their vanity makes them traitors to the truth. Other Churchmen are moved by the more worthy desire of winning to the Church the men of science and philosophy. They pare the creeds and trim the Bible to make them more acceptable to those who deny inspiration and miracle. They admit that the earlier stories of the Old Testament may be mere legends and myths and are important only in the history of religious growth. They strip the New Testament of specific doctrines and miracles and leave us a mere skeleton of moral principles. They call justification by faith a theological fiction and profess to have outgrown the reformation. It is this denuded Christanity that scientific men profess to respect. It is certainly not the religion of the Church, and they make a wide distinction between Christianity and Theology. Dr. J. W. Draper wrote of the Conflict between Science and Religion, but Andrew D. White a few years later wrote of the Conflict between Science and Theology. We must not, therefore, attach too much importance to words like those of Paulsen, "Religion will not disappear from the world." "That is above all the grand teaching of Christianity; through suffering and death we pass to resurrection and glory."* That sounds well, but when we come to understand it we find it a mere husk.

*Instroduction to Philosophy, pp., 326-335.

The Christianity which we received from our fathers and hold dearer than life is a supernatural religion. Bereft of its character as a revelation from God, its prime essence is gone. It is God's voice speaking through inspired men, not the utterance of mere religious genius. It is not a philosophy, but a divinely established religion. The man who does not believe this differs radically from us and we can not regard him a Christian. For him Jesus was only a wonderfully gifted teacher; for us he is God incarnate. We may seem to him benighted and superstitious, back numbers, or religious fossils or what not, but he seems to us a heathen. The question of the supernatural is the crucial one. The miraculous in the gospel story is the vital issue. The man who says that the miracles, once the corner stone of evidence, have become the stumbling block to educated people, ought to remain outside of the Church. He is not entitled in any true and historic sense to the name Christian. If the Church ever erases from her creed the article of the supernatural she degenerates into a mere charitable institution and becomes a mere ethical sect.

Natural science can have no place for the supernatural. It tells us that "we must always wait for sensible evidence for our beliefs and when such evidence is inaccessible we must frame no hypothesis whatever." It deals with physical facts under close and fast law. It must take facts as it finds them, and it is unscientific to inquire into the ultimate origin of things or the primary basis of law. We have no fault to find with La Place when as a mere scientist he said to Napoleon, "I have no need of the hypothesis of God," nor with Dr. Osler when he said to the Harvard students that science can know nothing of the immortality of man. Neither God nor the soul after death is a sensible fact. Mere science has no more place for consciousness than it has for God. One of the most fundamental principles is the conservation of energy. The physical energy of stumulus and nerve can not, under that law, be turned into conscious activity, nor the energy of consciousness into physical force. Consciousness lies just as much outside of natural science as the supernatural. Physiological psychology

has taught us much about the physical side of mental phenomena, but has thrown no light upon the nature of consciousness. It knows nothing of free will or moral ideals. Its judgments are of facts, not values. It can not furnish a solution of the problem of the world. It is entitled to no word about the supernatural. But its pretentions are astonishing. It is very young yet but it makes wonderful claims for itself. Dr. William James says, "Think how absolutely new scientific conceptions have arisen in our own generation, how many new problems have been formulated that were never thought of before, and then cast your eye upon the brevity of science's career. It began with Galileo not three centuries ago. Four thinkers since Galileo each informing his successor of what his own lifetime had achieved, might have passed the torch of science into our own hands as we sit here tonight in this room. Indeed for the matter of that an audience much smaller than the present one, an audience of some five or six score people, if each person in it could speak for his own generation, would carry us back to the black unknown of the human species, to days without a document or a monument to tell the tale. Is it credible that such a mushroom knowledge, such a growth overnight as this, can represent more than the smallest glimpse of what the universe will really prove to be when adequately understood? No! Our science is a drop, our ignorance a sea. Whatever else be certain this at least is certain, that the world of our present natural knowledge is enveloped in a larger world of some sort of whose residual properties we at present can frame no positive idea." * In that larger world of which this scientist and philosopher speaks there may be plenty of room for the supernatural. We should hear attentively all that science has to say in its various departments, use its methods as far as applicable in all investigations but not beyond them, *ne sutor supra crepidam.*

Philosophy is the science of reality, the sum total of all scientific knowledge. Its field is far wider than physics. Its prov-

*The Will to Believe, p. 53.

ince is the universe so far as it is known. It seeks to rationalize all knowledge and reduce all things to unity. It can never become complete until the universe has been thoroughly explored. Its present tendency is to monism in the form of absolute identity. Mind and matter are not substances but manifestations, modification of the eternal infinite substance. On its religious side this philosophy is pantheism. God is absorbed in or identical with the universe. Outside of and independent of the world he has no existence. The supernatural is, therefore, impossible. Paulsen is a spiritualistic monist and an avowed pantheist. Miracles for him are absurd. "The Biblical miracles are no exception to this rule; they belong to a category of world views which has disappeared and cannot long survive them. I do not believe that the Church can again win the confidence of thinking men until she decides to discard the belief in miracles." * He has no more place for the divine right of conscience than for the supernatural. "Conscience is the consciousness of custom." As long as philosophy is pantheistic it will regard the story of a miracle as a myth. But our philosophy is not final. The present systems can be regarded as little more than tentative. The numerous wrecks along the line of higher thought serve as warnings against our confidence. The memory of Hegelianism is recent enough to restrain the arrogance of even the most daring. Indeed philosophy is just now a little out of favor. The riddle of the world is not solved. A wiser philosophy may yet find that reality can be explained only by the hypothesis of a personal God. The day for the burial of the Christianity of our fathers has not yet been appointed. We may still ask what evidence do we have that God has revealed himself by supernatural means to sinful men? It remains a question of fact and not theory. What cannot be accounted for by any known natural force must be left wholly unexplained or be ascribed to the supernatural. We believe the case is stronger than that. We may safely assume that we know enough about natural laws to say

*System of Ethics, p. 435.

that some things connected with the Gospel story are either myths or miracles.

St. Paul for several different reasons becomes one of the most important witnesses to the fact of the supernatural. Next after our Lord he is the most conspicuous figure in the Church. Dr. Schaff calls him "the most remarkable and influential character in history." The main facts of his life are too clearly established to be questioned. He wrote nearly as much as all the other writers of the New Testament combined. Nearly all of his works are admitted by the great body of critical scholars to be genuine. Only a very few extreme radicals, like Bruno Bauer and Loman, have ventured to pronounce all of them fabrications. Tübingen recognized the first four, and since the time of F. C. Baur the list has grown until all except Ephesians and the pastoral epistles* are conceded. His preëminent ability is acknowledged. He was the first to recognize the universal side of our Lord's life and accept with full consciousness the meaning of the commission "Go into all the world." He carried out with clear purpose the tendency which had its beginning in Stephen and Barnabas and did most among the Apostles to make Christianity a universal religion. Without him the Church would have remained a much longer time under the trammels of the Jewish law and might have sunk back like the Ebionitic party into a Jewish sect. So important was the service he rendered that in onesided and extravagant language he has been called the author of Christianity. Bacon says, "Christianity as we know it is Pauline Christianity." His great talents, his rich experience, his exalted character and his magnificent work entitle him to the place we give him in Christian Evidence.

Though of the Diaspora Paul was a Jew of perfectly pure strain, a Hebrew of the Hebrews. He was a native of Tarsus and by inheritance a Roman citizen. His father was a Pharisee and though very devoted to the religion of his fathers was politically more liberal than most of his brethren. The family

*These are rapidly gaining favor.

had some prominence in the community. "In the first century when the citizenship was still jealously guarded, the *civitas* may be taken as a proof that the family was of distinction and at least of moderate wealth."* His early life was passed in a Jewish home located in a Gentile community, and he was, therefore, under both Jewish and Gentile influences.

Tarsus was a commercial, political and educational centre. It was the seat of one of the three great universities of the Roman world. The celebrated Athenodorus, the friend of Seneca, was about this time one of the philosophical faculty. Ramsay thinks that Paul was more influenced by this ministry than is commonly supposed. The boy breathed its literary atmosphere, even though he was not a student in its halls, and must have been to some extent at least affected by it. Possibly it is through Athenodorus the likeness between Paul and Seneca may be best explained. But the first school to which little Saul was sent was most probably the one in connection with the synagogue. If the educational rule, "At thirteen let them be subject to the law," was at that time in force, he was sent at that age to Jerusalem to be brought up at the feet of Gamaliel. Here he studied the Old Testament with eminent success. He became equally familiar with the Hebrew and the Greek text. He learned the methods of interpretation that were popular at that time. But the Rabbinical quibblers did not leave a lasting impression upon him. His character as a student won for him favor with the Jewish authorities. At some time, whether at Jerusalem or Tarsus, he became acquainted with the Greek language and to some extent with Greek literature. His grammar is faulty but he used the language with a vigor and mastery that is marvellous. Weiss thinks that his knowledge of it was gathered not from books but from intercourse with the Greek people. If that be true, it shows a wonderful genius little short of direct inspiration. During the ten years he spent in Tarsus after his conversion he must have been engaged in preparation for the special work to which

* Ramsay: St. Paul The Traveller.

he knew he had been called. It was most probably at this time he obtained that Hellenic culture that he used so effectively as the Apostle to the Gentiles. He came back to his native city in the strength of early manhood, with his mental faculties well disciplined and with his purpose in life fully formed. He was at that time of life when he would make the greatest intellectual strides and lay the broadest and deepest foundation for his subsequent work.

As a student he was taught to believe in the supernatural but he was not ignorant of the contrary view. The Sadducees were sceptics, denying the existence of angels and spirits and the resurrection. They had possession of the High Priesthood and were strong in the Sanhedrim. Their prominence would force their peculiar opinions upon the attention of intellectual young men. If he accepted the faith of his fathers it was not without personal examination.

His character is unimpreachable. He was one of the most conscientious of the Pharisees. He tells us that he was one of the strictest of the sect, the strictest of the strict and lived in all good conscience before God and men. His standards may have been too low in some matters and too exacting in others, but he was not conscious of falling below them. He was honest and truthful. His zeal for the faith as he had received it and his intense devotion to the law made him a persecutor. He made havoc of the Christians in Jerusalem and was entrusted with letters of prosecution from the Sanhedrim to carry his bloody work to Damascus. Though we have no sympathy with his work, we cannot but admire his earnestness in carrying out his convictions. It is strange that the most narrow and bigoted of the Jews should become the most catholic of Christians. It is the more remarkable because the great revolution came suddenly as he was riding along the highway.

His journey to Damascus was the great epoch in his life. He was about thirty years of age, strong in health and full of energy. There is not the slightest intimation of any physical infirmity whatever or any previous visions or trances. He was

still, according to his own statement, perfectly convinced that Christianity was a dangerous heresy. "I verily thought with myself that I ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth." (Act 26 : 9). But on the way to Damascus he was converted, and from that time to his martyrdom he gave himself with unreserved consecration to the cause he had before so bitterly opposed.

What he had known about Christianity prior to this event is largely a matter of inference. He was probably in Jerusalem during our Lord's ministry but from his own statement it is commonly believed that he never saw him. He may have been out of the city at the time of the crucifixion. He had heard of Stephen's defense and witnessed his triumphant death. Weiss thinks that most likely he belonged to the Cilician synagogue whose members disputed much with Stephen and, therefore, he looked on while he was being stoned. But his association with the first martyr seems to have intensified his hatred of a religion which could awaken such insane fanaticism. His commission from the Sanhedrim shows an intimacy with the Jewish authorities that put him in possession of everything that seemed prejudicial to Christianity, and was likely to stir his zeal. While very much that they told him was false it is certain that they gave him no proof of any serious fraud on the part of the disciples. The authorities, therefore, did not know that the statements of the Christians about the life, miracles and resurrection of Jesus were false.

Paul's first experience of the supernatural was at his conversion. There are three accounts of it given in the Acts : (9 : 1-20 ; 22 : 6-16 ; 26 : 12-18). They are all from the same source. The first is given by the historian from some earlier record ; the other two claim to be directly from Paul himself. The author of Acts evidently from the space given it regarded it as an exceedingly important event. If Luke is the author of Acts, as the preponderating and increasing weight of evidence shows, we have Paul's statement as he heard it on at least two separate occasions. There are numerous references in the Pauline epistles corroborating the history in Acts. There can be no

doubt that something very extraordinary occurred at that time. Upon it Paul based his claim to be an Apostle of equal authority with the twelve. He never betrayed the slightest doubt as to the objective reality of the vision. Two things are certain, that in Acts we have substantially the facts as Paul conceived them and in his epistles his own interpretation of them as miraculous. The only question that remains is, was he mistaken?

He had ample time to study its meaning and test its validity. Soon after his baptism he left Damascus and went into retirement in Arabia. This part of his life is sketched by himself. "Immediately I conferred not with flesh and blood, neither went I up to Jerusalem to them which were before me but went I into Arabia and returned again to Damascus. Then after three years I went up to Jerusalem to see Peter and abode with him fifteen days." (Gal. 1: 16 18). He takes a Jewish oath in confirmation of the whole account. "Now the things which I write unto you behold before God I lie not. (v. 20). The three years' study confirmed him in the conviction that he had received a direct and independent revelation. He did not feel the need of the help of the companions of the Lord. When at last he goes to see Peter, he remains only fifteen days. He may have gone to consult him about methods of work, and not about facts and principles. At least he does not confess to any special obligations to Peter for any material assistence received from him. He goes soon after into Syria and then to Tarsus for the purpose of developing his own resources and becoming more thoroughly fitted for his own peculiar field. The remainder of his life was a verification of his divine call. His convictions unless they had been most thoroughly grounded would have been put under an insupportable strain by his sufferings. "Three times beaten with rods, once stoned, three times shipwrecked, besides the perils of waters, perils of robbers, perils by his own countrymen, in perils by heathens, in perils in the city, in perils in the wilderness, in perils in the sea, in perils among false brethren."—Thus he rapidly sketched the dangers to which he had been exposed. Once at least he was compelled to enter the arena and fight with wild beasts. He lived as one under

sentence of death, and hourly in danger of execution. His arduous labors were carried on under difficulties, dangers, self-denials and sufferings that had never been experienced. But his faith never waned. Ardent, fiery temperaments like his have violent reactions and sometimes sink into the gloom of black despondency, but one thing he never doubted and that was his immediate, miraculous call to be an Apostle. Nothing that he subsequently experienced can cast a shadow of suspicion upon the very real, positive, objective vision of the risen Christ. The beginning of such a life had its ground in certainty. No stronger proof of his unfaltering belief could possibly be given. Was it after all merely subjective? The story of his conversion has been assailed from several different standpoints.

1. The authenticity of the records has been questioned. Some have said that the Acts is the work of a bungling editor of the second century, but Ramsay, trained first in the Tübingen school and afterwards making a special study of the travels of Paul, pronounces Luke a historian of the first order. Some who recognize Luke as the author say that the accounts of the conversion are contradictory. Weiss says, "Luke repeatedly heard the Apostle describe the vision and has himself given a free representation of it but even apart from these free representations that are not entirely reconcilable," &c. The author of Acts did not regard them contradictory. Admitting for the moment that in part they cannot now be reconciled, it is still true that they agree in all essential particulars. But when we come to study them the reason for the charge against them is not very clear. In chapter ninth it is said, "The men who journeyed with him stood speechless hearing a *voice* but seeing *no man*." In chapter twenty-second it is said, "They that were with me saw *the light* and were afraid but they heard not the voice *that spake to me*." But here there is no contradiction. The men saw the light but not the Lord, and heard the sound of the voice but not the words spoken to Paul. In chapter twenty-second it is said that Ananias told Paul that he was to be "a witness unto all men of what thou has seen and

heard," but in chapter twenty-sixth it is the Lord who said, "I have appeared unto thee for this purpose to make thee a witness both of the things thou has seen and of those in the which I will appear unto thee." Part of the words may have been spoken twice, first by the Lord and then repeated by Ananias. Paul condenses the account and puts together the two announcements, as both were supernatural.* The discrepancies served to confirm the account. A fabrication would not have introduced them or a late editor, unless sure of their harmony, permitted them to remain. Nor would a fabricator take an obscure man like Ananias, of whom we know absolutely nothing beyond his part in this incident, to render such a service to so great a man as Paul. He would have sent Peter or John or at least one of the twelve down to Damascus to baptize the great Apostle to the Gentiles. The fact of the vision, confirmed as it is by Paul's letters, must be admitted as historic.

The vision was either an objective reality and thus supernatural, or a subjective delusion. The former was the interpre-

* Prof. B. W. Bacon in his story of St. Paul, just published, says, "The most important variation in this account is that which concerns the healing, baptism and instruction of the new convert by Ananias. Paul receives his call to preach to the Gentiles directly in the vision itself and at once obeys. Ananias disappears entirely from view in 26 : 16-18. In the narration of 9 : 6-30 Ananias is told of Paul's commission to the Gentiles which we are left to infer he repeated to Paul," p. 47. There are reasons for the variations. In the speech to Agrippa, Paul speaks his direct commission because there was no need of referring to Ananias whose chief office it was to baptize him. In the speech to the Jewish people it was more important to tell them of the "devout man according to the law and having a good report among the Jews." To neither does he speak of his baptism. In the ninth chapter the account is fuller and includes more than either of the others. Ananias hesitated to go to Paul and he is told of the great commission to remove those fears and to explain the wonderful vision Paul received. It is only an inference, and that not very well grounded, that Ananias said anything to Paul about the Gentiles, but if he did it was only to tell him all the Lord had said to him. It was purely incidental. Those who find irreconcilable variation here must certainly be looking for it. The authors habit of grouping things separated by years and faithfully recording documents as he received them and facts as he heard and saw them ought to be sufficient explanation of their accounts.

tation of Paul and his contemporaries and has been the faith of the Church in all ages. The burden of proof, therefore, lies with those who maintain the subjective theory. We turn then to :

2. The Rationalistic theories. The first is the illusion theory. It is not of recent origin but it was revived and made popular and plausible by the brilliant rhetoric of Renan. It is given by Dr. Schaff from his Life of Jesus. "Every step to Damascus excited in Paul bitter repentance; the shameful task of the hangman was intolerable to him; he felt as if he were kicking against the goads; the fatigue of travel added to his depression; a malignant fever suddenly seized him; the blood rushed to his head; the mind was filled with a picture of midnight darkness broken by flashes of lightning; it is probable that one of those sudden storms of Mount Hermon broke out which are unequaled for vehemence, and to the Jews the thunder was the voice of God, the lightning the fire of God. Certain it is that by a fearful stroke the persecutor was thrown to the ground and deprived of his senses; in his feverish delirium he mistook the lightning for a heavenly vision, the voice of thunder a voice from heaven; inflamed eyes, the beginning of ophthalmia, aided the delusion." It is a theory of perhapses. Perhaps remorse, perhaps a fever, perhaps a delirium, perhaps a thunder storm, perhaps the thunder mistaken for a voice and the lightning for a vision of Christ. It is strange that the attendants never told Paul that he had been sick and been overtaken by a terrific storm. Nothing of all these most remarkable coincidences is anywhere intimated in history. If we can think them possible can we believe that a man of Paul's character could have been their victim? The theory is too preposterous to be seriously entertained.

The second rationalistic theory is that of hallucination. This is more sane and more worthy of serious examination. It supposes that a psychological phenomenon was turned into honest self delusion. The appearance of Christ was the creation of a momentarily disordered brain and was mistaken for an objective reality. There are many analogous cases, as Mohammed, Swedenborg, Joan of Arc and even hundreds of others. But

will the facts in the experiences of Paul allow this natural explanation?

Stress is laid upon the reputed words of Christ. "It is hard for thee to kick against the goads."* It is said that they were the results of his doubts and a serious mental conflict. It is supposed that Paul had been deeply impressed by the death of Stephen and the repeated discussions he had held with Christians. Half convinced, his intense prejudice had prevented him from yielding and the suppressed convictions had turned him into a persecutor. But misgivings in a man of Paul's candor would have abated his zeal. He was on an errand of persecution when arrested and was least likely to fall into a state of mind so fatal to his immediate object and his future career as he had marked it out for himself. "How could a fanatical persecutor, breathing threatenings and slaughter, stultify and contradict himself by an imaginative conceit which tended to build up the very religion he was laboring to destroy?" Paul has the right to testify in his own case. He says that he verily thought he was doing God's service and that he obtained mercy because he did it ignorantly. The seventh chapter of Romans cannot be adduced as evidence in this case. There is not the slightest reason for believing that he had the remotest reference to his experiences on the way to Damascus.

But the chief strength of the theory lies in the fact that Paul had other visions. The supposition that he was an epileptic is wholly unsupported and is not necessary to the argument.

In Acts we are told of several of these visions. "And a vision appeared to Paul in the night." "There stood a man of Macedonia and prayed him saying come over into Macedonia and help us."† (16 : 9). Again in Corinith: "Then spake the

* Bacon says the goads were the providential arrangements fitting Paul for his life mission. The suggestion is worthy of attention.

† Prof. Bacon suggests that this vision and the one on the night of peril in the deep (Acts 27 : 23-24) find their explanation in "the automatic action of the mind which modern psychology designates as subliminal.' He refers to the fact that "some of the greatest minds in history have been so constituted that the solution of their problems burst upon them unforeseen in dreams or even trances according to temperament and condi-

Lord to Paul in the night by a vision: "Be not afraid but speak and hold not thy peace. For I am with thee and no man shall set on thee to hurt thee." (18 : 9). He tells in his defense before the people of a vision on a former visit to Jerusalem while praying in the temple. "I was in trance and saw the Lord saying, make haste and get thee quickly out of Jerusalem for they will not receive thy testimony," (22 : 17 18). On the night following his arrest as Luke tells us "The Lord stood by him and said, be of good cheer, Paul, for as thou has testified of me in Jerusalem so must thou be witness also at Rome," (23 :11). He wrote to the Galatians that he went on one occasion to Jerusulem "by revelation" (2 : 2). The nature of that revelation he does not indicate. The one to which most importance is attached is that related in Second Corinthians. He regarded it as very peculiar. He had not before spoken of it to any one and he tells it now with much hesitancy. He confesses that he did not fully understand it. "I knew a man in Christ above fourteen years ago (whether in the body I cannot tell or whether out of the body I cannot tell, God knoweth) such a one caught up into the third heaven. How he was caught up into Paradise and heard unspeakable things which it is not lawful to man to utter" (11 : 2-4).

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tion." (Story of St. Paul pp. 40-42). He cites the case of Luther and Pilate's stairway. There is an element of truth in this suggestion. Subconscious thought, first observed by Leibnitz and afterwards defended by Hamilton, is forcing itself more and more upon the attention of psychologists. All admit now that there is unconscious cerebration, but that does not seem to explain all the facts. Subliminal activity may have had its influence in some of Paul's visions and may have been used by God in making revelations to him. We have a great many instances in which God employed natural causes as instruments of miracles. If we may fall back upon Genesis we have examples in the dreams of Jacob and Joseph. To these two visions of Paul the vision in Jerusalem was similar and we have Paul's interpretation of that as a miracle. We are willing to trust his critical judgment upon it. Bacon admits that there was some kind of revelation in these visions. "Revelation it is and ever will be, no matter how much we may learn as to the mode of God working in it." If a revelation then there was a supernatural element and Paul was right in regarding the vision as a direct communication from God even though it was based upon his subliminal faith and reason.

Visions were not peculiar to Paul. Peter had the vision of the sheet let down from heaven which led to the baptism of Cornelius. The story is told by the historian and Peter alludes to it in his speech before the council in Jerusalem. If a hallucination, it is strange that messengers should meet him as he descended from the house top who gave it meaning. On another occasion when he was sleeping in prison between two soldiers an angel appeared to him and bade him arise. If a hallucination it is inexplicable that the chains fell off and the triple doors should be open.

Hallucinations in the same subject follow one general type But those of Paul can be divided into four distinct classes. The vision of the night, the trance when the Lord gave him words of cheer, the vision of Paradise and the vision of his conversion. Cerebral disorder, the cause of hallucination, is local and when repeated is always in the same section of the brain producing the same or analogous visions. If Paul was subject to hallucinations he was a monomaniac and his case is absolutely peculiar in the history of mental diseases.

Hallucinations are confined to the subject. But the attendants of Paul shared in part the vision. According to his statement they all fell on the ground and they all saw the light, and according to the other account they all heard the sound of the voice. (Acts 26 : 14 ; 22 : 9).

Hallucination cannot account for Paul's blindness. He says, "I could not see for the glory of the light, being led by the hand of them that were with me I came to Damascus." He was three days without sight until one Ananias "came unto me and said unto me 'Brother Saul, receive thy sight. And the same hour I looked up upon him" (Acts 22 : 11-13). Hallucinations do not produce such physical effects as blindness which after three days is suddenly removed by the word of a stranger. Here was a fact that he distinctly remembered, and it was verified by all in his retinue. It was to him a perfect guarantee of the objective nature of his vision.

Hallucinations are the effects, and not causes, of disease. Paul's thorn in the flesh was a consequence of his vision of

Paradise. He knew of no natural relation between them. He says the thorn was given him lest he should be exalted above measure. What the thorn was we do not know. The conjectures are all without satisfactory support and afford us no light.

Paul's other visions confirm rather than discredit his experience on the way to Damascus. If he had experienced no other we might have questioned that one. It is not probable that the Lord after making one such marvellous manifestation would never again speak to him in dream or vision.

Paul observed the difference between his visions. About the one he had some uncertainty but not about the others. Of the one he speaks only once, but he often speaks of his conversion. The vision of the Christ on the way to Damascus was quite unlike those that came to him in dreams and trances. It was distinct and peculiar, without any paralled in his experience. The basis of such a great claim as a call * to be an Apostle along with the companions of the Lord, to be the equal of the pillars of the Church and to have the right to rebuke the chief leader, he must have examined in every light to assure himself of its reality and validity. His own explanation is entitled to more credit than that of modern critics. He knew a great deal more about it than they can possibly know.

If it was a hallucination, a mere subjective vision, Paul's whole Christian life and work was founded upon a delusion. The current of history was turned by a thing as baseless as a dream. Keim says, "The whole character of Paul, his chief understanding which was not weakened by his enthusiasm, the careful, cautious, measured, simple form of his statements, above all the total impression of his narration and the mighty echo of it in the unanimous, uncontradicted faith of primitive Christendom, are the proofs of the objective reality of the vision." † Baur in frequently quoted concessions said, "No psychological or dictatorial analysis of the experience can explore the inner mystery of the act in which God revealed his Son in Paul." "The sudden transformation of Paul from the most violent adversary

* 1 Cor. 9 : 1, Gal. 1 : 16 : 2: 1-14, &c.

† Quoted by Dr. Schaff from History of Christ, Vol. III, p. 532.

of Christianity into the most determined herald, is nothing short of a miracle, and the miracle appears all the greater when we remember that in the revolution of his consciousness he broke the barriers of Judaism and rose out of particularism into the universalism of Christianity." Reuss of the same school, but a little later, said, "The conversion of Paul, if not an absolute miracle after the old theological pattern, is yet a most remarkable psychological problem. The so called natural explanations have to do for the most part merely with the known external phenomena, leaving the subjective element of the occurrance unexplained, while the traditional view, to save the former, entirely ignores the latter. It is evident from the oft repeated assertion of Paul that to his mind the appearance was objective and morever not the only one, and that he was not conscious of having attained his Christianity from personal instruction of the Apostles. In view of these facts it is, to say the least, precarious to attempt to see in the occurence nothing but a thunder storm and an overwrought imagination. On the other hand no sound theology can be satisfied with the solution of a compulsory, mechanical transformation of a great and noble soul." * Holstein, Pfleiderer, Schenkel and others had made similar concessions. The efforts of the great masters have acknowledgedly failed to torture the facts into harmony with the pantheistic theory. Paul's vision then was a clear instance of the supernatural.

Paul believed that he had revelations beyond those of the visions. He tells the Corinthians of "abundant revelations." He had faith in his own inspiration. He uses a tone of authority that would be inexcusable in any one not fully conscious of an immediate divine direction The spirit of his ministry was that of an assurance of official infallibility. The distinction between his own opinion and that of his inspiration was clearly drawn in his own consciousness, and he does not hesitate to say it whenever he was in doubt. The Christian man was not absorbed in the inspired Apostle. In his personal life he walked

* History of the New Testament, Vol. I, p. 54.

as we do, by faith. Officially he was positive and dogmatic but personally he was modest, humble, self-distrustful and self-reproachful. He ascribed all the good that was in him to divine grace. Once he calls himself the chief of sinners. The Corinthian said his bodily presence was weak and his speech contemptible, but his letters are weighty. He replied that as he was in his letters, so he would be indeed when he came. He was writing about his authority which had been given him by the Lord (2 Cor. 10 : 8 11). The boldness, fearlessness and unquestioning spirit of his ministry * had its ground in his unfaltering confidence in the revelations given him.

Paul claimed to have performed miracles. He uses the words by which miracles are elsewhere in the New Testament designated: signs, wonders and mighty deeds. He appeals to them as credentials of his apostolic commission. The first is an incidental statement in the Epistle to the Romans: "For I will not dare to speak of any of those things which Christ hath wrought by me to make the Gentiles obedient, by word and deed, by mighty signs and wonders, by the power of the Spirit of God, so that from Jerusalem and round about unto Illyricum I have fully preached the gospel of Christ," 15 : 18-19. Another is in the Epistle to the Galatians 3 : 5, "He that supplieth to you the Spirit and worketh miracles among you doeth he it by the works of the law or the hearing of faith?" He was writing to a church that had in it a party of enemies. He is vindicating his claims against their aspersions. He appeals to their own knowledge of the facts. Unless the miracles had been clear and manifest beyond question he would not have dared to summon them as witnesses. A third claim was made to the Corinthians. "Truly the signs of an Apostle were wrought among you in all patience, in signs and wonders and mighty deeds," 2 Cor. 12 : 12. Here again he was writing to people who had been turned into opponents and would accept nothing for fact except that which was beyond doubt. These appeals prove that Paul did things which were recognized

* 1 Cor. 2 : 12-13 ; Gal. 1 : 8.

by the whole community as miracles and that he himself had perfect confidence in their miraculous character. They prove also that Paul believed that similar miracles were wrought by the other Apostles. The appeals are admitted, and his own honest convictions are certain. He who denies that there were miracles must show that Paul was mistaken as to the character of his own powers.

In Acts we have records of some of the miracles performed by him. There is this general statement of his work in Corinth. "And God wrought special miracles by the hand of Paul so that from his body were brought unto the sick, handkerchiefs or aprons, and the disease departed from them and the evil spirits went out of them," 19 : 11–12. For some people this statement carries its own refutation upon its face. To their judgment it is preposterous. But there are facts occurring today which make us more cautious in rejecting the statement as false. Why could not God use as agents in miraculous cures certain psychical powers which are proved beyond doubt to exist, but which no one fully understands?

The first case given specifically is that of Elymas, the sorcerer, who was in the company of the Proconsul Sergius Paulas at Paphos in Cyprus. Paul filled with the Holy Ghost fixed his eyes upon him and said, "The hand of the Lord is upon thee and thou shalt be blind, not seeing the sun for a season. And immediately there fell on him a mist and a darkness and he went about seeking some one to lead him," 13 : 6–13. The Proconsul was so impressed that he became a Christian. We do not know from what source the author of Acts learned the story, but it is most probable that it was from the Apostle. An incidental statement adds something to its confirmation. Both before and after this time Cyprus was an imperial province and its officer was a proprietor, but Zumpt discovered that at this particular period it was transferred to the control of the Senate, and its deputy is properly called by Luke, Proconsul. A spurious story of later date would have called him proprietor. There is no natural explanation of the facts possible except hypnotism. One can readily see how a rationalist might

turn the fact of Paul's fixing his eye upon him and the probable susceptibility of the sorcerer into a plausible argument. But no respectable author, so far as we know, has thought it worth while to resort to such a theory and we may dismiss it by saying that if ever done we can easily show that the conditions exclude it.

The second instance is the case of the man who was a cripple from his mother's womb and who had never walked. Paul said to him with a loud voice: "Stand upright on thy feet. And he leaped and walked" (14 : 8-12). The people of Lystra were so impressed with the miracle that they prepared to offer sacrifices to the Apostles and were with difficulty restrained. If this was a case of faith cure it is the most marvelous in history. The story most probably was told by Paul to Luke who recorded it.

The third case is related by an eyewitness, most probably by Luke. It is that of the girl at Philippi who was possessed of a spirit of divination and who annoyed Paul because for many days she "followed Paul and us and cried, These men are the servants of the most high God." He "turned and said to the spirit, I command thee in the name of the Lord Jesus to come out of her. And he came out the same hour." (16 : 16-18). It was a notable case for it led to the arrest, trial in the midst of an excited multitude, and the imprisonment of Paul and Silas. Those who deny that there are demons or spirits of divination must find some explanation of facts so well authenticated. Clairvoyance, mindreading or whatever it may be of that sort is not exorcised or extirpated in a moment.

The fourth is given by the same eyewitness. The young man Entychus at Troas fell while asleep from the third story of the house where Paul was preaching "and was taken up dead." "Paul went down and fell on him and embracing him said, Trouble not yourselves for his life is in him." "And they brought the young man alive." If Luke was the eyewitness we have the opinion of a cultivated physician. The fall without a special providence would kill. If not entirely extinct the

man would have died from concussion. It seems a clear fact of miracle (20 : 8-12).

The last belongs to the same "we section" While Paul was placing some sticks on the fire on the island of Malta "a serpent fastened itself on his hand but he shook off the beast into the fire and felt no harm." (28 : 3 5). The people of the island knew that it was very venomous and expected Paul to fall down dead. In their opinion of the nature of the serpent Luke shared. If they were not mistaken, and there is no reason for believing that they were, it was certainly a miracle. In regard to the last three at least Paul is responsible for the conviction of his attendants because he knew that they thought that these deeds were miracles and he left them in that belief.

In his letters we have an implicit confirmation of the Gospel story. Their silence is as significant as explicit statement. He does not refer to a single one of the Lord's miracles, quotes very few of his sayings and mentions only one fact in his ministry. He does not repeat the story of the crucifixion nor give any account of the institution of baptism. He assumes that his readers are familiar with the story of the Lord's life. His allusions and references, indeed the whole of his epistles, would be meaningless without a knowledge of that story. They harmonize with our canonical Gospels. His letters presuppose full oral instruction, both in the fundamental facts of the history and in the elementary principles of Christianity. Everywhere he speaks of the Lord as if there were no need of repeating things with which they were perfectly acquainted. His four undisputed letters, to which we may most confidently appeal, were written to Gentile congregations. Two of them were established by himself and they had learned of Christ first from him. His arguments were based upon facts he had taught them. That story did not differ from the one told by the other Apostles, for any material difference would have been seized upon and used against him by the Judaizers who followed him. They availed themselves of every trivial thing to cast doubt upon his work and they would not have overlooked so important and effective a means as a serious departure from

tradition current in Jerusalem. But in his letters of defense there is no reference to any such charge and we are sure it was never made. It was the same story and when a few years afterwards the Gospels came to these churches they found it the same that Paul had given them.

We do not know certainly the source from which he obtained his knowledge of the life of the Lord. It has been inferred from his words to the Galatians that it was by immediate revelation. He says, "Immediately I conferred not with flesh and blood, neither went I up to Jerusalem to them which were Apostles but I went into Arabia and returned again to Damascus." * To the Corinthians he wrote, "For I have received of the Lord that which I delivered unto you, That the Lord Jesus the same night in which he was betrayed" &c. † This language certainly affords some grounds for the inference. Let us know that God does not work miracles when natural means are available. Beyschlag says, "It is utterly unnatural to think of an immediate revelation from hearers of facts such as the night in which Jesus was betrayed or the succession of the particular appearances of Jesus after his resurrection." ‡ He points out Paul's opportunity of learning much from the Christians in Jerusalem before he was converted and from the disciples in Damascus. Bacon asserts that Paul went up to Jerusalem to see Peter for the purpose of acquainting himself with Peter's store of recollections and teachings of the Lord. But the proof of his assertion is not conclusive. If we knew definitely what Paul did in Arabia we might be more certain about the origin and extent of his knowledge of the facts of the Gospel story. If he gave himself up to a profound study of the new religion he had adopted or if he was engaged in preaching he needed a fuller acquaintance with what the Lord said and did, than could be picked up on the streets of Jerusalem or gathered from the disciples in Damascus during the few days he was with them

* Gal. 1 : 16-17.
† 1 Cor. 11 : 23.
‡ New Testament Theology, Vol. 1, p. 19.

before he went to Arabia. The principles of Christianity can not be understood without the facts. Preaching in that early day, especially on missionary ground, was chiefly a narration of the story of Christ. Three years was a long time to wait for a thorough knowledge of what was so essential to him. While granting that Paul got much in the ways these scholars have indicated, it still seems probable that there is more in what appears to be Paul's claim of immediate revelation than they have admitted.

But interesting as the question is, it is not material to our present purpose. In any case Paul endorsed the story as we have it with all its supernatural facts. "Paul was a critic as well as a mystic," says Bacon. "If we imagine him as accepting without question whatever came in the form of vision or revelation we should be utterly mistaking our man. Paul is no more open to delusion by the mere mode in which an alleged truth presents itself than your modern scientist who knows that genius is nothing in the world but the scientific or poetic imagination (another term for brilliant guessing), and yet however grateful he may be for this mysterious endowment he holds every tempting suggestion down to the cold test of fact. It is Paul, this same seer of visions and revelations of the Lord, who bids the Thessalonians prove all things, (he is speaking of revelations), holding fast only that which can stand the test of moral judgment. It is this same dreamer Paul who demands that his Corinthian converts, shall subject every revelation to the test of reason and conscience, reminding them that the spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets."* This has reference particularly to the visions, but Paul was equally critical and cautious in accepting historical facts about his Lord and he carefully tested them whatever the source from which he received them. The endorsement is of inestimable might and his testimony is unequivocal.

Paul, then, is an unimpeachable witness to the supernatural. His letters are evidence of his preëminent character and ability.

* The Story of St. Paul, p. 43.

We dare not deny the extraordinary importance of his judgment in that which enlisted and absorbed all the powers of his mind and heart. We must reconstruct his history and the principles of fair and honest historical criticism before we can deny that "God who in sundry times and divers manners spoke unto the fathers by the prophets hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son."

ARTICLE IV.

FOUR DECADES OF THE GENERAL SYNOD.

Rev. S. E. Greenawalt, A.M.

The great Church of the Reformation was an appeal to the supreme authority of the Word of God. It was no less a protest against the tyranny of mere human customs or traditions however hoary with age or widely accepted in practice. The touchstone of both doctrine and life was the revealed Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments.

The development of forms of worship and expressions of faith was not always and everywhere the same. These were influenced by both national and provincial peculiarities. There was one form of faith, however, accepted everywhere by those who followed the great Reformer and accepted his distinguishing name as their denominational title.

This was the Augsburg Confession, the work of Melanchthon with the co-operation and approval of Luther. This is the Symbol of Ecumenical Lutheranism. Other symbols have been here and there added and have been marks of the particular rather than the universal in Lutheranism.

The prevailing spirit of the age will to a degree influence the religious thought and life of that age. It may do more, even give a trend to the faith and life of succeeding generations.

The skeptical and rationalistic spirit of the eighteenth century on the continent was manifest in many who came to make their homes in the new world. Widely divergent in faith and life were the early settlers of our own country that bore our

common denominational name. So true was this that when the founders of the General Synod prepared a Constitution that might find acceptance, as they hoped, among all the divergent representatives of the Lutheran faith in our land less than a century ago, even a mention of the chief Symbol of the Lutheran Church was not made therein as a test of the denominational soundness of the co-operating Synods. Section III, of Article III, reads: "All regularily constituted Lutheran Synods, holding the fundamental doctrines of the Bible as taught by our Church, not now in connection with the General Synod, may, at any time, become associated with it by adopting this Constitution, and sending delegates to its Convention according to the ratio specified." This was done, we are told, that the conscience of none might be burdened and lest the test of subscribing to symbol or the yielding to authority might be resented by the Synods extremely suspicious of any assumption of power, and very jealous of their privileges. The rationalism of the mother country had its followers in the new land, and the faith of many had been influenced thereby.

There was a determination, however, on the part of the most influential founders of the Synod, to exalt the ancient Symbol of our faith to a higher place in the affections of the people and to a more hearty acceptance by the Church than had been the case in recent years. This is especially manifested in the Formula for the Government and Discipline of the Evangelical Lutheran Church and in the obligation taken by the Professors in the General Synod's Theological Seminary, at Gettysburg, from its founding, in which occurs the following sentence: "I believe the Augsburg Confession and the Catechism of Luther to be a summary and just exhibition of the fundamental doctrines of the word of God." "And I do solemnly promise not to teach anything either directly or by insinuation, which shall appear to me to contradict, or to be in any degree, more or less remote, inconsistent with the doctrines or principles avowed in this declaration" &c. This was the obligation assumed by Rev. Dr. S. S. Schmucker in the beginning of the Seminary, and the same that was taken by Dr. J. A. Brown, his successor, in 1865, and it is unchanged to this day. This was possibly the

strongest declaration of confessional subscription in our Church for that period. That not all Lutheran ministers or Synods measured up to this is doubtless true. Even the Pennsylvania Synod which withdrew from the General Synod after the first meeting and did not re-enter until thirty years later, 1853, did not even have the recognition of the Augsburg Confession in its constitution until the year of its re entering, when the following was adopted: "Resolved, That we, also, in common with the Evangelical Lutheran Church of our fathers, acknowledge the collective body of the Symbolical Books, as the historical and confessional writings of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of former times, accord to the Unaltered Augsburg Confession and Luther's Small Catechism, an especial importance among our Symbolical Books generally." But my especial task is to present the later period of the General Synod's history beginning with 1864. It must of necessity be incomplete and faulty, a mere sketch of an important period in our Church life.

1860 was an eventful year in our Nation, in that the events presaged peace and unity, by the close of the struggle between the states. It was an eventful year in our Church, in that conflict and division were presaged between Synods and members united in one general body in our Lutheran faith. 1861 had seen the culmination of territorial expansion to that time and seemed to bid fair to realize the desire of the founders, collecting in one body all the scattered synodical organizations of our Lutheran Zion. There were then 27 district synods in 14 states, from New York to Texas and from New Jersey to Iowa. There were enrolled 875 ministers, 1662 churches and 165,826 members, while outside this general organization there were reported but 471 ministers, 784 churches and 72,200 members.

The meeting of the General Synod in York in 1864 saw 24 synods represented, two, Minnisota and the Franckean, being received at this session. The reception of the later was conditioned upon its formal acceptance of the Augsburg Confession at the next regular meeting. This is claimed in intention and

fact to have been done upon its adoption of the General Synod's Constitution.

This act of the General Synod was the occasion of the Pennsylvania Synod, which had opposed the reception of the Franckean Synod on these conditions, entering a protest against the action of the Synod and its delegation withdrawing to report to their own Synod; thus they had no further part in the sessions of this synodical meeting and asked that their names be removed from all committees. This right of withdrawal in certain contingencies they had reserved when they re-entered the General Synod in 1853 according to their records, but no minute of such reservation was recorded by the General Synod at the time. This was the beginning of the division which was accomplished two years latter at Ft. Wayne.

Important resolutions relative to the teaching of the Confession were passed at this meeting. These are known as the York resolutions and were meant to correct some current teaching and to define the Synod's understanding of the Confession.

Whereas, Our Churches have been agitated by the imputation of grave and dangerous errors in this Confession, so that amid conflicting statements many who are sincerely desirous of knowing the truth are distracted, knowing not what to believe, whereby the danger of internal conflict and schism is greatly increased: And

Whereas, The General Synod, according to its Constitution, "shall apply all their powers, their prayers and their means towards the prevention of schism among us," we, therefore, in Synod assembled, in the presence of the Searcher of hearts, desire to declare to our Churches and before the world our judgment in regard to the imputation of these errors and the alienation among brethren which may arise from them: Therefore,

Resolved, That while this Synod, resting on the word of God as the sole authority in matters of faith on its infallible warrant, rejects the Romish doctrine of the real presence or Transubstantiation, and with it the doctrine of Consubstantiation; rejects the Romish mass, and all ceremonies distinctive of the

mass; denies any power in the sacraments, as an *opus operatum*, or that the blessings of Baptism and the Lord's Supper can be received without faith; rejects auricular confession and priestly absolution; holds that there is no priesthood on earth, but that of all believers, and that God only can forgive sins; and maintains the divine obligation of the Sabbath. And while we would, with our whole heart, reject any part of any Confession which taught doctrines in conflict with this, our testimony, nevertheless, before God and His Church, we declare that in our judgment the Augsburg Confession, properly interpreted, is in perfect consistence with this, our testimony, and with the Holy Scriptures as regards the errors specified.—*Minutes of the General Synod, York, Pa., May, 1864.*

They have been reaffirmed by the General Synod and printed along with the Confession. An important Constitutional amendment was proposed and handed down to the district Synods for their adoption. This made the acceptance of the Augsburg Confession a condition of entrance to all future Synods and at the same time was a stronger official recognition of the Augustana in the Constitution of the General Synod than hitherto existed. These acts served to define more clearly than hitherto the confessional basis of the General Synod and aimed at avoiding missunderstanding or missinterpretation of the same.

The Institutions of the Church at this time as reported in the year book were as follows: Theological Seminaries, Hartwick, (1816); Gettysburg, (1825); Wittenberg. (1845); Illinois State University, (1853); Missionary Iustitute, (1859); Theological Seminary at Philadelphia, (1864). Colleges: Pennsylvania, (1832); Wittenberg, (1845); Iowa, (1860), at Albion. Academies: Hartwick, Selinsgrove, Muhlenberg, Johnstown Academy, Hanover Collegiate Institute, Markleville Academy, Washington Hall, (Trapp, Pa.); Elysberg Academy, Leechberg Academy, Shippensville and Aaronsberg. Female Seminaries: Lutherville, Gettysburg, Susquehanna, Mendota, Springfield, (Ill). General Synod Societies at that time were: The Parent Educational Society, Foreign Missionary Society,

Home Missionary Society, Church Extension Society, Publication Society and Historical Society.

The next convention of the General Synod at Ft. Wayne, Ind., in 1866, was looked forward to with great interest. The two years intervening were years of discussion and conjecture. Delegates from 21 Synods were present and participated in the organization of the Twenty-second convention of the General Synod. The delegates of the Pennsylvania Synod were present but during the organization of the Synod, when the name of this Synod was reached, the President made the following ruling concerning their present relation to the General Synod: "The Chair regards the acts of the Pennsylvania Synod, by which they severed their practical relation with the General Synod, and withdrew from the partnership of the Synods in governing functions of the General Synods, as the act of the Synod of Pennsylvania, and consequently that Synod was out of practical union with the General Synod up to the adjournment of the last convention, and as we cannot know officially what the action of that Synod has been since, she must be considered as in that state of practical withdrawal from the govering functions of the General Synod, until the General Synod can receive a report of an act restoring her practical relations to the General Synod; as no such report can be received until said Synod is organized, the Chair cannot know any paper offered at this stage of the proceedings of the Synod as a certificate of delegation to this body." An appeal was made from the ruling of the Chair and the Chair was sustained by a vote of 77 to 24. The Synod thus made the act of the President its own and the delegates of the Pennsylvania Synod were not permitted to participate in the organization. Soon after the organization, however, a committee to consider the matter of the Pennsylvania Synod and report was appointed. No credentials, however, were presented. This subject occupied the time of the Synod for several days. Both sides were heard upon the floor of the Synod. Efforts were made to reconcile all parties.

A resolution at length was passed expressing a willingness to receive the Pennsylvania Synod, and another urging these

delegates to waive what might seem to them an irregularity in the present organization and to acquiesce in the same. The final response of the delegation asked the General body to admit that it was wrong and that the Pennsylvania Synod's contention was just, and if this were done they would come as "equals with equals." This the General Synod felt it could not do without dishonoring its own act, and refused. The Pennsylvania Synod delegation then withdrew finally from the General Synod. A protest against the action of the Synod in the case was presented by representatives of the Ministerium of New York, Pittsburg Synod, The English Synod of Ohio, English Synod of Iowa, Synod of Northern Indiana, Hartwick, Minnesota, and Synod of Illinois, in all 22 delegates. A committee to reply presenting the ground for the General Synod's action was appointed and later in the session rendered its report. All effort at reconciliation failed and the hope so fondly cherished for a united Lutheran Church in America was to be long delayed if not entirely thwarted. Doctrinal and liturgical differences were not urged on the floor of the Synod as any ground of division but the question was fought out on the technicality of the President's ruling upon which good men honestly differed.

To many then and now this division seemed wholly unjustifiable, unfortunate and in every way regretable. Some who but recently were the strong defenders of the General Synod, who had spoken with great warmth and ability of her doctrinal basis and religious life, her genius and achievements, now were found speaking disparagingly of both her men and her measures. Long-time friends became alienated and harsh speech was some times indulged that embittered individuals and injured the cause of Lutheranism and the cause of Christ.

A sentence from the report upon the state of the Church may interest.

"Your committee expresses the hope that in the future the mind and heart of the Church will be less engaged with matters of controversy, and more earnestly in the developing of the field in which God in his providence has placed us as laborers. They further cherish the hope that the time is not far distant

when, we trust, there will be also a greater conformity in our forms of Church service, in accordance with the teaching of God's word and the historic character of the Church of the Reformation."

The report of the committee on literary and theological institutions reported the endowment of Wittenburg College to be over $100,000, and the enrollment of students above 200, and that to this date there had gone into the ministry from this school 100 men, being just 15 less than the entire number of its graduates.

The new general body, the General Council, was soon after formed. The old General Synod had its numerical strength lessened by these defections. First the Southern Synods withdrew during the Civil War, and now further withdrawals, as here indicated.

In some places, as had been the case for years previous, the strictly Lutheran methods and practices, forms of worship, and religious phraseology, were largely influenced by the surrounding denominational activity and teaching. The "new methods" as they were called were practiced by many of our Ministers. Especially was this true of what was the then "West." Many causes contributed to this which we have not the time to discuss here. Among these causes was the reaction from a rationalistic influence in the past. The very spirit of the time and religious life of many communities strongly influenced the Church. The influence of other denominations was felt and the misunderstanding and misrepresentation of the spirit of our Church did something to aid this matter also. Two men of splendid and efficient service in this period upon our own territory, both now having entered upon their reward, told me of the extreme difficulty in overcoming prejudice and misrepresentation, and those that influenced them in methods which otherwise they would not have followed. Some good came of it and possibly some harm also, but it is of the past.

The reaction and disintegration seemed to have reached its limit by 1868, two years after the division at Ft. Wayne. The report of that meeting revealed that now there were 590 min-

isters, 970 churches, 86,198 members and the total benevolence was $115,609.

The spirit of the Synod at that time, judged from the report on the state of the Church, was one of hope. While they deplored the loss of three Synods and part of three others in the formation of the General Council, they rejoiced in the unity, peace and harmony existing and the attainment of a more compact and effective working power. At this session the revised Constitution was finally adopted, the district Synods having approved the same. This made the definite statement of the "acceptance of the Old and New Testament as the only infallible rule of faith and practice and the Augsburg Confession as a correct exhibition of the fundamental doctrines of the divine word and the faith of our Church founded on that word."

Among the needs of the Church were mentioned "the need of more men for the ministry, more liberality in the benevolent operations of the Church and more earnestness in the Master's work by both the clergy and laity. About 60 young men with the ministry in view were reported to be in the college classes of Gettysburg, and a like number in Wittenberg. An appeal was issued and published in the Church papers urging the need of more young men to prepare themselves for the ministry of the word.

The next meeting of the General Synod was the following year in Washington, D. C.; 22 Synods were represented including the Synod of Kansas, received at this session. Arrangements were made for the transfer of the work of the Church Extension, Home and Foreign Missionary Societies to Boards to be appointed by the General Synod directly. This marks the beginning of these Boards as we know them today in their efficient work for the Church. At this meeting also was adopted an order of public worship which has been known as the Washington service. It was an advance liturgically upon what was used in most of the churches at the time and aimed at more uniformity in mode worship.

The report of the committee on revision of the Hymn book was received and adopted and the book recommended for publication. It was to contain beside the selected hymns, the Morning

and Evening service, the Augsburg Confession, Formula of Government and Discipline, Luther's Smaller Catechism, and a series of Family Prayers. A committee on statistics was appointed to collate facts and data of interest to present at the next meeting of Synod. The number of members reported was 91,720.

The convention of 1873 was held in Canton, Ohio. The report showed 669 ministers, 1056 congregations, 99,246 members. This year was introduced the apportionment system for the benevolence of the Church. The condition of the Church is best seen from the report of the committee on the state of the Church which was presented by the Rev. Dr. Gotwald, from which report we quote a few sentences. "Both in respect to all that pertains to our external condition and our internal and real spiritual life and growth there is very much to gladden the heart of every lover of Zion. Never perhaps in our history as a General Synod have we enjoyed a more encouraging condition in all that relates to the visible prosperity of the Church than we do at present. The indications that our Church is advancing in spirituality and in intelligent scriptural piety are gratifying. As a Church we are growing in all that constitutes a healthful and genuine life. The especial needs of the Church of that period as they appeal to him are: 1. A concentration and union of efforts in all the various Church associations. 2. Enlarged systematic beneficence. 3. The great wants is men, active, devoted, well-qualified, prudent men for the misistry. 4. A higher state of piety, more personal holiness, more entire consecration to Christ." The Theological Department of Wittenberg was reported as discontinued for the present and the students advised to go to Gettysburg to prosecute their studies. This was but a temporary arrangement.

The close of the second decade of our study brings us to the Thirty-first Convention of the General Synod held at Springfield, Ohio. This was the first that the writer of this sketch had the privilege of looking in upon while a student in College. Dr. J. G. Morris presided. This was a period of the more complete organization of the Boards of the Church and

the employment of salaried secretaries who should give undivided attention to work of the extension of the Master's Kingdom. This period also marks the organization of the Woman's Home and Foreign Missionary Society of the Church which has done so much to interest the women of the Church in this especial work. A new liturgy known as the Magee liturgy was adopted in this decade. That it was not wholly satisfactory is evidenced by the fact that a petition signed by 50 persons was presented asking for a committee to prepare a service and liturgical form more in harmony with the doctrines and usages of the Lutheran Church than the one then authorized. The General Synod reported 23 Synods, 845 Ministers, 1301 Churches, 128,338 Communicants.

Of its spirit this is said in the report on the state of the Church: "Our prosperity was never more bright and cheering than at the present. Our people are manifestly growing in intelligence, piety and liberality. They are with some unimportant exceptions becoming better acquainted with the history and doctrines of their own Church, acquiring a clearer and stronger Lutheran Christian consciousness, not in the direction of bigotry or exclusiveness, or cold orthodoxy and formalism, of hair-splitting destinctions in non-essential matters, but in that manly form of true Godliness restored to the world by Luther and his co-laborers, consisting in justification by faith, and good works as the fruit and evidences of faith. Our Ministers and people of the General Synod are becoming Lutheran in this direction; they are not ashamed of the Lutheran name nor of the Augsburg Confession." The benevolent contributions of this biennium amounted to about a quarter of a million dollars.

The Committee on Scarcity of Ministers presented a report deploring the existing fact, and proposing as a solution additional provision for beneficiary education, urging the Churches to increase salaries, and united prayer for more laborers. A uniform blank for the reports of all the Synods was recommended. The Synodical meeting at the close of the third decade was held at Canton, O., again, and was wel-

comed in golden words by the late martyr President, then Governor of Ohio, William McKinley. In his address he used the following: "Respect for true religion and righteous life is on the increase. Men no longer feel constrained to conceal their faith to avoid derision. A religious spirit helps every man. It is at once a comfort and an inspiration in every relation in life. There is no substitute for it. It may be assailed by its enemies as it has been, but they offer nothing in its stead. It has stood the test of centuries and has never failed to help and bless mankind. It is stronger than at any previous period of its history and the Church is ever promoting its permancy and its power." This was a notable Synod in several respects. The Common Service which had been adopted in the last decade was used in full in the services, and the officiating Ministers according to the custom of the Church that acted as host wore the clerical robe. The overture for two Hymn Books was denied. The development of Luther's Smaller Catechism as presented by the Committee with some change was ordered printed for use in the Churches. The translation of Luther's Smaller Catechism and the Augsburg Confession was presented by the Committee. The Committee was instructed to prepare the order of Ministerial Acts. Overtures for practical co-operation of all Lutheran bodies in America were presented and acted upon favorably. A revision of the Hymns and Tunes in the Book of Worship was arranged for. Considerable interest was shown in the Deaconess work and the Home for the Aged just at this time made possible. The General Synod's deliverance upon the now much discussed question of Divorce was here made, in which advanced and thoroughly scriptural grounds were taken on this important question. The statistics for this biennium shows 26 Synods, 1027 Ministers, 1525 Congregations, 163,514 Members with a total Benevolence of $443,168.

The report on the state of the Church represents Canton, 1893, as high water mark thus far for the General Synod. "The reports all indicated an earnest effort and rich results unequaled in any former period of our history. Whatever our differences may be, in this we are one; the spirit which pre-

vailed in the formation of this body, which has characterized all its history, and which has fostered its growth is in direct antagonism to all narrow exclusiveness. True to this spirit, we extend the fraternal hand to all God's true children of every name and faith. Every hand is lifted to bear onward the banner of our common Lutheranism. Not one would allow this banner to be lowered in the smallest measure. It is this spirit of abiding loyalty to its own, with fraternal regard for others which has placed this body in the line of the best progress of the Christian Church in modern times."

I will not call the attention here and now to the specific acts of the last decade or to the steps by which she has gained her present position. These are too recent for history and are in the memory of man. But we will present a condensation of the summary presented by the writer to the last meeting of the General Synod at Baltimore one year ago.

"As we stand by a mighty river's side currents are seen to retrograde, but they are merely the eddies along the shore. A further view will reveal the onward movement of the majestic stream sweeping toward the sea. It is so with the Church of God. There may be eddies of retrogression, but the mighty stream sweeps onward toward the throne. We have come to a period of peace and work. Not the peace of indifference or of death, but of earnest endeavor to attain an ideal, to build upon an ample and satisfactory foundation. The General Synod is none the less fraternal interdenominationally, she has grown more fraternal internal-synodically. A better understanding is being had between the different Synods of our great Lutheran household of faith and our own Synod has had an honorable part in its advancement. There is a growing heartiness in our own body also, in the general work of the Church. The teaching office of the Church is emphasized not only in the ministrations from the pulpit but also in the Catechetical class and the Sunday School as well. Forty years has marked a wonderful advance in our Foreign Mission management and development, the institutions of the Church have been planted upon that foreign soil, the Word is being preached, the children are being taught, the sick are being treated, the orphans are being

homed, and the most largely attended college of our Church is the Watt's Memorial of Guntur, India. She has come far short of fully facing the tremendous problem involved in the Savior's last command, but she is awakening. At home the larger cities of our land are being entered as never before by the Home Missionary agencies of the Church urged on by the double urgency of patriotism and piety combined. The need of trained workmen that need not be ashamed is still evident and the injunction is still imperative, Pray ye the Lord of the harvest that he will send forth laborers into his harvest. The educational institutions of the Church are doing a noble work though hampered as yet by insufficient funds. But in this it seems a better day is dawning and more liberal gifts are in prospect, we are told, which means the possibility of better equipment. This is a day of great opportunity and consequent obligation. In the matters of teaching it is of great moment that all her schools are true to the integrity and authority of the Word in their teaching.

Great advance has been made in all lines of the Church's work and life during these years. As already indicated the Woman's Home and Foreign Missionary Society has come into being with its splendid record of achievement. The Missionary Journal and other publications of the Church have come into existence in this period. A splendid literature of our own has been created that makes ignorence of our Church inexcusable.

The Board of Education has been organized and has already done much in founding Midland College and The Western Theological Seminary, as well as aiding other schools of our Church. The Deaconess and Home for the Aged, Loysville Orphans' Home and now also the Oesterlen Orphans' Home, and the Western Home in Nachusa, Ill., are but some of the outward marks of progress of our General Synod. The benevolences of the Church during the last biennium of the report reached over a half million dollars. The General Synod takes her place among the religious forces of the new century better fitted to do valiant service for the Master than in any time in her history. The organization of her varied activities is more complete than in the past; she has awakened to a

consciousness of her treasures of doctrine and of worship; she is undisturbed in her creed acceptance and Scriptural position; she is content to be herself. She emphasizes the methods both historical and Scriptural, which have been honored of God in the past, and have proven themselves neither antiquated nor inefficient. She has led the host in the percentage of net gain in membership in recent years. We are grateful for a growth external that can in a measure be tabulated, but she recognizes that the truest measure of success is that life internal hid with Christ in God, made possible alone by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit for which she seeks and to which may she in all fullness attain.

ARTICLE V.

THE RESURRECTION OF THE BODY.

By Rev. R. W. Mottern, A.M.

The immortality of the soul is and has ever been a very commonly accepted belief among all nations of men whether Heathen or Christian. When the soul passes away from this tenement of human clay, mankind in general believe it exists somewhere in the spirit world, separated from the body and not subject to decay.

But when we consider the subject matter of this poor, frail compound of human clay, according to Shakespere, this material, fleshly form, when it is left deserted by the soul in the cold embrace of death, that this body shall be reanimated again by that self-same soul and again be a living, breathing, individual organism, this gives wide range for discussion. And when we consider that it matters not how long the body has lain in its last resting place, nor where or in what condition the soul left the body, nor yet the utter impossibility of human knowledge to discover the whereabouts of even the atoms of dust that once formed a human body, greater wonder and surprise will be manifested in the wisdom of the Almighty to reunite each individual soul with each identical body as it was at the time of natural death. This impossibility to all human

wisdom and philosophy, to resurrect a human body, after the life has become thoroughly and absolutely extinct, is the source of much doubt, unbelief and positive rejection on the part of many of the doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body as taught us in the Apostles' Creed, which same doctrine we as Christians universally accept and believe. But nevertheless in the Creed it stands, a grand and magnificent monument of the teaching of the Old Testament and the New Testament, of Christ and his own personal experience, the teaching of the Apostles and the faith of the Fathers of the early Christian Church, the ground-work of the faith of the noble band of reformers, that helped to mould and guide the life of the Christian Church onward in its glorious mission of salvation to the human race; and that same essential doctrine today holds its rightful place among the things to be believed among us as set forth in the Word of God. Today as ever it is the norm of practical Christian faith and it needs to be sounded forth more loud and clear as distance removes us from the earthly experience of Him who fully proved its reality.

In the study of this doctrine we observe it comes under the head of Eschatology, or of the Last Things. The time when the resurrection of the body is to take place in the plan and purpose of God, *i. e.*, the General Resurrection, is just preceding the General Judgment, when all, small and great are to stand before God to be judged according to the deeds done in the body, whether they be good or bad. At the time of the end of this present physical universe when this earth shall melt with fervent heat and the heavens be rolled together like a scroll, and the Lord Himself shall descend from the Right Hand of the Father, at the blast of the trumpet, the dead shall come forth from whatsoever hiding place, every nook and corner of the universe where they have been for centuries and ages, since the flight of years began. The General Resurrection shall absolutely put an end to time itself. For the consummation of the great salvation furnished mankind through the work and merits of Jesus Christ, shall have the most glorious conclusion in the Resurrection of the Body. Christ's salvation and meritorious work of redemption includes the entire human being,

his soul *and body.* Paul says, "waiting for the adoption to wit—the redemption of our body."

The subject of this paper is just as much an object for our faith as the redemption and salvation of our souls. For as believers in Jesus Christ we say in the Third Article of the Creed —"I believe the resurrection of the body."

Now the *doctrine* of the Resurrection of the Body belongs to the truths of Revelation, but the full realization of it, as a fact, is yet in the illimitable future. It will not do for us to court or indulge in speculations and theories, for they will not furnish us the desired information such as we obtain from a study of the Scriptures on this subject; and to this study we must confine ourselves. We desire to state that

The Resurrection of the Body is a Well Attested Fact of Scripture. The grand old prophet Isaiah gives us the first and clearest idea of the Resurrection of the human body. Ezekiel also hints at it very strongly in his remarkably picturesque vision of the Valley of Dry Bones, where each bone joined to its fellow bone, and all arose from the dead like a mighty host revivified and reanimated. Daniel also clearly and unmistakably makes allusion to it, saying: "Many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake." Job and the Psalmist speak beautifully and forcibly of the Resurrection of the Body. And indeed general was the teaching and understanding of the Old Testament on this subject, even at the time of the long looked for appearance of the Christ of God. A sect among the Jews called "Sadducees" brought just such an involved question to Christ for his opinion on it.

The Resurrection of the Body of Jesus Christ, the very body that died on the Cross, is today the best attested fact of history. No subject has received closer and more thorough investigation and none has more truthful and competent witnesses, eye witnesses, to the very fact itself.

When Christ gave up the ghost on the Cross, no human body was more thoroughly dead than His, proven so by Pilate, the Roman Governor, the Roman Centurion and the Roman soldiers, all of whom had no special interest in the matter. His body was put to the most severe test and strain, that could be

given a human being, first deprived of sleep for a whole night, then roughly handled, lashed, beaten, buffeted, nailed hand and foot to the cross, then thrust in the side with a spear by Roman soldiers to see if He were really dead, and the presence of the flowing blood and water from his side, and then His actual burial, the same as any ordinary human being—all, all taken together fully satisfy the demand for proofs of His real and actual death. His close and intimate friends saw His dead body, which appeared the same in every particular as any other dead body. They tenderly prepared, or really embalmed it, for permanent burial with spices and bandages, and they had forever abandoned any hope of His ever returning in His recognized and familiar bodily form. And so certain were they that He was actually dead, and that every particle of life had disappeared, that when they, after His Resurrection, saw Him, they were the most difficult to be convinced that He was actually alive, and that He was the same Christ who died just three days before. Peter and John saw the empty tomb, and saw the linen bandages, that had been wound around His very body, all carefully folded up and lying in a corner of the tomb. The women before this had come with spices to further the preservation of his body, and found an angel sitting at the tomb, who said to them, "Come see the place where the Lord *lay* (past tense.") "He is not here, He is risen" and as He said, "Go tell my disciples to go into the land of Galilee and there shall they see me." He was the very same Christ in physical form, though beautified, glorified, and highly wrought upon by the Spirit of God, and out of touch of further physical and material corruption and decay.

Mary Magdalene went to the tomb and found it empty, she thought that some one had carried His body away, and with great fright and surprise she recognized Him in the Garden. And as the women went to tell the disciples about what the angel had told them, Christ appeared in his very familiar physical-like form, and with joy they fell down and clasped Him by the feet. Christ also appeared to Simon Peter while he was alone. Two disciples while on their homeward journey from the Temple were met and joined by a third person, whom

afterward they recognized as the very crucified Christ while offering grace at the table. And on the evening of the same day while ten disciple, Thomas being absent, were assembled together, Christ bodily, not however with a psychical body, but a spiritual body made His appearance to them, even while the doors were bolted and the windows were closed, and with this spiritually endowed body Christ was able to penetrate the closed stone of the sepulchre, the closed doors, and did not have need for clothing and food. And he spoke to them by means of His lips and voice just as before, saying, "Behold my hands and my feet, handle me and see, a spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye see me have." Thomas, having been informed of Christ's appearance, at once shuts himself against all hearsay evidence, and declared that he wanted positive proof for himself, that Christ had bodily risen from the dead; so one week later Thomas being present with the other disciples Christ showed Himself bodily again, (and may we not say,) purposely to convince Thomas before them all, that His very crucified body that had the nail prints in His hands and feet and spear thrust in His side, had arisen from the dead. Thomas's doubt was completely set at nought. He was compelled to say: "My Lord and my God." Several days after Jesus appeared to seven disciples along the Lake of Galilee and spoke especially to Peter. Not long after that He appeared again to the Eleven Disciples on an appointed mountain in Galilee. Immediately after that He showed Himself to the very large number of five hundred. James also saw Him at another time. And at the end of a forty-days sojourn on the earth He assembled the Eleven Disciples, giving them His last earthly command; before their very eyes, He ascended and a cloud received Him out of their sight. And because of what the disciples saw with their own eyes and heard with their own ears, they had such full proofs of Christ's bodily resurrection that they were willing to stake their lives on it and had no reason in the least to disbelieve or disprove it.

After our Lord's resurrection He was positively seen and recognized by no less than three eye witnesses. Stephen, a noteworthy disciple and deacon of the early Christian Church, said,

"Behold, I see the heavens opened and the Son of Man standing on the Right Hand of God." St. Paul saw the Lord after His resurrection and ascension, and even spoke to Him and received an answer from the Right Hand of God. "And as he journeyed, he came near Damascus; and suddenly there shined round about him a light from heaven: And He fell to the earth, and heard a voice saying unto him, Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me? And he said, Who art thou Lord? And the Lord said, I am Jesus whom thou persecutest: it is hard for thee to kick against the pricks."

And St. John, the beloved Apostle, saw our Lord and heard Him on the "Isle called Patmos," saying: "I heard behind me a great voice as of a trumphet, saying, I am Alpha and Omega." "And when I saw Him I fell at His feet as dead. And He laid His right hand upon me, saying unto me, Fear not; I am the first and the last: I am he that liveth and was dead, behold I am alive for evermore, Amen."

Christ could not have given His disciples better proof of His bodily resurrection than He so carefully did. The disciples built their lives upon the fact and lived accordingly, and at last died to prove what they had seen and believed. Their steadfast testimony of Christ's resurrection convinced thousands of others who likewise rested their hopes of the future upon it and surrendered their lives to prove what they believed. Nothing can possibly be found to account for the fearlessness and boldness of the apostles if we brush away the fact of Christ's bodily resurrection, for that fact alone inspired them and fired them with such courage as was never witnessed before by human beings. They caught up the new conception of what Christ's bodily resurrection meant, and with joy and gladness proclaimed it to a dying world. That the Sabbath day has been changed from the last to the first day of the week, is another positive evidence of the reality of the Resurrection. The existence and activity of the present Christian Church, is further evidence of the Resurrection. "Faith in mere visions or phantoms produce phantoms, but not such a phenomenon as the Christian Church, the greatest fact and the mightiest institution in the history of the world." And again

the resurrection of the actual body of Christ perfectly fits into the life of Christ, as a most necessary and essential part. The plan of God from before the foundation of the world would be woefully deficient without it, as the consummation of salvation, which was provided for in Christ's resurrection for both soul and body.

Christ's Bodily Resurrection is the Pattern and Pledge of Our Own Now. "He took not on Him the nature of angels; but He took on Him the seed of Abraham; therefore in all things it behooved Him to be made like unto His brethren." And "He took upon Him the form of a servant and was made in the likeness of men." And He was "found in fashion as a man." Thus Scripture tells us that the Christ of God was perfectly human as well as divine having the two natures in one person. Now therefore Christ was of flesh, blood and bones, and head and heart and lungs and took food as we, to sustain His body. He slept, He awoke, He wept, He walked the earth, He had a human disposition, human likes and dislikes, human traits of character, human love and was made like us exactly, but without sin—"who knew no sin," "neither was guile found in His mouth,"—died and was buried just the same as any other human being and hence by means of His glorious resurrectiod He has become the "First fruits" of those that sleep in the grave. When we see him resurrected bodily with all His physical capacities and mental activities just as before his death, except that He was not material—this is proof sufficient that each human form that existed since the flight of years began shall exist in the General Resurrection, at the end of time, come forth in glorified humanity with spiritualized bodies, exactly in the same shape, form and size as each possessed before death.

HOW THE DEAD ARE TO BE RAISED.

Death is a separation that holds at a distance the soul from the body—but for a limited time known only in the mind of God. The soul lives on and on and on, while the body is resolved back again into its chemical elements, for from those elements was it originally formed. As God said to Adam,

"Dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return." But shall the body always remain as the dust of the earth? This body that has been so wonderfully and fearfully made, this workmanship of Heaven, shall it continue to lie in shapeless and hopeless ruins and never be gathered together again to be as it was once? It is not an impossible thing for God to raise the dead. He was the Almighty former and framer of our wonderful bodies in the beginning and that too out of *nothing*, and surely now He is abundantly able to repair the ravages of time and death and bring the separated soul and body together again. This separation is not one of permanent continuance, for there shall come a time when, as the words of Scripture positively assure us, in which the mighty power of God will work upon the dust of the ruined body and reunite each soul to each body to which it belonged previous to death. Now the means that God will employ is the Archangel's trumpet, which shall give one long and loud call, and all that are in the graves shall at once hear the command, "Arise and come to Judgment." All without an exception shall hear, though many millions had not heard for thousands of years. And those who are alive at the time shall cease their occupations, attend at once the all-commanding and new-creating fiat of the Almighty and be changed "in the twinkling of an eye," just as though their bodies had been dead and turned into dust long centuries before. No matter where the dust of the body shall be, whether it flies in the air, floats on the ocean, or grows in vegetation on the earth, it shall again be collected and form a living, animated, spiritualized body. The voice of the Son of God, through the Archangel's trumpet, shall speak all that was once human into existence again. That voice of God shall be life-giving at once without a moment's delay. And His command means that not only the bodies shall be together in their proper parts, bone for bone, joint for joint, but also that the souls which on earth dwelled in these bodies shall again re-inhabit them, whether the souls come from Heaven or Hell. Christ's command to the grave shall be, "Arise ye dead and come to Judgment." And His command to the redeemed in Heaven shall be, "Ye spirits of just men made perfect, all de-

scend to the world, from which ye originally came and assume your new formed bodies." His command to the evil spirits in Hell, shall be "Come forth and appear ye prisoners of darkness, and be again united to the bodies in which you once sinned, that in them ye may suffer." Thus will this summons spread throughout every corner of the universe, of Heaven and Hell and all their inhabitants shall hear and obey.

THE KIND OF BODY THE RESURRECTED BODY WILL BE.

The great mystery of the Resurrection shows itself just here. It is mysterious because it is beyond the reach of human reason, lying within the realm of the supernatural: and therefore there are many disposed to doubt the resurrection of the human body. But in some instances this may be, because some lay more stress on the body resurrected as being a material body than that it shall be a spiritualized one, a body more adapted to the realm of the supernatural than the natural. St. Paul plainly illustrates what sort of bodies we shall have. Our present bodies of flesh and blood, suited only for earthly conditions, can in no wise "inherit the Kingdom of God." This body is corruptible, mortal, easy of decay, a "vile body," and as such is no more suitable for spiritual conditions, than the angels are suitable for a life of earthly sojourn. This "mortal must put on immortality, this corruptible put on incorruption."

No better illustration of the resurrected body could possibly be given than that of St. Paul's, in which he speaks of the seed buried in the ground and springs forth into the plant—first the seed, then the plant, then the blossom, then the fruit. The fruit is identical with the seed, but it is not the seed; the life principle of the seed has made the fruit possible. And hence there has been a real connection from seed to fruit. However, "our future bodies may be no more like our present ones than a rose is like a black seed or a lily like the bulb." "We put into the ground an ugly bulb and it rises a golden lily; we drop into the mold a seed and it comes forth a brilliant flower, resplendent with magnificent colors; those are the same we put into the earth, the same identical, but oh, how different."

"How then can the seed and the plant be the same? Just as the plant grows out of the seed, the same plant always from the same kind of seed." The caterpillar becomes the butterfly, with most gorgeous colors. The ugly black charcoal becomes the hard, brilliant and valuable diamond. And thus the body, that will rise from the dust, will be in a legitimate sense the same that was buried, having undergone wonderful changes and transformations in the "twinkling of an eye."

Says Dr. Valentine, "even though not one atom of the dust of the former material body be used by the Almighty to construct our spiritual bodies and such cannot be entertained in our present theological thinking, yet the risen body will be 'our body.' "For though the seed sown dies and not a particle of its matter is found in the wheat grown, the life principle has carried the line of continuity over from the seed to the product and formed an identity between them." And thus it is not an *absolutely necessary* thing to have in it a particle or germ of the physical body that died or that "our body" shall come forth in its gross materiality. This then is at a great variance from the teaching of the old school, and probably of not a few of our Lutheran ministers, who believe and teach the shocking and revolting doctrine that at the General Resurrection the ruins of the human bodies scattered far and wide, "a limb in one country, here the head, and there the trunk," here the heart and there the body, "and at the sound of the trumpet they shall all be collected from wherever they had been scattered: all properly sorted and united wheresoever they had been confused, atom to its fellow-atom, bone to its fellow-bone and that all these several parts though scattered shall darken the air as they fly from country to country to join their proper parts." Now in answer to this with the almightiness of God it would not be an absolute necessity for Him who first formed man to require the scattered physical parts of the body before He would be able to change it to a spiritual body. That he is fully able to do with or without one atom of the original body as nucleus. Most theologians today reject the gross and materialistic views held by many as to the resurrected body.

The resurrected body will differ from the physical body in

many particulars. It will be free from decay and corruption and will endure eternally. While the natural body when dead becomes unsightly, earthly, pale, colorless and offensive, the spiritual body will become glorious, brilliant and most beautiful without the seeds of sickness and death, and will appear in the very highest perfection of which it is capable. It will be *glorified* and *glorious*, it will be clothed with ineffable honor, splendor and glory, and will shine with divine light, lustre and brilliancy.

It will be a powerful body because it is free from fleshly limitations, infirmities and appetites, pains and diseases, and hence will be strong, vigorous, not subject to suffering, free, agile, subtle, no weight nor gravity will be able to prevent it from being caught up with the Lord in the air. It will be a spiritual body, perfectly adapted to the mode of living in the heavenly atmosphere, yet it will not be spirit so-called, but a spiritual body, just like the angels, though it will not be an angel, nor equal to them. Our bodies will have spiritual adaptivities, never needing food nor drink nor sleep; they will be entirely under the control of the Holy Spirit. They will be heavenly also, will shine with great brilliancy and brightness, like our Savior's on the Mount of Transfiguration. They will no longer be subject to corruption, disfigurement, imperfection, be maimed, deformed, but ideally, beautifully perfect, complete in all their parts. Christ's own spiritualized body gives us an example of the happy qualities of the resurrected body. Our bodies will also be immortal. Paul says, "This mortal must put on immortality." The victory of the power of an endless life, the grace of Christ will forever crown the resurrected body.

But now the bodies of the wicked and the damned shall be immortal and incorruptible just the same as those who are blessed of God. They moreover shall be subject eternally to suffering, pain, tortures, shall have not the least glory, not the least honor, no power, no special beauty, but scarred by eternal foulness and disgrace, and shall continue in eternal darkness separated forever from everything that is good, cast off and abandoned of God, to whom the Judge of quick and dead shall

say—"Depart from me ye cursed into everlasting fire;" while the blessed of God shall have everlasting life rejoicing in their spiritual bodies, like unto our Savior's glorified body; for in His glorification at the Right Hand of God, His human-spiritualized body was carried to its very highest point of perfection possible. So Christ's glorified body on the Mount of Transfiguration, when "His face did shine as the sun, and His raiment as white as the light," is an example of what ours will become. "Eye hath not seen nor ear heard neither hath entered into the heart of man the refulgent brilliancy and brightness and enjoyment God has in store for those who love Him. Then thanks be unto God who giveth us the mighty victory through our Lord Jesus Christ, who said "Behold I am alive for evermore. Amen."

ARTICLE VI.

FAITH.

By Mary Dever.

"What if there lurk a might behind this might?"

There are two view-points from which it is possible to regard faith. The popular one is that faith is an eccentric action of the mind, possible at some times, but of doubtful possibility at others; that it touches some phases of human experience, while others lie entirely beyond its range; that only certain types of mind can ever exercise it at all; and that the man who possesses faith can no more tell how he came by it nor account for the manner of its operation than can the poet explain to others why the contemplation of certain aspects of nature that causes no emotion in ordinary minds brings to his lips a song of joy. The other explanation of faith is that it is a legitimate exercise of the highest function of the sum total of psychic life—call it mind, soul, spirit or what you will; that it is the conscious coöperation of the individual with the "power that makes for righteousness"; that in this coöperation man with full intent of purposeful action assists in the universe process of

evolution—the bringing into manifestation of higher types and the establishing of better conditions; that in the exercise of faith the infinite in man acts with the Infinite outside him; that it is not only *a* way but *the only* way of knowing the Divine; that a more excellent order already exists potentially and that man by the certitude that a nobler individual life and a nobler race life are possible, helps to bring such conditions into actuality.

To those who hold with the latter view, the words, "Great is thy faith," are highest praise, for they describe a mind that has power to live in spirit beyond the present material condition—that can endure as seeing Him who is invisible—that can manifest to others some sense of the presence of the God that his own soul discerns. To these the statement, "According to thy faith be it unto thee," is not a dramatic utterance of vague meaning, but the enunciation of a great underlying principle, that holds every day, every hour and in every possible circumstance.

The average man has faith of a certain order. It is vague, it is general. It has never been developed to the point of dependableness nor quickened into vital activity. It is not well-defined in its initiative, hence its results are not discernable—not because they do not exist, for every mental condition is productive of results—but because the faith exercised is so small and so pitifully jostled by fear and uncertainty. Such a man will tell you that he has an abiding confidence that the general tendency of all life—of the race-life and of his own particular life—is toward the good. But he tacitly assumes that many issues are of minor importance, if not utterly unrelated and irrelevant to the final issue. This position is untenable and is held only by persons whose thinking is careless in the extreme. How, we would like to ask such reasoners, can we speak of a general result that does not involve all causes contributing to it? How can we speak of the final issue of a life, whether racial or individual, without reckoning with its every event? Now, as a matter of truth, events in themselves are utterly unimportant and meaningless. If they never touched hu-

man beings we should care nothing about them. Considered apart from the persons whom they befall, they are disconnected, without significance, and entirely unworthy of serious thought. But when the event is taken in connection with that from which it should never be separated—its effect upon consciousness—then its importance becomes enormous, for it is the reaction of the mind upon the world that makes up the life of the individual. This reaction in unreflecting mentalities is spontaneous and beyond the control of the will. Development with such persons is slow and is accomplished only in the general upward movement of evolution. The action is wholly from without, for the internal has never coöperated with the external.

It is not so with the wide-open mind, the ever-sentient heart. To the man who thinks, who experiments, the so called material world is a vast and incomprehensible dynamic spectacle. It ever warns him of realms beyond realms, and by faith he enters them. All man-kind are the beneficiaries of his heroic confidence in what is just beyond, and by his service humanity comes into a richer heritage than fell to the lot of the followers of Joshua—the inventions that have changed the whole aspect of civilized life. They were heirs to houses and lands, but we of this later day inherit a body of knowledge bearing upon the natural sciences, and a bewildering maze of inventions whose immediate and accrued benefits can never be spoken in words or calculated in terms of value. These men have indeed spoken to the earth and it has taught them. Their reaction upon the physical world has been such that they have won from nature her secrets. By the power of their faith in the possibility of better conditions, those conditions were present in their own minds and they were later brought into actual human experience. They were obedient to a vision of something beyond the already known. Their response to nature was unique; they were the explorers, the pioneers of thought. Indeed, the Infinite can impart knowledge only as some one has faith that there is something to know beyond present realization. A conviction that nothing better is possible would in the moment of its acceptance close up every avenue of advancement and

render life a monotonous repetition of operators in comparison with which the most ordinary happenings of our hopeful lives would be events of thrilling interest.

Great indeed is our obligation to those who have won from the domain of ignorance whole kingdoms of knowledge, who have lengthened and broadened human life by increasing its bodily comfort; but greater far is our debt to those whose courage has enabled them to look away from self and in thus doing to discern "things not seen."

Just as the material world continually suggests to the scientist a more useful arrangement of some of its elements, a more helpful ordering of some of its phenomena; just as it tells him that never yet has he comprehended its perfect rhythm, its majestic sweep—for bits he knows, yet not the whole—so the great universe admonishes the man of faith that care, grief, loneliness, the disappointment of his hopes and the frustration of his plans are not his portion—that in spite of the seemingly hopeless nature of these outer happenings there can be built up a life of freedom, joy and victorious peace. The man without faith lays stress upon the *external event*, and thus travels over the well worn road that leads to nowhere. The man that *sees the invisible* knows that the internal reaction is the only thing of any importance to him. Events pass—he remains. But *the reaction* itself is not the end of the series. It is in reality the initial movement in a new series, for by it thought is modified. When the manner of a man's thinking is changed, whether greatly or ever so little, the man himself is changed. He is never quite the same again. We might add to Descartes' famous axiom, "I think—therefore I am," the postulate "My thought is modified—therefore I am modified."

The ordinary mind responds to poverty with a sense of restriction, of the starving of the body or mind according as it is the one or the other that seems of greater importance. Not so the Phrygian slave who in chains boasted of the freedom of his spirit. He was rich though lacking all things, and claimed his own mind as a kingdom. Again, positions of power tend ordinarily to the leading of a self-centered life—the willingness

to be ministered to. Yet because he discerned things not given to many to see the wisest of the Emperors of Rome could be simple amid imperial splendors, just in an age of oppression, true when surrounded by deceit, serene and unperturbed though administering the affairs of a nation of warriors.

Faith in its perfect exercise is not an agonizing conflict—one mental faculty arrayed against others. It is a firm and serene action of the whole mentality. It moves as Cæsar said of a certain river, "with incredible smoothness."

Unbelief retrenches, narrows, contracts, ventures less; faith stakes out large claims, and dares all things.

It is a singular fact that many who earnestly protest that they desire the life of faith confuse knowledge and faith, and thus defeat their own ends. If faith could be proven it would no longer be faith, but knowledge, which is a very different thing. An effort to give knowledge the precedence of faith renders the latter impossible. Faith rightly precedes knowledge, which indeed is only a summing up of results.

The operation of the mind in its acts of faith far transcends in importance all other reachings-out of the individual to the external. The free self-expression which conditions professional success, the unsentimental love that recognizes others as comrades, are themselves the result of a measure of faith, and may be turned to account as an increasing asset in the affairs of a future whose growth is victorious, whose adjustments are manifold and delicate, and whose love is tender and unselfish in a degree that is beyond our present power to grasp.

ARTICLE VII.

CURRENT THEOLOGICAL THOUGHT.

I. ENGLISH AND AMERICAN.

By Professor M. Coover, A.M.

Associated with the mystery of sin is the mystery of suffering. Since the catastrophe at Martinique *The Hibbert Journal* beginning with its first issue has been furnishing interesting articles on human suffering, or "Catastrophes and the Moral Order." The cry is, How can an imperfect world issue from a being of eternal perfection!

There are as many attempted solutions as there are conceptions of life. Theist, rationalist, and metaphysician, each offers his suggestion at the shrine of the mystery. One says that evil is but good in disguise; evil is good in the making. This begs the whole question. Then there is no such thing as evil. Much Christian theology acutely resolved finds its home in this philosophy.

Buddhism at least is honest; it evades the whole question. For the Buddhist the only reality is non being. Present being is an illusion. Life is but a transient by-product of the evolution of a dream.

The whole universe is again and again rehearsed from hydrogen atom to thinking brain in one endless cycle, an everlasting goalless drift.

The modern materialist formulates his creed after the same fashion. Life is but a little ferment of oxygen and hydrogen; thought is the radiation of an electron. Each mind is a microcosm in mineature of the great macrocosm; a retina to epitomize a multiplex world; an electron containing inwardly the counterpart of all that takes place outwardly. Pain is the jarring of negative, repellent atoms; pleasure the marriage joy of blending chemicals. If there be any music in the wild whirl of

adventure in the world of cosmic atoms, it is the melody of dissonance.

We live to think the thinkable, but the thinkable is only dream fancies. Life is indeed being, but being evanescent with indistinctness and indefiniteness. Logic, after all, is but a flight along a milky way; a tangent at an unstable point of thought.

The metaphysician, too, offers his suggestions. We are phantasma in the dream of an infinite being, who, though omnipotent, cannot change the laws of his mental action; for he cannot awake himself from his own slumber. But when he awakes, we shall go where dreams go to. Shall we whisper, "Dream on," or cry, "Awake, thou that sleepest?" This universe is a cosmic nightmare whose dream-creatures we are, and who can dissipate the spell?

Sorrow and joy are the shadows which come and go with the movements of a fairy wand. Harmony and dissonance are one; we are such stuff as dreams are made of.

To treat the familiar as unfamiliar is half the secret of philosophy, says Leibnitz. Whether life be a dream or reality it still stands in need of explanation. If we consciously share in the nightmare, though creatures of a dream, we may yet try to explain the illusion. Especially in this age when respect is paid, not to faith, but to ratiocination, we should not be censured for our cogitations.

When we deny or ignore the problem of evil, we lose the meaning of moral good. Mazdeism struggled with the question and gave us a dualism. God is the sum of all moral perfections, the absolute goodness; but he is confronted by an absolute Foe, an eternal principal of evil. Two opposing eternal principles contront each other, out of the conflict of which all things emanate. From the conflict of negatives all positive existences have arisen.

But this is to surrender by its acceptance the singularity and significance of God. The mind seeks unity, and cannot rest in dualism. There can be but one eternal principle, and that absolute, and to satisfy the rational aspirations of man that Ab-

solute must be personal and moral. An impersonal and unmoral power cannot make for righteousness.

But if he be omnipotent, why does he permit evil? If he be all-powerful he cannot be the sum of all moral perfections; his goodness suffers in alliance with unbanished evil.

But there is our weakness; we know things only in part. We make of evil a separate problem, while it is part of a great whole. We set the world's pain in parenthesis, not to subordinate it, but to accentuate its features; we print it in italics to arrest attention; or depict it in capitals to appall by massivity. Exceptional convulsions of nature become agonizing problems. Pompeii and Herculaneum, St. Pierre and Slocum, bristle with interrogations that seem to impugn a righteous and just divine providence.

As knowledge comes through analysis and synthesis, and we can know wholes only by comprehending parts, by building thesis after seeing things in antithesis, we must become aware that if the whole suffers, if our conception of the Absolute makes him lacking in moral elements, it must be because our selective attention has been confined to parts, and too few parts have been comprehended to make a synthesis worthy of our rational conception of the Absolute. Our view of the moral order is but a fragmentary arc and not a complete circle. Many relations of existence unviewed make our concept incomplete.

Yet viewing things rightly in parts may mitigate the asperity of the aspect of the whole.

The nervous organism that feels pain is the same that occasions ecstatic pleasure. The brain is the center of pain and the center of thought. The same organic function that makes us suffer keenly, makes us think deeply as well. It is only the most sentient beings that can think at all. Should we lack susceptibility to suffering, we should lack power of thought and reason. Pains are a minimum when brains are small; creatures of meagre nerves suffer little, and think less. The least thing to be desired would be to have less susceptibility to suffering.

Though this be true, yet why should there be occasions of unusual suffering in the economy of divine Providence? Volcanic eruptions with lava-streams, earthquakes, storms, and floods, with appalling catastrophes, are seemingly unnecessary features of a well-ordered world.

But the world became habitable that way. Spinning through space it cooled and contracted, and still through cleft and fissure spits flame and lava-flood.

Were it better that the human drama had been deferred till the world were past all danger of flood and flame?

Should millions of years have been added to cosmic preparation, and man's advent delayed and his past achievements subtracted, in deference to a world flawless of possible conditions of danger, of convulsions and catastrophes? This is a conjectured past and future, but the possibilities may be weighed and measured. The relations of a universe in its making are too vast and complicate for us puny reasoners to correlate. An amended order to suit our modled system would end in chaos. Krakatoa may yet again paint the sunsets red all round the world, but let us not wish that the human drama were in unborn embryo until all such scenes had forever vanished, and the possibility of their recurrence forever foreclosed.

Thirty millions of human creatures die annually in circumstances of the natural order unforced by extreme conditions. Attendant upon this natural order are untold pains of widowhood and orphanage, pangs of parting, and the harassing sadness of slowly fading memories. This is natural; soon after the birth cry is crape on the door. Progress comes only by dissolution and reorganization of forms, by inheritance of accumulated experience.

But thirty thousand fall in one moment in Martinique unattended by prolonged suffering, with none left to agonize in parting, or to suffer widowhood and orphanage, and hands are lifted up in horror.

This view mitigates the severity of the moral shock, but does not banish the fact of suffering.

It, however, shows that suffering is a thing relative, a thing to be examined from many view-points.

The world is red in tooth and claw; yes; and the excitement of the chase, and the agony of the capture, are anesthetic to pain itself. Quick unconsciousness is the world's greatest anesthetic for suffering.

But why necessarily? Let all animal life be herbivorous; why need there be omnivorous or carnivorous creatures? The sea, then, would be depopulated of almost all its animate creatures. The physical organisms of half the world's teeming population must be changed in adjustment to new conditions. Laws in relation innumerable would entail new coordinations.

Then let all animate life die a death painless by some sudden cause as apoplexy. But what agent would assume the world's sanitation? Millions of putrid forms would dot the earth, poisoning air, stream, and food. Men would be obliged to resolve themselves into a senate of sextons. Funeral directors must then patrol forest and field, and undertaking would become the supreme mission of thinking creatures. Then let carnivora remain, and have tooth and claw destroy dead animal forms. But the contest of talon and tooth of beast of prey over carcasses would entail more suffering and injury than the pains of capture in the single chase, and the sudden shock quickly culminating in unconsciousness.

Neither humanity dying by regiments, nor animal life in the struggle for existence, accentuates the suffering of the world. These are milder than the accustomed order, the pangs of slow dissolution.

Hunger, thirst, fatigue, are pains of want which are self-corrective. They perform the part of monitors for the world's health. The common pains of bodily disease are the severe forms of suffering, and these accomplish the order of the world's progress.

To think we must suffer. The same organic function is the agent of both. We must die to live, and there is one door to the mystery. To die with great moral fulness and spiritual

wealth we must die severely. But then we live the hereafter supremely.

The existence of conscience adds to human pangs. Religion makes a man die keenly, makes his apprehension acute. Conscience makes painful the past by regret, makes agony of the future by anticipation.

Perils of conscience, the moral creations of man before and behind, augment his sufferings beyond any pangs of suffering beast. If we live but for one world, woe to us! But if another is better through the throes of personal and vicarious pain, blessed be the pain that makes possible the eternal weight of glory. The surgeon is called for in an act of love. Pain is the cost of restored health and soundness.

The moral analogy is not irrelevant. And yet it is a mystery still. We know but little more than Job. If we say "we know," we deceive ourselves. But we know in part; and let us not be deceived.

Righteousness is the substance of God's love; love is the form of his righteousness. God expresses his love not only in his conduct of mercy, but in his conduct of discipline as well. God thinks truth and acts justice. He thinks in actions, or actions are his thoughts. Thought and action are one in God's exercise. His will is his holy nature and sovereign. The moral order of the world is no more obscure than the physical natural order. But remember, that order there must be, and transgression of it is suffering. The herd flees the foe, and in blood heat lies down in the cool canyon. The chilled lung becomes tubercular, and the world suffers.

A law has been violated, but law there must be. Heredity is necessary for accumulation of qualities and characteristics for physical and intellectual advance beyond old types and properties. Without it there is no progress. Defect is propagated by a law that works the world's advance. Chaos is obviated by existence of law; exemption would be perpetual miracle. God is a God of order. Sin is transgression, and the wages of sin is death.

To solve the mystery of suffering we turn from philsophy to

preaching, that is, the moral side of the question comes uppermost. In this effort at solution we point to salvation; in philosophy we do not speak to accentuate certitude. We would but suggest, rather than assert.

In the recent number of *The Expository Times* Professor Robert Mackintosh has been giving a series of articles on "The Dawn of the Messianic Consciousness." In the March number he gives us a moral study of Jesus' temptation with a psychological interpretation of the mind of Christ.

Prof. Mackintosh thinks that Jesus was awakened to his Messianic consciousness for the first at the time of his baptism; otherwise he would have met the occasions of his career with a programme already mapped out. The materials for such a programme were at hand; the Old Testament prophecies, and the inner revelation, the personal moral intuitions, divinely borne to his consciousness.

But in this supposition of pre-arrangement of a Messianic programme Prof. Mackintosh slights the system of a psychological interpretation of Jesus' character and career. To map out a programme involves the creation of events to suit his career. Occurrences are thus occasioned mechanically to fit sign and sermon, miracle and teaching. Jesus goes forth daily not to meet exigencies naturally arising, but to put together parts of a programme previously arranged.

Such a psychological and moral mechanism could scarcely answer to the ministry of Jesus.

A Messianic consciousness could arise and exist without a definite outline of a ministry, every detail of which was located and logically co-ordinated. The occasions need not be manufactured to suit a mechanical Messiah. Jesus was not lacking in system, but his plan scarcely involved a mechanical co-ordination of events. He was not man then, but a docetic appearance fitted into pre-arranged circumstances.

But a psychological study of Jesus will show glimmerings of a Messianic consciousness before the time of his baptism.

The pious household of Joseph and Mary, however spiritual its religious conceptions, was doubtless more or less influenced by the popular idea of the Messiah. The coming deliverer was not conceived to be a purely moral and spiritual Messiah. The political uprisings in Galilee were more materially expressive than suited the pious, *die Stillen im Lande*, yet politics was deemed a department in the Messiah's work. Jesus scarcely escaped the *Zeitgeist*, but how did he meet it? What were his youthful ambitions near the very time of the great uprising in Galilee under Judas?

A young man today feeling a call to special duty has two ideas of salvation or deliverance, and the predominant one will prevail. He will, if earnest and ambitious, be found in one of two situations; in a theological seminary, or a military academy.

When Jesus was missed where did his parents find him? In some quiet obscure nook in Galilee practicing with the sword? In the temple he was found surprised that any should surmise otherwise. "Wist ye not that I must be in my Father's house?"

If he had any consciousness at all, this shows the trend of it, as well as its intrinsic character.

A psychological study of Jesus must begin before his baptism by John, and the pursuit of it will discover the youthful Jesus with an unusual consciousness of some great mission.

Prof. Mackintosh accepts the order of the temptations as set forth by Matt. regarding the words of Jesus, "Get thee behind me, Satan," as the close of the parley. The objective character of the trial is not definitely affirmed; it may have been occasioned by an external tempter, or a "simple train of thought." But "the train of thought," is evidently accepted by Prof. Mackintosh, for Jesus does not actually go to Jerusalem to test his trust in angelic care. There was no element of ostentation in the desire to leap from a pinnacle of the temple, thinks Prof. Mackintosh; no wish to influence men by the miraculous and startling.

This is possible; but if mere trial of trust in his Father's

care were the sole content of the temptation, the "train of thought" might well have stopped at the summit of a crag overhanging some wady.

The wilderness, the scene of his temptation, was doubtless environed by rocky ravines affording objective points for subjective trials. Jesus need not be in Jerusalem to be tempted to ostentation, but to go there in mind rather than to some place of seclusion is significant of spectacular demonstration.

Prof. Mackintosh interestingly classifies the three temptations as the self seeker of natural appetite, the fanatic, and the opportunist.

Most of us fall into temptation in the sphere of physical appetite, and the tempter need proceed no farther. But Jesus could not be seduced by appetite. He would not place himself outside the category of men by doing for himself what other men could not do for themselves. He would do miracles to relieve others' distresses, but not to alleviate his own. His character was above the plane of the self seeker. Man does not live by bread only. So Jesus will trust his Father for sustenance.

Then Satan rises higher; the sublimity of trust may become a spiritual temptation. The tempter has an ethical man to meet; reason may be pushed to unreason.

Trust God to the full; leap, and trust to angels' hands. Jesus may become a fanatic. But this has no force with Jesus.

All men dread suffering. Cannot high ends be attained without anguish and toil, sacrifice and crucial agony? Why agonize for ends that can be gotten for the mere asking? "Fall down and worship me," do as the worldly do, and the domain of the world shall be yours. Will Jesus be an opportunist?

The politician of today would deem such an offer the greatest opportunity of his life. He would spring at such a suggestion; he would leap to its acceptance.

But Jesus will not thus receive the heathen for his inheritance with their life of pagan pleasure. He will not make dogma out of the second Psalm apart from its great context. Neither fanaticism nor opportunism finds susceptibility in Jesus.

Prof. Mackintosh excludes the theory of Baldensperger, that the temptation lay in the wish for the power of miracle-working, a power not in the possession of Jesus. The theory of Dr. Sanday is the more keen and psychological, that this temptation manifests intrinsically and inherently in Jesus the possession of supernatural power. The predominant characteristics of a man's nature come to the surface in his temptations. He is tried where he is most susceptible, and he is susceptible where the play of his qualities has become confirmed and tends to the habitual.

At what point shall Satan approach Jesus? What is the predominant element in his moral constitution which may be inclined to act without awakening suspicion of wrong? Satan approaches men on the side of their susceptible human nature; but he approached Jesus on the side of his divine nature, the stronger part of his personality. It would be no temptation to you to turn stone into bread; for you could not do it.

What temptation could it have been for Jesus to have suggested to him something he could not do? The nature of the temptation suggested to Jesus shows inherently Jesus' power to work the miraculous. *Ex nihilo nihil fit*; the temptation was not a fiasco.

Prof. Mackintosh does not think that Jesus spent forty days in serious solemn meditations on Messianic rights and duties, aims and problems, in the wilderness. The environment was forgotten and his stay amid wild scenes was a long period of rapture, "a long rapture placed at the favorite conventional figure of forty days." First was God's presence, and the soul's delight in spiritual communion with the Father in the newly realized sonship of Jesus; then another presence, whether objective or subjective, the great mystery of sin embodied in mental disturbance, entitled temptations.

The forty days of fast associated with Jesus' fast in the wilderness was made by the early Church primarially to follow the feast of the Epiphany, Jan. 6th, the feast of Jesus' baptism.

After the controversy over the feast of the nativity the Church in the West transferred the forty days of fasting to the forty days preceding Easter. This Quadragesimal period supplanted the forty hours' fast celebrating the hours of our Lord's rest in the tomb.

Since Sundays were exempt from fasting only thirty six days remained; hence John Cassian called these the tithe of the days of the year due to God.

To complete the number forty the custom arose in the West, after the time of Gregory the Great, of beginning the fast on the previous Wednesday (Ash Wednesday, *Dies cinerum*). But the Church in Jerusalem before the beginning of the fifth century exempted Saturday and Sunday from the fast period and the Quadragesimal season was extended to eight weeks to complete the full forty days.

This period was a *tempus clausum.* All social engagements such as marriages, birthday observances and amusements, were discontinued. Criminal investigations and unnecessary business engagements were postponed. Palm Sunday introduced passion (torture) week. The chief days of the week following Palm Sunday were Thursday, the day on which the Eucharist was celebrated, *feria quintae paschae.* It was called Green Thursday, *dies viridium.* Foot-washing was also observed on this day, *dies pedilavii.* Friday was the *dies crucis, domini passionis,* and in the middle ages, Care Friday, *dies lamentationum.* Assemblies were held in cemeteries in celebration of the *descensus Christi.* Saturday was the favorite day for baptisms. The Quadragesimal fast closed with the cock-crow of resurrection morning, when began the festival of Easter. This was followed by the Quinquagesimal season ending with Pentecost.

There was a tendency to observe simply a Quadragesimal period to Ascension Day, but the Quinquagesima prevailed. An unbroken series of feast days followed for one week after Easter during which all business engagements and judicial processes were held in abeyance. The newly baptised were arrayed in their white baptismal garments (*dominicæ in albis*) until the octave of Easter, called White Sunday.

II. GERMAN.

By Professor S. G. Hefelbower, A.M.

In the first two numbers (1905) of Luthardt's *Allgemeine Evangelisch-Lutherische Kirchenzeitung*, there appeared an introductory article under the words: "Heaven and earth shall pass away but my word shall not pass away." The general tone of the article, as will be seen, is very gloomy; in fact we are convinced that it is too pessimistic; but it certainly represents the attitude of many conservative pastors and others. Therefore we reproduce it here.

Dare we use the words of Christ in speaking now concerning the Bible? One hundred years ago we could have used them, in spite of Rationalism, for that really did not attack the Word, it concerned itself only with its explanation. And even fifty years ago this text was applicable, although the criticism of that time had left us little more than the lids of the Bible. But the writers offered only bald assertions and suppositions. Proofs were required, and when they were not produced the genuineness of one after another of these books became established. Then came the great conflict. It had been proved that the sacred writers had lived and written as recorded, but, it was claimed, they had no more authority than many other great thinkers of the race; they were divinely sent messengers, it is true, but only in the sense in which Herodotus, Plato, Cicero and others were God's emissaries. "That which has hitherto passed with the Church as God's revelation proved to be only the product of Jewish theology and Grecian philosophy. The 'eternal' Word of God became the speculations of some Jews, which were probably useful and comprehensible for their times, but are without any claim for lasting authority." It was considered wrong to force the "conception of offering" for sin [vicarious atonement] upon the present generation. Even the picture of Christ as found in the gospels was conceived according to the taste of that time. He is reported to have spoken words that He never uttered, and to have performed miracles that never occurred, etc. Historical investigation has forever removed the mystic veil from the man

Jesus. The time for the old gospel is passed; a new view of things has broken upon the world, and with it a new religion.

If there were only a few individuals who held these views, they would merit little attention; but such opinions prevail with almost the entire cultured class, and certain professors of theology are the chief heralds of the "new religion" It has not been twenty years since the beginning of this attack on the gospel was made in the discussion concerning the Apostolicum and what an excitement that occasioned! But all was soon comparatively quiet, and now there are comparitavely few who are aggressive in the conflict, there is no such thing as the Church rising in defense of God's Word.

And yet there is now special reason why the faithful believers in the integrity of the Bible should rush to the conflict. The advovates of the "new religion have begun the" publication of the "*Religionsgeschichtlichen Volksbuecher*" (Religious-historical annals for the people.) The title makes it plain that it knows and wishes to know nothing of revelation, or of the history of God given salvation, but accepts only a religious history of man, in which Christianity appears as one among many other religions; it is true, it is the best, but it simply developed in man. This journal is intended to reach the students in the Gymnasiums and Universities as well as the cultured laymen. And against this great anti-Bible, anti-Christ campaign the Church has failed to rise in her might. There are some strong apologists and many who accept the old faith, yet there is no general rushing to the conflict. But if the old zeal for the gospel were to stream through the Church, there would be war, victory-bringing war, and not long drawn out skirmishing.

Another sign of the times was mentioned: At a meeting of pastors [not a synod, but a convention of like minded liberal pastors] the question as to whether we dare now preach concerning the Son of God, was earnestly discussed. The "milder" party were of the opinion that the expressions "Son of God," "Divinity of Christ," "Saviour" and other like terms still had roots in certain congregations, and it would therefore be best to

bear with them awhile before casting them aside. The more extreme pastors held that that time had arrived, and that the doctrine concerning Christ was a stumbling block, and prevented the bringing of Christianity to the man of culture of today. One speaker even went so far as to advocate the substitution of the "religious reason" for revelation and objected to praying to Christ, and added: "The doctrine of God and of Christ should no longer be mixed. The latter belongs to the human side of the religious relation, *i. e.*, to the doctrine of man." And such men preach, or rather speak from evangelical Christian pulpits, and the appointed officials of the Church tolerate it. The speaker just quoted is a pastor in Berlin.

And this theology has triumphed in many places It no longer approaches the Church in a bold struggle for its existence, it rather revels in the confidence of victory, and that in spite of superintendents and synods. There is no accepted standard, anarchy is everywhere. And the result of it all is a Christless people. And if Christ be taken away God cannot long remain. The religious prospect is dark. But this is not peculiar to Germany; Catholic France is in a still worse condition, and the other nations of the world are also suffering.

When the Middle Ages were giving place to the new intellectual movements of the Renaissance, many systems were turned up side-down, and there were those who awaited a new religion. But after the clouds had passed away it was found that only man's work had suffered change, and that God's Word did not pass away. And it will be the same in the storm and stress of the present troubled times. But the Church must rise in all her might to the conflict and arm herself with the unconquerable armor of God, and the fruits of the Spirit which will draw the whole world to her. But in place of these all-powerful fruits of the Spirit we so often see the manifest works of the flesh, pride, envy, strife. There must be more earnest healthful pietism in both pulpit and pew. The old theology must become a power, for the people want not words but spirit, not formulas but life.

But not everything is dark. The hopeful signs multiply, a

new and aggressive theology is quietly springing up which will surely soon make itself felt, and it *is* true: "Heaven and earth shall pass away but my word shall not pass away."

In number 8 of the *Christliche Welt* of this year Harnack discusses the "reliability of the gospel history," and finds the following difficulties in the way of accepting it as authoritative.

Immediately after the death of Jesus his followers conceived of him as throned in heaven and as possessing all the power of God. This was a great and abrupt change, for before this he had been a man among them. This new conception of him "outshone" their old knowledge, and made their recollection of his words and works hazy in a man made halo; accordingly we find many things in the gospel which do not belong there.

But how does Harnack *know* that this really was the condition of affairs? Do we not find here the very thing that he imagines he finds in the evangelists? a preconceived notion as to what Jesus really should be, which prevented him from seeing him as he really was?

The messianic elements in the apostles' conception of Jesus offer another difficulty. The Jews were expecting the Messiah of prophecy, who should manifest such and such distinguishing characteristics in personality and activity. Hence, Harnack concludes, "suddenly there appeared along with his real history a second and an unreal history, and there were added to their recollections of his person the characteristics of an imaginary Messiah who had never lived."

Again we ask, Whence does Harnack know all this? Were it not for the fact that he intends to be serious, we would be justified in considering his statements the absurdly impious poetizing of a godless man.

A third element that helps to make the gospel narrative unreliable was the religious syncretism of that age. Religions were want to borrow many things from each other, and there was no reason why Jesus and his followers should not do the same. If is true, Harnack warns us against going to the ex-

tremes of the *Religionsgeschichtliche* school, but he finds "all sorts of unusual things," which cannot be accounted for in Judaism and the religious peculiarities of his person.

And Paul, the great apostle, simply constructed his own Christ, since he did not know Christ personally [just as Harnack is trying to do now.] "His conception of Christ stands before Christ whom he preached." Though Paulinism exerted but little influence on the writers of the gospels, which is greatly to their credit and proves their reliability, those who read the gospels now read them through glasses colored by Pauline theology. "His Christ was in many respects only his."

It is probable that this extreme position of Harnack will help rather than hinder the cause of positive theology, for, though it will serve to increase the devotion of some of his followers, it will tend to drive many earnest half negative men toward the camp of the conservatives.

The date and the circumstances of the writing of Luther's battle hymn seem to be as uncertain as ever. Prof. Tschackert, in the Oct. No. of *Neue Kirchliche Zeitschrift*, concludes that the hymn, which appeared for the first time in 1529, was in all probability written in 1528, when it seemed as if the evangelical cause was about to be crushed. Prof. Groessler, of Eisleben, published an article about the same time, in which he concludes that it was written during the closing hours of April 15th, 1521, but his proof is all found in tradition, which does not go back of 1570, which Troeltzsch rejects in a second article in *N. K. Z.*, and to this Groessler replied still adhering to his former position; and Troeltzsch again asserted his former conviction that 1528 was the year when it appeared, and rejects all of Groessler's authorities as unreliable, because they were too far removed from the time about which they reported.

During the last five years there has been considerable discussion among the leaders of the Church in Germany concerning

the use of individual communion cups. Late in 1904 the Imperial health board of Berlin delivered an opinion which we condense.

There are well authenticated instances of the communication of contagious diseases by using vessels or dishes which had been used by persons suffering from a contageous disease. However, up to the present time no such spreading of sickness by the communion cup has been recorded, yet we must admit that it is possible. But if we further consider in how many ways a person is exposed to contagion by coming into contact with objects that may be the carriers of disease germs, paper money, coin, books from a public library, etc, we must ask ourselves whether the spreading of contagion by the communion cup, which is certainly theoretically possible, really has such a practical meaning as is claimed on many sides.

The individual communion cups would of course be the surest means of protection, but these cannot be introduced in many of the poorer congregations. Generally speaking, sufficient protection can be had by using several cups successively which are cleansed by an attendant in a solution of soda before being used again. In fact the custom of turning after each administration and wiping the portion of the cup that comes in contact with the lips, is a sufficient precaution, especially if those who are suffering from suspicious diseases commune privately.

ARTICLE VIII.

REVIEW OF RECENT LITERATURE.

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, NEW YORK.

The Ethical Teaching of Jesus. By Charles Augustus Briggs, D.D., D. Litt, Professor of Theological Encyclopaedia and Symbolics in Union Theological Seminary, New York. 293 pp.

It is a good and hopeful sign of the times that so many books are being written and published with *The Teaching of Jesus*, as the chief term in their titles. It looks as though the cry of "Back to Christ," so prominently raised a few years ago, was bearing good fruit. Cer-

tainly every honest and devout effort to discover, or clearly to state, just what Jesus thought and taught on the great religious, moral and social questions, that are stirring men's minds and hearts, and moulding their lives today, is to be commended. And this seems to be the object of this latest book from the prolific pen of Dr. Briggs.

There are eighteen chapters bearing such titles as, "The Sources of the Teaching of Jesus," Chap. I.; "The Kingdom of God," Chap. V.; "Repentance and Faith," Chap. VI.; "Sin and Judgment," Chap. XIV.; "The Church and Society," Chap. XVIII., &c. In each chapter the author seeks to bring together, and to arrange in their logical order, the reported sayings of Jesus bearing on the topic of the chapter, and to determine their original form and exact meaning.

As might be expected from Dr. Briggs, the method followed is subjective rather than objective, and in many cases he changes the form of our Lord's words, as given in the gospels, or puts them into a different place or order, for no other reason, apparently, than because it seems to him more natural. Most of these changes do not materially affect the teaching of Jesus. Sometimes, however, they do so, as when, commenting on the parable of the Pharisee and the Publican, in the chapter on "Righteousness," p. 166, and especially on the closing words of the parable, "This man went down to his house justified rather than the other," Dr. Briggs says, "It is doubtful whether Jesus used that word justification, which may have come from the interpretation of St. Luke, the pupil of St. Paul," though he does add, "But Jesus used some word that was its real equivalent.' Why not then, the word itself, just as reported by St. Luke, the only one who gives this parable? It is this science of juggling with the words of Scripture that must shake our faith either in the judgment of the critics, or in the reliability of the Scriptures themselves.

To read this book intelligently and with satisfaction, one should have at hand Dr. Briggs's other books, *New Light on the Life of Jesus* and *the Messiah of the Gospels*, to both of which frequent reference is made in the footnotes.

The publishers have done their work exceptionally well. The paper, the type, and the press work are all that is needed to make a beautiful and attractive volume.

JACOB A. CLUTZ.

A Harmony of the Gospels for Historical Study. By Wm. A. Stevens and Ernest D. Burton, third edition, revised. $1.00.

A poor workman may complain of his tools, but a sensible craftsman avoids any ground of such complaint by securing the best possible. Students of the New Testament have been offered many arrangements of the Gospels, in the shape of fusions or harmonies. Of all that have come to our notice this is by far the best. The editors are themselves

earnest and careful students. They appreciate the value of an accurately arranged harmony such as will facilitate rapid study. One who uses this book will feel the spur of their own enthusiasm which quickens to effort. Here are no useless references to authorities which confuse the reader. The flexible binding which enables the book to lie open smoothly is itself an invitation to use it. The broad outlines of the gospel history are given in a principal division and in a full and clear analytical outline. Then follows an excellent index for finding any passage in the harmony, which is itself furnished with footnotes giving the readings of the margin of the English revised version and of the American revision. The passages from the different gospels are placed in paralled columns, so that comparisons can be made at a glance; indeed, this arrangement practically permits the student to dispence with a concordance for the gospels. Appendices contain suggestions to teachers, designed particularly for leaders of Bible classes; a very full list of repeated sayings of Christ so that the student may at once locate the passage in the proper historical setting; and a valuable list of Jewish history from 536 B C. to 70 A. D. Perhaps the only addition to be desired in this connection is a list of books treating of this period, but any one at all familiar with the contemporary history will be able, from these references, to locate the events which fill the background of the gospel story.

Here then is a fine tool which any student, he of the scholastic or rabbinic temperament, or he of the prophetic and spiritual cast of mind, will find most useful in assisting him to a knowledge of the life and teachings of Christ. The wellknown scholarship of the editors makes it trustworthy. Inasmuch as this is the third edition revised, one may infer that there has been a demand which justifies its continued publication. It has been tried and found not wanting by the student body. These facts are in themselves sufficient recommendations. One need only try the book for himself to discover its worth.

D. W. WOODS, JR.

A. C. ARMSTRONG AND SON, NEW YORK.

Sermons Addressed to Individuals. By Reginald J. Campbell. 328 pp. $1.25 net.

Books of sermons are as a general rule not very interesting literature for the majority of our readers. When sermons are put into print they seem to lose many of their original qualities, such as the occasion which gives rise to them; the circumstances under which they are delivered, and the personality and loving voice of the preacher. When these are absent there is indeed very little left beside the mere words and their peculiar arrangement in accordance with certain grammatical and rhetorical principles. Only he who understands these

principles can succeed in getting approximately near the thought they were meant to convey.

But in spite of this the book of sermons here mentioned is among the exceptions to this general rule. Each sermon is prefaced by a brief account of the special circumstances which occasioned its preparation. In most cases they were the direct result of some personal interviews with persons who came to the pastor with their troubles and perplexities. Hence, the simple title of the book.

It is right here that a very commendable feature is found. Every sermon has an *aim* and that aim is very definite. The truth is not sown broadcast over the heads of the hearers, but is skillfully directed toward those for whom it was specially prepared, and the author gives use th hint that in nearly every case he accomplished his purpose. If nothing else were gained than just the simple way in which the author makes an application of this one homiletical feature the reader of this book would be amply rewarded.

It mlght be possible to find in some of the statements contained in this book such theological conceptions as might incur the wrath of some starched theologians, but since the sermons are given to us just as they were delivered—extempore speech – the reader who does not have an unduly critical eye will soon be lost in the deep spiritual and ethical tone as well as the intense sympathy which is greatly manifest in all these sermons. Above all the preacher never fails to emphasize the fact that the real remedy for all the doubts and fears of the human heart is the acceptance of Jesus Christ by a personal, active faith. On the whole I regard these sermons of considerable practical value, and they might be read by every minister of the Gospel with much profit.

E. C. RUBY.

LUTHERAN BOOK CONCERN, COLUMBUS, OHIO.

Luther's Marriage Ring. A selection of three sermons of Dr. Martin Luther on the marriage estate. From the German by Rev. J. Sheatsley, A.M., Delaware, Ohio. Pp. 125.

As the basis of society is the home, and the basis of a happy home is marriage, properly entered into and sacredly observed and honored in all its relations, this little volume needs no apology for its publication.

The three sermons selected from Luther's writings give a clear presentation of his views on the holy estate of marriage. They are based respectively on text as follows: Heb. 13 : 4; John 2 : 1-11; Eph. 5 : 22-33. There is added a Lutheran Marriage Service and a Marriage Hymn. Of the sermons the most striking characteristic is that the relations and duties of marriage are made "to reflect upon the reader's mind solely in the full light of God's word." The little volume is deserving of an extensive circulation.

R. H. CLARE.

A Flower's Mission, and other stories. Pp. 76.

This charming little book contains ten short stories for the little folks, of which the first is the story of *A Flower's Mission.* The stories are quite interesting, and will delight the little folks for whom they are intended. The book is printed on good paper, and altogether tastily gotten up.

R. H. CLARE.

BOARD OF PUBLICATION OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL.

Recent Sermons. By Joseph A. Seiss, D.D., LL.D., L.H.D., Pastor of the Church of the Holy Communion, Philadelphia, Pa Pp. 325.

This volume of sermons was being prepared for publication by the author when his pen was stayed by his last sickness. The name of Dr. Seiss gives ample assurance that these sermons are of no ordinary grade They present the same characteristics which mark his other sermons in volumes which have preceded this, and show that the author's intellectual strength was unabated by the advance of years, and that he maintained to the last his high standard of pulpit efficiency. The sermons in this volume are marked by a vigor of thought, and clearness and beauty of style, that make their perusal delightful and helpful. They are so simple that they can be read understandingly by the masses, while their penetrating exposition and scholarly finish will delight the educated. They bear the marks of a child-like faith and unfeigned piety, and display a keen insight unto the wants of our day and of our age.

As the last of Dr. Seiss' numerous productions these sermons, we think, will be especially cherished, and will be perused with feelings of sadness by many friends of the departed in all parts of our Church.

R. H. CLARE.

EATON AND MAINS, NEW YORK.

The Child as God's Child. By Rev. Charles W. Rishell, Ph.D.

The author characterizes his book as "a plea for the religious rights of the child." Initial and chief among these rights is the child's relation to God as it comes into this world. This relation must be correctly apprehended, and the child dealt with accordingly. In defining child nature the doctrine of original sin is accepted, while that of total depravity is denied. Infant character is a mixture of evil and good, the result of heredity. The good, as well as the evil, is the inheritance of every child, whether born of Christian parentage or not. "It may be improper, from the standpoint of technical theology, to speak of the child as regenerated; but it is not improper to say that it is the subject of divine gracious activity." In support of this view the almost universal belief that all children dying before the age of respon-

sibility are saved, not lost, and the recognition which Jesus gives to children as members of his kingdom, are cited. Upon this conception of the child's position the book is built.

The discussion opens with the question, whether a child can be religious, which is, of course, answered in the affirmative. In defining child piety, and particularly its appropriate manifestation, the author is very happy. "The boy evangelist may be sincere, and even effective, but he is a monstrosity." * * * * Encouragement should be given only to that kind of religious life which manifests itself in reverence, confidence, acquiescence in the providence of God, gratitude, love to God and man, and the like.

The task of Christian training is the "protection and development, from infancy to maturity, of the moral and religious state in which the babe enters the world. How this task may be most surely and effectively accomplished, this is the practical and difficult problem for which a solution is sought. The responsibility for this proper training belongs primarily to the parents. They are its chief agents, and after them pastors and teachers. The incomparable school for Christian nature is the home; the Sunday school and catechetical instruction are important supplementary agencies. Baptism admits the child into the Church, and the duty of the Church to care for the lambs of the flock is earnestly insisted upon. The concluding chapters on "The Critical Period," and "The Ideal," are both replete with valuable suggestions.

Concerning Baptism the teaching presented in the Book of Discipline of the Methodist Episcopal Church is accepted. What the worth of this ordinance is, we do not recall. That it is anywhere denominated a sacrament, may be gathered from such statements as the following: "It is an outward sign of an inward grace," "a dedication to God," "a recognition of God's work already wrought in the soul, and that the child belongs to him," "baptismal regeneration is a fiction," "it confers nothing at the time, but it opens the way for future benefits of most blessed character." This kind of teaching completely empties Baptism of its divine content, and it need hardly be added that to a Lutheran and to many other Christians, it is wholly unsatisfactory. To him and to them Baptism is a sacrament, the bearer of grace.

With the qualification above indicated, the book is to be cordially received as a valuable contribution in the discussion of a very important subject. The views presented are the fruit of careful reflection, and the statement of them is clear and compact. The whole presentation is sensible and in admirable spirit. L KUHLMAN.

"*The Heart of Asbury's Journal.*" Edited by Ezra Squier Tipple, D.D. 8 vo. pp. 720. Price, cloth, $1.50 net.

This is a volume of rare interest. It presents a vivid picture of the pioneer days of Methodism in America. Francis Asbury was a great

itinerant preacher, and he had a remarkable career. He came to America in 1771 and no one wielded a greater influence than he in the establishment and early development of the Methodist Episcopal Church. He was elected Bishop at the Christmas Conference in 1784, and for thirty years he traveled extensively, preaching the Gospel and superintending the work of the churches. His labors were not confined to the eastern states, but he rode in the saddle to the borders of Canada, and penetrated the western frontier to the Mississippi Valley. No records of American frontier adventure show greater courage or endurance than Asbury's travels beyond the mountains. Armed hunters, twenty-five or fifty in number, would escort him from point to point to protect him from the Indians, and wherever he appeared the meetings were marked by great spiritual awakenings. It has been said of him that he rivalled Melanchthon and Luther in boldness; that he combined the enthusiasm of Xavier and the far-reaching foresight of Wesley. Moreover, he was a man of remarkable piety and devotion. Freeborn Garrettson said that Asbury prayed the most and prayed the best of all the men he knew.

In view of his extraordinary career, the Journal which Asbury kept during his many years of travel and observation has a special value. It gives such information of early Methodism as can be found nowhere else. Parts of the Journal were printed during Asbury's life time and were corrected by him, and the manuscript of the remainder revised under his direction and approved up to the year 1807. The author of this volume has put the Journal in more accurate and readable form by verifying whatever could be verified, by correcting evident errors, by omitting unimportant entries, by throwing light on many other statements, by explanatory notes, and by inserting numerous illustrations of individuals and places mentioned in the Journal, which add greatly to its interest. This book cannot fail to awaken new interest in the pioneer preacher and bishop, and the reader will lay down the volume with reluctance.

W. H. HARTMAN.

FOX, DUFFIELD AND CO., NEW YORK.

The Star of Bethlehem, a Miracle Play of the Nativity. Reconstructed from the Townely and other Old English Cycles of the XIIIth, XIVth, and XVth Centuries and Supplemented and Adapted to Modern Conditions, by Charles Mills Gayley, as Composed for Mr. Ben Greet, and Presented by his Company. (8x5 3-4; pp xx 70 Price $1 00.)

The doubt of many as to whether there is any propriety in the attempt to adapt the mediaeval mysteries to the modern stage will scarcely be removed by this composition. Those old dramatic performances have their interest and value to students of the drama, but for that purpose they are wanted in their original form, undiluted with modern admixture. Language that requires a glossary in footnotes is ill suited for popular representation. The old conceptions will not fit into our twentieth century life, and such a reconstruction as the present can scarcely satisfy either scholarship or piety.

J. A. HIMES.

Herbert Spencer. An Estimate and Review. By Josiah Royce. Together with a Chapter of Personal Reminiscences by James Collier. Price $1.25. Postage 10c.

In this small volume we have a very valuable contribution to right understanding, both of Herbert Spencer himself and of his philosophical teaching. Dr. Royce, if any man, fully comprehends that teaching, and having himself elaborated a type of evolutionary cosmology, is sufficiently sympathetic to do fair justice at least to Spencer's generic aim. This fair justice is everywhere evident in the kind tone marking the review and estimate.

From his introductory statement we learn that his impulse to write was at least measurably influenced by the recent appearance of Spencer's "Autobiography," through which both the philosopher and his works are seen in new perspective, enabling a better summing-up and characterization of what he has done for philosophic inquiry. The import and value of his work are now seen in nearer view and clearer light. Prof. Royce's plan is best given in his own statement in the introduction: "Spencer's life-work is a part of a very large historical movement." For the sake, therefore, of giving the whole discussion its due setting, I shall begin with a few comments upon the general history and meaning of the concept of Evolution. I shall then review what the Aubiography tells us about the origin and significance of Spencer's own view about Evolution. Thirdly, I shall attempt a sketch of this view itself in its finished form. Fourthly, I shall close with some critical observations upon the significance of Spencer's work as a thinker."

Accordingly, the reader finds briefly sketched how, from early times in various parts of the world, students of nature were led to interpret its phenomena under evolutionist conceptions.

A glance of these is given, and of the continuity of evolutionist thought in later philosophies down to modern times and the scientific theories of Lamarck and Darwin. But from the autobiographical disclosures we are informed that Spencer was extraordinarily innocent regarding every sort of nexus between his own philosophy and that of any remote period or foreign country. His processes were, for his consciousness, his own. Indeed we are made to see in him a surprising non-acquaintane with previous philosophical scholarship and a seemingly purposive self-isolation in working out the problems involved in his own thinking. One is impressed, indeed, with the great vigor and energy of his philosophic mind, but at the same time with his limited equipment of scholarly learning. Our author sketches for us the chief steps in his process in reaching and elaborating his famous scheme of "Synthetic philosophy," noting at the same time some gaps and difficulties.

In indicating his "estimate," Dr. Royce presents some distinct criticisms as to the soundness of Spencer's reasoning, showing how, at places, it fails to reach the point for which it is used. An instance of this is in

his analysis of the Spencerian principle of "unification of the purely phenomenal process of evolution." In this analysis he makes plain that Spencer's expositions fail to explain *how* the acknowledged "*opposing tendencies*" in nature are *unified*, as required in the process of evolution. "Just because every case of evolution is obviously a case where mutually opposing tendencies somehow balance one another, and combine into higher unities, the requirement for the situation is, not that the philosopher should tell us (truly enough) that evolution involves both shrinkings and swellings, both mixings and sortings, both variety and order, but that he should show us *how* these various tendencies are, in the various types of evolutionary process, kept in that peculiar balance and unity which, each time, constitutes an evolution. This is what Spencer has not done." "His theory of evolution does not determine the relations of the essential processes of evolution to one another, does not define their inner unity, and does not enable us to conceive a series of types of evolutionary processes in orderly relations to one another." This criticism cuts very deeply into the essence of Spencer's work.

The parts of the volume on Spencer's Educational Theories, and giving Collier's Personal Reminiscences, form very interesting reading, exhibiting, as they do, the famous philosopher in the environment and activities of his times.

Dr. Royce's small but attractive volume comes in good place. Such "a review and estimate" was due to the high prominence won by Spencer's great talent. His criticisms are due to truth. It may be that these criticisms may help to verify anew the now oft-asserted truth:

"Our little systems have their day;
They have their day and cease to be."

M. VALENTINE.

LUTHERAN PUBLICATION SOCIETY, PHILADELPHIA.

The Atonement and Modern Thought By Junius B. Remensnyder, D. D., LL.D, Author of "Heavenward," "Doom Eternal," "Six Days of Creation," "Lutheran Manual," etc, etc With *An Introduction* by Prof. Benjamin B. Warfield, D.D., LL.D., of Princeton Theological Seminary. 75 cts. till July, afterward $1.50.

We welcome this volume as a timely and valuable contribution to our current theological and devotional literature. We have read it with great interest and satisfaction. Of course, upon this high and long discussed theme, with its transcendant realities and bearings, there will inevitably be found some forms of definition and representation not preferred by all Christians; but the volume sets forth and vindicates the essential elements and features of the atonement as accepted in the faith of all the orthodox denominations of the Church. In its substance and meaning, it is the atonement of the Church Confessions. It is strongly presented, and defended with ability and logical force.

In the XXXIX brief chapters of the work the great truth is viewed in all the chief aspects and relations it sustains to Christianity as a whole and as organically connected with the various constituent truths of the order of salvation. Some of the closing chapters are most impressive and inspiring presentations of the central and vital character of this great doctrine and of the supreme necessity of its firm maintenance, as the truth of all gospel truths for saving faith and redemptive power.

Dr. Warfield has written a cordial and instructive introduction, especially calling attention to the false tendencies in the so-called "liberal" thought of our day, which make the appearance of this volume timely. There is great need for it, and it ought to have a wide reading.

M. VALENTINE.

LUTHERANS IN ALL LANDS CO.

Luther's Church Postil Gospels, First to Twelfth Sunday after Trinity. Translated by Prof. John Nicholas Lenker, D.D. Pp. 390, $2 25.

The Epistles of St. Peter and St. Jude, preached and explained by Martin Luther. Translated and edited by Prof. John Nicholas Lenker, D.D. Pp. 383, $2.25.

We take pleasure in again commending Dr. Lenker's efforts to give us Luther in English. The old gospel has lost none of its power as interpreted long ago by the prince of preachers. The devout Spener said, "Among all his writings his Church Postil is one of the very best, as he himself called it, his most beloved book, in which he sets forth the divine truth with a rich spirit; and the less he shows of art and eloquence, found in his other books, the more power the devout reader receives from it." These sermons on the Church year will edify the lay reader, and be of special value to the preacher

The commentary on the Epistles of Peter and Jude is characterized by Luther's keen insight into Scripture and his simplicity of expression. While the work has little critical value, it has freshness and force and is capable of rendering useful service after nearly four centuries of existence.

J. A SINGMASTER.

ATLANTIC MONTHLY, BOSTON, MASS.

The April number of the *Atlantic* opens with a strong and timely paper on "The Cost of War." It is followed by one on "The Eternal Life," which will be widely read. This number contains articles on "A Bay Window in Florida;" "In the District Attorney's Office;" "Henry James;" "Christian Thomasius;" "Letters of Mark;" "Significant Books on Politics and Economics;" "The Right and Wrong of the Monroe Doctrine" and the fourth installment of "Thoreau's Journal." Two interesting chapters of "The Coming of the Tide;" "The White Llama;" "Stranger than Fiction;" and "The Recompense;" make up the fiction of this number. The poems and the "Contributors Club" are fine. Indeed this number is only another proof of the fact that there is no magazine which so consistently maintains its standard of excellence as the *Atlantic* does.

O.K.

THE

LUTHERAN QUARTERLY.

JULY, 1905.

ARTICLE I.

THE OLD LUTHERAN DOCTRINE OF FREE-WILL.

(CONTINUED FROM PAGE 188).

By Professor J. W. RICHARD, D.D., LL.D.

Reviewing now what we have written on the subject before us we conclude that there can be no material difference of opinion in regard to what Melanchthon taught *de libero arbitrio* from 1530 to 1551. More important is it to learn what he taught on this subject from 1552 to 1560.

I. THE TIMES.

The period now to be taken under review was one of great agitation in the Lutheran Church. The Schmalkald War had put the times sadly out of joint, and Melanchthon had been placed in a false position by the Leipzig *Interim*. But the Treaty of Passau had brought the War to an issue favorable to the Lutherans, and Melanchthon had extricated himself from the *Interim*, He is still hailed as the "Dear Preceptor," and still ranks as the most influential teacher in the Lutheran Church. During the last eight or ten years of his life his works show a spiritual depth and a moral earnestness such as they had not previously exhibited. In these years we have his matured views as the result of the continued study of the Scriptures and of the Fathers. Besides, during this period he is much engaged in controversy with the Romanists, the Jesuits, the Schwenckfeldians, the Enthusiasts, the Osiandrians, the Flacianists, and other opponents and critics, some within and some without the Lutheran Church.

For these two reasons we have decided to quote from no

work of Melanchthon's not composed, or not formally approved, by him during the last ten years of his life, except that we may occasionally bring in earlier writings for the purpose of showing the essential harmony of all his teaching on Free-will during the last thirty years of his life. But in order to make a fair and faithful presentation of Melanchthon's doctrine of Free-will we must first state clearly his doctrine of the *natural inability* of man for spiritual conduct, and his doctrine of *grace*, for these are the two focal points in Melanchthon's theology.

II. MELANCHTHON'S DOCTRINE OF SIN.

What did Melanchthon teach in regard to the natural inability or weakness of man in spiritual things? In the *Loci* of the third period (1543–1559) he writes: "The sin of origin is the want of original righteousness, that is, in those born of virile seed, it is the loss of light in the mind, and the turning of the will away from God, and contumacy of heart, so that they are not able to obey the law of God. On account of this corruption they are guilty, and are the children of wrath, that is, they are condemned of God, unless they shall have been pardoned. If any one wishes to add, that also they are born guilty on account of Adam's fall, I do not object. * * * The sin of origin is not only imputation, but it is, as I have said, darkness and depravity in the very nature of man." He then says that these views agree with those of Augustine, Hugo, Bonaventura, and later writers, and he quotes Hugo as saying that "the sin of origin is ignorance in the mind and disobedience in the Will."

These general observations touching the depravity of man in both mind and will he confirms by quotations from the New and Old Testaments: "Rom. 8 : 7 : The carnal mind is enmity against God. For it is not subject to the law of God, and cannot be made subject. This is a sad and awful description of the human race. The words show plainly that they are spoken not in regard to actual sin only, but also in regard to the sin that inheres in nature itself, which we call enmity against God. What more dreadful can be said than that the nature of man is hostile to God? that is, that man carries round with

him at all times darkness and doubts in regard to God, security that neglects God, distrust that flees from God, and manifold contumacy."

"Gen. 8 : 21 : The imagination of the heart of man is wicked from infancy. He (Moses) affirms that sins arise not only from habit, but that there is depravity in the heart of children from their very birth. For in the Hebrew the words are plainer : The working of the human heart, or πλασμά, or fabricatio, is evil, that is, the very substance of the heart is corrupt, or indeed all the emotions and impulses, or ὁρμαὶ in the heart, are things evil, that is, they are turned away from God."

It would be difficult for language to represent man in a more corrupt, depraved, helpless, and forlorn condition than is done here by Melanchthon. With him sin is not merely something negative, a *defectus*, as the Flacianists falsely charged against him. It is an "act that fights with the law of God." It "offends God." It "makes guilty of eternal wrath." It is "contumacy of heart." It is "enmity against God." It is "corruption." It is described as "a disorder of all the appetites," as "ipsum vitium born with us." "In general sin is vitium perpetuum or factum fighting with the law of God." * In *The Reply to the Bavarian Articles* he declares that "the sin of origin is not only guilt (reatus) but also vitium in nature itself," and he describes it as "a lasting disease (morbus) clinging to nature." † He also revives the old Augustinian idea of concupiscence as an *active* evil in man, ‡ and sets it over against the scholastic idea of concupiscence as a mere "weakness" in man and not sin. The fact is, in some of his private writings Melanchthon defines and describes original sin in stronger and more positive terms than he defines and describes it either in the Confession or in the Apology.

Under the heading *Of Actual Sins* we read the following : "Original sin is, as I have said, darkness in the mind, aversion of the will from God, contumacy of heart against God. These evils are not called actions ; but from these arise actual sins

* *C. R.* 21 : 378. Ibidem : 12 : 437.
† Witt. Ed. 1, 412,[b] .
‡ See *C. R.* 12 : 440.

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within and without: "In the mind constant doubts and blasphemies; in the will security and neglect, distrust of God, admiration of self, preferring our own life and will to the command of God, and a greatly confused mass of vicious affections." He also expressly condemns the Pelagians "who deny the whole doctrine of original sin," and the Scholastics, who "retain the name, but extenuate the reality." He regards man as corrupt, vicious, and depraved in the very ground of his mental and moral fiber and fabric, as by *nature* turned away from God, and as full of sinful inclinations. By his natural powers he is unable to do anything acceptable to God. In his *Commentary on Colossians* (1527) he declares that "man's nature by the natural powers is not able to produce true fear of God and true confidence towards God, nor any religious affections and emotions," and this declaration almost word for word is found in the *Loci* both of the second and of the third period. His meaning is that depravity of man on the religious side of his nature is totally disabling, that it extends to and involves the mind and will in such a way as to render man totally averse to God. He can of himself neither rightly fear nor rightly trust God. In other words, Melanchthon to the end of his days reaffirms that very doctrine of sin which in 1530 he had placed in the Augsburg Confession, though often in stronger term in the later writings. For instance: In describing the seat of sin, in the *Explicatio Symboli Nicaeni*, 1557, Melanchthon says: "These innate evils, defects, and depraved inclinations are not only in the body; but they are at the same time in the soul and in the body, namely, in the cognitive faculty, vanity, darkness, and doubts in regard to God. In the appetent faculty and in the heart there exist no good inclinations, nor the love of God, nor the fear of God, but there exist depraved inclinations, the improper love of ourselves, pride, many sinful appetites, that is, the entire man (totus homo), soul and body, since the Fall, has ceased to be the home of God, and since God does not shine in man there is in him darkness and manifold disorder." *

What, now, can this *totus homo*, soul and body, do in spirit-

* *C. R.* 23 : 403.

ual matters? In a declaration presented at Worms in 1557, written by the Wittenberg theologians present, that is, by Melanchthon, it is said: "In the list of articles laid before us the second one is *De Libero Arbitrio*, in regard to which our article in the Confession delivered at Augsburg is full and clear and was not then rejected. And we judge that our explanation is profitable for discipline and for the Church when we speak of the liberty that remains in the Will, namely, that of regulating the external conduct, and that the Will of man without the Holy Spirit is not able to produce the internal affections commanded by God, such as the fear of God, faith, the love of God, constancy and strength in confession, chastity of heart, and like internal virtues, which are and are called the fruits of the Spirit. By means of this our distinction both the Pelagians and the Manichaeans are refuted. and discipline is confirmed and at the same time the benefits of the Son of God promised in the Gospel are shown.

"We say that the unregenerate both ought and can regulate their external movements so that the external conduct can agree with the law of God. It is of external actions that it is said: *The law is given for the ungodly.* But we affirm that this external discipline cannot satisfy the law of God, and is not the righteousness that pleases God, nor does it merit the remission of sins, nor is it that by which a person is righteous before God, that is, is accepted, but for other reasons, of which we shall speak at the proper place, it is necessary." *

In *The Reply to the Articles of the Bavarian Inquisition*, 1559, it is declared that sin and death cannot be removed by the Free-will of man, nor is the Will of man able to begin internal obedience without the Son of God, without the Gospel, without the Holy Spirit. "Such freedom does not belong to the Will of man." † In the German *Loci* of 1555 it is written: "It is perfectly clear that no person by his own natural powers can take away death and the inborn evil inclination from this nature; but this is done alone by the Son of God, who says: O death, I will be thy death. In this there is no working of our

* *C. R.* 9 : 339.
† Witt. Ed. I. fol. 370. b

powers. It is also certainly true that no man can merit the forgiveness of sins, as is clearly written in Tit. 3 : 5 : Not by works of righteousness which we have done, but by his mercy he saved us * * *. It is also true that we are not able to satisfy the law of God; also we cannot begin internal obedience in the heart without the divine working, without the Son of God, without the knowledge of the Gospel, without the Holy Spirit. And true faith and trust in God, patience in affliction, joy in God and other graces of the heart towards God we cannot kindle of ourselves. But God is not known nor loved where the Son of God does not create light, and does not comfort us through the Gospel, and give the Holy Spirit who works in our souls and hearts such graces as he is. This is proved by the following passages," (Rom. 8 : 3 and 1 Cor. 2 : 14 are quoted).

In the *Examen Ordinandorum*, 1554, it is said: "It is very clear that the disorder which is born in us, and is called evil concupiscence and death cannot be put away by the natural powers. Nor can men perfectly satisfy the law of God. Hence in Romans 8th it is declared that it is impossible to be justified by the law. Also: The carnal mind is not subject to the law of God and cannot be made subject to it. In view of these clear proofs we know that the doctrine of the Pelagians is false, which is followed by the Monks, who have taught that men are able to satisfy the law of God by their natural powers, to merit remission of sins and to be righteous by the fulfilling of the law." *

These quotations show what Melanchthon taught on the subject of sin and human inability during the last years of his life. The same teaching is contained in all his writings when he formally touches the subject of sin, which is described not only negatively as the loss of original righteousness that ought to exist, but as something positively evil and corrupting in the very nature of man; "finally in the heart a dreadful contumacy that begets vagrant appetites, and passions conflicting with the law of God, unreasonable affections, unjust hates." † As a conse-

* *C. R.* 23 : 15.
† Wittenberg Ed. 1 : 413.

quence of his native depravity and of his positive inclination to do evil, man, in the anthropology of Melanchthon, is totally unable by his own natural powers *to begin* or *to perform* any internal work that can render him acceptable to God, or that can in any sense serve as a ground for justification, or that can make it in any sense *congruous* or *condign* that God should confer grace upon him, that is, should pardon his sins. In a word, according to Melanchthon, sin is an anti-divine principle residing in human nature, that creates enmity against God, destroys the proper relations with God, renders man obnoxious to the wrath of God, and brings him under the divine condemnation unless gratuitous forgiveness be obtained.

Hence there is absolutely no ground whatever for the allegation of Professor Pieper that Melanchthon "draws a broad line through Rom. 8 : 7 ; 1 Cor. 2 : 14; Eph. 2 : 15; Eph. 1 : 19, 20, and says, Yes, where the Scripture says No, and says, *δύναται γνῶναι*, where the Scripture says *ου δύναται γνῶναι*" The fact is that Melanchthon does and says no such things as Professor Pieper alleges. On the contrary the evidence is overwhelming that he teaches the total depravity of man and his absolute inability by his natural powers to know the things of the Spirit of God. 1 Cor. 2 : 14.

And as over against Pelagius whom he calls a heretic, it is the reiterated teaching of Melanchthon that man is wholly dependent upon divine grace for salvation from sin, and that Christ is the sole meritorious cause of salvation to the utter exclusion of all human merit. This we now proceed to show.

III. MELANCHTHON'S DOCTRINE OF GRACE.

As the counterpart to Melanchthon's doctrine of the absolute helplessness of man in all spiritual matters, stands Melanchthon's doctrine of grace, or rather his doctrine of the work of Christ, *for the sake of whom alone* man is justified and saved when he believes the promise of God. In the last edition of the *Loci* he thus defines grace: "Grace is the remission of sins or mercy promised for the sake of Christ, or it is gratuitous reception, which is necessarily attended by the gift of the Holy Spirit. They who are acquainted with the Hebrew can easily understand the word. Often the Hebrew word means favor,

sometimes also gift. Now I will add the passages which show that on this subject grace specially signifies gratuitous mercy, or gratuitous reconciliation: Rom. 4 : 4: To him that worketh the reward is not reckoned as of grace. Here grace is clearly understood as gratuitous benevolence or imputation. For the antithesis is: The reward is reckoned to them that work: but to him that believeth, though he brings no merits, yet is gratuitous imputation reckoned. In the same manner it is then said: Therefore by faith according to grace, that the promise may be sure, that is, that reconciliation may be certain. It does not depend on the condition of our worthiness, but it is gratuitous. For if you think that you have remission, provided you are worthy and pure, there follows interminable doubt and despair. Rom. 6 : 14: Ye are not under the law, but under grace. Here Paul means that we please God for the sake of the Son, not on account of our own worthiness, since much weakness and sin still remains in the regenerate. Grace, therefore, means the gratuitous mercy promised for the sake of the Son."

A little further on he says that "reconciliation is given for the sake of the Son of God the Mediator, not on account of our worthiness, nor on account of our merits, nor on account of our virtues or deeds." He then says that the exclusive particle, *Gratis*, "transfers the cause of reconciliation to the Son of God alone;" and he gives four reasons for the use of this exclusive particle: "The first is that due honor may be reckoned to Christ. Secondly, that the conscience may retain a sure and firm consolation, and that the error of those who command to doubt may be exploded. Thirdly, that true worship may be rendered. Fourthly, that the difference between law and gospel may be perceived." *

It will thus be seen that Melanchthon in the matter of reconciliation takes all merit from man and transfers it to Christ alone, for whose sake alone we have reconciliation. Indeed, Melanchthon's fondness for the use of the phrase, "For the sake of Christ," (Latin: *Propter Christum*; German: *Um Christi willen*), is known to all readers of his works, and it is

* *C. R.* 21 : 752–3.

safe to affirm that he uses this phrase thousands upon thousands of times, and always to set forth the *meritorious cause* of reconciliation to the *utter exclusion*, implied or expressed, of human worthiness, merits, virtues, and deeds of the law, as in any sense the ground or cause of reconciliation with God. According to the teaching of Melanchthon man is justified by faith alone for the sake of Christ. He says that the particle, *Sola*, does not exclude contrition or other virtues, "but it denies that they are causes of reconciliation and it transfers the cause to Christ alone." "And this is the proper definition of faith: Faith is assent to the entire Word of God as presented to us, and, therefore, also to the promise of gratuitous reconciliation given for the sake of Christ the Mediator. It is also confidence in the mercy of God promised for the sake of Christ." *

Referring to the conversion of Peter he says: "In the conversion of Peter repentence and faith must of necessity exist, by which (faith) he may know that he is pardoned. Other virtues must also follow; and yet the proposition is true and must of necessity be retained: Sin is pardoned freely (gratis), because it is pardoned not on account of Peter's virtues, but for the sake of the Son of God." †

In the German *Loci* it is said: "When it is declared that we have the forgiveness of sins and are justified by faith, this must not be understood as though we have forgiveness on account of an act called faith, but for the sake of Christ the Lord, in whose obedience and death confidence is based. But faith is the means by which we look upon Christ the Lord, and apply and appropriate his merit to ourselves." ‡

In the *Examen Ordinandorum*, to the question, "How does a person receive the remission of sins and reconciliation or justification, and the gift of the Holy Spirit and eternal life?" Melanchthon makes answer as follows: "In conversion, that is, in true distress and alarm, a person receives remission of sins for the sake of the Mediator, the Son of God, our Lord Jesus Christ, God and Man, freely, by faith alone, not

* *C. R.* 21 : 744.
† *Ibid.* 753.
‡ *C. R.* 22 : 330.

on account of his own worthiness, or on account of his own virtues, or his own works or merits. In this alarm there must always be considered the difference between the law and the Gospel, and we must know that it is the eternal and unchangeable command of God that we believe that we are accepted for the sake of Christ, as is said: As I live, saith the Lord, I will not the death of the sinner, but that he be converted and live. Likewise: Grace abounds over sin. And when we are encouraged by faith and accept the remission of sins, the Son of God is truly active, and by the voice of the Gospel imparts consolation to our hearts; and at the same time we receive by faith imputation of righteousness or reconciliation and the Holy Spirit, and are made heirs of eternal life, freely, for the sake of Christ." *

Thus we might go on and add quotation to quotation until we had filled many pages with passages of identical import, But what we have quoted suffices to show that Melanchthon rests salvation upon *grace alone for the sake of Christ*, to the utter exclusion of human merit as in any sense a cause of reconciliation with God. Indeed, it may truly be said that such teaching forms the sum and substance, the heart and center the kernel and marrow, of Melanchthon's didactic presentation of the way of salvation. And it may be said truthfully that were we to eliminate from his didactic writings the phrases *Propter Christum*, *Um Christi willen*, always used to set forth the *causa meritoria* of salvation in the most exclusive sense, we would render such writings absolutely unintelligible. It would be like removing the sun from the heavens—there would be no center of gravity, no source of light; confusion and darkness would follow. Hence it is from this center of gravity, from this source of light, with the full recognition of its all-controlling, all-illumining significance, that we must study Melanchthon's doctrine of Free-will, which is not *central*, but relatively *peripheral*, in his system. In other words, we must enter upon this study with the distinct understanding that in conversion the human mind and will, according to Melanchthon, contribute absolutely nothing of worthiness, or of merit, or of works

* *C. R.* 23 : 20–1.

of righteousness, to the precedent action of the divine Word and of the operation of the Son of God and of the Holy Spirit through the instrumentality of the divine Word; and further, that in Melanchthon's conception of conversion there is no such thing as "better conduct," (to use Professor Pieper's language in Professor Pieper's sense), when he teaches that in conversion, "the will is not wholly inactive," "Free-will does something in David," "Man's will assents to, and does not resist the Word of God." * All such affirmations must be viewed and interpreted so as to harmonize with the most fundamental, the all-determining principle of Melanchthon's anthropology viz., that sin has taken all spiritual life, power and virtue out of man, and has left him spiritually helpless by means of his own powers; and from the the central principle of his soteriology, viz., that salvation comes to man alone "for the sake of Christ through mercy, not on account of contrition, or love, or other works"—thus, we say again, absolutely excluding all human merit as a ground of salvation, and leaving the honor and glory of God and the merit of Christ undimmed and unobscured by anything that man does or can do by Free-will.

Several questions now arise. First: Why did Melanchthon lay so much stress on human inability, on the futility of human virtues in the matter of attaining salvation? The answer is easy. The Roman Catholic theologians maintained that Free-will in reference to spiritual matters is not entirely lost, and that man can in some sense and to some degree love and obey

* Having examined the matter very thoroughly we are prepared to say that Professor Pieper's declaration that Melanchthon taught that "the cause of conversion and of salvation lies in *the better conduct* (*Besseres Verhalten*) *of the person*," is utterly without foundation in fact. Any such conception as that is diametrically contrary to Melanchthon's reiterated affirmations about the *gratia sola* and the *fides sola*, which he magnifies with as much emphasis as does the Form of Concord itself. For proof of this in part we point to the *Propositiones* written by Melanchthon both before and after the death of Luther. *C. R.* 12; pp. 399–704. See especially pp. 665 *et seqq.* If Professor Pieper can find his pet phrase or its equivalent in the works of Melanchthon in the sense in which Professor Pieper uses the phrase *The Lutheran Quarterly* will welcome the discovery.

God by means of his natural powers, * and can make it congruous that God should bestow grace upon him. Secondly: Why did Melanchthon lay so much stress on the exclusive particles, *Gratis* and *Sola*? Because the Roman Catholic theologians taught that man is not justified by Faith alone, but also by works. In his *Loci Communes* Dr. John Eck says that "faith does not suffice without works," and, "to believe in God, according to the Scriptures, includes adhering to God through charity."† In other words, Melanchthon's Roman Catholic apponents maintained that a man is justified by faith and works combined, and they constantly repudiated the exclusive particles as corruptions of the Scriptures. Why did Melanchthon so constantly reiterate the propositions: Christ operates through the *Word*; the Holy Spirit operates through the *Word*? It was because the Schwenckfeldians and the Enthusiasts insisted that they had no need of the external Word, that the Holy Spirit spoke to them without means, and that God drew them by an internal impulse.

To these errors Melanchthon replied by declaring that man by his own powers cannot satisfy the law of God, cannot truly love and fear God; that he is justified by an act of divine grace without work; that God has given the Word as the instrument by which Christ and the Holy Spirit operate on the mind and will of man. Hence God must be sought in his Word. Only the Word contains the revelation of his grace, and of his will to save men from their sins. Sin, grace, the divine promise are pivotal words in the theology of Melanchthon, and they are made prominent because of the antithesis of his opponents. The Pelagians denied the doctrine of original sin, the Romanists denied the doctrine of salvation by grace alone, the Enthusiasts denied the need of the divine Word, as the instrument of the Spirit. We must understand him on these points before

* Gabriel Biel († 1495) in his Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard (Book III, Distinction 27) says: "The human will can by its own natural powers love God above all things;" "The will is able by its natural powers to conform itself to God, and consequently can love God above all things."

† *Locus 5, De Fide et Operibus.* Edition of 1525, printed at Landshut.

we can understand him in his doctrine of Free-will. Hence the foregoing premises. If theologians would only acquaint themselves with these premises, and would hold these in mind, they could not conscientiously say that Melanchthon's doctrine of Free-will derogates from the grace and glory of God in the work of man's salvation, or that Melanchthon teaches that man by the powers of nature can in some sense, or in some measure, make himself acceptable to God in things belonging to the salvation of his soul.

With these premises well established we are prepared to go forward.

IV. MELANCHTHON'S DOCTRINE OF FREE-WILL AS EXHIBITED IN HIS WRITINGS FROM 1552 TO 1560.

1. In an official *Opinion* prepared in 1558 for "all the Elec tors, Princes and Estates of the Augsburg Confession," and which was made the basis of the *Frankfort Recess*, he says: "OF FREE WILL." "First, it is certain and cannot be doubted that the *Stoic necessity* is a down-right lie, and is a reproach to God. It is also a lie that there is no *contingency*.

"Secondly, it is also incorrect to say in general that in evil works the Will is absolutely passive. Although the devil impelled Nero, and much dreadful sin is committed, chiefly through the demons in men, yet it is true of David that without compulsion and voluntarily, he took the wife of Uriah, and that he might have retained the Holy Spirit, had he resisted the temptation, in which struggle he might have had the Holy Spirit. The same thing is true of many others. In external morality it is *true* that the Will is not forced to commit adultery, theft, e c. It is very profitable to know this rule of the Holy Spirit. It is true that God very marvelously illumines and works in conversion, and even during the entire life of the Saints, which illumination the human will only receives, and is not a co-worker, and is *absolutely passive*. Also it must be taught that in all temptation we should reflect on the Word of God, and should will to strengthen ourselves by it, and to pray for God's assistance. For God operates through the Word.

And so cries the prophet, '*Convert me, O Lord! and I shall be converted.*' And the same is taught by the words: *God draws, but he draws him who is willing.* A person must not persist in unbelief, and think that he shall wait until he is drawn to God, without his own will, by some special Anabaptistic vision or miracle. God works, gives the Holy Spirit, strengthens and comforts by his Word. *Faith comes by hearing and hearing by the Word.* This rule people can understand and can profitably employ. It also leads man to God's Word, and does not create any confusion in regard to Predestination, or other irrelevant disputes *about necessity.* And although Luther in the *De Servo Arbitrio* wrote harshly, yet in other writings he counsels just as we now have done. Nor do we have from this those pernicious consequences that therefore man has merit, etc., as Gallus of Regensburg and Anthony [Otto] of Nordhausen have caviled. In a word, could intelligent men in a convention understand this subject, they would, I think, abide by this opinion." *

In this *Opinion* we have an epitome of Melanchthon's doctrine of Free-will. Necessity is denied, and contingency is affirmed. In matters of civil morality man can of himself act virtuously. In conversion God works through the Word, and in some acts of God man is only *receptive*; but he must not wait to be drawn without any activity on his part, or against his will, since *God draws him who is willing*—a quotation made from Chrysostom, which Melanchthon repeats scores of times. But the inferance made by some persons that there is some merit in the predicated act of the Will is rejected as a cavil. Free-will does something in conversion; it must not persist in unbelief: it must accept the divine operation; it must follow the drawing of God. But it does not merit anything by its activity, nor does it become a co-worker with God in any such sense as to render God propitious. Indeed Melanchthon does not anywhere employ the words, *mitwirken*, † *cooperatio*, *synergia*, in describing

* *C. R.* 9 : 467–8.

† In the *Leipzig Interim* the word *mitwirken* is used. But that "compulsion" document was forced on the Saxon Churches by a half-apostate Elector, and was repudiated by Melanchthon as soon as possible.

the Will's activity in conversion. His formulas for expressing the activity of man in conversion are, "Free-Will does something." "The Will is not entirely inactive." What the nature of that activity is we will learn by and by. Suffice it to say here that the closing paragraph of the part of the *Opinion* quoted by us puts the quietus upon Professor Pieper's "better conduct," in the sense of merit, as involved in Melanchthon's doctrine of conversion and Free-Will.

2. March 9th, 1859, Melanchthon, at the command of his Elector, rendered an *Opinion* on the *Weimar Confutation Book*, which, in its final shaping, experienced the land of Flacius, and was designed to refute the *Frankfort Recess*, which had been subscribed by three electors, one count, one duke, and one landgrave, as in harmony with the Augsburg Confession and its Apology. *

In this *Opinion* Melanchthon says: "As to how we teach on the subject of conversion or regeneration—for these words mean one and the same thing—we refer to the *Loci* and to the Commentaries on Paul. We begin with the Word of God, which condemns sin, and which offers forgiveness of sin and grace for the Lord's sake. And we say distinctly that through the Word God works alarm and comfort, as was shown already in David's conversion. And when we say that we must begin with the Word of God, we condemn Schwenckfeld and those like him, who imagine that God imparts himself without means, and that man is as a block and that God forces him, and that he would be converted whether he regard the Word or not."

Then he gives the rule in the oft quoted words of Augustine: "*Praecedente gratia, comitante voluntate.* For both are true. If man were a block there would be no controversy. Also, if the Will can turn itself away from the consolation, conversely it must be understood that it does something and yields to the Holy Spirit when it accepts the consolation. *And rejecting, it rejects by its own volition and God is not the cause that the Will*

* *C. R.* 9 : 489-507.

rejects. Also, so long as the Will only resists there is no conversion." He declares that the fancies of Flacius and Schwenckfeld are only words that deceive the people. He closes by saying that the operation of God does not occur apart from reflection on the Word, as Schwenckfeld, Flacius, Stoltz and all the Enthusiasts imagine; but the following rules of the Church are comforting and are to be carefully observed: "*Praecedente gratia, comitante voluntate. Deus trahit, sed volentem trahit.*"*

Now this is no new doctrine brought into the Lutheran Church and promulgated from Wittenberg only after Luther had passed away. It had been taught to and conned by thousands of students, and had been published to the world. In *The Elements of Rhetoric* (we quote from the Edition of 1542) Melanchthon had said: "The causes of faith are the Gospel, which proclaims remission for the sake of Christ, and the Holy Spirit, who acts through the Gospel and persuades the Will. And the Will assenting to and not resisting the Holy Spirit. * * * We are able to assent to the promise only by faith. Therefore, the promised reconciliation is effected not on account of any work of ours, or on account of our worthiness, or on account of any virtues of ours, but for the sake of Christ, and yet there must be something by which we accept that benefit. By faith, therefore, we accept."† Then on the following page the author makes a clear distinction in regard to these causes. They are not causes in the same sense: "I have spoken of the object of faith. The instrument by which this is effected in us is the Word itself. The efficient cause is the Holy Spirit, who operates through the Word, and incites the mind and will of man. And the Will assenting and not resisting." It is evident then that Melanchthon does not regard the Will as "the efficient cause" of faith. Consequently it is not the efficient cause of conversion, since there can be no conversion without faith. In the attainment of salvation all the *efficiency* is from without. It resides in the Holy Spirit who operates through the Word. The Will assents under the

*C. R. 9: 767–9.
†C. R. 13: 426–7.

divine persuasion. And in the *De Anima* (1540): "The Son of God, the Word and Image of the Eternal Father, by his own light illumines the mind so that Joseph knows the Eternal Father, and knows that he is and will be cared for by him, and at the same time the Son by the Holy Spirit moves the will and heart of Joseph, so that he wills to obey God, and he increases the fear of God, and the Will assisted assents to the Holy Spirit, restrains the external members, and does not admit the enticement. In this contest he perceives that the Will is not inactive. Therefore the Holy Spirit does not destroy the freedom of the Will, but corrects it and turns it to God, according to the saying: *He who draws, draws him who is willing.* The Will in Joseph might have shaken off the Holy Spirit, but, assisted, it recovers itself and obeys the Holy Spirit." *

Now, analyzing these quotations, we find (a) that the office of the Will is to assent to the Word and to obey the Holy Spirit. (b) Its place is *third* in the great transaction of conversion, and not precedent as in Semi-Pelagianism: *Nostrum est velle, Dei perficere.* (c) Its procedure is simply the appropriation of the proffered grace and assistence by an act of self-decision and self-surrender *praecedente gratia.* Thus Melanchthon follows the golden *via media* between Pelagius on the one hand and Augustine on the other; though he leaves Semi-Pelagianism yet on the left, and leans strongly towards Augustinianism in the doctrines of sin and Free-will, but not in the doctrines of predestination and irresistible grace, for he insists on the universality of the promise and on the resistibility of grace.

3. Inasmuch as Melanchthon in his *Opinion* on *The Weimar Confutation Book* appeals to his *Loci* as containing his doctrine of conversion we now turn to that most important of all of his dogmatic works. But we confine ourselves to the third period of this widely circulated hand book, and make our quotations from the edition of 1559. Here the essential freedom of the Will is vindicated in the following language: "The human Will

*C. R. 13: 162.

is able by its own powers without renewal, in some sense, to do the external deeds of the law. Such freedom of the Will is rightly attributed to man by the philosophers." The impotence of the natural man in spiritual things is unequivocally affirmed in the following paragraph: "The mind of the unregenerate is full of doubt in regard to God, the heart is without the true fear of God, without true confidence, and has strong impulses against the law of God." And again: "The Will is captive, not free, namely, to remove the depravity of nature, and death." Also: "The Will of man is not able without the Holy Spirit to produce the spiritual works which God requires, namely, the true fear of God, true confidence in the mercy of God, the true love of God." Once more: "As regards external works the law is effective; but he (Paul) denies that man is justified by the law, or satisfies the law on account of works." These passages are all taken from the *Locus* on Free will. They deny absolutely the potence and the freedom of the Will in spiritual matters, or the ability of man to contribute anything towards his justification. On the contrary it is said not less than eight times in this same *Locus* that we are justified, reconciled, please God, render acceptable obedience, etc., "for the sake of Christ." The author also declares that we must begin with the Word of God, and must not seek God apart from his Word.

He thus on the one hand returns to his fundamental position against the Roman Catholics, and, on the other, to an equally fundamental position against the Enthusiasts.

In the *Locus de praedestinatione*, after quoting John 6: 44 (5) "'Every one that hath heard from the Father, and hath learned, cometh to me,'" he says: "God begins and draws by his Word and by the Holy Spirit; but it behooves us to hear and to come, that is, to lay hold on the promise, and to assent, not to resist, nor to indulge in distrust and doubt." Commenting on Philippians, 2 : 13, he says: "God draws minds in order that they may will, but it behooves us to assent, not to oppose, and He promises that He will be with us in order that the salvation which has been begun may be perfected."

These passages show that Melanchthon places the beginning

of salvation in the operation of God through the Word and in the active agency of the Holy Spirit. To this rule there is not a solitary exception in all that he wrote on the subject of conversion and of faith. Man has no power of himself to *begin* to be converted or to *begin* to believe. Even the *willing* comes from the *drawing* of God. He has the power *praecedente gratia* to cease to resist and to assent, when the Holy Spirit has illumined the mind through the Word, and "has persuaded the mind and Will." The *initiative* proceeds alone from God, as does all *efficiency* in conversion. The activity of the Will is confined to *assentiens, et non repugnans;* but such activity is not *initiative* nor *constitutive*, nor *generative*, nor *meritorious*. It is itself *initiated, constituted* and generated by the truth *praecedente gratia, adjuvante Spiritu Sancto*, the Will meanwhile acting freely and deciding. There is no self potentiation of the Will in the premises. All the potentiation is from without, is from the *causa efficiens*, which is the Holy Spirit, who uses the Will as the faculty for appropriating the truth, and as the faculty of self-determination, for the impartation of himself to the human personality. If we may be allowed once more to repeat what Melanchthon reiterates times almost without number: The Will *assents* to the Holy Spirit, *assents* to the Word of God.*

*Since writing the preceding pages we have happened upon the following: 1. "It should be carefully considered in regard to the word *concur*, that in nowise do the Word, the Holy Spirit and the Will concur in conversion in an equal manner or mode. But all efficiency is attributed alone to the Holy Spirit, who through the Word and not otherwise exercises that efficiency in men, but as the poet says of the boy who attends his father: *Sequiturque patrem non passibus aequis*, so the Will of man is joined to the Holy Spirit as an infirm and weak companion who receives all his efficiency from the Holy Spirit, and only when assisted by the Holy Spirit does he exercise the modus agendi divinely implanted in him and rest in the Word of God." Pezel's *De Liberi Arbitrii sententia* in Schlüsselberg, v. pp. 104–5.

2. "There are three causes of conversion, &c., but they are not equal or similar, or at the same time operative, or coöperative: There is only one efficient cause, namely the Holy Spirit. The second is the instrumental cause, the Word and the Sacraments. The third is the subject, in which through the Word the Holy Spirit works most freely by his

Further than this Melanchthon does not go in exhibiting the Will as a cause of faith, or as a cause of conversion. And further than this he could not go without contradicting his fundamental and principiant teaching in regard to sin and grace. He always magnifies the *efficient* activity of the Holy Spirit and the *instrumentality* of the Word, as in his *Commentary on Romans*, to which also he appeals: "Neither can the promise of mercy be accepted, nor can confidence be conceived except by the Holy Spirit who moves hearts through the Word." Throughout the entire period of the thirty years under review, faith, with Melanchthon, meant, as in the Apology, *assentiri verbo Dei*, and *velle et accipere gratiam* though in the later writings, as is suited to their nature and purpose, we find a more elaborate treatment of the subject; and in later years more stress is laid by him on the ethical features of conversion as over against those who "vociferated" that "before, in and after conversion man holds himself in an attitude of resistance," * and as against those who asserted that "God snatches you by some violent rapture, so that you must believe, whether you will or not." †

And now in view of all that has preceded we believe that Melanchthon's doctrine of Free Will can be summed up in this formula: *Praecedente gratia, adjuvante Spiritu Sancto* the Will of man can assent to and can reject the offer and call of grace.

* *C. R.* 24 : 390.
† *C. R.* 24 : 43.

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movement, operation and efficacy." So writes Nicholas Selneccer in his splendid vindication of Luther and Melanchthon: *Recitationes Aliquot* (1581) p. 331, after he had declared: "We know that Philip was not a Sacramentarian, but a Lutheran, that is, a Christian in heart and in speech."

3. "When man assents, he does not do this by the power or worthiness of Free-will, but by the efficacious action of God, who through the Word and by the voice of the gospel, and not otherwise, is effective." *Confession of the Wittenberg Theologians* (1561) in Schlüsselburg, v. pp. 525 *et seqq.*

Surely these testimonies ought to put to shame those modern writers who insinuate or say that Melanchthon and his followers held that the will is *causa efficiens* in conversion.

In so far the Will is a concurring cause in conversion. Under the conditions given in the formula the Will determines itself without compulsion, without necessity, for the *accipere gratiam*, or for the *repudiare gratiam*. In other words, Melanchthon, as the Scriptures also do, makes the human will a factor in forming character and in deciding destiny. And it is out of this principle that we have, according to Melanchthon, the *actio dissimilis* which in the result makes the difference between David and Saul whom Melanchthon so frequently employs to illustrate the principle that in conversion the Will is not totally inactive. He says: "Conversion takes place in David not as a stone is changed into a fig-tree. But Free-will does something in David. When he hears the denunciation and the promise he now willingly and freely confesses his sin. * * * Since the promise is general, and since there are not contradictory wills in God, it must follow (necesse est) that in us there is some cause of the difference why Saul is rejected and David accepted, that is, it must follow that there is some different action in these two" But the *causa discriminis* is not something meritorious in David—not "besseres *Verhalten*," as Professor Pieper misinterprets, but simply *Verhalten*. Under the influence of the divine Word, David acts in one way and Saul acts in a different way. And in the syllogism that follows, the conclusion is inevitable. If the *promissio* is *universalis*, and if there be not contradictory wills in God, then it must follow that the difference is in us—not by a *necessitas absoluta* or *necessitas consequentis*, but by the *necessitas consequentiæ*, the difference of which, Professor Pieper, who claims to have studied logic, is supposed to understand.* Melanchthon's argument is, that God's Will of salvation is known from the revealed Word and from that alone. In the revealed Word salvation is offered to all men alike. God does not have a revealed Will and a se-

* Luther says: Qui Philippum non agnoscit Praeceptorem, eum necesse est merum esse asinum et beanum superbissimum. Quidquid scimus in artibus et in vera Philosophia, illud debemus Philippo. Quoted by Selneccer in *Recitationes Aliquot*, p. 328. It is to be supposed that Profess Pieper does not interpret Luther's *necesse est* as he does Melanchthon's.

cret Will in regard to man's salvation. Hence *necesse est.* The difference is not in God, for that contradicts the premises, but in us men. Melanchthon is logical. The old Lutheran Church was logical. The great body of Lutheran theologians are logical. But Missouri is illogical at this point. She accepts the premises but interjects a secret Will of God, a particularistic and absolute election of grace. She in effect goes back of the *Deus revelatus* to the *Deus absconditus*, and at this point she is Calvinistic, and has been so regarded by Lutheran theologians generally. According to Missouri's conception God elects David and overcomes his resistence without any *Verhalten* on his part. Saul has not been elected, and therefore he cannot be saved. According to Melanchthon's argument the difference lies in the different attitude taken respectively by those two men. The one assents to the Word of God which is able to save him, and the other rejects that Word. Or as Melanchthon himself has generalized the doctrine in *The Theological Definitions* (1552–3): "When a person is drawn by the Holy Spirit he is able to obey and to reject"—which is *Verhalten*, but in Melanchthon's conception it does not imply *besseres Verhalten* or meritorious action on the part of him who obeys.

Now this teaching of Melanchthon's on Free will, Flacius and his followers have stigmatized as *Synergism.* There is a sense in which this term is applicable to the teaching of Melanchthon and of the old Lutheran Church on Free will. According to that teaching the Will is not absolutely inactive in conversion. Under the divine stimulus, which is an operation on the mind and will of man, the Will is enabled to assent, and does assent to the promise of grace. If Synergism should be so understood, Professor Pieper is probably not in error when he implies that Synergism is the theological standpoint of the General Synod; for we are not aware that the *absolute passivity* of man in conversion is taught in any theological seminary, or is preached from any pulpit, under the auspices of the General Synod. The General Synod is Lutheran according to the Lutheranism exhibited in the Augsburg Confession.

But when the Flacianists, both the old and the new, try

to make themselves and others believe that Melanchthon taught that in Conversion man co-operates *meritoriously* with God, or that "the natural man by reason of his own natural powers, being yet unregenerate, is able to attent to, to know, and to apprehend the things of God," * and when they read *besseres Verhalten* into Melanchthon's doctrine of Free-will and say that Melanchthon forsook and corrupted the old Lutheran doctrine of Free-will, and consciously or unconsciously taught a sublimated Pelagianism about the Will of man in conversion, and by his doctrine detracts from the honor and glory of the divine grace,—then we demur and say that the Flacianists have falsified the teaching of Melanchthon on this subject, and for proof we appeal to the many quotations made from his works in the preceding pages, and to the whole drift and scope of his teaching on this subject and on those closely allied to it.

And when the Flacianists, beginning with Flacius, 1558, quote Melanchthon's definition of Free-will: "Liberum arbitrium in homine facultatem esse applicandi se ad gratiam," without quoting the five words that immediately precede, and without the explanation that follows, then we say that they have garbled Melanchthon And when they say that Melanchthon took this definition from Erasmus in the sense of Erasmus, which sense Luther powerfully refuted,† then we say that they are manifoldly mistaken, for Melanchthon says that "some ancients have so said." Moreover, the definitions are

* Schlüsselburg *Cat. Haereticorum*, v. pp. 16, 17. Indeed, Schlüsselburg's account of Synergism, vol. v. pp. 13-51, is jaundiced to the very core—a tissue of inveracity and sophistry used by many subsequent writers on the subject. One can apply to it Horace's famous lines:

——————— *Hic nigrae succus loliginis: haec est*
Aerugo mera. Sat. I, 100-1.

Even Strigel, so late as 1564, declared: "It is necessary that in true conversion to God the mind be illumined by the Son of God through the Gospel, and that the Will be efficaciously drawn by the Holy Spirit. When this is done, the mind assents to the promise of grace, not by its own powers, but by the Holy Spirit, who in this way, in the consideration of the Word, and not otherwise, is effectual." Schlüsselburg, v. pp. 69.

† *Acta Disput. Vinar.* pp. 370.

not identical,* and Melanchthon's meaning is not that which Luther extracted from Erasmus's definition and refuted. And when they quote this definition without submitting Melanchthon's explanation of the same, they do not discharge that great primal obligation of the historian in relation to facts, namely, that all the facts are to be given and are to be taken into the account before the verdict is rendered. He who quotes this definition of Melanchthon's should quote it as Melanchthon wrote it: "Therefore some ancients have thus spoken: Free-will in man is the faculty of applying himself to grace, that is, he hears the promise and strives to assent and casts away sins against conscience"; and he should say that at Worms in 1557 Melanchthon said to his friends that this definition should be taken in connection with the three preceding lines, that is, should be applied to the *arbitrium liberatum*,† that is, to the mind and will freed from the bondage of sin; and at the same time our historian should quote the three preceding lines: "Know thou that God wills to convert us in

*Erasmus's *verba ipsissima* are: Porro *Liberum Arbitrium* hoc loco sentimus vim humanae voluntatis, qua se possit homo applicare ad ea quae perducant ad aeternam salutem, aut ab iisdem avertere." Works vol. IX. *De Libero Arbitrio*, p. 1215 *et seqq.* Luther's interpretation of this definition is: "Free-will, according to Erasmus, is a power of the Will which is able, of itself, to will or not to will the word and work of God," (Erl. ed. *Var. Arg.* 7. pp. 191–2.)—which is not even Erasmus's meaning, much less is it the meaning of Melanchthon. We gravely suspect that not a few of those who in these last times speak and write about Synergism, have never read either Erasmus's *De Libero Arbitrio*, or Luther's *De Servo Arbitrio*, or Melanchthon's *Loci*. Their learning seems to be of the second-hand variety, hence relatively worthless.

† See Frank, *Die Theologie der Concordienformel*, I, pp. 135, 198. Herrlinger, *Theologie Melanchthons*, p. 92. *C. R.* 21 : 597, 598. *The Luth. Quarterly* for Jan. 1904, pp. 23, 24, 30. *Gieseler*, *Eccle. Hist.* Eng. Trans. IV. p. 444, says that when Melanchthon's friends asked him about this definition at Worms he "satisfied them by the declaration that he meant, voluntas renata." Even Selneccer, after reciting Melanchthon's answer to Brentz, at Worms, says: "In hoc responso Brentius acquievit. Tom. III, pp. 206–7. And in his *Recitationes Aliquot* (1582) he says that in this definition Melanchthon declared that "he meant to speak de libero arbitrio liberato, sive hominis renati," p. 331. After such explanation supported by such testimonies, why this modern defamation of Melanchthon?

this very way, when, excited by the promise, we struggle with ourselves, pray, and resist our unbelief and other vicious affections," and should tell his readers that in the preceding half dozen paragraphs Melanchthon has been discussing Conversion, and that the words, "in this very way," refer to what precedes, and not to the definition that follows in the next paragraph; and he should tell his readers that Melanchthon's teaching in the *Loci* is that God does not convert men as stocks and stones, as the Schwenckfeldians, Enthusiasts and Flacianists taught, but that God invites and attracts us by the Word of grace, which has an inherent vitalizing, illumining, fructifying energy, and that he sends the Holy Spirit into our hearts with operating grace, so that we are *enabled* to assent to the promise, that is, to believe, whereupon we are justified and regenerated.

The honest historian who goes to the sources of information will not tell his readers that Melanchthon teaches that Free-will (Liberum Arbitrium) is able by its *own* powers to apply itself to grace, or by its *own* powers is able to appropriate the divine promise of forgiveness; but that it *is enabled* to do these things when its bondage is broken by the divine energy that comes into the mind and will from above. Or in Melanchthon's own language: "When the Will is drawn by the Holy Spirit it is able to obey and to resist. Therefore freedom is increased when hearts regenerated are directed by the Holy Spirit, as Paul says: 'They that are led by the Spirit are the sons of God.' And then liberty is the power by which the regenerated person is able to obey the governing Holy Spirit." *

The case is a clear one. In the teaching of Melanchthon Free will in man is the faculty by which he applies himself to grace *only* when grace has been given him and *only* when he is moved and led by the Holy Spirit operating through the truth. The *initiative* and the causal efficiency are from God, and from him alone.

By this teaching Melanchthon on the one hand steered clear

* *C. R.* 21 : 1078.

of the Scylla of Romish Semi-Pelagianism, which taught that man, though fallen, still has some power *in spiritualibus*; and on the other hand he avoided the Charybdis of the Schwenckfeldians, the Enthusiasts, the Flacianists, who were united in "making man in conversion a block, a stock, a log, and in saying that conversion is a new creation in which the heart, though it resists the Word of God with the utmost violence, is forced to true repentance and contrition, and to the knowledge of Christ and to true faith; and who do not begin with the Word of God, which condemns sin, and proclaims forgiveness of sin and grace for the sake of Christ, whereby God works alarm and comfort; but they set up compulsion by which man, against his Will, and, as it were, by the hair, is drawn to God, whether he regards the Word or not." *

VI. THE SUMMATION.

In the preceding pages we have tried to set forth the old Lutheran doctrine of Free-will. We have seen that there is nothing in the earlier Lutheran confessions, and nothing in the private writings of Melanchthon, the "dear master," from 1527 on, that indicates that man is to be regarded as *absolutely passive* in conversion and in conceiving faith. Nor is there the slightest intimation in the earlier confessions, nor in the private writings of Melanchthon after 1527, that in conversion man "is much worse than a stone, or a block," that in understanding and Will he is "nothing else than the *subjectum convertendum*," or is *absolutely passive* under the operation of grace—all of which is emphasized in the Form of Concord. On the contrary it may be said with all emphasis that the *verba ipsissima* of the earlier Lutheran confessions do not inculcate the theory of *absolute passivity* of man in conversion; and that the earlier Lutheran confessions do not compare man to a block, a stone, a statue, is known to all persons who have read them. And the fact that Melanchthon to the end of his life re affirmed the Augsburg Confession and the Apology is *prima facie* evidence that he had not placed the theory of *absolute passivity* in those confessions, and that he did not inter-

* *Endlicher Bericht* (1570) fols. 93–4.

pret them as containing that theory, since such a theory cannot be reconciled with the teaching on Free-will as contained in the *Loci*, in the Commentaries on Romans, in *The Reply to the Bavarian Articles* and in other writings of Melanchthon, both official and private, some of which he names in connection with those confessions as together containing his teaching on Free will. Common honesty, to say nothing about charity, forces us to conclude that Melanchthon knew what the Confession and its Apology were intended to mean and what they actually do mean, and that he was honest and consistent in reaffirming those confessions along with the *Loci* and the commentaries on Paul as containing his views on the subject, and especially so inasmuch as in February 1557 he wrote to the Duke of Mecklenburg: "I have begotten no new doctrines; but the sum of the doctrines received in these Churches I have drawn up as best I could, and some things I have stated less harshly for the sake of the younger men." The *onus probandi* of an opposite conclusion in regard to Melanchthon and to the meaning of the confessions named, rests on the shoulders of Professor Pieper.

And the fact that in the violent controversies that racked the Lutheran Church in the years 1540-1560, when the slightest suspicion of deviation in doctrine was magnified to the last degree of exaggeration, and when every supposed deviation was remorselessly branded with the terrible word *Corruptela*—that even under such circumstances no accusation was brought against the *Variata*, nor against the doctrine of Free will as contained in the *Saxonica*, the *Rhetorica*, in the *De Anima*, in the *Loci*—not even against the definition: *Liberum Arbitrium in homine*, etc., until 1558, or ten years after it had been inserted in the *Loci*—these indisputable facts show to a demonstration that the Lutheran Church had consented to Melanchthon's doctrine of Free-will. The burden of proving the opposite rests again with Professor Pieper. We now give the facts in detail.

1. *The Loci.* We have already learned that Luther placed his *imprimatur* on the *Loci* of 1535, and commended it to the Wittenberg students to be read next to the Bible, though in this

edition already Melanchthon had declared that in conversion "the three causes are conjoined, the Word, the Holy Spirit, and the Will, not indeed inactive, but resisting its own weakness," and had "rejected the deliramenta of the Manichaeans, who attributed absolutely no action to the Will, not even when assisted by the Holy Spirit, as though there were no difference between a statue and the Will." *

These propositions were repeated in the edition of 1543, even in strengthened form, and the famous dicta of Basil and Chrysostom were added: "Only will, and God anticipates:" "He who draws, draws him that is willing," and also the *assentiens nec repugnans*—indeed here in 1543 we have the *Locus de Libero Arbitrio* in its *final* form, † except that in 1548 Melanchthon inserted the definition: *Liberum Arbitrium in homine*, etc., of which we have already spoken. And yet in 1545 Luther praised the *Loci* of Philip above all other works on systematic theology, and wished that his own books might be buried in oblivion in order to make room for those that are better. Indeed it would seem that the more Melanchthon removed the harshness from his own earlier view, and from Luther's view of Free-will as contained in the *De Servo Arbitrio* and elsewhere, the more Luther praised the *Loci*. And to Melanchthon belongs the immortal honor of having saved the Lutheran Church from the harsh and severe doctrine of determinism as that doctrine had been expressed in the *De Servo Arbitrio*. Of this there is not room for two opinions. David Chytraeus, one of the authors of the Form of Concord, a Tübingen *Magister Artium*, a student of theology at Wittenberg under Luther and Melanchthon, ‡ wrote to the Wittenberg theologians in 1595: "You know that when, more than seventy years ago, the doctrine of the Church began to be corrected by Luther in your own metropolis of Churches and Schools, the Free-will of man was bravely attacked, and many things in regard to this

* *C. R.* 21 : 376–7.

† Strobel's *Versuch einer Litterar Geschichte von Philipp Melanchthon's Locis theologicis*, p. 130.

‡ Adami *Vitae*, Art., D. Chytraeus.

very subject of the doctrine of Predestination were treated and asserted too harshly, namely, that the Divine Predestination takes liberty from the entire Will of man, both in external works, and in internal thoughts, and that all things come to pass necessarily and by an absolute necessity; that there is no contingency in human affairs; that God also wills all that he foresees; that Pharaoh was hardened not by the permissive, but by the effective action of God. In six consecutive pages it was contended that the passage: I will not the death of the sinner, but that he be converted and live, is the voice of the revealed God, but the other is the judgment of the hidden God, who wills that Pharaoh should perish. These and many other similar horrid things, which then in your lecture room were taught as oracles, but now are retained nowhere except in the schools of the Calvinists, Philip, our common Preceptor, gradually toned down and removed, whilst in all his treatises on theology, ethics, physics, and dialectics, he refutes those absurd opinions, as he calls them, about the Stoic and Manichaean necessity, and explains clearly in regard to the powers of Free-will, both what they can do alone, and what they cannot do except they be converted and changed by the Holy Spirit, and the passages of Scripture quoted by Luther in the beginning of his career for the purpose of establishing the divine Predestination or Manichaean and Stoic necessity, he explains very differently and everywhere refutes the principal arguments, and that too, while Luther was living. * * * And when these earlier hypotheses had been gradually abandoned, he substituted others which by common consent our Churches now embrace, namely, that this is truly the Will of the veracious God which he has revealed in his Word, and that it is an accursed impiety to affirm that there are contradictory wills in God. * * * And though he constantly repeated these things in his teaching and refuted those Stoic and Manichaean opinions as he called them, which had been too strenuously defended in the *Assertio* and in the *De Servo Arbitrio*, and which impose necessity on all the actions of men, and upon other creatures, and remove all contingency, nevertheless

harmony between them, as also afterwards, when they differed on the Lord's Supper, was publicly cultivated, and they were able to bear with each other, for the purpose of preserving the tranquillity of the Church and of the University;"* to which the Wittenberg theologians made no reply in attempted refutation. And while it is true that Luther has not left on record any *formal* endorsement of Melanchthon's doctrine of Free-will in particular as it is taught in the *Loci*, yet there is no evidence that he ever raised his voice against it, and for Luther to keep silence on this subject, and to laud the *Loci* in general so extravagantly, was for Luther to approve. Hence very properly may the learned Planck say: "He (Luther) shows most unquestionably that he was conscious of a change, since he looked on in silence while Melanchthon was propounding the new theory under his eyes, and he never once winked a sign of disapproval of it.

"Now we need scarcely ask in addition how the other theologians of the Protestant party may have felt in view of this theory. Unquestionably Melanchthon's had become the prevalent one (die allgemeinere), since in all the schools of the party theology was taught only according to his Hand book (the *Loci*). Indeed very many may have accepted it from him without knowing or caring that they had been led away from Luther's theory, since it required more penetration and learning than we may suppose most of them to have had, to comprehend the difference between the two theories. There may have been many who still clung wholly to the genuine Augustinian theory as it had been impressed upon them by the writings and teachings of Luther, but they were very little troubled about Melanththon's having set up or wishing to set up another."†

Planck goes on to say that those who were not quite satisfied with Melanchthon's theory of the Will "very gladly remained neutral, because Melanchthon's theory had gradually

* Dav. Chytraei *Epistolae*, p. 1267 *et seqq.*

† *Geschichte der Entstehung*, etc., 4 : 566. The reader will observe the perfect agreement between Chytraeus and Planck on the main subject, viz., that Melanchthon changed the whole course of doctrinal development in this subject.

gained the upperhand in the presence of Luther's silence. And this was the surest sign that in their convictions the same change had been going on as in his, or that their adherence to Augustinianism had at least lost some of its rigorous stiffness." Even when Melanchthon's theory, that the Will in conversion is not absolutely passive appeared in the *Leipzig Interim*, the opponents of the Interim "satisfied themselves," says Planck, "by making it known merely that they could scent a heresy in it, had they been pleased to do so, but for the most part they hastened away without giving the subject any further attention" *

So much then in regard to the *Loci*, and in regard to the attitude of Luther and of the theologians generally to Melanchthon's doctrine of Free-will, which finds its most characteristic expression in the *Loci*.

2. In the year 1556 Flacius, Melanchthon's most violent opponent, sought "to effect a friendly agreement *in causa adiaphoristica* between the Wittenberg and Leipzig theologians and those who have written against them." To this end he sent to Wittenberg thirteen "mild propositions," † as he styled his terms of reconciliation. These propositions call for the common condemnation of the Pope as Antichrist, of the Council of Trent, of the *Augsburg Interim*, ‡ of the errors of the Anabaptists, of Zwingli, Major, Schwenckfeld, Osiander, and asks for union on the Augsburg Confession—of course the *Variata*, for only that was then in vogue—"as a brief statement of the fundamental difference between the papal and Lutheran religions." But in these articles not one word is said about Free-will, or about Synergism, or about Synergists, nor is there the remotest intimation that the doctrine of Free-will as the same was at that time taught at Wittenberg and at Leipzig, was to be considered, or was in any sense in the purview. Proof positive this that the Wittenberg and Leipzig teaching on Free-will had

* *Ibid.* p. 567.

† Given in Preger's *Matthias Flacius Illyricus*, II. 9–11.

‡ Melanchthon himself had violently opposed the *Augsburg Interim*. See Richard's *Philip Melanchthon*, pp. 329 *et seqq.*

not yet been catalogued as a heresy, though the definition of Free-will, of which we have already spoken twice, had stood in the *Loci* now eight years.

3. In January 1557 at the instance of Flacius and other Magdeburg theologians, the superintendents of Lübeck, Hamburg, Lüneburg, and Brunswick, each attended by one of his clergy, suddenly appeared at Wittenberg with eight articles of reconciliation prepared in the main by Flacius, and offered themselves as "Mediators" between the Magdeburg and Wittenberg theologians. These articles demand "agreement in doctrine according to the Augsburg Confession and the Schmalkald articles," and name the several errors and *corruptelae* that are to be rejected. But Synergism is neither named nor alluded to, nor is anything whatever said about Free-will. The clear inference is that the Wittenberg doctrine of Free-will did not come into the purview in those negotiations.

The eight articles were subsequently revised and enlarged; more errors and errorists to be rejected were named, but not one word is said about Synergism and Synergists. Moreover, in the documents relating to these negotiations, consisting of letters and explanations, as given in the *C. R.* 9 : pp. 23–72, there is no intimation that Free-will is a subject of dispute between the parties. Also in the Magdeburg Confession,* written by Flacius, and reaffirmed in the eight articles mentioned above, as still the faith of the Magdeburgers, not one word had been said about Synergism, nor has any reference been made to Melanchthon's definition of Free-will that had been introduced into the *Loci* two years before, nor is any objection raised to the Wittenberg teaching on Free-will. The irresistible conclusion is that if agreement could have been reached on the basis of the things named in the eight articles, the article of Free-will as the same had been presented in the Confession and Apology, and as it had been more fully elaborated in the *Loci* would have been satisfactory to Flacius and his Magdeburg *confreres*. And now for the proof of this.

* Found in Hortleder, II. Bk. 4. Cap. 5, where it covers sixteen folio pages. Written in 1550.

4. Scarcely had the Superintendents of the lower Saxon cities left Wittenberg than two commissioners arrived from the Duke of Mecklenburg, bearing a *Formula of Pacification*,* which had been prepared at the request of Flacius, who for a long time had been importuning the Duke to act the part of Mediator between him and Melanchthon.† These Articles, eight in number, treat of Doctrine in general, of God and Christ, of Justification, of the Necessity of Good Works, of the Lord's Supper, of the Efficacy of the Word, of the Freedom of the Human Will, of Adiaphora. Of Doctrine in General the *Formula* says: "This with true heart we embrace in that sense which is begotten by the various parts of the Scripture when compared with each other, and which is expressed in the Apostles' Creed, the Nicene Creed, the Augsburg Confession, the Confession and Catechism of the Reverend Dr. Luther and in Philip's *Loci Communes*." Here we see Melanchthon's *Loci* catalogued and placed side by side with the Augsburg Confession and with the Confession and Catechism of Luther. There can be no mistaking the significance of this fact in the premises now before us. Hence there is no need of comment, especially in view of the fact that when the *Formula* comes to speak of the Will it asserts the essential freedom of the Will, and its natural ability *in civilibus*, in language almost identical with that found in the works of Melanchthon; and then it says: "Fourthly, In Spiritual actions, in the knowledge of God, in faith, in worship, in patience, it is certain that the human Will cannot by its own powers will or do anything except God himself precede by his Word, and by the divine afflatus moving and influencing wills so that they assent and obey. Fifthly, after this moving and influencing of the Will has been made from above, the Will of man is not absolutely passive, but, moved and assisted by the Holy Spirit, it does not resist, it

* *C. R.* 9 : 92–103.

† Schütz, *Vita Dav. Chytraei*, I. p. 146. Salig, III. p. 251. The Wittenbergers believed that Flacius had himself written the Articles. Flacius says that he had only in a general way requested articles of mediation, but did not know how the Duke had taken up the matter. Preger, II. p. 60, note.

assents, it obeys God, and *σύνεργος ἐστῖ* as Paul says: When Joseph retains the grace of God and abstains from his master's wife his Will is not absolutely passive, but, incited and assisted by the Holy Spirit, he resists the temptation, and restrains his external members. When David heard the consolation, *The Lord hath removed thy sins*, his Will was not absolutely inactive, but it assented, and resisted distrust and doubt and struggled with itself.

"This simple and true doctrine de *συνεργια* of the human Will we enbrace with consenting minds as the same is set forth in the *Locus de Libero Arbitrio*, and elsewhere by ours." *

The Ducal *Formula* was rejected by Melanchthon, because to have accepted it as a whole would have been for him to cut his own throat, as he wrote the Duke. But the commissioners, now leaving Wittenberg, went, as they had been instructed, to Magdeburg and placed the *Formula* before Flacius and Wigand, who replied the next day *in writing* that "they would have accepted the *Formula*, had it been accepted by the other party," meaning Melanchthon and other Wittenbergers. † *O tempora! O mores! Ubi gentium sumus?* Nothing that Melanchthon ever published is so out-and out "synergistic" as are the three paragraphs quoted above from the Ducal *Formula of Pacification*, and yet Flacius and Wigand were willing to sign the *Formula*, as the Duke of Mecklenburg had signed it with his own hand ‡ after it had been composed at his command by the theological faculty of Rostock and the civil counsellors, § by which transactions it became a confession of the Mecklenburg Lutheran Church.

* *R. R.* 9 : 100–1.

† See Report of the Ducal commissioners in *C. R.* 9 : pp. 106–8. Preger (II, p. 60, note), who is quite and apologist for Flacius refers to and employs this report, and therefore recognizes its genuineness and authenticity, but fails to note the fact just noted in the text. Such conduct is not worthy of an historian. Dr. Carl Schmidt, in his *Philip Melanchthon*, p. 599, has noted this important fact after having said that "the articles on the Lord's Supper and Free-will hold fast to Melanchthon's way of teaching."

‡ *C. R.* 9 : p. 103. Salig, III, 251.

§ Schütz, *Vita Dav. Chytraei*, I, 150. Preger, II, p. 60.

But attention should be called to the closing sentences of the last paragraph quoted: "As the same doctrine is set forth in the *Locus de Libero Arbitrio*, and elswhere by ours." The first sentence undoubtedly means the *Locus de Libero Arbitrio*, or the doctrine of Free-will, as set forth in the *Loci* of Melanchthon, and the "elsewhere by ours" probably means the Rostock Catechism, which is taken almost literally from Melanchthon's *Loci*. In other words, the doctrine of Free will as the same had been set forth in the *Loci* has been formally endorsed by the official head of the Mecklenburg Church, and by the theological faculty of Rostock, and would have been formally accepted by Flacius and Wigand had Melanchthon accepted the *Formula of Pacification.** This caps the climax. But it is not all.

5. In the Autumn of 1557 a Diet was held at Worms for the purpose of bringing about an understanding between the Catholics and the Protestants. The Jena Weimar theologians were present. But they demanded as a condition procedent to their taking part in the Diet that the other Lutheran theologians present should join them in "the rejection of all sects and false doctrines *in specie* and by name, as those of Zwingli, Osiander, Major, the Adiaphorists and other." † But in this long *Protestatio* there is not one word about Synergism or Synergists, or about any false doctrine of Free-will among Lutherans. And that this is not accidental is shown by the fact that when Strigel, who had signed the *Protestatio* at Worms, inquired again and again in the Weimar Disputation, August, 1560, why silence had been so long maintained on this subject, and

* On the nineteenth of April, or nearly two months after the failure of the Duke's efforts to effect reconciliation, Nicholas Gallus, a Flacianist, begged Melanchthon by letter, C. R. 9 : 142, to give up his "definition of Free-will, as a condition of pacification on this point," meaning, evidently, that all the rest might stand. The definition, as we know, is not an essential part of Melanchthon's doctrine of Free-will, but is incidental and was intended by him to mean, as we have shown, the *Arbitrium liberatum*. That letter is proof positive that Melanchthon's doctrine of Free-will as such, and in its essence, was not an insuperable rock of offence to the Flacianists.

† *C. R.* 9 : 285.

why it had not been brought up at Worms and included in the *Protestatio*, * he was answered never a word. Proof positive this that Melanchthon's doctrine of Free-will had not really become a *quaestio vexata* in the Lutheran Church, and that even at Jena, where Flacius was at that time, it was not regarded as a "heresy," as afterwards it was called by the Flacianists. Strigel, who had been a student at Wittenberg, taught "Synergism" at Jena, and defended it at Weimar in 1560.

6. After the Jena-Weimar theologians had withdrawn from Worms (1557) because the other Lutheran theologians would not join in their *Protestatio*, the Lutheran theologians remaining, and representing churches from Pomerania to Wuertemberg, united in a *Declaratio*, in which they set forth that they do not change the doctrine of the Augsburg Confession, and will not change it, and they reject all doctrines in conflict with it, and they affirm that "there is no difference in regard to the teaching of the Confession." † And as further proof of the entire agreement in doctrine we find that Melanchthon in reporting on the Diet writes as follows: "Brentz agrees with us all in doctrine." ‡ "Brentz declares that he agrees with us all in doctrine." § "Brentz, after speaking further about Osiander's doctrine, says that he is in absolute agreement with us all in doctrine as it has been taught by us," ||—meaning evidently as doctrine had been taught by Melanchthon. "Brentz says that he agrees with us in doctrine absolutely." ¶ This surely is conclusive in regard to Brentz. It shows that he stood with Melanchthon. And as further evidence of agreement we now quote from Brentz, who

* *Acta Disputatio Vinar*, p 38. Said Strigel: Miror me hac materia sic urgeri, cum ante tres annos Vuormaciae nulla sit facta hujus controversiae mentio, cum de aliis multa severa mandata traderentur.

† C. R. 9 : 387. It was at this Diet that Melanchthon being asked about the definition: *Liberum Arbitrium in homine*, etc., gave the answer that satisfied all. See *The Lutheran Quarterly*, Jan. 1904, pp. 23, 24.

‡ C. R. 9 : 311 :

§ C. R. 9 : 319 :

|| C. R. 9 : 452 :

¶ C. R. 9 : 457 :

in reporting the transactions of the Worms Diet to his Prince, says: "Because it was said of our theologians that we were not agreed in regard to the Augsburg Confession, we drew up a special declaration in order to testify our agreement in doctrina et dogmatibus,"* thus corroborating the declarations of Melanchthon. Moreover, the agreement was not merely in doctrine in general, but in the specific doctrines—in dogmatibus.

And as final proof that Brentz did not stand with Flacius, and as proof at the same time of Melanchthon's conservative position, we quote from a letter written by Dr. Jacob Runge, Pomeranian General Superintendent, who was present at Worms: "When the Papists demanded that ours should condemn Illyricus (Flacius) in the doctrine *de Libero Arbitrio*, Osiander in the doctrine *de Justificatione*, and Calvin in the doctrine *de Coena Domini*, and Brentz and many others were not opposed to condemning Illyricus, Master Philip replied that they must not obey the Papists in this matter, since under the name of Illyricus they were cunningly demanding of ours the condemnation of Luther. That Luther's mind and view in the doctrine of Free will was known to him. Hence he neither could nor wished to condemn it."† Brentz and Melanchthon are absolutely at one in doctrine, even in the doctrine of Free-will. One more fact:

7. As a proof that even Flacius had at this time no serious alarm about Melanchthon's doctrine of Free-will, we note that while the Diet of Worms was in session, he wrote to the King

* Pressel's Anecdota Brentiana, p. 443. It was the *Confessio Variata*, which always bore on its title page the words: "Presented to the Emperor Charles V, at the Diet of Augsburg. anno 1530," (*C. R.* 26 : 343 *et seqq.*), that was the basis of this agreement at Worms. See Schaff, *Creeds of Christendom*, I, p. 241, fourth edition. No other edition was in vogue at that time. See THE LUTHERAN QUARTERLY for October 1889. Köllner's *Symbolik* I, 253, 254.

† Balthaser's *Historie des Torgischen Buchs*, 5 :32. Gieseler, Eng. Tr. IV. p. 448, *note*. In 1537, Melanchthon wrote to Veit Dietrich, "You know that I speak less harshly about predestination, the assent of the Will, the necessity of new obedience and mortal sin. In regard to all these subjects I know positively that Luther entertains the same views, but ignoramuses lay too much stress on certain very course expressions of his, not knowing whither they lead." C. R. III. 383.

of Denmark * and accused Melanchthon of various errors, but says not one word about his doctrine of Free-will, or about Synergism. He is now at Jena, and the next year (1558) the Jena Academy is erected into a university in opposition to Wittenberg and Leipzig, and with the avowed purpose of opposing errors and sects. Now the synergistic strife, led by Amsdorf and Flacius, breaks out. Amsdorf publishes a book against Pfeffinger of Leipzig, and Flacius attacks Melanchthon's definition of Free-will, though, as we have seen, in 1549, one year after that definition had appeared in the *Loci*, he professed to value the *Loci* as his own life.

"——— *Nescit vox missa reverti.*"

We are not now concerned with the history of the Synergistic Controversy. Our object has been to show what doctrine of Free-will prevailed in the Lutheran Church from 1530 to the death of Melanchthon. To this end we have given facts. We do not claim that we have exhausted the subject. Hence if Professor Pieper knows of any essential facts that bear on "the other side," if there be another side, THE LUTHERAN QUARTERLY will welcome them, provided they be presented *sine ira*, *sine studio*, and with verifiable references to the books and pages where they are to be found. Between Professor Pieper and ourself this is not a question of superiority in "*theological knowledge.*" The superiority which he impliedly claims for himself and his party in the opening paragraph of his article we cheerfully concede. It is a question of facts and of the rational interpretation of facts. To know these facts and to be able to interpret them rationally one has no need to go to Marburg or to St. Louis, nor to sit at the feet of Professor Heppe or at the feet of Professor Pieper. He may run that readeth.

"*Nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri.*"

VII THE CONCLUSION.

Bringing the facts together we find:

1. That beginning with the year 1527 Melanchthon ma-

* *C. R.* 9 : p. 296.

terially modified the harsh doctrine of Free-will which earlier had been taught oracularly by himself and by Luther in the University of Wittenberg.

2. That Luther is not known to have expressed himself in opposition to Melanchthon's doctrine of Free-will. That on the contrary by his unbroken silence in regard to Melanchthon's teaching, and by his repeated sweeping endorsement of the *Loci*, he practically placed his *imprimatur* on that teaching.

3. That Melanchthon knew himself to be in harmony with Luther in regard to Predestination and the assent of the Will.

4. That Melanchthon's *Loci*, and consequently his doctrine of Free-will, was taught in all the German Universities that had received the Reformation; and that the theologians had accepted it, or had at least acquiesced in it. (See the letters of Flacius and Wigand on a preceding page).

5. That dissent in regard to the doctrine of Free will in the *Leipzig Interim* received no formal expression of condemnation.

6. That no Synod, no Diet, no theological faculty, condemned Melanchthon's doctrine of Free-will so long as Melanchthon lived.

7. That even at Jena Strigel taught Melanchthon's doctrine of Free-will in opposition to Flacius, his colleague, and defended it at Weimar in 1560.

8. That the doctrine of Free will played no part among the Lutherans at the Diet of Worms in 1557, as it had played no part in the peace negotiations between Flacius and Melanchthon, except in the Mecklenburg *Formula*, as noted above.

9. That Flacius formally attacked Melanchthon's definition so late as 1558, or ten years after it had appeared, during which time, as is well known, the Editions of the *Loci* followed each other faster than the years. Nor did Flacius in his attack mention the name of Melanchthon. *

10. That Melanchthon taught that the Will is free *in civilibus*, but that *in spiritualibus* it is absolutely unable by its natural powers to do anything acceptable to God.

* *Acta Disp. Vinar*, pp. 370-1. Planck IV. p. 579. *note* 138.

11. That when assisted and urged by the Holy Spirit acting through the Word, the Will can assent to the promise of pardon and can resist its own infirmity. Though such assent and resistance have absolutely no justifying merit, and are in no sense a ground of pardon, since we are justified by faith alone, "for the sake of Christ."

12. That in conversion Melanchthon begins with the Word as the instrumental cause, and then proceeds to the Holy Spirit, whom he names "the efficient cause," and ends with the Will, which is a cause only when and only in so far as it is potentiated and moved by the divine efficiency.

13. That in the older confessional teaching of the Lutheran Church, and in the *Loci* of Melanchthon (1535–1543, 1543–1559) which had almost the authority and influence of a confession of faith, it is neither said nor intimated nor implied, that in conversion and in conceiving faith, the Will of man is *absolutely passive*; nor is it said nor intimated that in relation to conversion man "is much worse than a stone or a block."

These thirteen propositions sum up the history of the old Lutheran doctrine of Free-will, and exhibit that doctrine as plain, simple and evangelical. The common people can understand it. On the one hand it saves anxious consciences from despair; on the other hand it divests sinners of the vain expectation of anabaptistic visions and miracles. It drives all men to the Word of God, which proclaims pardon to all who believe on the Lord Jesus Christ. It says that they are elected who believe.

Such a doctrine of Free-will can satisfy both the understanding and the heart of man. It shows what men cannot do and what they can do in the matter of their salvation. It also magnifies the ethical content of the Gospel. This doctrine prevailed in the Lutheran Church for at least thirty years, and has really never died out of the Lutheran Church. In modern times it has, in its essential features, the endorsement of the great majority of Lutheran theologians, at least to the extent that they posit some action of the Will, a *Verhalten*, a *self-determination* in conversion. But fifty years after the Lutheran

Church was born, a doctrine of Free-will was officially promulgated in the Lutheran Church which is more *Flacian than Lutheran.* Or, rather, this new doctrine of Free-will may be described as Luther's earlier doctrine of Free-will, systematized and scholasticized by means of the conceptions and of the *Lehrweise* of Matthias Flacius Illyricus. *Lapis* and *truncus* have come now to be used in logical rather than in rhetorical relations. In conversion "man strives with his will against God, the Lord, until he is converted." He is simply the *subjectum patiens*, or "only the *subjectum convertendum*, that is, that which is to be converted." He can hear and reflect on the divine Word, but beyond this he has no responsibility for his conversion. His personality, in its highest faculty, is *in spiritualibus* not *voluntas*, but *noluntas.* "Conversion to God is the work of God, the Holy Spirit alone." There is no *velle et accipere gratiam.* Conversion is a mechanical rather than an ethical act. Hence according to this doctrine the Missourians are right when they say that in conversion the resistance of man is overcome as the snow melts before the rays of the vernal sun. There is no *Verhalten*, no *self determination* of man in conversion. The Iowans and Ohioans see in this teaching of the Missourians the doctrine of *gratia irresistibilis* and the Augustinian Predestination. The Missourians simply draw the logical conclusion of the *absolute passivity* doctrine of the Form of Concord. The Iowans and Ohioans, in relation to the *absolute passivity* doctrine, sacrifice the demands of the understanding to the needs of the heart and to experience. The Missouri doctrine, both in this country and in Europe, has been called Calvinism, though it is generally conceded that it does not draw all the conclusions of Calvinism. The Missourians denounce the Iowans and Ohioans as "Synergists." They too are right. The Iowans and Ohioans are Synergists, albeit not Synergists in the sense in which Amsdorf, Flacius, Schlüsselburg, and the Missourians, misstate and misrepresent Melanchthon's doctrine of Free-will. They are Synergists in the sense that they maintain that in conversion there is some action on the part of man, a *Verhalten*, "a free self-determination of man,

though this is first rendered possible only by divine grace," which would undoubtedly have satisfied Melanchthon as over against "the Stoic and Manichaean necessity," but would not have satisfied Flacius, who declared at the Weimer Disputation that God converts men non solum non cooperante ex se naturali, carnali aut Adamico libero arbitrio, sed etiam contra furente et fremente.* The Iowans and the Ohioans posit an action of the Will—for *Verhalten* and self-determination are actions of the Will—in connection with the Word and the operation of the Holy Spirit. What now is this but the doctrine of "the three concurring causes"? Three activities meet here. These activities may not be (we would say, By no means are they) causes in the same sense. But they are embraced together in that concatenation, in that complex, *sine qua non*. This is Melanchthonian, though the Iowans and the Ohioans may not care to use the language employed by Melanchthon. But things that are equal to the same thing are equal to each other. Results, not different words, must determine our judgments and conclusions.

The Missourians are essentially Flacianists, and their language and their *ratio disserendi* remind one not a little of the language and the method of Flacius at Weimar. Moreover, the Missourians maintain that some men are eternally ordained to faith. Hence foreordination is the logical *prius* in the *ordo salutis*. This is essentially Flacianist. The Iowans and Ohioans maintain that men are elected in Christ in view of faith, and this is essentially Melanchthonian—though the idea may be traced back to Luther's Preface to the Epistle to the Romans, in which he treats of sin and grace and faith, and *then* of election, as a section of soteriology.

Between the parties named above a controversy resulting in schism has raged for more than a quarter of a century. The questions at issue directly involve the doctrine of Free-will. Both sides profess to adhere literally to the Form of Concord, whose second and eleventh articles have been the battle-ground of the contestants, and have furnished no small part of the

* *Disputatio*, p. 130.

materials of the contest. Both sides cannot be right, and both sides have declared that the issue lies only in the defeat of one side or the other. It is a war unto death. But it is a war that has sprung out of the form of Concord—essentially out of the doctrine of Free-will that was placed in the Form of Concord. Is the Form of Concord, then, really a *Form of Concord*? What has been its history? But we forbear. Only this. Is the Form of Concord adapted to be the last ground of appeal in settling a Lutheran doctrine? Shall the *De Servo Arbitrio*, the *Deus absconditus*, and Flacius, the epigone, the scholastic, be enthroned in the *Lutheran Church*, rather than the *Deus revelatus* and the *later* Luther and "our Master Philip, who can explain the Scriptures and present their meaning in brief compass?" Shall Article II of the Form of Concord, with its scholastic subtlety, have more weight in the Lutheran Church than Article XVIII of the Augustana with its evangelical simplicity? In the efforts that are making and that shall yet be made to unite the Lutheran hosts of America, shall the Form of Concord or the Augustana have the ruling place? Will the Lutherans of America learn wisdom from the history of the Lutheran Church during the last three hundred years?

These questions are submitted, not for controversy, but to be pondered by every lover of the Lutheran Church.

[*To be Concluded.*]

ARTICLE II.

THE LUTHERANISM NOW NEEDED.

By Professor S. A. Ort, D.D., LL.D.

Lutheranism embodies the true system of religious belief. This system is modern, yet ancient. It is not a new religion, the production of modern philosophy, nor the out-growth of scientific research, nor the expression of the most refined thought of the human mind. It is not a deliverance of the natural understanding, nor primarily a theological development.

Lutheranism is a revival of Apostolic Christianity. The evangelical mind of the 16th century arose out of deep experience of divine facts in human salvation.

Lutheranism is the testimony of this experience to the reality of these facts. The facts abide. They are the same for all ages. Apostolic religion, hence, in its essential elements is unchangable. In the experience of some men of the 16th century it verified itself in a most powerful manner, reviving the pure Christianity of Peter and Paul. This revival, in the best sense, we term Lutheranism. Lutheranism is profoundly Scriptural. Not the word of man, but the Word of God is the source whence it came, to which ever it refers, whose truth, in its most precious reality, it exhibits.

No men, since the days of the Apostles, gave themselves in the study of devine things, so exclusively, so intensely, so prayerfully, so profoundly to a searching of the Sacred Scriptures as did Luther and Melanchthon, the tallest men of their age. They passed by the theologies of more than a thousand years; they laid aside the decisions of great councils; they repudiated the speculations of the centuries, and counted the logic of the natural man as worthless in furnishing the one fact on which for them everything hinged, namely, certainty. Back through the mazes of human thought, to the Word of God they went. There they stood against all the world, Dame Reason on the one hand, and an arrogant papacy on the other. Under the light of a guide which never failed them, they

brought forth in their simple garb the great and precious truths of salvation, and exhibited them to the world under the form of what is now known as Lutheranism.

The sixteenth century is, by what the reformers did, inseparably linked with the first. In all that goes with a pure Gospel, the former may well be styled the recurrence of the latter. The twentieth century dissatisfied, as it now is, with its religious belief and in a state of deep unrest, cannot in its effort to get back to Apostolic times successfully ignore the 16th. It must pass through this century and beyond. It never can go without taking with it Martin Luther. He must be its guide, he must show the way. Only by taking the road he went, will the present or any age find itself at last where the great reformer was, in company with Paul and Christ, getting the pure truth of God's Word which alone is life and salvation for sinful man. The present age with its naturalism and rationalism, with its liberalism and literary criticism, will never, by repudiation of the 16th century, reach the Apostolic Church. It will either mire in the bogs of the dark age, or find itself bewildered in the fog of an old-time skepticism.

Present day and 16th century Lutheranism are, in their ground elements, one. In their accidental features they differ according to the difference of then and now. Times and circumstances vary. Human opinion and human judgments are ever subject to the influence of environment.

Every age in life and history has its distinctive characteristics. Nevertheless there is also that which persists through every period the same. Its manifestations vary, but the thing itself, the underlying principle is unchangeable. Lutheranism, hence, in its fundamental teaching is invarible. What it was in the 16th century, such it is now, and such it ever will be.

Sometimes it is proclaimed, "We take the spirit of Reformation but not its essence, not its teaching. This has been outgrown, much of it outlived. We have reached the age of more advanced thought, and have a better way of knowing and stating divine truth than did the men of the reformation age. We accept the spirit of that time, but not the doctrine."

Delusive speech! The spirit of a truth is not outside it, but

in it, its veritable soul. To have the one without the other is plainly absurd. As well might one say that he has the spirit of Christ, without having Christ himself. The spirit of Lutheranism and its principles are inseparable. If the spirit of this belief is here now, then the belief itself is here. Otherwise its spirit is merely a ghost of the dead past—a vain and empty shadow. But our attention is called to the fact that we have outgrown the 16th century not only in the practical, secular concerns of human life, but in religious thought. We have broader and deeper views of the Kingdom of God than did the men of 375 years ago. We are capable of improving some of their chief statements and, in the light of the high attainments which the age has reached in Biblical as well as natural knowledge, this is now necessary. In short the Lutheranism of the 16th century in some of its vital points needs to be exhibited in a new way in order to be agreeable with the developed understanding of the present time. In this connection two points should be observed, and a right distinction noted: the one is experience; the other is judgment. Experience is finding the object and thus knowing it, judgment affirms or denies something concerning that which is already known. In the case before us, the experience noted arises in consciousness not by natural, but by supernatural means. Paul knew the deep things of God not by logical judgment, but by spiritual discernment. Luther, likewise, reached a clear apprehension of the saving truths of the Gospel in the same way. Lutheranism, hence, is not a deduction of human logic, but a knowledge of Divine truth in Christ, furnished by an experience of the soul given through the trust of the heart in Jesus Christ. In the case of Lutheranism, hence, the question primarily is not one pertaining to the logic of the human intellect, but to the apprehension of Divine things by the spiritual man through faith. It is not knowledge first and experience afterward, but experience the source of all knowing by judgment and conception in religion as well as in philosophy and science, which is the fact that needs ever to be distinctly recognized as the claim of Lutheranism. Experience furnishes the material of knowledge, hence the broader and deeper the

former becomes the more extensive and profound will be the latter. Theology, therefore, is dependent on the contents supplied by faith in the Christian consciousness. As these become clearer and richer will the science of them be characterized by a real and enduring progress. If then the experience of the facts and truths of salvation grows, the understanding of these facts will correspondingly improve.

Should the question now be raised, whether the 19th century has outgrown the 16th in its knowledge of Divine things, the inquiry should be whether in these things the experience of the present day transcends that of Reformation times. Or to put the case in precise form, have the men, who insist on either throwing away or remodelling the Lutheranism of the 16th century or toning down its belief, a deeper experience of the deep things of God than had Luther and Melancthon? Is it here that there has been a passing beyond these select men? If so, then the improvement is thoroughly fundamental, and it can be but a matter of course that the intellectual understanding of saving truth at this day should be the more correctly profound.

To us it seems at least an open question whether the leaders of the Reformation did not sound a depth in the experience of Divine realities which has not been reached since their day, and in all probability will not be during many centuries to come. It must be kept in mind that they were not ordinary Christian men: they were select individuals, chosen of God for a special time, for a mighty undertaking, for a representation of the eternal truths of redemption in their original purity. To this end they were endowed with a faith which rendered them capable of looking into the depths of Divine truth to a degree which has not been fathomed by the Christian mind since their day. For this reason their apprehensions of the very heart of the Gospel are even at this late period a surprise to the Christian soul. They have a peculiar interest and, I may say, attraction for religious minds of the present, and, in the freshness and enduring truth of many of their thoughts, reveal the fact that they, in their experience of the deep things of the Gospel, have projected themselves beyond our age.

Sometimes the cry is raised, "Back to Luther!" And why to him? Only it must be said because of the rare experience of the reality of saving truth of which he was the subject. In this field he is recognized to be still a great teacher from whom something can be learned which the Christian mind since his day has not outreached. Undoubtedly in the case of Luther the prayer of the great Apostle was preëminently realized; that the God of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of Glory, may give unto you the spirit of wisdom and revelation in the knowledge of him, that the eyes of your understanding may be enlightened; that ye may know what is the hope of His calling and what the riches of the glory of His inheritance in the saints, and what is the exceeding greatness of his power to reward those who believe, according to the mighty working of his power which he wrought in Christ, and that rooted and grounded in love ye may be able to comprehend with all saints what is the breadth and length and depth and height and to know the love of Christ which passeth knowledge that ye might be filled with all the fulness of God.

This in large measure was the experience of Luther. And now have we gone beyond this experience and are thus able to exhibit a truly advanced Lutheranism, and a theology which furnishes an improved development of the vital truths of our holy religion? If this be fact then we have outgrown the 16th century and can allow no superiors save the eminent men of the Apostolic Age. We must then say that our Lutheranism is not only a return to primitive Christianity, but at the same time a deeper experience of the reality of the Gospel of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, than that which has been the fact in the Christian consciousness since the days of the Apostles.

Do not understand me to depreciate the spiritual attainments of any period since the Reformation or to insinuate that little progress has been made in the development of a right religious consciousness. This is far from my thought. I gladly recognize the fact that our time in its apprehension of Divine truth occupies a high eminence. Nevertheless I must say that the experience of Luther of the saving truths of the Gospel

has not been surpassed and that therefore the Lutheranism of the 16th century in its essential elements has not been outgrown. It is for us and our time that which, in the measure of its fullness, is yet to be realized. It is hence to be appropriated by us. In proportion as this occurs will the Lutheranism of three and one-half centuries ago become, not a matter of historical belief, but of an actual experience of the soul, the Lutheranism of the present time. All other claims to a true Lutheranism are false and are representative only of a system of religious intellectualism of which instances are afforded in the history of the Lutheran Church as well as in the scholasticism of the middle ages.

This leads me to say that Lutheranism stands for two principles: One is the Divine love as revealed in Jesus Christ; the other is justifying faith. The first is the ground principle of the scheme of redemption viewed from the Divine standpoint; the second is the ground principle of this scheme as observed from the standpoint of the human soul. The one has its seat eternally in God, the other its place in man. Both have the ground of their practical realization in the recovery of the sinful human creature, in Jesus Christ.

Of the principle of divine love I make no extended mention. Suffice it to say that it offers the only true conception of the Divine being. God is love. In his essence he is such, as a Spirit likewise, and equally as life and light. Love is God. This is not a metaphysical or theoretical idea, but the practical conception of Him who eternally is. Love, according to its nature, is evermore practical. It exists no otherwise. It could not be in different manner and still be love. It eternally acts and does. In this acting and doing it never seeks self, but always goes forth in the commitment of itself to another. God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son. He died, the just for the unjust. He gave himself for us. This is loving the sinner, and it is for every sinner, for all sinners. This is loving a guilty race, God giving himself in the person of his only begotten Son, in whom dwelt all the fullness of the Godhead bodily, to a world wrecked by sin, that he might get it back to himself, that it might be one with him,

be the subject of his mightiest working, and the object of the unreserved communication of himself throughout the ages coming. This is the glorious revelation which the Divine love has made of itself in Jesus Christ for the life and joy of Adam and his sons. This is the precious Gospel which love has given to the world, namely, that God, the holy and just one, would have all men saved and come to a knowledge of the truth, that whosoever will may take of the water of life freely, that Christ Jesus tasted death for every man, and that every one who believes on him shall not perish, but have eternal life. This is the sublime truth which enters into the very heart of Lutheranism, and makes it to be a republication of the glorious Gospel of God.

I come now to that other principle, so well known by us and of which so much has been said, justifying faith, the practical principle of our belief. This is the principle which has to do with the benefits of the Gospel and our possession of them. We are sinners, guilty and under condemnation. We need forgiveness. We are dead in trespasses and sins. We need life. We are against God and at enmity with him. We need peace. We are unrighteous in all our works and exposed to the condemnatory judgment of the Almighty. We need righteousness, not our own, but that which belongs to Christ. How can we get it? This is the crucial question. Long ago it was raised. How can man be just before God? There is only one true answer which has ever been given. It is found in the saying of the Great Apostle: And be found in him not having mine own righteousness which is of the law, but that which is through the faith of Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith, God in Christ holds nothing against us. He is perfectly reconciled. He has forgiven us of our sins. When we are there, we are with him, we have his forgiveness as an actual possession, we are at peace with him and he with us, and, as the sum of it all, God sees us not in our own, but in the righteousness of Christ, and so reckons us to be just. This is our eternal justification, namely, that we are found in Christ and thereby the possessors of his righteousness, and

consequently God can behold us only as he sees our substitute, and so must declare.

If the inquiry be made, How comes this to pass? the only correct reply is, by faith. We are justified by faith in Christ. It must be carefully noted that everything is free gift, the justification and the faith. Let it be distinctly said, that we are justified not because of our faith as though faith were the reason for our justification, nor for the sake of our faith, as though faith has in itself merit and earns as reward our justification, but that we are justified, reckoned righteous, by faith solely as a means, nothing more, nothing less. Faith is neither the source nor ground of our justification. These must be referred entirely to the Divine love and the merit of Christ. But faith is the means and the only means whereby we can become the possessors of the treasures of grace. And this is as it should be, for we are personal beings, and in the application of redemption to ourselves by the saving power of God, we must be treated in a way consistant with our original endowments. Otherwise the eternal, personal God could not deal with us. The Scriptures speak concerning this whole matter of our salvation with no uncertain speech. "By grace are ye saved through faith." "Being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom He has set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood to declare his righteousness that he might be just and the justifier of him who believeth in Jesus."

Such is the plain teaching of the Divine Word. It is no intellectual abstraction, no theoretical teaching of the natural reason, no deduction of a brain-splitting logic, but a clear fact evidenced as real in the experience of the soul which lays hold of Christ by trust. The principle of justifying faith is therefore pre-eminently practical, and carries with it the deepest conviction of certainty, certainty of our deliverance from the guilt and condemnation of sin, of forgiveness, of justification and peace with God. This is the great and enduring truth for which Lutheranism stands. Not only so, but this truth first and last is the Gospel, which Paul avows to be the power of God unto salvation to every one who believes. This Gos-

pel, the Gospel of Paul is the very essence of the teaching of the Reformation age, the essence of that system of religious belief ever since known as Lutheran. It is, in short, the very heart of Lutheranism wherever and whenever you find it, for without this truth there is no Lutheranism; and, modified or lost, the very foundation of our belief is gone. The Gospel itself is no longer here, for this principle is the Gospel, and there is no other and never will be.

We are justified before God by the faith of Christ. Other salvation for the human race has never been revealed. No man from the day of Adam down to the present has given clear and certain assurance, that another way leads back to the tree of life.

This principle of Lutheranism needs to be defended, and upheld, and proclaimed, and confessed with the same ardor, the same boldness, the same persistency, and the same enthusiasm which distinguished the Reformers.

We are living in a skeptical age, an age of confusion in religious belief, an age in which many vague and immature ideas concerning the Gospel are afoot, an age in which there are two marked tendencies; one is in the direction of naturalism, the other is moving toward Rome. Both these movements repudiate the principle of Lutheranism. I do not have in mind the rejectors of a pure Christianity, as found in the world, but those who, although in the Church of the living God, are dissatisfied with the old faith, and, who, in their eagerness to get something new, something up-to-date, and influenced by the psychological and philosophical environment of the day, busy themselves in either toning down or perverting the cardinal truth of our religion. In their effort to get away from the principle of the Reformation and the clear teaching of the New Testament concerning salvation, they either keep close to the border of rationalistic territory, or else they set sail toward the mouth of the Tiber. They are twentieth-century men, men of advanced views, but strange to say, their closest companions are teachers of long ago, resurrected, such, for instance as Semler and Abelard. I mean to say in plain English that the religious teaching of the present time, which either ignores or

perverts the principle of justifying faith, is in its essential elements not new, but a restatement in the forms of expression current today, of an old time rationalism on the one hand, and the delusion of Romanism on the other. I spoke of two movements in the Protestant Church today, that of naturalism and of Romanism.

They are by no means insignificant. In fact they are steadily becoming more influential. They have already paralyzed the energies of the Church, so that from every quarter comes up the plaintive cry, What ails thee, O Zion! So you ask, What is the matter? Ah, the matter is that the great underlying principle of saving faith has been pushed, in many minds, far into the background, or, worse still, is pronounced false. Justification by faith *alone* is repudiated as a chief truth of Christ's Gospel and styled a Pauline speculation, or rejected as unreasonable by not a few universities and theological seminaries in the persons of some of their famous professors. In the pulpits, many refrain from emphasizing, if they do not outright teach contrarywise, justifying faith the essential, practical truth of our Gospel. Notions of the natural man, fads of the day, scientific speculations, sociological excursions, and mixed theories about how to be prosperous, happy and good, engage the attention and perplex the brains of many religionists. At least it all comes to this so far as getting in right relation with God is concerned. Apologize to the Supreme Being for having acted as you have, and say: I am sorry, very sorry for my conduct, Good Lord; and I will try not to do so any more. Please forgive me this time.

The principle of the Reformation cannot be superseded by any theories of human wisdom, and the Gospel of our Lord and Savior be indeed life and salvation to the perishing multitudes. The truth of justification by faith alone as a fact of certainty in personal experience only can preserve evangelical religion in our day and throughout the century and furnish the basis for an advanced, up-to-date theology. And it is the proclamation of this Gospel only which will draw the masses to the house of God, maintain a pure Christian life, and keep the Church of Christ on the rock against which the gates of hell

cannot prevail. This is the doctrine which the age needs and without it will go to wreck and ruin. This is the Gospel that must be preached with the devotion, courage and heroism of the elder days, else there is no hope for our generation, nor for our century.

Lutheranism, in its fundamental truth, has not passed into the shades with the old gods. It never will. As long as there is a sinful human race, guilty and condemned before High Heaven, will this precious Gospel be the life and light, the joy and peace of the troubled soul. The men and women of every time need it. They must have it. Without it they never can become what they ought to be, having a righteousness, not of the law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ. To maintain, to defend, and to preach this Lutheranism which has proved itself invincible before the most powerful enemies of the truth, and brought joy and peace to millions of hearts, is our mission in the present day, the glorious work of our Church throughout the century and the ages coming. Let us not waver, nor falter, nor fear, but as the Church, the people of the living God, be true to our faith and press on.

ARTICLE III.

THE ORIGIN OF WOMAN.

By J. J. Young, D. D.

Anthropology in its treatment of man's origin takes it for granted that man and woman have the same beginning. It is the object of this paper to see whether the genesis of woman may, after all, not differ from that of man. We have reason to believe that the origin of the universe, and especially our own, must be of paramount importance, else God would not have given us a concise account of the same in His revelation; neither would He have caused it to be placed at the very beginning of the Bible. Hence our attitude toward the same dare not be that of indifference.

We believe also that the various and even contradictory views held about woman, and the treatment she has received in the past, justify such an investigation. Whilst at present she is held in high esteem among Christian nations, she did not enjoy the same among the ancient nations, nor among Christian nations a few centuries ago. Our German fore-fathers, for instance, classed her among things. Hence "das Weib" instead of die Weib. The wife was the purchased property of the man, and as such could be sold again. According to their view she was not man's equal, but simply his property. From Scheer's Germania, p. 17, it appears that in the days of the Merovingian rulers it was still a debatable question even among priests of the Christian Church—whether women were really human beings. Hence she was accused of blackart, witchcraft and intercourse with devils; and no less than 100,000 were put to death as witches. The Monk, John Dominice, who died about 1419, discovered, on *careful* investigation, no less than twenty-three evil attributes in woman. These he worked out carefully, and doubtless conscientiously, in an alphabetical order, and they make very interesting reading for those who love to revel and

edify themselves in the study of the evil attributes of the gentler sex.

We must, however, not forget that some women were held in high esteem among the ancient nations. Our German forefathers, for instance, considered Valeda not only a prophetess, but even venerated her as divine. Few men possessed such political power, or wielded a greater influence, than she. The oracle of Delphi, whose responses were eagerly sought by foreign princes, seems to have been presided over by a woman. Even the monk, who is apparently averse to woman, has, nevertheless, his holy Virgin. A careful study of the fine arts will also show that its masters looked upon woman not only as surpassing man in beauty, but also as possessing exceedingly rare and precious qualities. Hence, sculptors, painters and poets have vied with each other in making woman the model of some of their grandest and most enduring creations. In fact, their works leave us under the impression that they have looked upon her as creation's crown. Surely no one will consider the tracing of the origin of such a creature as a useless task.

Since the views of men—even great men—differ so vastly in regard to woman, the question arises: Whence did she originally come? It is evident that she could not have had the same origin as her descendants. For whilst they are born of women, she is not the offspring of woman. Whence then did this motherless woman, who is the mother of all living, come? Can this mystery be solved without the aid of divine Revelation? Man's failure to do so justifies us to believe that Revelation alone can give us a true Salvation. Science seems to know nothing of the cause or causes that led to the organization of living matter. Cautious and well informed Scientists of today will not venture beyond the following statement of "a thorough-going naturalist."—"The beginnings of life came upon the earth in some way unknown to science." As we have such a divine Revelation in the Holy Bible let us turn to the same and see what light God's Word throws upon this important subject. In doing so we will not overlook the fact

that a number of eminent biblical scholars claim to have discovered a gradual development in the Sacred Scriptures; and that according to said development the latter portion of the Bible contains not only a higher truth, but also a clearer and completer Revelation. Since this is maintained by many we will, therefore, begin in the rear of the Sacred Scriptures in order that we may thus, by means of the higher, clearer and completer Revelation, be enabled to understand the lower, obscurer and more incomplete, portions at the beginning of the Bible.

What does the New Testament teach as to woman's origin? When we turn to I Tim. 2 : 13 we find the following words bearing upon this subject: "Adam was first formed, then Eve." Here we have doubtless a reference to the first human beings. Their names, as here given, are Adam and Eve. The words leave us under the impression that they did not appear simultaneously, but that the man, or Adam, was here before the woman, whom Paul calls Eve. Our verse tells us not only their names, but also something about their origin. According to it our progenitors were not brought forth by the earth, neither evolved from a plant or animal, nor came they into existence by the bestowment of the supernatural element, namely the Spirit, unto a perfectly developed animal, but they were formed. Paul uses the verb πλάσσω, which does not mean bring forth, evolve or bestow, but form, mold or fashion out of clay or wax. According to this verb, man, who appeared before woman, must have been a special creation of God. The divine Being must have molded, formed or fashioned him out of something. We need, however, not fall back upon the verb πλάσσω in order to guess at the substance out of which Adam was formed, for when we turn to I Cor. 15 : 47 we find the substance mentioned. There we read: "The first man is of the earth, earthy." Thence Adam must have been formed, molded or fashioned out of earth, or the ground.

Though the woman did not appear simultaneously with the man, but some time afterwards, she was, nevertheless, according to I Tim. 2 : 13, also formed. "Adam was first formed,

then Eve." This brings us to the genesis of the woman. How was she formed? Had we no further revelation upon this subject than the verses quoted we would naturally conclude that she was formed in the same way and out of the same substance as the man. But the very portion of God's Word, containing the very highest, clearest and completest revelation, tells us that she was formed out of different material. In I Cor. 11 : 8 we read: "The man is not of the woman, but the woman of the man." The Twentieth Century New Testament, which has been translated from the original by both eminent and critical scholars into the English of our times, renders this verse as follows: "For it was not man who was taken from the woman, but the woman from the man." According to this verse the first woman was not taken from the earth, but from the first man. Here we see that according to I Tim. 2 : 13 and I Cor. 11 : 8 and 12 the woman, who appeared after man and was according to I Cor. 11 : 9 created for man, is a separate creation or formation, and not made like man, but taken from man: Hence according to the highest, clearest and completest portion of God's Word the woman is taken from man, or is a part of man. These verses clearly teach that Eve's origin differs from Adam's. Whilst man is formed of the earth, the woman is taken from and formed of man. How are we to understand this? This looks very mysterious, indeed. We will, however, not stop here and begin to speculate how the woman was taken from and formed of man, but turn from the Epistles to the Gospels and see what they contain upon this subject.

In Mark 10 : 6 we read: "From the beginning of creation God made them male and female" In Matt. 19: 4 we find the following words referring to this subject: "Have ye not read, that he who made them at the beginning made them male and female?" These words of our Saviour were brought about through a tempting question upon the perplexing subject of divorce. Christ told the Pharisees that in spite of the Mosaic permission to give a bill of divorcement, on account of the hardness of their hearts, it was originally not intended, since He who made mankind from the beginning "made them male

and female." Whilst through these words the Lord simply wished to show that the creation of a single pair was an evidence that divorce—and we might also add the plurality of wives—was contrary to God's original plan of creation. He, nevertheless, also told them that God created the original pair. It is true He does not say: Adam was first formed, then Eve. He, nevertheless, states that God made them at the beginning and mentioned the male before the female. We can at least infer from these words of our Saviour that Adam was formed or made before Eve.

Thus we have seen that according to the highest, clearest and completest portion of God's revelation, as found in the Epistles and Gospels, woman is a special creation of God—even as man—though not created simultaneously with man. We have further noticed that whilst man was taken from and formed of the earth, woman was taken from and formed of the substance of man and for man.

Let us now see what the Old Testament has to say about woman's origin. Though it is, according to many biblical scholars, a considerably lower, obscurer and more incomplete Revelation than the New Testament, we ought, nevertheless, with the light obtained from the higher, clearer and completer Revelation of the New Testament be able to solve all the difficulties that may here confront us. We find nothing of any importance upon this subject till we get back to the Mosaic account of creation. There we read, Gen. 1 : 27: "God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them." These words seem to set forth the fact that God created the first human pair; that he created them in his own image, and that he created the male before the female. In Gen. 2 : 7 we read: "The Lord God formed man out of the dust of the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life and man became a living soul." This verse seems to set forth the manner of material out of which God created man. In Gen. 2 : 21–23 we read: "And the Lord God caused a deep sleep to fall upon Adam, and he slept; and he took one of his ribs, and closed up the flesh in-

stead thereof. And the rib, which the Lord God had taken from man, made he a woman and brought her unto the man. And Adam said, "This is now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called woman because she was taken out of man." These words record the names of the first man and woman and set forth the manner of woman's creation and the substance out of which she was formed. Whether Adam's "deep sleep" was of such a nature that the whole scene of Eve's creation was presented to his imagination, as Lightfood supposed, we know not; from the Mosaic account we know, however, that when he awoke from his "deep sleep" and beheld the woman, he not only recognized the vast difference between her and the animals he had hitherto seen and named; but he also joyfully realized and clearly understood that she had no connection whatever with the same; but was rather a part of himself and as such a suitable companion for him.—The words: "This is now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh: she shall be called woman"—female—man or Männin, according to Luther's Translation—clearly indicate that Adam knew whence Eve was and the purpose for which she had been created. It is well for us to notice here that Adam, in his primitive, uncivilized, ignorant, rude, degraded and savage state, as some modern scientists love to describe the original state of man, seems to have known more about woman than many at the present day.

The question arises now: How does the Mosaic account upon this subject agree with the one found in the higher, clearer and completer Revelation of the N. T.? A careful comparison will show a perfect harmony between the two. In fact the Mosaic account even tells us the part of man out of which the woman was formed. The account of woman's origin found in the much decried lower, obscurer and more incomplete portions of the Bible, does not differ from the description found in the higher, clearer and completer portions of God's Word. The Mosaic account of man's creation, and especially the origin of woman, is sustained by no less authority than the New Testament. Now, since the Mosaic account upon this subject is so

completely sustained by the acknowledged higher, clearer and completer Revelation, does it not seem strange that some of the writers have nevertheless so confined themselves to the first chapters of Genesis as to leave one under the impression that they contain the only biblical information upon this subject? This is somewhat peculiar, to say the least; but these men have doubtless reasons for their peculiarity thus manifested.

This brings us to the *efforts made by those who seem to have more faith in the theory or theories of evolution, than in the Mosaic account of creation.* That there is a difference between the biblical account of woman's origin and that of moderate or Christian evolution, as some call it, saying nothing of evolution itself, is evident. The efforts put forth by those entertaining these views seem to indicate that they are well aware of this fact. In spite of their untiring efforts to harmonize divine Revelation with evolution, they have, nevertheless, found the biblical account of creation an exceedingly stubborn thing to deal with. This is especially true of woman's origin. Hence we need not be surprised at the various attempts made to bring the same in line with evolution. We have heard of some ridiculously describing it as "a side issue;" others stigmatizing it as "ridiculous and unbecoming the dignity of the Creator." These remarks seem to harmonize very much with statements made by a man, who did not live in our enlightened age, but is known in Church history by the name of Celsus. This enemy of primitive Christianity is represented as having described the Mosaic account of woman's creation as "extremely silly;" and as having said: "The more modest among the Jews and Christians are ashamed of these things and endeavor to give them somehow an allegorical signification." (Anti Nicene Fathers vol. IV. p. 514 and 569). We see nothing immodest nor anything unbecoming the dignity of the *Creator* in the Mosaic account of Eve's creation. The transactions recorded there, if carefully examined, will prove neither unreasonable, unaesthetic, immodest nor unscientific. It is in perfect harmony with our up to-date science, especially surgery. The putting of people into a "deep sleep" and the removing of a portion of

their body whilst in this unconscious condition, is a daily occurrence in our hospitals. No sensible man has, to the best of my knowledge, ever described the proceedings in an operating room as unreasonable, unaesthetic, immodest or unscientific, but, to the contrary, everybody rejoices over the remarkable, praiseworthy and wonderful achievements our surgeons have made in relieving suffering humanity. They have proven themselves great benefactors, indeed, and we gratefully hail them as such. The only thing in which our advanced surgery is still far behind the operation described by Moses is in the advantageous utilization of the parts removed.

We find that quite a number fall back upon the allegorical interpretation in order to remove the difficulty. This, as we have seen, is no more modern than the effort to overcome the Mosaic account of woman's origin by ridicule. If Celsus, the first literary enemy of Christianity, is correct, then the more modest of the Jews and Christians of his age, who were ashamed of the Mosaic account of Eve's creation, endeavored to get round it by giving it an allegorical signification. Whether Celsus' account of the more modest among the Jews and Christians is correct, we do not know, but we have reason to believe that the present effort is not on that account. The object in view at present is doubtless to harmonize it with evolution. If the Mosaic account of woman's origin be, however, not a fact, but only an allegory, what part of the Mosaic account of creation may be considered as a simple fact? Bp. Horsley realized the importance of this, and hence made the following remark to show the absurdity of such an interpretation: "If therefore any part of the narrative be a matter of fact, no part of it is allegorical. If any part be allegorical, no part is a naked matter of fact. If the formation of the woman out of man be allegory, the woman must be an allegorical woman. The man must therefore be an allegorical man; for of such a man only the allegorical woman will be a meet companion. If the man be allegorical, his paradise is an allegorical garden; the trees that grow in it, allegorical trees; the rivers that watered it, allegorical rivers; and thus we may ascend to the

very beginning of the creation, and conclude at last that the heavens are allegorical heavens, and the earth an allegorical earth. Thus the whole history of creation will be an allegory, of which the real subject is not disclosed, and in this absurdity the whole scheme of allegorizing ends." (Butler's Bible Work. Gen. and Ex. p. 172). We would thus not only be in ignorance of the origin of woman and the universe in general, but the higher, clearer and completer Revelation of the New Testament would, after all, be no more authority than the lower, obscurer and more incomplete portions of the Old Testament. Then Luther did not know what he was talking about when he said: "Die Schrift legt sich selbst aus." And the Formal Principle of the Reformation would thus be nothing more than a dead letter. This having thus become a dead letter the question would naturally arise: What would then become of the Fundamental Principle of the Reformation, which is so closely connected with the Formal?

Shrewn questions, calculated either to confuse the minds or shake the faith in the Mosaic account of woman's origin, have also been employed to accomplish the desired end. These are also nothing new as Luther's Commentary on Genesis shows. Among these we find the following one: "Did God create Adam with an extra rib, or did he substitute another for the one removed to form Eve?" As far as the divine records are concerned we have no evidence that Adam was created with an extra rib, or that another was put in the place of the one removed. We read: "And he took one of his ribs, and closed up the flesh instead thereof." It is true that since we read of no substitute being put in its place, therefore, one might argue that Adam must either have been created with an extra rib, or else he must have had one rib less on one side after Eve's creation. This momentous question can unfortunately not be definitely settled till the spade of the Archeologist has laid bare the remains of Adam. Then and not till then can this weighty and scholarly question be settled. We have every reason to believe that specialists are able to tell us that a fossil tooth found in the Rocky Mountains belonged to an animal

that must have gashed the throats of its victims ten thousand years before Adam appeared upon the face of the earth; or who can construct out of "a few bones of a monkey and fewer of a man" the long looked for pithecanthropus erectus, will also be able to tell us, when they behold the fossil remains of Adam, whether he was originally furnished with an extra rib, or whether he was minus of a rib on one side after Eve's creation. But why this question at all? Is it put because man has just as many ribs on the one side of his body as on the other? The fact that this is so, proves that Adam had originally just the same number of ribs as his descendants. It proves nothing more and nothing less. Since God did not replace the removed rib by another Adam must have been minus of the same after Eve's creation. And the fact that in the human skeleton this absence cannot be traced is no proof against the same. No scientist has yet been able to demonstrate that the removal of a man's rib will so effect his offspring that his male descendants will be minus of a rib. So long as scientists cannot prove that the removal of a rib from a man will so effect his male offspring that all are born minus a rib, will all the shrewd questions and insinuations about a man's skeleton having just as many ribs on one side as on the other, be very unscientific and exceedingly foolish.

Among the latest efforts to harmonize the Mosaic account of woman's origin with evolution, we find that of Dr. Ph. E. Dennert. This man is looked upon by many as a scholar along this line. He considers himself a moderate evolutionist, by which he doubtless means a Christian evolutionist; as some call themselves in this country. In his late book upon the Mosaic account of creation, under the title: "Es Werde" p. 72, he speaks of the special creation of woman out of the rib of the sleeping man, as a human invention—Menschlige Zutat—suggested by the abdominal cavity. He says: "Jedenfalls ist aber dieser Teil des Berichts nicht wörtlich zu fassen; er ist menschliche Zutat, die der Berbachtung entspricht, dass sich beim Menschen Zwischen Rippen und Hüftknochen eine grosse Lücke findet." Now since it is assumed that this is

not divine revelation, but a mere human addition, suggested by the abdominal cavity, the question arises: Why were the men who added this addition to the Mosaic account, and who must have been keen observers and careful students of anatomy, led to the conclusion that Eve was taken from Adam, instead of Adam from Eve? It is not an established fact, that the abdominal cavity is larger in woman than in man of equal stature; and would not this fact have led scholars of anatomy to the very opposite conclusion? We must therefore consider this latest effort to harmonize the Mosaic account of the origin of woman with evolution, as far-fetched, unnatural and unscientific.

Now if the Mosaic account be not a divine Revelation, nor contains literal facts, as some would have us believe, then it will never do for us to fall back upon Moses, Christ and Paul to show that our doctrines and laws concerning monogamy are based upon divine authority. Then they are simply based upon legends and myths borrowed from rude heathen nations or manufactured by the writer himself. We have therefore no divine authority to oppose Mormonism, free lovism, etc., neither have we any right to demand that our heathen converts put away all their wives but one. Hence we are not only without any divine authority for monogamy, but we have the majority of the human race also against us upon this subject. And if the voice of the people be the voice of God then polygamy is divine and monogamy human.

He who will carefully study the origin of woman, as taught in the Bible, will find nothing amusing, nothing childish and nothing unbecoming the dignity of God. He will not only discover that the skeptical speculations, questions and jests are idle and absurd, but he will also find something solemn, wise and honor-reflecting upon the Creator. Nothing sets forth the close, intimate, tender and true relation between man and woman; nothing defines their respective stations in life, and marks the boundaries of their mutual spheres, like God's Holy Word. And it was in reference to this very relation that both Christ and Paul referred to the Mosaic account of creation.

The material out of which the woman was formed was not taken, as it has been well said, out of man's head to top him, not from his feet to be tramped on by him, but from his side to be equal with him, from under his arms to be protected by him and from near his heart to be loved as his own flesh and bone by him. A little more knowledge upon and faith in the genesis of woman, as set forth in divine Revelation, would not only prove very helpful to our social and domestic life, but it would also bring about a much needed change. The sanctity of the relation between man and woman—of which sanctity so many seem to know nothing at all—can only be truly advanced through a proper knowledge of the same. Such knowledge the sacred Scriptures alone can and do impart. But, alas, there seem to be so many who prefer to remain in ignorance upon a subject so important to the advancement of our social and domestic happiness.

Thus we have seen how the origin of woman, as taught in the Mosaic account of Creation, is substantiated by the highest authority, namely the New Testament. Therefore he who rejects the former rejects the latter also. The inner relation of the truth presented by the two, on this subject, is so close that they stand or fall together. Hence the ignorer of the teachings of the New Testament lays himself open to the charge that he has as little faith in the New as in the Old; and that his sole aim is to subject the interpretation of God's Word to the theory of evolution. The Word of God can, however, no more be bound by the assumptions of evolutionists than by traditions and the decrees of councils.

We have further seen, that there is nothing against the literal meaning of the Mosaic account of the origin of woman, but everything in its favor; and that the peculiar methods employed to shake our faith therein, are more calculated to establish than to shake. Any theory that will not allow us to interpret the Old Testament by the plain teachings of the New, or that is out of harmony with the New, must be looked upon with suspicion; since the New Testament is absolutely essential to a proper understanding of the Old. There is and can be no

human authority above Scripture; it alone is its own and true interpreter. We dare not, we cannot, therefore sacrifice the plain teachings of the New Testament for the unsupported assumptions of evolution. Thence, doubtless, the reason why "bold and talented scientists," who have been advocates of evolution, are abandoning the same as a "defunct theory."

ARTICLE IV.

THE MORAL INFLUENCE OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOL.

By T. F. Dornblaser, D. D.

The importance of the Public Schools of our country cannot be over-estimated. We have, in the United States, twenty-two millions of school age, between six and sixteen; of which number over sixteen millions are enrolled and in attendance upon these state institutions. Here we find one-sixth of the population, at the most impressible and susceptible age, under the direct influence and training of an army of teachers for five days in the week during a period varying from eight to twelve years; and what tremendous influence for weal or woe, such training will exert upon the rising generation, and upon the future of this Nation, no statesman or seer is able to forecast. As Christian citizens, we are, and ought to be, deeply interested in the moral character of an institution, which exerts such a moulding influence upon the youth of our land.

The contents of this paper will call attention to the following points:

1. The moral aspect of the Public School as exhibited by the data in hand.

2. The chief purpose of the State in establishing and maintaining such a system of universal education.

3. The best methods of safe-guarding and promoting the moral character of these nurseries of the State.

4. The measure of responsibility resting upon the Lutheran Church in this country, in helping to solve the problem. How to supplement this week-day secular education, by a thorough moral and religious training.

First then, let us consider the moral influence of the Public School as exerted upon the youth of our country at the present day. Taking the Chicago schools as an illustration, we find a total enrollment of 279,183, out of a population of school-age, numbering 680,592. This multitude of children is

presided over by 5,614 teachers, of whom 5,139 are women, and 475 are men,—making the proportion of male to female teachers, as one to eleven. This disproportion of female teachers, we are inclined to think, is calculated to weaken the discipline of the schools, but, on the other hand, we are as strongly of the opinion, that the wholesome, and possibly superior, moral iufluence of the lady-teachers, is calculated to counterbalance and overcome the lack of masculine authority. It will hardly be denied, that women, as a class, are cleaner in their habits, and purer in their morals than men. To prove this, we need only to refer to the police records and criminal statistics of our country. Add to this the greater love and sympathy female teachers have for small children, and we need not wonder that so many of them are engaged in this noble and self-denying work. In the country schools the disproportion in favor of female teachers is not so large, possibly about three to one; but this fact must be conceded, that the majority of parents, as well as their children, prefer the lady teacher, and for the very reasons mentioned,—their womanly sympathy in connection with the moral and refining influence exerted upon their pupils. We are inclined to the belief, that the large excess of lady-teachers, is rather favorable than unfavorable in shaping the morals of the rising generation.

In consultation with the superintendent and principals of our city schools, we learned with sore regret, that the Bible is barred out of the city schools In the opening exercises there is no Scripture read, no hymn sung, no prayer offered. The Constitution of the state of Illinois provides that every child from six to twenty-one years old, irrespective of color or previous condition, shall be afforded an opportunity to secure a good common-school education.

Section 3, says: "No appropriation, or public fund whatever, shall be used in aid of any church or sectarian purpose. Church and state are separate and independent of each other, and each must pursue its mission without the aid of the other."

There is no positive declaration in the Statutes of the State, forbidding the use of the Bible in the Public Schools, but the

school authorities of Chicago are acting upon the presumption, that the Bible is a sectarian book, serving only sectarian ends, and must therefore be excluded. Instead of admitting the Bible, a few standard hymns, and the Lord's Prayer, or such opening religious exercises as are adopted in a majority of the states of the Union, the School Trustees have recently introduced a musical program, consisting of a series of "cultural melodies," by which they hope to refine the tastes of the pupil, and foster a kind of nature-worship. The title of some of these melodies are as follows: Spring, Summer, Autumn, Winter, Little Gypsy Dandelion, The Squirrel's Tea, The Hungry Spider, The Ponies, The Trees, The Doves, The Butterfly, The Weather, The Moon; for the more advanced classes they have a few patriotic airs, including Hail Columbia, a Thanksgiving Song, a Song for Christmas, "Hark what mean those Holy Voices!" The Morning Glory, and a Song to Venus. The entire collection for the eight grades consists of about 200 such ditties; good enough in their place, but all of which put together are not equal to the one grand hymn of Providence, composed by William Cowper: "God moves in a mysterious way his wonders to perform." We are in sympathy with the sentiments expressed by the father of our country, George Washington, in his farewell address: "Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, Religion and Morality are indispensible supports.

"In vain would that man claim the tribute of Patriotism, who should labor to subvert these great pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of Men and Citizens. The mere Politician, equally with the pious man, ought to respect and cherish them. Where is the security for property, for reputation, for life, if the sense of religious obligation desert the oaths, which are the instruments of investigation in Courts of Justice? And let us with caution indulge the supposition, that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of relig-

ious principle. It is substantially true, that virtue or morality is a necessary spring of popular government."

The Congress of the United States passed the following Preamble and Resolution, as early as 1778: "Whereas true religion and good morals are the only solid foundation of public liberty and happiness; Resolved, That it be and is hereby earnestly recommended to the several states to take the most effectual measures for the encouragement thereof." The Constitution of Ohio contains this significant declaration: "Religion, morality and knowledge being essentially necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of instruction shall forever be encouraged by legislative provision, not inconsistent with the rights of conscience."

All Christians, and not a few non Christians, agree that the Bible is the best book to teach sound morality. It is a settled fact, that ethical precepts, however beautiful, have but little force without the faith and sanction of religion. We have reason to believe that the most wholesome and abiding moral influence is exerted in such schools, where the Bible is reverenced by the pupils and daily read by the teacher or responsively with the scholars. A committee of the Presbyterian church, of which Dr. Francis R. Beattie (of Louisville, Ky.) is chairman, has recently published its report covering its investigation along this line. The committee was insturcted to ascertain by correspondence and otherwise, to what extent the Bible was used and moral instruction imparted in the Public Schools of the United States. They corresponded with all the State and County Superintendents, and Principals of city schools, and brought out many interesting facts, as follows:

Alabama: The Statutes of the state silent on the subject. The Bible is generally read at the opening of the schools.

Arizona: All sectarian literature excluded. The Bible not read as a rule. Teachers shall inculcate principles of morality, truth, justice, and patrotism.

Arkansas: Religion, morality, and knowledge essential to good government. Use of the Bible optional with the teacher and the local school board.

California: No money for sectarian schools. King James' version of the Bible prohibited, and not read in the schools.

Colorado: In some schools the Bible is read and the Lord's prayer repeated, where no objection is offered by the parents.

Connecticut: The Bible is generally read without comment, a hymn sung, and the Lord's Prayer repeated.

Delaware: The reading of the Bible almost universal, without note or comment, accompanied with song and prayer.

District of Columbia: The Bible shall be read, followed by Prayer and appropriate singing.

Florida: The law silent. Most teachers and principles read a Scripture lesson, and offer prayer. Parents favor it, and no objection is raised.

Georgia: The Bible has a place in the statute, and must not be excluded.

Idaho: No law on the subject. Scripture reading optional with the teacher.

Illinois: The law forbids instruction in sectarian doctrines. The general custom, outside of Chicago, is to open with scripture reading, prayer and appropriate singing.

Indiana: No general usage. Where majority of the parents object, the Scripture lesson is dispensed with. Most teachers read without note or comment.

Indian Territory: Left entirely optional with the teachers.

Iowa: The Legislature shall encourage, by all suitable means, the promotion of the morals of the people. The Bible shall not be excluded from any public school or institution of the State. Nor shall any child be required to read it, contrary to the will of the parents. The general custom is to read, and have devotional exercises.

Kansas: No sectarian doctrine shall be taught, but the Bible without comment may be used, which is the general practice.

Kentucky: In Louisville the Bible must be read daily. Elsewhere in the state it is discretionary with the teacher.

Louisiana: The Bible excluded, and not read in the schools.

Maine: Teachers must inculcate principles of morality, justice, sobriety, industry, frugality, chastity, moderation, temperance, all other virtues. King James' version of the Bible is read universally. This state has led all others in temperance legislation.

Maryland: The Bible is generally read. The Douay version may be used if preferred by the majority of the patrons.

Massachusetts: The school board shall require the daily reading of the Bible.

Michigan: The Bible is generally read. The Lord's prayer or extempore prayer is used. The practice varies.

Mississippi: The Bible not excluded.

Missouri: The Bible generally read, and without comment. Moral instruction is given in all schools.

Montana: The whole matter left with the local school board.

Nebraska: Open with Scripture lesson, prayer and song. The Bible not regarded as a sectarian book.

Nevada: The Bible not generally read.

New Hampshire: Common custom to read a Scripture lesson, pray, and sing

New Jersey: The Bible is read responsively, and the Lord's Prayer is repeated in concert.

New Mexico: No religious exercises whatever.

New York: The Bible generally used to impart moral instruction. Only one vote in the Legislature was cast against the use of the Bible in 1838.

North Carolina: Bible reading the basis of moral instruction.

North Dakota: Daily Scripture lesson. The Bible not regarded as a sectarian book.

Ohio: The Bible generally read in the country and smaller towns.

Oklahoma: The Bible in general use.

Oregon: Left with the teachers and local boards.

Pennsylvania: Bible reading, prayer, aud singing, in nearly every school in the state.

Rhode Island: Bible reading, prayer, and singing, in nearly every school in the state.

South Carolina: Bible reading, prayer, and singing in nearly every school in the state.

South Dakota: Bible reading, prayer, and singing, in nearly every school in the state.

Tennessee: Bible reading, prayer, and singing, in nearly every school in the state.

Texas: Bible reading, prayer, and singing, in nearly every school in the state.

Utah: Bible reading, prayer, and singing, in nearly every school in the state.

Vermont: Scripture reading and song in all the schools.

Virginia: Brief Scripture selections and the Lord's Prayer.

West Virginia: King James' Version recommended, and generally used.

Wisconsin: Bible prohibited because the court decided it was a sectarian book.

Wyoming: The Bible is not excluded, but holds its place as the text-book on morals.

The committee, as well as the Superintendents and Principals from whom inquiry was made, acted upon the supposition that the Bible was the highest and only infallible authority on Christian morals, and where its precepts were read and approved, the best ethical results were always attained. From their report, we summarize the following facts:

1. Every attempt by State Legislature to exclude the Bible from the schools has failed.

2. School Boards of large cities have done so, where a considerable number of the patrons objected to its use.

3. Where the Bible was used to inculcate sectarian tenets by the teacher, the Courts rendered decisions against its use for such ends.

4, The Bible is widely read in the schools of the country; eleven states require its reading by statute law.

5. In thirty-six states and territories it is generally read in connection with the opening exercises.

6. Four states use the Scriptures only in localities where it meets with favor on the part of the patrons.

7. Only two states, Wisconsin and Louisiana, exclude the Bible by the decision of their Courts, upon the doubtful assumption, that it is a sectarian book.

II. We come now to the second point in our discussion, namely—What is the paramount purpose of the State in maintaining a system of universal education? Is it to produce astute politicians, sharp lawyers, keen merchants, and unscrupulous sharks, who, by their superior wits, may fatten upon the innocent gullibility of the community? Is it to furnish the youth of our land with splendid intellectual equipment and send them adrift, to be, almost certainly, wrecked on the rocks of immorality and vice? You might as well expect the most magnificent battleship on the high seas without a commander, to accomplish the end of its construction, as to expect the most highly educated young man, devoid of moral principle, to serve the ends of his own being or those of the State. The only legal ground by which the State derives its authority to impose a universal school tax, is, that by this means the rising generation may be better fitted for the duties and responsibilities of good citizenship in this free Republic. It is incorruptible character, rather than intellectual brilliancy, that insures the perpetuity of the State.

Over every true school might well be inscribed the sentence which we find in Genesis: "Let us make man." That great purpose, anterior to creation, lies behind all the work of the teacher. Teaching is a species of creation. The writer of Genesis little knew how much was involved in the making of man. He conceived the process as needing only a handful of dust and a day of twenty-four hours. Now the evolutionists at least know, that "the making of man means millenniums: the slow climbing from dust to crystal, from crystal to plant, from plant to infusoria, from infusoria to mammal, from mammal to Moses and Dante and Shakespeare. But as each student repeats and epitomizes the history of the race, each involves a

fresh creative process, and all true teaching has behind it the basal purpose of the world: 'Let us make man.'"

To make a muscular marvel—a Samson or a Sandow—is not to make man. To make a prodigious memory by conning Chinese classics for generations, is not to make man. To produce a logical mechanism, a mere reasoning faculty, by sacrificing to it all the rest of human nature, is not to produce man. To produce, as the output of an educational system, shrewd manipulators, abnormal geniuses, like Macchiavelli in political life, or Barny Barnato in commercial life, is not the object of our school work. We cannot allow any part of the pupil's nature to atrophy, in order to produce a dazzling prodigy. The aim of an education is to make full-orbed men—men of keen senses, trained intellect, warm hearts; men rich in imagination and emotion; men of power to resolve, to initiate, to administer, to achieve; power to see swiftly, judge accurately, decide immediately, to love deeply and hate persistently, and grow forever,—men such as all the past of human history now should culminate in producing.

But the fact is, that for the past few centuries we have tried in our schools to produce minds rather than men. We have given our whole strength to mentality, often ignoring the physical basis on the one side, and the entire gamut of desire and volition on the other.

Modern psychology makes the will central in human nature. To possess a will active, and active on the side of righteousness, is more than to carry in one's head all tongues, ancient and modern, or to be familiar with all the sciences of the world. We have thought of the educated man as one who knows certain things, regardless of how he feels or what he does. But no mere knowledge ever yet guaranteed an education. The educated man is, above all, one who controls his own powers, and controls them for righteous ends. Encyclopaedia knowledge with a weak will, George Eliot has pictured in Doctor Causabon. Vast knowledge with an evil will, Goethe has pictured in Mephistopheles. One of them is less than human, the other is more. It is a severe indictment of our modern training,

that we can conceive of an educated man that is bad, while to the Greeks such a being was inconceivable.

We think of education as an intellectual process. The Greeks thought of it on the whole as a moral process. We understand perfectly the divorce between intellect and character, between mind and conscience, between learning and doing; but the Greeks could not conceive such a separation as possible. Plato and Aristotle will rise up in the judgment to condemn the educators of this generation; for they aimed at the production of moral human beings. The ideal of our leading educators is, we think, changing for the better. They begin to see that the end of education is volition—as Kant said, "The only good thing in the universe is a good will." The moral nature is the seat of character, and if not rightly directed, the best product of the schools, rests on a sandy foundation. They sow to the wind and reap the whirlwind.

Education is the building of character, not so much by means of the "3 R's, readin, writin, and rithmetic," as by means of the three H's, "head, heart, and hand." The purpose is, to make the pupil a good citizen,—fit for self-government, self-control, self-help; a living, thinking being. The celebrated three R's reciprocate the commercial spirit that gave them birth. One trouble with our educational work today, is, that the three R's appeal more strongly to the average citizen than do the three H's, and a money value rather than a soul value of education is still dominant in the esteem of the masses.

Many of the teaching profession have taken up their work for the little ready money there is in it, rather than from the love of learning and life, with their ceaseless and wondrous unfolding.

The hand is a twin with the brain. Dispositions, temperaments, and habits of thought are written upon the human hand. There is a phrenology in the palms of the hands, as well as in the contour of the skull. He that neglects the brains of his hands is as faulty as he that slights the brains of his skull.

Whatever our youth expect to do in future life, the educational worth of the culture of the hands is comparable with

that of any other form of education The new education of the hand is making reputable avenues to the completest development of life.

Why cannot reason and the will of God prevail in the hand-arts as well as in the classic arts? The laboring professions have not yet caught up with the literary professions in the scope and efficiency of their culture. The need of the hour is a higher spirit of learning in the avocations of manual labor and household economics.

Victor Hugo conceives of man as possessed of three centers: the brain, the heart, the stomach. He gives the characteristics of the stomach as appetite, satiety, and putrefaction. He makes it break the equilibrium between the soul and the body, and makes Rabelais, the French humorist, the discoverer of the stomach's place in history. This erroneous conception of Hugo is still too prevalent. Education has overlooked this third center—the stomach in civilization.

Household economics is fundamental in the humanities. A stomach's god shall no longer be Silenus, the attendant of Bacchus, as Hugo claims, but the goddess Hygeia; its animal not the pig, but an exalted man. We determine scientificaily the balanced ration that will fit the steer for the market, a horse for strength and speed, a sheep for short or long wool; the whole realm of animal industry is far better provided with scientific information than the nursery of our youth It is high time that our culinary departments should know better how to prepare food for the human being of the future. It is no mean service to one's generation to prepare wholesome food which will produce the pure red blood that shall nerve the brain, sustain the muscle, and fortify the soul for the wear and tear of a strenuous life. One has well said: "The skillet is mightier than the sword."

Some belittle sentiment as a work of weakness. Wholesome sentiment is stronger than intellectuality. The heart sees farther than the eye; feels more deeply than the hand, and understands more profoundly than the brain.

Our public schools, therefore, should be scientific, yet prac-

tical; non-partizan, yet patriotic; non sectarian, yet religious.

Just as patriotism can be taught without partizan bias, so can religious truths be inculcated without sectarian prejudices.

One of Cicero's mottoes, Salus populi suprema lex, is a good one to inscribe upon our public school system, "the welfare of the people is the highest law."

III. In referring to the best methods of promoting the moral character of these nurseries of the State, we would call attention, first of all, to the careful selection of the teachers.

The teachers' association of Northern Illinois, which met in Evanston, a week or so ago, held up the following qualifications as necessary for an up to date teacher.

The most important requirements for the modern teacher, as gleaned from a score of addresses, are as follows:

Must be human.

Must be a good "mixer" in the polite usage of the term.

Must be able to dance, play pool, billiards, and other games enjoyed by the community in which he lives.

Must be a church member.

Must be magnetic.

Must take active interest in civics and the welfare of the city, ward, village, or town in which he is employed.

Must go into society and make himself popular in the community.

Must keep in touch with twentieth century life.

Must understand the child and get into the good graces of the parent.

Must be dignified and command respect and obedience in the schoolroom.

Must get out of the beaten tracks.

The Old Timer Must Go.

Superintendent Upton was the educator who advocated the employment of teachers who knew how to dance and were not afraid to be caught gliding across a polished floor with an arm around a young woman.

The first requisite is moral character in the teacher. When Emerson's daughter wrote to him about her choice of studies,

he answered: "It matters not so much what you study, as with whom you study." A small man cannot cast a great shadow. A teacher cannot do work at a higher level than that of his own interior life. No formal instruction in morals can ever have one-thousandths part of the influence which steadily flows from a teacher by nature magnanimous and steadfast.

Especially is character in the teacher indispensible in dealing with very young pupils, for they depend almost wholly on example and contact. To force little children into moral philosophy, is to make liars and knaves out of them. Emphatically true is it of children:

> "Theirs not to reason why, but to do or try."

Virture in the abstract they do not understand. Goodness they know, not as a quality, but as an incarnation. Hence a teacher of rich, large, generous spirit, noble by instinct, and righteous by training, is the best possible code of law, and the only true treatise on moral philosophy for little children.

> "O'er wayward childhood wouldst thou hold firm rule
> And sun thee in the light of happy faces?
> Love, Hope, and Patience, these must be thy graces,
> And in thine own heart let them first keep school."

In dealing with older pupils, the need of character in the teacher is hardly any less. The graduates of our secondary schools and colleges, when they come to talk over the old days spent in study, always speak first, not of the buildings, the text-books, or the formal lessons, but of the character of their instructors, That is obviously the thing which makes the deepest impression on the student-mind. A college alumnus forgets everything else sooner than he forgets the personality of his teacher. And as we look back in life, we see that the best our teachers did for us, was to incarnate before our eyes the simple homely virtues, which are the warp and woof of noble living.

Marcus Aurelius opens his Meditations—one of the best books in the world for a modern student—with striking tributes of this kind: "From my grandfather Verus, I learned good morals and the government of my temper. From the reputation and

rememberance of my father, modesty and manly character. From Alexander, the grammarian, I learned to refrain from fault-finding. From Maximus, I learned self government, and to do what was set before me without complaining."

The moral power of a teacher is exerted largely through the administration of a school. The entire management of a school constitutes the atmosphere in which the pupil's life is to unfold. One of the graduates of Brown University was employed to ring the bell for recitation about seven or eight times a day. He now declares that the best thing he received from his college course is the habit of regularity and punctuality, derived from four years of bell-ringing.

When a school is administered in the spirit of impartiality and justice, it is giving indirect instruction in rights and duties. Candor and honesty in personal intercourse, means love of truth in the pupil; kindness and courtesy in manner, means refinement of spirit inculcated in the best possible way. Neatness of attire, erectness of posture, grace of personal carriage; these things produce the self respect without which virtue is impossible.

To recur again to our masters, the Greeks. They had no ten commandments to teach their pupils, their religious sanctions were feeble compared with ours, and they could not enforce duty by any clear vision of the life to come. Yet their education was so serious and noble, so essentially bound up with moral action. that at the age of seventeen or eighteen, when a young man received the soldier's spear and shield in the presence of the magistrates, he took the following oath: "I will not dishonor my sacred arms; I will not desert my fellow soldier by whose side I shall be set; I will do battle for my religion and my country, whether aided or unaided. I will reverently obey the laws of my country which have been established by the national will; I will honor the temple where my fathers worshiped: of these things the gods are my witnesses."

Can the average American youth take, and keep, that oath? And if he cannot, is it not ungrateful, if not impertinent, for

him to offer as a substitute a certain amount of Greek, and Latin and Mathematics ?

II. Not only the example of the teacher, but also direct ethical instruction is necessary to develop right character in the pupil. After a child has learned to admire the right, and to do the right, and to love the right, comes the formulation of right principles and rules, and the question, why one thing is right and another is wrong. As flowers come before botany, and stars before astronomy, moral living comes before moral philosophy. Yet inevitably the student will come to ask as to the reason of righteousness, and will need direct ethical instruction. This latter instruction will depend largely on circumstances. In institutions wholly under private or church control definite religious instruction may be added as a powerful sanction to the moral life. In some public schools and state universities this is generally forbidden. But it does not follow that the teaching of practical ethics is impossible. The theory of ethics is still in debate among philosophers, but the practice of virtue is accepted by Christian, Jew and Agnostic, and may be taught in the same way by all of them. There can be no valid objection to the use of brief treatises on moral conduct as seen in society and history. That righteousness tendeth to life, and that the wages of sin is death, is not, and never can be, sectarian instruction. It is simply a statement of moral gravitation, as universal, as pitiless, and quite important for us to appreciate as the law of physical gravitation. A text book on this subject should describe the virtues which are essential to human beings dwelling together, it should illustrate and enforce them by the great characters in sacred and profane history.

In two respects, especially, do the pupils need such instruction today. First, they need training for citizenship. The average pupil knows little and cares less about the character of the government under which he lives. He does not look forward, as did the Greek and Roman youth, to the service of the state, as the noblest possible career, but he thinks of laws and courts and legislatures, as instruments through which, by shrewd manipulation, a skillful citizen may attain his private

ends. Such an attitude is anti-social and anarchistic. The worst anarchists are not those who wave a red flag. They are those who use the American flag as a cloak for the concealment of private schemes and the attainment of selfish ambitions. The essence of anarchy is the exaltation of self above the state; the spirit of mob-law; the contempt and defiance of constituted authority.

This spirit must be conquered, not in Haymarket square, but in the public school; not by the policeman's club, but by the teacher's personality.

Again, we need such instruction to prepare the coming generation for the duties of home life. Back of State and Church, and school, stands the home, the fundamental institution of civilization. When the home is strong and pure, all other institutions will flourish; when the home decays, all is corrupt.

Again, since our country is historically and professedly a Christian Nation, we cannot understand why the Bible should be excluded from the Public schools. There are opposing elements, we know, but they are not the class of citizens which we care to hold up as models of virtue and patriotism. If it must be discarded as a text book of morals, and daily readings from its pages forbidden, it ought, at least, be accorded a place along side of Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, as a book of reference, if nothing more. All true patriots should protest against the exercise of such unfavorable and unreasonable discrimination toward the Book of all books. It behooves all evangelical Christians to contend for the proper recognition and daily reading of the sacred volume in the common schools of the state.

We admit there are some portions of Scripture not appropriate, but selections can be made from both Old and New Testament, to which neither Protestant nor Catholic, Mormon or Mohammedan, Infidel or Agnostic, can take exception. In order that the rising generation may not learn to despise the Book, we believe the morning lesson should be read from the Bible itself, and not from a book composed of selections from the Bible. There cannot be found a system of ethics in the

civilized world today, that is not directly or indirectly, dependent on the lessons taught in the Scriptures, and to this source we may trace all that is "pure and lovely and of good report" among men. This, certainly, is not a dangerous book to put into the hands of the young. Historically, it is the oldest record of past time. Centuries before Herodotus, the father of history, wrote his annals, all the books of the Old Testament, except that of Malachi, had been written, and were known and read wherever the Israelites were dispersed We find here the earliest mention of Assyria, Babylonia and Egypt.

The record of time is contemporaneous with the oldest dynasties, verified as they are by the cuneiform inscriptions found among the ruins upon the Tigris and Euphrates, and the hieroglyphics in the sarcophagi disinterred from the catacombs on the Nile. Palestine, with all her old associations, is revived, when the traveler uses the sacred volume as his guide book.

Shall it be said that what the prophets of the Old Testament foretold of Ninevah and Babylon, when the excavations and researches of modern archeologists have confirmed their predictions, may not be perused by the children as a part of their education in the history and geography of the world? There is no censorship suggested over the Latin and Greek classics, or German and French literature, however objectionable may be the production; the crusade is against the Bible only; the first printed volume after types were invented; a volume recognized by every civilized nation as sacred, and, in contradistinction from all other books, is called the Bible,—the Book. If this book must be debarred for the sake of some tender consciences, then must we also exclude such works as Josephus, Pope's Essay on Man, Milton's Paradise Lost, Hallam's Middle Ages, Prescott's Phillip Second, and Motley's History of the Netherlands, for each of these offend some tender conscience on the ground that private judgment is interfered with.

The best authorities on state craft declare, that the ultimate ends of the State cannot be subordinated to the individual conscience. The State may use religion, not as an end, but as a

means to an end. It has to do with conduct rather than character. If the will of the State come in conflict with the will or conscience of an individual, the individual may suffer martyrdom, but the State must uphold its sovereignty. The safety of the public is the supreme law.

The real difficulty in this question lies in confounding two things radically different. The State is for time; conscience, for eternity. The State recognizes nothing higher than its own sovereignty; conscience is responsible to God. When these two spheres come in conflict, we need not ask which should yield to the other; each must triumph on its own ground; the State, for this world; conscience, for the next; the State enforcing its own claims, and conscience adhering to the claims of God.

In all the so-called Christian nations of Europe, Bible instruction is made obligatory, and even the Catholics manifest no special tenderness toward the sonsciences of those who differ from them. The question of moral and religious instruction admits of easier solution, in countries where Church and State are practically united, but the necessity for such instruction is the same where Church and State are separated. We say, in America, Church and State are independent of each other, but, it is nearer correct to say, they are inter dependent upon each other. The Church depends upon the State for protection, and the State depends upon the Church to train its citizens in morals and religion, without which human government rests on a sandy foundation. In the free schools of Germany, the Bible is not only read; it is studied. A regular course of religious instruction, including Bible History, the Discourses of Jesus, Church History, the Doctrines of Christianity, is required in all the higher grades.

Before a pupil receives his certificate of graduation, he must give satisfactory evidence before a committee of clergymen and teachers, of possessing a certain degree of Bible knowledge, and of the positive truths of Christianity.

The Austrian system, like that of Prussia, is based on religion, and is supported and controlled by the State.

In the Republic of Switzerland, no one is allowed to exercise the vocation of a teacher without a certificate from a clergyman of his own Church that he is fitted both by character and education to conduct the religious education in the school for which he is designed.

In Holland all pupils must be instructed in the doctrinal creed of the religious community to which they belong, but that instruction shall not be exacted of the schoolmaster.

The Courts of Equity in the British Empire will not sanction any system of education in which religion is not included.

In all these European countries there are dissenters from the State religion, and the utmost care is taken to avoid injury to the just views of the different sects, and the injury is avoided by means of combined literary, and separate religious instruction. But the pupil in a school is absolutely required to have some religious instruction from some person, either the teacher, the pastor, or some responsible person.

Some of our political leaders have been telling us, that the home and the Church is the place to teach religion and morals, and not the public school. This is very true so far as it goes, but what about the millions who receive no such instruction either in the home or in the Church? Shall they remain in heathen darkness concerning the highest law of morality, and the sublimest Revelation of divine inspiration with which the world has ever been blessed?

Temporizing and compromising politicians are not the safest guides in public morals and religion.

Some thirty years ago, it will be remembered, the politicians of Cincinnati, for the sake of harmony, prevailed upon the school board of that city, to adopt the following resolution:

"Resolved, That the religious instruction and the reading of religious books, including the Holy Bible, are prohibited in the the Common Schools of Cincinnati." For forty-five years, including the above offensive instruction, the schools prospered and pursued their course in undisturbed tranquility. But in an evil hour it was suggested, that, either the Catholics must be exempt from taxation, or there must be a division of the school

fund, to support separate schools for their children. For the purpose, therefore, of conciliating the Catholics and Jews, the Agnostics, Infidels, and what not, who objected to any religious instruction whatever, the board was persuaded to take the above action in the face of the positive and significant declaration of Archbishop John B. Purcell, of Cincinnati, which is as follows:

"The entire government of public schools in which Catholic youth are educated can not be given over to the civil power.

"We, as Catholics, cannot approve of that system of education for youth which is apart from instruction in the Catholic faith and the teaching of the Church.

"If the School Board can offer anything in conformity with these principles, I am prepared to give it respectful consideration."

Three days after the passage of the above Resolution, the Catholic Telegraph, of Cincinnati, the official organ of that Church, contained the following paragraph:

"The first chapter of this school controversy is now closed; it ends with the triumph of law. The second chapter will open with agitation against the law itself, in the name of justice, and the right that both Protestants and Catholics have to positive religious instruction in separate schools. If the school laws be modified to secure denominational education for all, Catholics will cheerfully pay their portion of the school fund. If this wise amendment cannot be made, taxation for school purposes must cease. Now that the Bible has been excluded from the schools, if the professed Protestants have been sincere in all they have said in its favor, they must agree with the Catholics in the second issue of this question. Consistency will make them our friends in the future."

Another excellent authority among Catholics gave the following deliverance: "The School Board of Cincinnati have voted, we see by the papers, to exclude the Bible and all religious instruction from the public schools of the city. If this has been done with a view to reconciling Catholics to the common school system, its purpose will not be realized. It

does not meet, or in any degree lessen, our objection to the public school system, and only proves the impraticability of that system, in a mixed community; for it proves that the schools must, to be sustained, become thoroughly godless. But to us, godless schools are still less acceptable than sectarian schools, and we object less to the reading of King James' Bible, in the schools, than we do to the exclusion of all religious instruction.

"We will not subject our children to your teachers.

"We will not expose our children to association with all the children who have a right to attend the public schools.

"The plain and undeniable resolution of the whole question is this; the State or the city has no more right to tax me for schooling my neighbors' children than for feeding them, or clothing, or housing them. The utmost that can be granted is, that for abandoned children the State may provide schooling, as it provides food and clothes for its paupers."

The Christian citizens of Cincinnati protested against the Board's action as in direct violation of the State Constitution of Ohio, which says: "Religion, morality, and knowledge being essentially necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of instruction shall forever be encouraged by legislative provision, not inconsistent with the rights of conscience."

The whole question was brought to trial in the Superior Court of Cincinnati. It was argued by able attorneys on both sides before the three supreme justices of the State, of whom, the majority decided against the prohibitory resolution, thus rendering the action of the Board null and void.

The strongest argument on the side of the defense was made by Stanley Matthews, a prominent attorney of Cincinnati, who succeeded John Sherman as United States Senator, and afterwards was appointed by President Garfield to fill the office of Chief Justice of the Supreme Courts of the United States. In presenting his argument to the Judges of the Court, he paid one of the most eloquent tributes to the Holy Scriptures it was ever my privilege to read. He said: "Do

let me say, for I conceive it to be a privilege to say it, that I believe that this book, which I hold in my hand, (the Bible) is a sacred book in the highest sense of the term. I believe that it is the word of the living God, as essential to our spiritual nourishment and life as the bread that we eat is for our bodies. It records the history of the most marvelous appearance that ever occurred in human history—the advent in Judea of the man Christ Jesus, the promised Messiah of old, whom Moses wrote about, and of whom Moses was a feeble type; whom Joshua predicted when he led the hosts to take possession of the promised land; whom all the prophets foretold, and the psalmist sung, and the people sighed for, throughout all the weary ages of their captivity and bondage; who appeared in the light and brightness of the heathen civilization of the Augustan age; who spake as never man spake; who healed the diseases of the people; who opened their eyes; who caused the dumb to speak, the blind to see, the deaf to hear, and preached the Gospel to the poor; who was persecuted because he was the living representative of divine and absolute truth, and who was lifted up on the cross charged with blasphemy untruly, but slain upon the baser charge of treason to the Roman Caesar, while in the very act of declaring that his kingdom was not of this world; lifted up, to be sure, by the hands of men, of ignorant men, for whom and for whose forgiveness he prayed, because they knew not what they did; lifted up by their hands, but in pursuance of a covenant that he had made in eternity with his Father that it should come to pass, because without the shedding of blood there was to be no remission of sin; lifted up in order that he might draw all men unto himself, that whosoever looked upon him might be healed of the poison of original sin, and live. Behold the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world! That, if your Honors please, is my creed."

What surprises me is, that a man with such a creed, and with such high admiration for the sacred Scriptures, should lend his influence and eloquence to bar out of the public schools the very book upon which his soul's life depended. It only shows

how a retainer's fee, and a lawyer's political ambitions, may warp his better judgment. When this same eminent jurist was appointed by the governor of Ohio, to frame the Statute and Rules regulating the Schools of Correction for incorrigibles, and a Reformatory for Girls, of which he himself was one of the directors, he drafted a set of By-laws which made it obligatory upon the Superintendents in charge, to have "daily religious instruction and prayers in the school, and regular devotional services on the Sabbath."

"A Bible and a letter of advice was to be given to each inmate when indentured, and again, when the pupil was discharged, he was to be presented with a Bible and a Letter of Christian admonition."

If it was so important to have Bible reading and religious instruction in the schools of correction and reform, would it not be a wiser policy to bring this moral and religious influence to bear upon the children in the public schools before they become incorrigible and reprobate? Children growing up without any moral or religious training become a dangerous element in any country, but doubly so in a free Republic like ours. If the principle is correct that the State cannot permit and support any religious exercises or functions in connection with any of its institutions, then the chaplains of both houses of congress, of the army and navy, the forts and penitentiaries, the soldiers' homes and reformatories, must all be dismissed; the Bible must be banished from the court room, and from the solemn ceremony connected with the inaugural of the President and the other officials of the government. The President's annual thanksgiving proclamation is an offense to some tender consciences, and must therefore be discontinued. Such a spirit of irreligion as this, is not only destructive of the fundamental principles of our government, but it is in direct opposition to the faith and practice of our fathers.

Listen to President Eliot, of Harvard, as he says: "Nobody knows how to teach morality effectively without religion. Exclude religion from education and you will leave no foundation upon which to build a moral character."

The National Teachers' Association in its meeting in Chicago a few years ago passed the following resolutions:

First: "That the attempt to separate the cultivation of the moral and intellectual powers which prevails to a certain extent in the school system of today is unphilosophical, injurious to children and dangerous to the State.

Second: "That in the judgment of this Association the Bible should be recognized as the text-book of ethics, and that the Word of God which made free schools should hold an honored place in them."

Still further and more definitely the Honorable W. T. Harris, U. S. commissioner of education, says: "While the education of the American people supported by taxes and public funds is becoming more and more rigidly secular in character and the lines drawn more closely which separate it from ecclesiastical and religious instruction, yet the true importance of religious instruction is coming to be better understood among scientific and philosophical thinkers. Hence all people whether connected with one or another denomination of Christians, or whether holding a religion other than Christian, or holding no conscious religion at all, must admit the importance of the religious instruction of the community."

IV. We will conclude this paper with a brief reference to the duty of the Lutheran Church in this matter. What ought, what can she do toward solving this difficult problem, or what can she do to avert the danger to both Church and State, by the secularization of our public schools?

It is certainly true, that the Lutheran Church, through her founder Martin Luther, and her great teacher Melanchthon, is largely responsible for the existence of the public school system throughout the Protestant world in Europe and America.

Both national and obligatory education, as understood in modern times had their origin in the Reformation. When man was made responsible for the religious "faith that was in him," it became necessary for him to read and interpret the Bible for himself. This explains the great attention that Luther and Melanchthon gave to the establishment of schools

for the people. After Luther's revolt from Romanism, he constantly advocated universal education and urged the establishment of schools for the masses. While he believed that the church was the mother of the school, he urged the establishment of schools by municipalities. In 1524, in an address to the mayors and aldermen of Germany, he says:

"Dear rulers, if we must spend so much yearly upon artillery, roads, bridges, dykes, and innumerable other things of the same kind, in order that a city may have temporal peace and tranquility,—why should we not spend as much on the poor, needy youth, that we may support an able man or two for schoolmasters?"

He not only urged the establishment of schools by every city and village for the mental and moral training of the youth, but he urged such a course, as a duty the municipality owed to itself. He believed that the safety, strength, and perpetuity of municipalities depended more on the schools they established, than on their armies and fortifications.

In a letter to John the Constant, who had succeeded his brother Frederick the Wise as elector, in 1525, he says:

"Where there is a city which has the ability, your electoral grace has the power to compel the people to support schools, pulpits, and parishes. It they will not do it for their salvation, then consider that your electoral grace, as highest guardian of the youth and of all others needing supervision, shall compel them to do so, just as they are compelled to give and render services toward bridges, paths, roads, or other matters pertaining to the public interest."

But his plans for universal education did not end with the establishment and support of schools by municipalities. In his sermon on the "Duty of sending children to school," he insists that it is both the right, and the duty of the state to enact laws compelling parents to send their children to school. He says:

"I maintain that the civil authorities are under obligations to compel the people to send their children to school. If the government can compel such citizens as are fit for military service to bear spear and rifle, to mount ramparts, and perform

other martial duties in time of war, how much more has it a right to compel the people to send their children to school, because in this case we are warring with the devil, whose object it is, secretly to exhaust our cities and principalities of their strong men."

There is scarcely any phase of education that was left untouched by Luther. As one has well said: "If we survey the pedagogy of Luther in all its extent, and imagine it fully realized in practice, what a splendid picture the schools and education of the Sixteenth Century would present! We should have courses of study, text books, teachers, methods, principles, that could serve as models for our age."

But Luther was too little understood by his own age, and his plans were but imperfectly realized. Still his labors brought forth much good fruit from their beginning.

Wherever the Reformation spread, plans for universal education accompanied it. In 1542 Calvin organized the ecclesiastical state of Geneva. Education was made universal, and, so far as Calvin was able to realize his plans, it was obligatory. In 1560 the Protestants of France took up the cause of universal education.

What Calvin did for education in Geneva, John Knox attempted in Scotland. The civil authorities gave Knox very little assistance, and it was not until 1633 that there was a legal enactment for the establishment of schools. Children were instructed in the rudiments, and in the catechism. Thus the great movement (which began with Luther's breaking the ecclesiastical shackles) of universal education was inaugurated. The greatest victory and success, we trust, will be attained in the American Union.

We believe that the Lutheran Church, with her universal system of catechisation, is best equipped, of all the Protestant denominations, to supplement the largely secular education of the schools, by a thorough inculcation of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity. If the pastors and parochial teachers will have the children under their training for several hours each week, the moral and spiritual natures of the children will

have opportunity for development, and the serious lack of our schools in this particular will be largely amended, so that the rising generation need not pass into life's stern realities "without God and without hope in the world."

We therefore propose the following theses for consideration:

1. Every good citizen should encourage and support the common school as the best system of educating the masses.

2. The Bible is the only correct standard of morals; it should not be excluded from the public schools; suitable selections should be read daily from its sacred pages.

3. That no pupil should be granted a certificate of graduation from the Grammar or High School, without passing a satisfactory examination in morals and religion.

4. That the Protestant churches should insist upon such a standard, and if the teachers cannot meet the requirements, that the pastors offer their services to the school board, and if need be without compensation, so that the poorest child in the community may be instructed in the fundamental principles of morals and religion, which are calculated to promote honesty, sobriety, industry and good citizenship. *

*In support of the positions taken in this paper, the author refers the reader to the following authorities:

A Sytem of Moral Science, by Laurens P. Hickok, D.D., late Pres. Union College, Chap. IX. page 229.

Systematic Theology, Charles Hodge, D.D., Vol. 3, page 356.

Doctrinal Theology, Heinrich Schmid, page 633.

ARTICLE V.

AVAILING PRAYER.

By Thomas Reisch, B. D.

"And what is prayer?
'Tis a missive sped by faith;
'Tis a thought, a sigh, a breath;
'Tis the soul's repentant cry
In the ears of God most high;
Messenger sent forth for food;
'Tis the speech of man with God;
'Tis the letter of our love
To our Father's home above;
Incense rising to the skies
Morning, evening, sacrifice."

Prayer is a means by which man holds communication with God, a means through which the lower approaches the Higher, the finite the Infinite. In order that one may intelligently approach and appeal to one higher in rank, it is proper that he should have an adequate conception of the manner of that approach and appeal. There is hardly any propriety in asking a Christian whether he believes in prayer. That is to be assumed from the very nature of circumstances. But it is right for everyone professing the Christian religion to ask and assure himself as to what reality there is in prayer; on what ground he approaches a Higher Power; what he may expect to accomplish for self and environment through prayer; to what extent he may hope for answered prayer.

It is the purpose of this paper to arrive at some rational conception of the reality of prayer.

In order that this may be done it is necessary to know the nature of man as distinguished from the brute creation, and the nature of God as the Infinite World Power, as well as the relation which God sustains to the world in general and to human-kind in particular.

1. As to the nature of man we observe that he is above everything else personal. By this we mean everything contained in that term. He is a creature not of circumstances,

but of his own making. He distinguishes himself from other creatures, by objectifying consciousness, knowing that he knows: "Cogito ergo sum," can be applied to man alone. Man alone is capable of moral acts. He does not act from blind impulses or irrational instinct.

Whether we look upon man as the grand crowning result of an evolutionary process, or as the finished product of a direct creative fiat, we must grant him the power of choice, that which is the telling feature of personality. When two motives present themselves to the mind, there at once arises a moral conflict, necessitating an act of judgment. Motives are weighed and while they are not causal for acts, that which seems at the time best to the observer, is decided upon. Such an act is a moral act. "The fundamental basis of the true moral faculty is found in self-consciousness, which constitutes man into a 'free' personality capable of reflecting on the facts of his conscious life, able to regard motives in an ascending and descending scale of value, to choose between such as present themselves as alternatives, and to give the effecting place to any motive, not in virtue of its momentary strength, but of its ethical quality.—There is nothing in purely animal psychology to correspond with this sense of this qualitative difference between the alternatives of choice. Animals may hesitate before they act, that is, when conflicting impulses within them are in unstable equilibrium. The hesitation, however, at once ceases, as soon as any one impulse emerges into dominance, and the action follows as inevitably as a moving body follows the resultant line of mechanical forces pressing upon it. Man, on the contrary, can reflect on his warring impulses; he can judge, rearrange, and control such motives as may be present in his mind, and by his self determining power settle whether he shall obey them or dismiss them out of his regard altogether. To the objective observer he may still seem to be determined by the strongest motive, but as he subjectively observes himself, he knows that he is not the mere sport of any motive, but a free agent who has given some particular motive the victory in obedience to a higher or lower ideal of conduct, which he chooses as the regulative principle of his character. Ethical

action, thus, is not uncaused action; it is 'self-caused.' To be free means that one is determined by nothing but by oneself. No animal possesses a self in this higher sense, nor any dawning sense of it: and moral freedom is thus another distinguishing mark of the genus homo." In this man stands out unique as the controlling center of the animal creation.

Man is again distinguished from the brute creation in that he is constantly bound by duty, whether in the sphere of the human or of the divine; there constantly looms up before him the vision of the "ought." Here again there is no difference, whether through an evolving process God has brought him from that which was impersonal to this state of freedom, or so endowed him when he first beheld the light of day. There was a moment from which man recognized himself in a condition of relations. This imposing condition of relations at once distinguished him as being in a sphere of the personal. Animals have not this sense of duty, because in them there is not the essential to personality, though sentient. To them are present no objects of ideal choice, because of being utterly incapable of them. But man lives and moves and has his being in the realm of personality, which at once puts him into the sphere of obligations as well as of rights. This recognition of duty is alone capable of a rational intelligent being. Man being the only creature possessing rational intelligence is the only creature capable of answering to the basal reality of personality, the only creature in the domain of moral agency.

Another characteristic feature of personality is the religious attitude. Man alone is a homage-paying creature,—homage-paying to God, which distinguishes him and places him wholly in the domain of personality. Only as a creature is evolved or directly created for worship of a deity is his personality perfected. In the domain of ethics, man recognizes duty to man; in religion, duty to God. How the race has come to possess these religious faculties is not for us to discuss here; suffice it to note that every human creature, from the lowest Hottentot to the highest in the scale of civilization, has them, and it is this which forms the crowning feature of personality. Personality then is predicated of that being which is capable

of self-recognition, self-determination, of moral choices; capable of distinguishing self from other objects, of self-identification, weighing motives, of rational choices, as well as a homage-paying, divinity-worshiping creature. Such a creature is man.

Personality may develop to higher attainments through the lapse of ages to come, but this does not argue that the human constitution is not already possessed with all the essentials for complete personality, yea, so complete is it, so perfectly independent is man in his higher self, that he may even by the effort of will, which is the distinguishing feature of personality, arrest the evolution of his moral and intellectual possibilities. "That there is such a fact as arrested moral development in man is beyond controversy." *

2. Now that we know the nature of man to be above everything else personal, it is necessary that we also have some idea of the nature of God. If man is a personal being, in order that he may have fellowship and communion with another, it is necessary that that one be also personal; hence we must posit personality for God, if prayer is in any way to avail. It is not our purpose to attempt in this paper a proof for the existense of a God. But being persuaded in our minds of an "Infinite World Ground" an "All Efficient First Cause," it is yet proper to have a definite understanding as to the nature of such a "Cause," and for the Christian Theist that "World Ground" is first and last a Personality. In all the various proofs for the existence of God there are elements which at the same time also argue for the personality of the Infinite. By these various proofs we are brought face to face with the fact that this First Cause is not a blind, unintelligent impersonal force, starting with an indeterminate something, "mere being" as Hegel puts it, having no attributes by which it is set off, gradually evolving until it merges into consciousness in humanity, but that God is a personal being. These elements thus revealed—the elements of personality—are found to be "reason or intelligence and free-will or self-determination." In the ontological argument we are forced to think of God as the Most Perfect Being, if we think of Him at all in any rational

* Jones' *Ascent Through Christ.*

way. If we thus think of God we can ascribe to him nothing short of free intelligence. In the cosmological argument we arrive at a primary cause, which is itself uncaused which we find to be an originating will-force. This in turn is strengthened by the teleological argument, which sees design in the universe, finding its culmination in the human mind. When we look at this grand organism which we call man it is impossible to think of that which caused it to be something less than that which was caused.

Mind then as free and intelligent must be posited for the originating power of all things, since it is alone in mind that will-force has its sphere. Now that we see conscious designs in our own activities of consciousness and at the same time know ourselves to be personal beings, so also is it forced upon us as we look out upon the universe to see designs and adaptations, hence the designs of a Higher Personality. "As human personality is the supreme fact in man's nature, the one in which he comes into free power and all his highest distinctions, so the divine personality is pre-eminently that in which God is the Highest Perfection of being." *

3. We have thus reached the conclusion of pure personality in both the human and divine constitutions. We have here reached a condition in which intercourse is possible, in which man can commune with God because both are distinct personalities. This forms then a legitimate basis for prayer, so far as the respective natures of man and the Infinite are concerned. Before, however, we can have a clear understanding of the reality or in fact the possibility of such prayer, it is necessary to consider the relation which God sustains to the universe. The fact of His specific personality, precludes at once any Pantheistic idea of this relation. God is not to be identified with nature as the result of an evolutionary process from simple being, nor with any other mode of revelation in which we lose the personal identity of His nature. The universe we believe to be an effect which necessarily demands a cause. Since no effect can at any time be its own cause we must posit something outside of the universe as the efficient cause.

* Valentine, *Nat. Theo.* p. 227.

Nor would we here enter into the Deistic demands for God's relation to this creation. This represents God as having set the world in running order as a mechanic his merchanism, after which the world was hurled into space to run its own course without providence or care for its well being. This bespeaks an absolute transcendence for the Infinite which would destroy what we believe to be God's overshadowing design, the creation of personality for the grand purpose of communion. This would form a gulf between Creator and the creature in His own image, impassable by prayer or supplication. While such an extreme separation should not be included in our notion of the relation of the Deity to the world, "yet God must be before and above the universe of created existence."

Nor on the other hand must we conceive of God as so thoroughly immanent in, and through, creation, that we would preclude the fact of established, immutable laws by which creation moves. God indeed works through second causes, Himself, however, the originator of that force which we call law. He is not to be thought of as at every moment creating or Himself being the immediate cause of every effect in the world. We must give place to, and acknowledge what we may call regularly established laws upon which the universe is run. To this extent we believe God's will to be immutable and fixed, so that we notice laws of health or growth or what not, in the world, which are externally producing the same conditions.

But in the world of personality God reigns supreme, yet that reign conditioned upon the contingency of the will of man whom He has created for perfect freedom. In this sphere God is to be looked upon as able to control the thoughts of man by His overshadowing power, leading man's affection, tempering his impulses, and all that we may attribute to personality. Even as in human kind one personality is often invested with an undaunted superiority over another, and, hence, capable of influencing another, so we conceive of God, yet in an infinite degree, capable, of leading and guiding those who by their own power are not willing to resist Him. Here perhaps we are in accord with Alexander Pope when he says:

> "Who '(God)' gave me in this dark estate
> To know the good from ill,
> And binding nature fast in fate
> Left free the human will."

By this we mean nothing more and nothing less than that God must, to be true to his nature here as we understand it, always keep in accord with the forces of natare which He himself set in order, yet Himself moves in and through the realm of personality as only perfect personality can and may.

4. With such a conception of the nature of man as true personality; the nature of God as true personality; God always in accord with the laws in the universe of which He himself is the author, yet related to man as personality to personality, what does prayer avail for us?

Stoicism is in part right in this its teaching. "Like the course of a river fate moves forward without contradiction or delay, in an irresistible stream, where one wave pushes on another. He knows little of God that imagines it may be controlled. There is no changing the purpose even of a wise man, for he sees beforehand what will be best for the future. How much more unchangeable, then, is the Almighty, to whom all future is always present?" The mistake of Stoicism here is that it makes this irresistible stream "Fate" considering man bound up in it as any other atom, distributing one intelligent soul through all reasonable animals, or in other words they made it Pantheistic. Let us substitute the term Providence for Fate. Then it is not difficult to harmonize this conception with God's goodness. Man was not an afterthought in God's divine economy, but it was the purpose of God's infinite plan to harmonize His modes of operation with the needs of man, for the realization of that destiny which man was to fulfill. God is always consistent with this plan and it is for man to discover it and its laws and demands, that he too may harmonize his actions and motives with this infinite plan. And our prayer in so far as it refers to nature might as well be the Stoic's prayer: "Give what thou wilt, take back what thou wilt." To suppose that God could interfere at any time with these pre-established laws of nature in answer to prayer, would presuppose a corresponding miracle.

At this point we may mention two attempts at answering the foregoing: (1) "The universe, with all the workings of its natural forces, may from eternity have been adjusted with reference to the foreknown prayers that were to be answered. In this case the natural operation of things brings about the accomplishment of the thing asked for. The answer to the prayer is as real as if effected by a supernatural and special interruption of the ordinary course of nature." This is, to say the least, an ingenious proposition.

2. "Or it may be supposed as Dr. Chalmers conceived that the answer is effected by a divine influence wrought on the invisible and untraceable powers of nature, while yet to all visible appearance the uniformity of nature remains undisturbed." This second view differs from the first in that it represents God as a changeable Being, to which proposision we could in no wise subscribe.

There is no need for any of the above explanations if we are willing to hold prayer within its proper sphere, which is alone the spiritual. If we are willing to admit that God does all things well in the physical realm, in which man has no part of control, but alone to put himself into harmony with the laws, co-operating therein, we may safely retire to that sphere where the soul, and alone the soul, of man is concerned, and there look for the answer to the soul's desires. It is in this sphere that as personality communing with personality interaction takes place. In the human sphere we see one personality influencing another. The power of personality comes under our observation every day. We come in contact with men and women in our daily experience who constantly draw us into better purposes and resolutions. We beseech superior personages for their intervention, their help, their directing powers to help us into right relations. Even so as person addressing person we beseech the Almighty, Infinite personality to lead us into right relations. As such we may pray, and expect answer to our prayer, that God may so come into touch with us and influence us to saving relations with Him and His great and holy plan concerning creation. But while the analogy between the influence of the Divine personality upon the

human personality and the influence of human personality upon human personality gives us an illustration, yet the influence of the Divine may be as infinite as that Personality is infinite.

Yet while this interaction of spirit upon spirit is a reality, we must confess that as all personality is endowed with freedom, such interaction, or influence may be repelled. But where we come to a realization of our limitations on account of the finiteness of our nature, we realize that higher need for help which alone the Infinite Spirit can give, and then it is that through prayer God may be moved to pity and grief out of sympathy with one's condition, for is not human personality moved when approached or besought by another? "The heart of God is where want and weakness are, and sorrow and shame that cry for deliverance and pardon and creatures that hold up hands of appeal for pity and help. God is where love is and love is where her help is most sorely needed." (Jones p. 254). And to this we add that the help needed by the creatures is alone in the realm of the spiritual, for it is here that character is made fit for its everlasting dwelling with the Lord. It is when we thus look upon the relation of God to His universe, that we may yet bring cheer to the starving mother in a famishing land as she looks, with anguish depicted upon her face, upon her starving babe as it cries for food. It is when we can tell such an one that it is only in the spiritual universe that God is free to come to the aid of His crying child, but that the laws of nature are fixed once for all, that we can still persuade her that God is good.

Though the human freedom is complete we yet through the Fall have missed the mark, have taken the wrong direction to the appointed goal, that is, humanity has not taken the straight path to the intended ideal, has become vain, and empty of righteousness, yea even transgressed that which was laid down for man's law or rule of life; in other words, personality became perverted, and now as one personality beseeches another in human needs, so we through prayer beseech the infinite personality for help, for strength and guidance in the right direction. Again, prayer has a reflex value which often brings its own answer even in the physical realm. Christian

science is not without its fundamental reality. Whatever is brought to bear upon the human will with its subtile forces is putting in power realities which are not realized by the unobservant. And any means by which these forces are brought into play is the direct agency to the desired end. What is prayer unless it is the means by which one puts himself in a condition where he is open to all the influences which bear upon the coveted object? By this is meant, for example, when one prays for the full light of any book he reads, that he himself brings to bear upon that book all the power of concentration of which he is capable, shutting himself off from any distracting influences whatsoever. What is prayer for health and strength but the bringing to bear upon that one object, health, all the powers of the will accompanied by hard work in the gymnasium? What would it have profited Luther to have prayed for Melanchthon's restoration to health, had not the nurse and physicians exercised every precaution that the proper medicines be administered at the proper time? Prayer then, is the most protent factor of man's life in any sphere of activity, in this, namely, that it brings all of his powers, influenced and directed by the divine power, to bear upon the thing asked for, by quickening all of his spiritual energies, by the strengthening of his purposes, and by bringing all of his spiritual faculties into full activity—thus making possible the attainment of the desired object.

ARTICLE VI.

JOHN OF BARNEVELD

By Rev. George C. Henry, A. M.

All students know William the Silent as the founder of the independence of the United Provinces of the Netherlands, but all do not know that John of Barneveld was founder of the commonwealth itself, and during forty years of as troubled and fertile an epoch as any in human history was second to none of his contemporaries. As advocate and keeper of the Great Seal of Holland he was virtually prime minister, president, attorney-general, finance minister and minister of foreign affairs of the whole republic. For long years it was he who took the lead in all state deliberations, moved resolutions, advocated great measures of state, saw that they were executed, collected the votes, summed up the proceedings, corresponded with and instructed ambassadors, received and negotiated with foreign ministers, besides directing and holding in his hands the various threads of the home policy, and the rapidly growing colonial system of the Republic.

The monarchs on nearly all the thrones of Europe at that time were mostly figure-heads, and among the few statesmen there was no stronger man than John of Barneveld, and none with a harder, a more complicated, and (as the sad sequel shows) a more thankless task, than he.

Born of the ancient and knightly house of Oldenbarneveldt in Amersfoort in 1547, the heir of good blood on both sides, but not of large possessions, he was a diligent and hard-working man from his youth up. Immersing himself in profound studies in the universities of Holland, France, Italy and Germany, he was, at an early age, one of the first civilians of his time, and a successful practitioner before the tribunals of Holland, becoming at twenty-nine chief pensionary of Rotterdam, an important post. Almost paralyzed, as the Republic was when assassination had done its worst with William the Silent Barneveld had been willing to suggest and would have been ready to promote conferring the sovereign countship (just

ready to have been conferred upon the illustrious father) on the eighteen-year-old son Maurice then a student at Leyden, but his clear judgment guided his confederates into first offering the protectorship of all the provinces first to England, then to France. The offer being almost spurned by both monarchs because of the possibility of war with the then greatest power on earth—Spain,—Barneveld now propose and carried the appointment of Maurice of Nassau to the Stadholdership of Holland. This came to pass mid fierce opposition and vehement debate and it was after just as vehement urging afterward on the part of the nobles and regents of the cities of Holland, that Barneveld after repeatedly declining the arduous and most responsible office, was, at last, induced to accept the post of advocate of that Province. Notice here and now, and remember, that he did it under the remarkable condition that, in any case any negotiation should be undertaken for the purpose of bringing back the Province of Holland under the dominion of the King of Spain, he should be considered as from that moment relieved from the service.

Among the very first questions to be at least partially settled was the great and vital one to Barneveld of Church and State. It was inevitable in a country like the Netherlands without a personal sovereign, that between the new Church and the civil government there would be a struggle for the mastery. It was three hundred years ago and they had happily in Holland got one step ahead of Spain in that they did not burn, hang, and bury alive culprits guilty of another creed than the dominant one. That one was the Reformed religion founded on the Netherland Confession and the Heidelberg Catechism. Across in England, Henry VIII, Elizabeth, and afterwards James, were local popes, but in Holland and in the Reformed Church the simplicity was fairly severe, the dogma imperious, the creed infallible. It was the true religion and there was no other. At this time and to the end, in arneveld's opinion the question of dogma was subordinate to that of church government. So when it was asked to whom the splendid old minsters in the cities belonged, and the humble but beautiful parish churches in every town and village, Barneveld said that they belonged

to the State; to the community represented by the states of the provinces, the magistrates of the cities and municipalities. And the other reply was: to the Church itself, the one true Church represented by its elders and deacons and preachers. Very well; and to whom belonged the right of prescribing laws and ordinances of public worship, of appointing preachers, schoolmasters, sextons? To the Holy Ghost inspiring the Class and the Synod, said the Church. No; said the magistrates; it belongs to the civil authority which maintains the churches and pays the salaries. Barneveld's judgment effected a compromise in 1590, that guided in the appointment of a board composed of both civil functionaries and church officials in equal numbers. The years passed on toward the close of the sixteenth century, Barneveld being constantly employed in diplomatic and state affairs, his ability recognized by Kings and nobles wherever he went, even haughty Elizabeth Tudor being pacified by his eloquence and saying, "I will assist you even if you were up to the neck in water," pointing expressively to her chin.

Contenting ourselves, owing to time limitations, to the barest outline and the principal events only, we see the young stadholder on the highest crest of the wave of popularity, the central figure of the current history of Europe. Twenty-four years had passed and now in his forty-second year in the very vigor of life, his possible elevation to the throne of Holland floated entrancingly before his vision, but the scheme seemed so fraught with danger to Maurice that it was reluctantly abandoned by his best friends among whom was the Advocate. Of course Barneveld had long exercised great powers and become, as it were, the chief magistrate of an important commonwealth, and just how much this affected him at that time, who will say? But it is sad enough to relate that despite the clear and cogent and well-founded reasoning Barneveld gained only the undying hatred of Maurice of Nassau.

Barneveld was tall and majestic of presence with large, quadrangular face, austere blue eyes looking authority and command, a vast forehead and a grizzled beard. His eloquence with either tongue or pen was fluent and convincing. He could

pack much in few words always caring more for the substance than the graces of speech or composition. He stood the consistent champion and strenuous to the last, of the civil authority over Church as well as State. Remember we are in an inflammable age now with these men Barneveld and Grotius, and as much as it was possible Barneveld turned his eyes from the subtle points of a theology which had the undivided attention of all the Netherlanders and who were ready to take each other by the throat on the great point at issue, and that point was—absolute predestination. Maurice, a steady church-goer, was no theologian and was wont to say that he knew nothing about predestination,—"whether it was green or whether it was blue. He only knew that his pipe and the Advocate's were not likely to make music together."

In 1603 James Harmenson, known historically as Jacobus Arminius, a learned and able divine of a meek Christian spirit, was appointed to a professorship of theology at Leyden. That was the spark to the powder. Then arose in his wrath the great Gomarus, likewise professor of theology at Leyden since 1594, the leader of the severe Calvinistic party, and the declared adversary of Arminianism which with all the powers of splendid eloquence, profound learning, and the intense bigotry of conviction, he denounced as horrible heresy. Arminius, "condemned by others," as Grotius says, "condemned none," and in the midst of the *rabies theologorum* from which the amiable and learned Melanchthon in his day prayed to be delivered, Arminius died. But Arminianism did not die. Its principles found their way in the masses and began to be internally developed. Originally taken to mean the assertion of universal grace and conditional election, it gradually came to denote a much more comprehensive tendency of liberality both in religion and morals. To the Gomarists the symbolical books explained Scripture absolutely; while the Arminians waved the flag of exegetical freedom and would be bound by the symbolical books only in so far as they agreed with Scripture. Hot Gospellers of the Church Militant three hundred years ago indeed were those Dutchmen. But serene amid that passionate throng, clear, steady, star-like, was the Advo-

cate, animated by the guiding principle that he was the servant and officer of the States of Holland. Like another he

> "bore his faculties so meek, was
> So clear in his great office,"

that he was for a long time in all civil matters the chief of the whole country. But the anger of his opponents, secret and open, was rapidly increasing. Envy, jealousy, political and clerical hate, swarmed about him and stung him at every step. Maurice seems actually to have enjoyed hearing Barneveld villified, who stood, as he himself wrote, "to remain good and true to my Lords the States, to the fatherland, and to the true Christian religion". I hope, he continues, "that God Almighty will second my upright conscience and cause his majesty to see the injustice done to me and mine." Maurice's free-will caused him, however, to see differently and along with the advanced orthodox party was, and continued to be, a most bitter hatred of Barneveld, having a faithful second in James of England, a would-be pedagogue of emperors, kings and republics, and despot-theologian, through whom the Advocate saw as if he had been made of glass. Barneveld's enemies went so far, indeed, as to insinuate that his design was "of no other nature than so to stem the course of the State that insensibly the Provinces shall fall by relapse into the hands of Spain!" Motley says that a more despicable idea never entered a human brain, for every word, action and thought of Barneveld's life was a refutation of it, and it was his desire to maintain with unchanging constancy the authority of the Dutch Government, the privileges and laws of the country, as well as the true Reformed religion. The men quailed before his majestic intellect, they hated him for the power which was its necessary result. Patient and devouring envy dogged his every footstep and jealousy followed him like his shadow. Well does his biographer observe that "there is nothing less surprising nor more sickening for those who observe public life and wish to retain faith in the human species, than the almost infinite power of the meanest of passions." What a strange age it was! Can we imagine a minister coming from the Court of St. James provided with more than seven vials of theological wrath and de-

livering long sermons upon abstruse points of divinity with ecclesiastical history before the States-General in accordance with elaborate instructions drawn up by his sovereign with his own hand?

We are now prepared to view more closely that contest which the Advocate was called to wage—a personal and political one, but fought to the finish with weapons taken from ecclesiastical arsenals. It was now an unequal contest, for the great captain of the country and of his time, the Son of William the Silent, in the fulness of his fame and the vigor of his years, had taken his place as the chieftain of the Contra-Remonstrants. Maurice and Barneveld were now in a death-grapple. The Contra-Remonstrants whom Maurice headed—who were they? They were the Gomarists referred to a few lines back, while the Arminians were the Remonstrants so-called for their having presented a *Remonstrantia* consisting of five articles to the estates of Holland and West Friesland. Here are the celebrated five points of Arminianism: 1. That God from all eternity predestinated to eternal life those who He foresaw would have permanent faith in Christ. 2. That Christ died for all mankind and not simply for the elect. 3. That man of himself and by the power of his free-will cannot do or think anything good and, hence, requires regeneration by the Holy Spirit. 4. That the grace of God though not irresistible, is the beginning, the progress, the perfection of everything a good man does or thinks. 5. That those who are grafted into Christ and partake of His vivifying spirit have the means by which to fight against Satan, sin and the world and their own flesh, and to obtain victory by the aid on the Holy Spirit implying, of course, the possibility of falling from Divine grace just as the fourth implies the possibility of the resistance of Divine grace. O that the pages of European history were not blotted with the wretched recital of the sectarian quarrels which once cursed every country! O the bitter hatreds! Think of Protestants in Germany, England and France not only in a life and death struggle with Catholics but also seeking to exterminate one another. Nor are the Netherlands backward in entering the same bloody arena. Two professors at the University of Ley-

den take sides on the eternal question of fate and free-will. The disciples of each line up into two separate camps; the controversy waxes hot, and the dispute vitriolic. The one only true Church, the Reformed Church of Holland, is split into two hostile sects with feelings toward each other anything but as soft as the oil which once ran down Aaron's beard. Who is to solve this question? It is as old as Job and as insoluble as the Sphinx. Among the Hebrews, the Greeks, the Romans, the Mohammedans, and the Christians it has puzzled men and severely tested the mental powers of thinkers. The astute Dutchmen were no exception but unfortunately the debate took an especially hateful form. The partisans of free-will insisted that if a man does not act from free-will, if his acts are foreordained by a Divine power which he cannot resist, then there can be no human responsibility for them, and to say that for sins thus foreordained men are to be punished is to deny the goodness of God.

On the other hand, the partisans of predestination insisted that nothing can take place without the foreknowledge and ordinance of God; that to deny this is to deny His omniscience and omnipotence. The debate, of course, went on from bad to worse until it became a disease, "a disease which speedily took an acute form breaking out here and there into mob murders."

Nor must we forget the miserable complication of religious question and political struggle. We must remember that Maurice wished to make himself virtually a monarch and that for reasons which seemed to him good and sufficient. Barneveld had been opposed to this, and this action of the leaders of republican tendency headed by Barneveld led to bitter hatred between them. Right then and there it was that Maurice saw in this wretched struggle between Calvinism and Arminianism his opportunity. He saw that the Gomarists had the populace on their side. As we have seen, he neither knew nor cared for the doctrines of the Contra-Remonstrants, but they were getting the upper hand, and that was enough for him as a politician. He tied his course to theirs, became the firm ally of fanatical peasants and their clerical managers, and went in

solemn state to the divine service at the Cloister Church accompanied by thousands who vainly attempted to gain admission into the overflowing aisles while the Great Church was comparatively empty, only a few hundred worshiping there. Yet, stranger than fiction, no one disputed the obligation of all parties to maintain the Reformed religion. But the question was whether the Five Points were inconsistent with the Reformed religion. Barneveld was no theologian, but he believed himself to be a Christian, and he certainly was a thoughtful and humble one. He did not profess to pierce behind the veil and arrogantly read the thoughts of the Almighty. The demand of party malice sunk men to an abysmal depth when they could accuse of treason a man who hoped for religious toleration. What would we think of a man over seventy writing as follows: "Believe and cause others to believe, that I am, and with the grace of God hope to continue, an upright patriot as I have proved myself to be in the last forty-two years spent in the public service. In the matter of different religious points I remain of the opinions which I have held for more than fifty years, and in which I hope to live and die, to wit, that a good Christian man ought to believe that he is predestined to eternal salvation through God's grace, giving for reasons that he through God's grace has a firm belief that his salvation is founded purely on God's grace and the expiation of our sins through our Saviour Jesus Christ, and that if he should fall into any sins his firm trust is that God will not let him persist in them, but mercifully turn him to repentance, so that he may continue in the same belief to the last."

Maurice could settle mooted points very cavalierly. His father had been raised to power by the strict Calvinists and he meant to stand by those who had always sustained William the Silent. "For this religion my father lost his life, and this religion will I defend," said he.

"You hold then," said Barneveld, "that the Almighty has created one child for damnation and another for salvation, and you wish this doctrine to be publicly preached."

"Did you ever hear any one preach that?" replied the Prince.

"If they don't preach it, it is their inmost conviction," said

the other. And he proceeded to prove his position by copious citations. "And suppose our ministers do preach this doctrine, is there anything strange in it, any reason why they should not do so?"

The Advocate expressed his amazement and horror at the idea. "But does not God know from all eternity who is to be saved and who is to be damned; and does He create men for any other end than that to which He knows from eternity they will come?" And so they enclosed themselves in the eternal circle out of which it was probable that neither the soldier nor the statesman would soon find an issue.

"I am no theologian," said Barneveld at last, breaking off the discussion.

"Neither am I," said the Stadholder. "So let the parsons come together. Let the Synod assemble and decide the question. Thus we shall get out of all this."

And the Synod did assemble, called a prodigious piece of machinery, the famous Synod of Dort, beginning on the thirteenth of November, 1618, and continuing until the ninth of May, 1619. It held one hundred and eighty sessions, all the doings of which have been recorded in chronicles innumerable. "Words, words, words." Things had already come to such a pass in the preceding August (1618) that Maurice on the crest of a wave of popularity and in the current of fanaticism had been able to arrest Barneveld and Grotius and send them to prison. Behold the lengths to which religious bigotry can go as you see John of Barneveld, a statesman renowned throughout Europe, his whole life full of high service to his country, his religious views tolerant, at the age of seventy-two stooping with age and leaning on a staff, carried to prison! It was the old fable of the sick lion and the beasts coming and heaping all sorts of indignities upon it, even the ass flinging its heels into its face. Europe rang with the news; villanous lampoons and libels were showered; his relatives could not appear on the streets without being exposed to insults and without hearing scurrilous and obscene verses against their father and themselves in which neither sex nor age was spared. Lies and libels along with calumnies and caricatures did their dirty, dev-

ilish, damnable work; the Republic became meanly and shamelessly lunatic, while "many who had been promoted by him to high places," says a contemporary, "and were wont to worship him as a God in hope that he would lift them up still higher, now deserted him and ridiculed him and joined the rest of the world in heaping dirt upon him."

On the third day of his imprisonment the venerable statesman wrote this letter to his family:

"My very dear wife, children, children-in-law, and grandchildren, I know that you are sorrowful for the troubles which have come upon me, but I beg of you to seek consolation from God the Almighty and to comfort each other. I know before the Lord God of having given no single lawful reason for the misfortunes which have come upon me, and I will with patience await from His divine hand and from my lawful superiors a happy issue, knowing well that you and my other well-wishers will with your prayers and good offices do all that you can to that end. And so, very dear wife, children, children-in-law, and grand-children, I commend you to God's holy keeping.

"Your dear husband, father, father-in-law, and grand-father,

"JOHN OF BARNEVELD."

The result of the Synod of Dort was a foregone conclusion. It was packed from the beginning; its proceedings determined by intimidation and intrigue rather than by discussion, the Arminians having little chance and being simply outclamored and voted down. The assembly was at once accuser and judge; the five articles of Arminianism were condemned; two hundred Remonstrant ministers were deposed, being told that to oppose the Synod was to rebel against the Holy Spirit, while those among them who would not promise to keep silent were banished.

The way was now open to dispose of Barneveld who for nearly seven months had sat with no charges brought against him and whose trial did not begin until the seventh of March. The court which tried him was composed largely of enemies who up to the first of May had examined him in all about sixty times, apparently having waited until the devout and spiritually-minded, heavenly-minded Synod of Dort had de-

clared all Arminians guilty of pestilent errors and corrupters of the true faith and their doctrines damnable.

Sunday afternoon, May 12th, about half past five o'clock, John of Barneveld enfeebled by age, physical illness, and by the exhaustion of a long imprisonment, heard his sentence from twenty-four judges dooming him to a traitor's death, judges who were unborn when he with other patriotic youths had faced the terrible legions of Alva in defence of the Fatherland, and who but for such labors, courage, wisdom, and sacrifices, might never have had a Fatherland to serve, or a judgment-seat on which to pronounce condemnation.

In his last letter to his family he announces the heavy and sorrowful tidings and that he must prepare himself to die to-morrow, and then continues:

"I console myself in God the Lord, who knows all hearts and will judge all men. I beg you all together to do the same. I have steadily and faithfully served my Lords, the State of Holland and their nobles and cities. Live together in love and peace. Pray for me to Almighty God who will graciously hold us all in his holy keeping."

At half-past nine o'clock on Monday, the 13th of May, 1619, the old statesman stood upon a prepared scaffold and calmly surveyed the scene. Lifting his eyes to heaven he was heard to murmur, "O God, what does man come to?" Then he said bitterly once more: "This, then, is the reward of forty years' service to the State?" Maurice was not there and from him Barneveld neither asked, nor allowed any of his family or friends to ask, pardon. As Mark Antony said of Brutus, "The elements were so mixed in him that nature might stand up and say to all the world, 'This was a man.'"

He knelt upon the bare planks of the scaffold for fifteen minutes during the prayer, and neither master, John of Barneveld, nor man, John Franken, true Stoics and Hollanders both, shed a single tear. His last words to the people in a loud, firm voice were: "Men, do not believe that I am a traitor to the country. I have ever acted uprightly and loyally as a good patriot, and as such I shall die." As he drew the cap over his eyes he prayed: "Christ shall be my guide. O Lord, my

heavenly Father, receive my spirit." Kneeling with his face toward his own house, Barneveld said to the executioner: "Be quick about it! Be quick." The executioner severed the head at a single blow. Into a box of rough unplaned boards originally prepared as a coffin for a pardoned murderer, his body and head were huddled, a box upon which on that very morning two ruffianly soldiers on that very scaffold had been throwing dice. The body was subsequently granted as a boon to the widow and children that it might be taken thence and decently buried in the family vault at Amersfoorst where it had first been held in arms seventy-two years before.

ARTICLE VII

RALPH WALDO EMERSON.

By Professor Edwin M. Bowen, Ph. D.

A few summers ago I visited the historic old town of Concord, the literary Mecca of New England. Few places in America are richer in historic association, or have more interesting literary traditions clustering about them, than this quaint, typical New England town. Every true American must feel his breast swell with patriotism as he visits Lexington and Concord and observes on all sides the many reminders of our hard fought battles for American Independence. At the bridge hard by the town are two monuments marking the spot:—

> "Where once the embattled farmers stood,
> And fired the shot heard round the world."

But the literary traditions and associations of the place are quite as interesting as the historic. What a group of names famous in the history of American literature occurs to our minds at the very mention of Concord! How the pulse is quickened and the imagination kindled as soon as we set foot on the ground once daily trod by men and women whose names loom large in our literary annals! Of these, however, none has greater drawing power than Emerson whose haunts and last resting place in Sleepy Hollow are almost as much frequented as Mount Vernon.

A man may choose the place of his residence, but he has no choice as to his birthplace. Nature was kind to the seer of Concord, in permitting him to be born in Boston (near the place he esteemed above all others), where the sweet light of this world greeted his eyes now a century agone. His father, Reverend William Emerson, was pastor of a church in Boston at the time of the child's birth. Emerson's ancestors for several generations back were of the clerical order. It is not surprising therefore that Ralph Waldo should have inherited a disposition almost angelic, which he is reputed to have possessed. He is said to have been so naturally good that he hardly knew temptation and was acquainted with the effect of evil in others only by observation. We are told that he had no personal experience of the tendency to evil in human nature, that he was so far from being virtuous that he was pure and good spontaneously, like beings that cannot sin. If then it be true, as reported, that Emerson was that rare phenomenon, a man of pure human innocence who always turned a deaf ear to the siren voice of sin so fascinating to ordinary mortals, small wonder that he made a profound impression on his disciples and was regarded as almost outside the pale of moral law.

His father dying when young Emerson was but eight years old, his aunt Mary Moody Emerson and her friend Sarah Bradford, both women of singular earnestness and fine classical scholarship, prepared the boy for college. At the tender age of fourteen he entered Harvard. There he applied himself diligently of course, but did not distinguish himself above his fellows. He showed a fondness for the classics, but disliked mathematics. Montaigne and the poets he read with keen zest. He did not confine himself to the curriculum in his intellectual training. He acted on the principle enunciated later in his life: "What we do not call education is more gracious than what we do call so." It is significant that the office of class poet fell to his lot on the occasion of his graduation.

After his graduation Emerson began to teach school for a livelihood, (an occupation which countless young men and women fall back upon to tide over an impecunious period of

indecision). After two years' experience at teaching he decided to prepare himself in obedience to a call to the ministry. After studying under the direction of Dr. William Ellery Channing, Emerson was ready to enter the Unitarian pulpit when only twenty years old. But at this juncture failing health compelled him to seek a milder climate; and so he spent the following winter or two in South Carolina and Florida. He preached several times during his sojourn in the South and, upon his return home in 1826, he was "approbated to preach." After several trial sermons preached at various points in his native state, he received a call to the pastorate of the Second Church, in Boston.

Emerson had scarcely become setted as a minister in Boston before a dark shadow was thrown across his path by the early death of his wife, in 1832, after three all too brief years of married life. A few months after this sad event, perplexed by theological doubts concerning the Lord's Supper, he resigned his pastorate and determined to strike out in a new field where he would be untrammeled by religious traditions and free to think and act as his conscience dictated.

He thereupon visited Europe. Here he met a number of distinguished men of letters including Coleridge, Wordsworth, Landor, De Quincey, and Carlyle. Of these his acquaintance with Carlyle ripened into a friendship which was fostered by a correspondence till death. In the winter of 1833–4 Emerson returned to America with his mind brimful of impressions and his heart of inspiration. He settled in Concord, taking up his residence in the "Old Manse." This quaint, old-fashioned gambrel-roof house (still standing) was built years ago for Emerson's grandfather, the shepherd of the Concord flock; and in one of its rooms Emerson wrote "Nature," and it is interesting to note in passing that Hawthorne later wrote his famous "Mosses from an Old Manse" in this same room.

Immediately on his return to his native heath Emerson decided to appear in a new role, that of a Lyceum lecturer. This role was destined to be his vocation for the next forty six years. In his early *repertoire* he included such subjects as "Water,"

"The Relation of Man to the Globe," "Michael Angelo," "Milton," "Luther," "George Fox," and "Edmund Burke." In these lectures are contained the germs of many of the thoughts which our author afterwards expanded into separate productions, both prose and verse.

If it be true, according to Holmes's dictum, that men consciously or unconsciously describe themselves in the characters they draw, Emerson must have found sympathy and congeniality in the great men he made the subjects of his early lectures. It is no tax on our faith to believe our bard had a spirit akin to that of the great Puritan poet of England in the stress he placed upon the purity of life and nobility of character. It is evident he was like him in certain external circumstances of life, as, for instance, his early experience as a school-master, the abandonement of the clerical office from conscientious scruples and the sad bereavement of his early married life. This fact, though only a coincidence, may have exerted some influence on Emerson and stimulated his development in the direction whence Milton drew his inspiration.

"It is the prerogative of this great man," says Emerson in his lecture on Milton, "to stand at this hour foremost of all men in literary history, and so (shall we not say?) of all men in the power to inspire. Virtue goes out of him into others." * * * "He is identified in the mind with all select and holy images, with the supreme interests of the human race."—"Better than any other he has discharged the office of every great man, namely, to raise the idea of man in the minds of his contemporaries and of posterity—to draw after nature life of man, exhibiting such a composition of grace, of strength, and of virtue as poet had not described nor hero lived. Human nature in these ages is indebted to him for its best portrait. Many philosophers in England, France and Germany have formally dedicated their study to this problem; and we think it impossible to recall one in those centuries who communicates the same vibration of hope, of self-reverance, of piety, of delight in beauty, which the name of Milton awakens."

From Concord Emerson made frequent excursions on his

lecturing tours. He departed from his beaten path of lectures when he delivered, in 1835, in Boston, a course on English literature, and during the following year on the history of philosophy. Later he delivered a course on human culture. Some of his popular lectures he subsequently recast and published under the title of "Essays and Addresses." He kept his time occupied during these years with Lyceum work, and his services as a public speaker were much in request on special occasions.

In 1836, Emerson published anonymously a slender volume of essays, entitled "Nature." This was the first sheaf of his intellectual harvest, the first fruits of his authorship. Though he withheld his name from the title-page, he could not conceal his identity, despite the fact that the style of the book was quite unlike that of his public lectures. However, this little literary waif did not meet with a cordial reception from the reading public. The contents of the volume were vague and indefinite, mystical and obscure. The thought soared into cloudland and proved incomprehensible to most of the critics. The uninitiated could not understand the book and so did not read it; and, however much the esoterists might revel in it, they were not numerous enough to make the venture a financial success. Consequently the sales amounted only to 500 copies in twelve years.

"Nature" is a kind of prose poem, like most of Emerson's essays, and is divided into eight chapters containing the author's impressions of the various aspects of his subject. After a delirious outbreak in which he loses himself in the contemplation of his theme, he discovers himself and addresses himself to the proposition of considering nature in the aspect of ministry to the senses. This chapter he denominates *Commodity* or natural conveniences. The second chapter shows how "a nobler want of man is served by Nature, namely, the love of Beauty." Here we find some of Emerson's philosophical ideas advanced which he subsequently clothed in poetic form in his poem "Rhodora." "Beauty," says he, "in its largest and profoundest sense, is one expression for the uni-

verse; God is the all fair. Truth and goodness and beauty are but different faces of the same all. But beauty in nature is not ultimate. It is the herald of inward and eternal beauty, and is not alone a solid and satisfactory good. It must therefore stand as a part and not as yet the highest expression of the final cause of nature."

The author next considers *Language*, showing how words are called into being first from nature and later become transformed and exhausted. In the fourth chapter he discusses *Discipline* as illustrating the influences of nature in training the intellect, the moral sense and the will. Then follow two chapters on *Idealism* and *Spirit*, respectively, which prove a stumbling block and rock of offense to the unimaginative reader. Such a reader sees here only the misty vagaries of a morbid imagination. The book closes with a discussion of *Prospects*, which soars far above the level of prose into the region of poetry, detailing "some traditions of man and nature which a certain poet sang." This is the quintessence of transcendentalism of which Emerson was the chief exponent.

If Emerson's philosophy as expounded in "Nature" signified foolishness to the man of average intelligence, not so his superb oration on "The American Scholar" delivered before that learned body at Harvard, on August 31, 1837. This scholarly and inspiring address, we are told, was listened to with rapt attention by an audience that was wellnigh spellbound by the speaker's eloquence. Lowell, referring to it, says that its delivery "was an event without any parallel in literary annals, a scene to be always treasured in the memory for its picturesqueness and its inspiration. What crowded and breathless aisles, what windows clustering with eager heads, what enthusiasm of approval, what grim silence of foregone dissent." Holmes speaks of it, in his Life of Emerson, as our intellectual Declaration of Independence; and his language is not mere rhetorical exaggeration. The essay is a masterly plea for a broad and liberal culture which shall embrace the full development of all the faculties. The general verdict of the auditors was that that address could never be forgotten, which burst

upon their ears like a clarion note calling to a broader, fuller and nobler life.

The following year Emerson delivered an address before the Divinity College in Cambridge which proved a rude shock to the orthodox thinkers of the world and threw them into a paroxysm of excitement. This address was in sharp contrast to the memorable address of the year before. Yet the unorthodox address was the logical outcome of the spirit of intellectual independence which breathes through every sentence of "The American Scholar." The publication of this essay proclaiming Emerson's emancipation from dogma was the signal for a veritable swarm of hostile critics of the orthodox school to gather about his head and fill the air with their angry buzz.

In 1841 Emerson gave to the world the first volume of his collected "Essays." The table of contents is stimulating and suggestive: History, Self-Reliance, Compensation, Spiritual laws, Love, Friendship, Prudence, Heroism, The Over Soul, Circles, Intellect, Art and the Young American (included in the later editions). These essays established Emerson's reputation as the prince of American essayists. This prose vein he developed and made distinctively his own. It is noteworthy that he confined his expression in prose exclusively to this species of composition. He is recognized therefore in American letters as an essayist *par excellence.* The reason why he chose this special form for the expression of his thought is not far to seek. A moment's reflection will explain why a lecturer should adopt the essay style.

This first series of essays is characteristic of their author's manner and method. If, according to Buffon's dictum, the style is the man, these essays reflect Emerson as in a mirror. We observe his subtle wit, his bold imaginative spirit, his magnetic charm and his power to inspire. The thought is driven home with peculiar force by the author's wealth of happy illustration and is clothed withal in crisp, trenchant and vigorous English. The essays abound in short pithy sayings setting forth the sage's philosophy of life. Yet here and there we stumble upon sentences that are wellnigh unintelligible, mere

words without sense. Those not initiated into the mysteries of transcendentalism can deduce no meaning from such passages and generally regard them as utter nonsense. An example in point is the conclusion of the essay on history where in a paragraph Emerson exclaims: "I am ashamed to see what a shallow village tale our so-called history is. How many times we must say Rome and Paris and Constantinople! What does Rome know of rat and lizard? What are Olympiads and Consulates to these neighboring systems of being? Nay, what food or experience of succor have they for the Esquimaux seal-hunter, for the Kanaka in his canoe, for the fisherman, the stevedore, the porter?" Now, this passage may be perfectly intelligible to the student versed in transcendentalism. But to the average reader it is a veritable enigma.

Moreover there is a degree of sameness about the several essays that is quite noticeable. The subjects, to be sure, differ. But on close analysis the thought will be seen to be very much the same in all. Each essay serves to present another point of view, another angle from which to look at the truth which is repeated again and again. An eminent divine used to say, after having preached innumerable sermons, that, after all, he had only one sermon, only one truth. Certainly this seems true of Emerson's essays. The message he brings is much the same in all. He had a revelation of the import of creation and this constituted his message to the world. This he presented in a variety of ways and under different figures, but the message was still the same.

Critics have pointed out reminiscences of various philosophers in these "Essays." In one place they recognize the influence of Plato who was Emerson's favorite among the ancient philosophers. In another place they attribute the original thought to Swedenborg, or to Schelling, or to the God-intoxicated Spinoza. In the essay, "Over-Soul," Emerson verges on pantheism in his rhapsodies. But whether this idea is borrowed or is evolved from his own inner consciousness, it would be difficult to determine. The author himself informs us that he read sedulously not only the above mentioned philosophers,

but many others. What is more natural than that his own writings should take tone and color from the works he fed on just as the chameleon takes its color from the object it feeds upon? If questioned himself about this matter, Emerson would probably have replied, "Every book is a quotation; every man is a quotation from all his ancestors.—When we are praising Plato, it seems we are praising quotations from Solon and Sophron and Philolaus."

In 1844 appeared the second series of "Essays." These are very much of the same general character as the first series and embrace such titles as the Poet, Character, Manners, Experience, Gifts, Nature, Politics, and Nominalist and Realist. Two years later Emerson published his first volume of poems. These, however, were not all new Many of them had already seen the light in "The Dial," and their appearance in book form did not excite much enthusiasm. And too, the sentiment was strikingly akin to that expressed in the "Essays."

In 1847 Emerson made his second visit to Europe, gathering fresh inspiration and renewing his acquaintance with the literary lights met on his first trip abroad. While in England his admirers and friends prevailed on him to deliver a series of lectures, which were received with considerable demonstration of approval. These lectures were subsequetly published under the title of "Representative Men." The men selected as the subjects of the essays, it is interesting to note, were men of thought and action, such as Plato, Swedenborg, Montaigne, Shakespeare, Napoleon and Goethe. In the choice of these men for portrayal Emerson clearly indicated to the world his own affinities and repulsions and revealed his own character perhaps all unconsciously and unintentionally. Of the six representative men Plato seems to approximate most closely his ideal man. Yet he does not hold up even Plato for our unqualified admiration.

Another book, "English Traits," though not published till 1856, was also indebted for its inspiration to this European tour. This volume and "Representative Men" form something of a departure from our author's customary method as a

literary artist. "English Traits" is an attempt at portrayal of character. But no individual Englishman is selected and held up as representative of his nation. Emerson's plan was rather to delineate the national characteristics of the English people, and in this respect he succeeded admirably. For the book is decidedly original, like all of its author's productions, and contains many clever, piquant observations upon the characteristic ways and manners of our British cousins across the sea. The strength of the book, however, lies in its broad generalizations and in its epigrammatic characterizations, as an eminent critic has felicitously expressed it. It is evident to the reader that Emerson was favorably impressed by the sturdy, stolid character of the typical Englishman, his indomitable pluck and vigor, his deep rooted conservatism, his love of routine, and withal his refreshing self complacency and contentment.

When the Atlantic Monthly was founded, Emerson was solicited to become a contributor. From this time forth much of his best work, verse as well as prose, found its way into the columns of this famous magazine. Here first appeared his poems "The Romany Girl," "Days," "Brahma," Waldeinsamkeit," "The Titmouse," "Saadi," and "Terminus," not to mention any of his prose contributions.

In 1860 Emerson published a new collection of essays, entitled the "Conduct of Life." This volume contained his ripe reflections upon such themes as power, fate, culture, worship, wealth, behavior, beauty, and illusions. These essays are in a similar philosophical vein to those previously published from his pen, and so do not call for a detailed consideration here. Six years after this Emerson collected a slender volume of his fugitive poems, giving them more permanent form under the title, "May-Day and Other Pieces." The booklet contained some of its author's finest poems, but little that was really new. Its reception by the public was not attended with any special demonstration or gush. Nor did Emerson care for this. He did not write for the approval of the public or of the critics. He acted altogether independently of the opinion of his con-

temporaries. Not that he was altogether insensible to criticism, for he was not. But conscience was his guiding principle.

It is not to be inferred that Emerson's literary productions were not cordially received. Far from this, they were accorded a hearty welcome, especially by the hosts of his ardent admirers on both sides of the Atlantic. This was but the natural consequence from the admiration and reverence in which he was held by all who knew him. His reputation as a philosopher and as an author was not confined to the shores of his native country. He counted his disciples in Europe by the score. He shed lustre upon the republic of American letters, and though he was not a voluminous author, the quality of his writings has extended his fame throughout the world.

After the publication of another collection of essays which he called "Society and Solitude" Emerson left America for a third visit to Europe. Upon his return he published a poetic anthology and resumed his work as a lecturer. But approaching old age admonished him to relax his arduous literary labors. Two volumes in his collected work, "Lectures and Biographical Sketches" and "Miscellanies," represent the last gleanings of his intellectual harvest. Some of the essays, however, which make up these last two volumes were the product of his earlier years when his mental vigor showed no indication of abatement. The contents of these volumes embrace a variety of topics, but do not enhance their author's reputation especially.

As we have seen, Emerson was not a prolific writer. About a dozen volumes of prose and verse represent the entire output of his literary labors. It need hardly be remarked that the bulk of his work is prose. Yet his collected poems make a good stout volume. He did not produce any lengthy prose work. The essay is his favorite form.

After this general survey it is fitting to consider the question of Emerson's place in American literature.

Emerson's poetry has been variously estimated by the critics, and has proved an unfailing source of contention. It seems to have divided the critics into two distinct classes. One class holds that Emerson was pre eminently a poet by nature

and instinct, and that even when he lasped into prose, his thought was essentially poetic. The other class, with equally firm conviction, maintains that Emerson was a mere versifier, only a poetaster, not a poet. In proof of this thesis they cite, with some pretence of right, the innumerable palpable defects of versification that blur and mar many of Emerson's pages.

It is true that the mechanical blemishes of his verse do tend to discount Emerson's poetic gift. But the question in dispute is a subjective one which, in the very nature of things, cannot be satisfactorily settled. Each critic may record his opinion and that is the end of the matter as far as he is personally concerned; but the question is far from the solution. Suffice it to say in respect of the present question, however, that the majority of critics are overwhelmingly in favor of voting Emerson a genuine poet.

First as to Emerson's prose. Emerson confined himself, as is well known, almost exclusively to the essay. He did not enter the vast domain of fiction which at present engaged the attention of most authors. He did not even venture upon the portrayal of character, except in a limited extent in his "English Traits." Emerson did not possess the faculty of definition (if that is the proper word) which is a pre-requisite to the novelist for describing with sharpness of outline the various characters of his story, so that they stand out from his page as clear-cut and distinct from each other as in real life. Nor did Emerson exhibit that type of creative mind which invents characters, and which sketches scenes bustling with action. In short, Emerson could not construct a plot and fill it in with men and women of his own creation.

Emerson's genius was of a distinctly philosophical type. This determined the product of his literary efforts. Not in works of fiction, but in history, in biography and in philosophy did he seek instruction and inspiration. Mere fiction did not appeal to him. His favorite authors were Plato, Plutarch, Montaigne, Goethe, Bacon, Swedenborg, Socrates, Aristotle, Milton and Shakespeare. These were the authors who stimulated his imagination and kindled his genius. These he quotes

again and again as emphasizing the proper conception of life and as illustrating the principle of pure living and high thinking. Emerson had an exalted conception of life and human destiny. He realized that he had a message for the world, and he was as much in earnest in the delivery of his message as was his friend Carlyle. Like the sage of Chelsea, Emerson was a moralist and took his mission very seriously, and made a lasting impression upon the world. Though in revolt against the accepted traditions of the Church. he dared to announce to the world his declaration of intellectual independence with absolute unconcern as to authority, names or institutions. Nor was he altogether like one crying in the wilderness. He had a large following. The world admires a man who has the moral courage to express his convictions, regardless of the penalty.

As a philosopher, Emerson's place is difficult to determine. He was not a psychologist. Yet he wrote and delivered lectures on the natural history of the intellect. He was a seer, a man of intuition. He lived and wrote as if by divine instinct. He arrived at truth not by any mental process of reasoning, but by intuition. Unlike most men, he did not reason out anything. The ratiocinative faculty was not developed in him. If it had been, he would have been more logical and consistent, and less of an enigma to his disciples. This is the reason why his writings appear wanting in logical connection. You may read his essays backward as well as forward with much the same effect. The arrangement is not always logical and the sequence of thought is frequently interrupted. Nor do the titles invariably furnish a true index to the contents. Hence not a few readers find Emerson rambling and incoherent, and sometimes, obscure and unintelligible. The obscurity is perhaps due to his idealism, his mysticism; for he is an idealist, a spiritualist, not a materialist. His mysticism, too, sometimes leads him perilously near the ridiculous and the absurd. But these lapses, it ought to be added, are only occasional.

Emerson's philosophy offers as its chief and distinctive achievement his analysis and interpretation of nature. This is the purport of his maiden volume and it is the theme of all his

subsquent volumes. Nature in its broadest sense he conceives as comprehending everything in the universe except man's soul, and it is the symbol even of this. In nature God has expressed in concrete form his infinite ideas, has incarnated himself, so to say, for man's development. Man represents the highest principle in nature, and the whole effect of nature upon him is disciplinary. Therefore, nature itself cannot be said to have any natural existence apart from man, and things do not exist in space, but are only reflected as from man's soul. The soul conceives the world as one vast canvas, as it were, painted by the master artist upon eternity and embodying his eternal ideas. When nature rises into mind—and its tendency is ever in that direction—individuality begins. Nature gradually evolves itself into spiritual man as the final cause of existence, and is itself but the projection of a Being in the form of man, that is, God. Such, in a nutshell, is Emerson's philosophy.

But Emerson was also a poet. In his verse as in his prose, however, he was still a philosopher. Like Lucretius, Emerson was a philosopher and poet both at one and the same time. But in the poet he is the philosopher transformed. In his philosophical poems expressing the great elementary ideas he is at his best, and is, in a sense, unapproachable. Here he deals in general symbols and abstract ideas, and impresses upon the reader his majestic conception of the infinite. These poems, it is true, contain more or less of mysticism; but, for all that, they are masterly productions of their kind. In the judgment of some of the most eminent critics these poems are the finest Emerson wrote and reach the very high-water mark of poetic composition. Of this class of poems suffice it to mention "The Sphinx," "Brahma," "Uriel," and "Guy." Yet other critics fail to discover any striking merit in these poems and derive no pleasure from their reading. They find them unsatisfying as poetry because of their hidden meaning, their mysticism. These poems are assuredly not radiant with light, whatever other excellences they may have to commend them. For this reason, mainly, they do not appeal to the popular taste. They are too philosophical to please the average reader, who

likes simplicity. For my own part, I prefer Emerson's love poems, such as "To Rhea," "Give All to Love," and "Initial, Daemonic and Celestial Love." Though these may not be models of simplicity and clearness, their meaning is not deep or far to seek. But whether one prefers the love poems or the philosophical poems, is, after all, a matter of taste.

However, Emerson's poetic output is not exhausted by these two kinds of poems. He produced another kind of poetry whose "beauty is its own excuse for being." Such are "The Humble-Bee," "Rhodora," "Painting and Sculpture," "Forbearance," "Good-Bye," and the famous Concord "Hymn." The beauty of these poems appeals to all men, the uninitiated as well as the initiated, and every one can appreciate them. If all his other poems were lost, these would be sufficient of themselves to preserve our bard's reputation as an original poet with a rare gift of expression.

Yet it must be admitted that, excellent as much of Emerson's poetry is, it has some serious defects. Emerson did not possess a faultless ear as is very evident from a cursory examination of his verse. He paid too little attention to the mechanical structure of his lines, to metre. Some of his verses show a cloven foot and go limping along in a fashion that offends delicate tastes. This result is the logical outcome of the "fatal facility" of his favorite metre. Like Byron, Emerson depended upon the inspiration of the moment to mold his thought in final shape, apparently disdaining to supplement the product of his genius with art. The labor of the file would have easily removed all the metrical blemishes, and that without sacrificing the spontaneity of the verse. But Emerson was unwilling to revise or to resort to art, to polish and perfect his lines. He concerned himself with the thought, not with the form, acting on the maxim of Cato, *Rem tene, verba sequentur.*

Aside from the mechanical imperfections, Emerson's verse is open to criticism on the same score as his prose. His poetry no less than his prose is marred by occasional obscurity and lack of coherence. The poet is sometimes carried off his feet in his rhapsodies and soars into cloudland. Hence as has been

noted, some of Emerson's poems are enveloped in mysticism and for this reason are difficult to understand. They smack too strongly of the transcendental school, and too often lapse into doggerel. Poe who was endowed with a keen artistic touch and was himself no mean judge of verse found much of the Concord bard's verse mere jingling rhymes, devoid of melody, beauty and sentiment. But Poe could not away with any of the transcendental poets.

Yet after criticism has said her last word, and analysis can go no farther, there still remains a beauty, a charm, about Emerson which is perceived more clearly than it can be expressed. His wealth of imagery and illustration which seems almost Oriental, his breadth and vigor of thought, his delicacy of treatment, his terseness of speech and his moral earnestness withal combine to make him a favorite author even despite his mysticism and transcendentalism. He dwells in a bracing atmosphere on the very mountain top of thought and, as a seer, catches visions of the infinite which he reveals to us for our upbuilding and inspiration. We recognize in him one of the most original and vitalizing forces in our literature.

Randolph Macon College.

ARTICLE VIII.

CURRENT THEOLOGICAL THOUGHT.

I. ENGLISH AND AMERICAN.

By Professor M. Coover, A.M.

Corresponding to the strenuosity so popular for robustness in physical and commercial life, another phase of virility is becoming popular, a doubtful but debonair attitude toward ethical conceptions and duties. Piety and holiness are deemed goody-goody terms; chivalry and honor are more robust and virile.

The historic development of ethical conceptions through Judaism and Christianity, philosophically augmented by Hellenic culture, is thought to be quite inadequate to satisfy the keen, vigorous sense of the strenuous humanity of the twentieth century. The natural barbarian of Northern Europe has also consummate virtues, in excellence superior to any product of Semite or Hellenic Aryan.

In *The Hibbert Journal* for April Mr. H. W. Garrod, Fellow of Merton College, Oxford, asks the question in respect of the origin of the cardinal virtues subsumed under ethics, *Christian, Greek, or Goth?*

Mr. Garrod rather disparagingly terms all writers on ethics previous to himself ethical lunatics, since they have left unrecognized the Gothic factor in their systems. He would classify such writers analogously with those that do not "count," according to the classification of a German philosopher, namely, with "cows, women, sheep, dogs, and other democrats."

The classification of Western ethical ideas Mr. Garrod deems both inadequate and false. He recognizes, indeed, a debt both to Jew and Greek, but that we are debtors to them for the best of our moral virtues he denies. The Gothic morality has been a neglected element in systems of ethics.

The barbarian of Northern Europe with whatever neglect of bodily habiliment did not descend on European civilization in

nudity of moral conceptions, requiring rules of life and conduct to be supplied by warm-flanneled Christianity.

The high conception of Judaism was holiness, that of Greece was intellectualism. Hellenism in its rapid forward movement fell, and in falling failed because of its moral defect. Christianity superseded it because it stood more firmly on its feet, and it stood firmly only because it stood still. It made no progress. It superseded Hellenism, but left humanity stationary. It conquered in its golden age, the period of the "Dark Ages," so dark as appropriately to be called the "Black Ages." The gallant, spirited effort of the Renascence to bring deliverance resulted in no progress. The real social salvation came from the North. The Goths brought two cardinal virtues, supreme in the category of ethical elements, "chivalry" and "honor," the qualities of the gentleman.

Mr. Garrod shows the ethical defect in Judaism. There was a man who took to himself his neighbor's wife, and sent that neighbor to the forefront of a fight whence he was not likely to return alive. According to the testimony of a "partizan historian" the seducer was a man after God's own heart; but he was not a man after the heart of decent-minded human beings. He committed a sin that has no forgiveness, not because he was an adulterer, not because he was a murderer, but because he was not a gentleman. And by not being a gentleman Mr. Garrod does not mean the sin of being badly dressed, nor of having a provincial accent, but the sin of being an "impossible person." Not to be a gentleman is to fail in two ideals, chivalry and honor.

Mr. Garrod happily chooses for illustration the well-known character of an oriental monarch of three millenniums ago, without mentioning his subsequent alleviating conduct and moral attitude, with which to compare an English gentleman of the twentieth century.

For a man believing in progress and the law of development, with a keen sense of the rules of comparison, this is a historical sin that has no forgiveness. True chivalry and intellectual honor would not make such a blunder.

This culpability of David was never condoned, but sounded the tocsin of moral warning to all Israel. Races contemporary with Israel were either unmoral or immoral, but Judaism and Christianity have been ethical from center to circumference, hence the plain unpartizan record of a historian who might have left the sad crime in oblivion.

Nor does Mr. Garrod think that Hellenic culture ever produced a gentleman. The Odysseus type of man is but contemptible, never chivalrous or honorable. Even the "large-souled man" in Aristotle's ethics is but a coxcomb, and in no wise a gentleman. He is no better than the Jew, and none superior to the Jew's conception, for the Greek gentleman resembles the kind of gentleman in one of Disraeli's novels.

Chivalry and honor came by the Goths. These cardinal virtues came by Christianity only as a protest against it. They were produced through a reaction against Christian ideals, and are a negative product against the implicates of humility.

It is true, says Mr. Garrod, that chivalry has had its defects. Duelling is no virtue, but is virtuous in contrast with the give and take of "the lie," and the indecent epithets of parried passion.

Mr. Garrod quotes Scripture in substantiation of his disparagement of Christian ethics. He discerns the lack of chivalry in the qualities extolled by St. Paul. To be a "fool for Christ's sake," "being reviled," "persecuted," "defamed," and yet to "endure," and "intreat," to be "as the filth of the world, and the offscouring of all things," is abject in the extreme, not chivalric. Through fear of the pusillanimous there is danger of Mr. Garrod's ideal becoming a pugnacious gentleman.

Humility for a great moral end is not a reprehensible vice, and insusceptibility to discern it is less than Hellenic intellectualism; it must be the prerogative of the Gothic gentleman.

For Mr. Garrod the instincts of the natural man are holy. Bread and the circus, the flesh and the world, are inherent rights even to the smashing of every window in your palace. If man's right relation to the world is that of freedom and vigor, his relation to Divinity is to be no less in the spirit of in-

dependence. Self-abasement is not befitting the estate of man. The divine Majesty should be no barrier to man's aspiring dignity. The rivalry of chivalric natures does not exclude God from the arena of contestants. In the language of Emerson, let God be to you "a kind of beautiful enemy, untameable." The Lord is a jealous God, but man should be equally jealous. This self-respect, this courageous independence, comes to us through the Gothic character. Hellenism cannot give it, nor Christianity supply it, nor can a fusion of the two give us what we want. To live effectually we need the vigorous.

We do not decry the gift the Goth gave us, but the supremacy of virtue for value and virility is not wholly a Gothic inheritance. It is sad to be a "Philistine," but 'tis sadder still to be something worse through moral misalliance.

Some men have never suffered keenly enough to discern the blessedness of the meek. It is chivalric in Mr. Garrod in his disparagement of Christianity not to arraign the ethics of Jesus. Perhaps it would not well serve his purpose to arraign the Nazarene.

It might not be displeasing to Mr. Garrod to be titled a virile robust barbarian in the flush of physical health and mental vigor, though it were better even at the cost of suffering and sacrifice to win an experience by which the ethico-religious elements of Christianity may become a treasure.

Of like tendency to the above is an article in the April number of *The American Journal of Theology* by Dr. James M. Whiton. In this presentation by Dr. Whiton there is no conscious action to belittle Jesus, but a full-orbed desire to extol the capacities of man. For Mr. Garrod the instincts of the natural man are holy; for Dr. Whiton all the instincts of Jesus are natural. Jesus is normally human throughout, and of course is the normally human character. Imitableness of Christ, therefore, finds no barrier in too lofty personality.

It is a matter of energized human endeavor to attain to the perfection of the Christ.

The God-Consciousness of Jesus is Dr. Whiton's theme, the

understanding of which renders accessible the approach of the natural man to a natural Jesus. The imitation of Jesus is a Christian axiom, but if it be an imitation in the sphere of mere conduct, says Dr. Whiton, it is not worth consideration.

Jesus is fully imitable in his God-consciousness. Conduct is the mere embodiment of consciousness, and imitableness, to be of worth, must imply likeness to the very core of personality. There is no transcendence from the human in the character of Christ; he is wholly imitable.

Dr. Whiton denies pantheism, but perfect imitableness of consciousness becomes identity of personality. When the Christian can perfectly reproduce the consciousness of Jesus he becomes identical in essence; he becomes at one with Jesus in more than mere impulse and motive. The core of personality separate and distinct from other entities is self consciousness, and for men perfectly and psychologically to duplicate another's consciousness would be to fill the world with Dr. Jekyls and Mr. Hydes.

The Christological standpoint of Dr. Whiton seems to be that of Dr. Harnack's that the oneness of Jesus with God is a unity of mere ethical feeling and character. It is but the keen sense of righteousness and the profound moral element that effect oneness between Jesus and his Father.

Professor Royce has no fear of Pantheism, but Dr. Whiton is not circumspect in his metaphysics and becomes logically a Pantheist, or a possible naturalist.

Man's limitations are due to physical circumstances that are variable. He is able to give selective attention to but few things, and to win the mastery of knowledge over them.

God suffers no such limitations. He is everywhere, and his eyes and ears are ever open. He never slumbers nor sleeps. He is the Absolute Consciousness. By extension of prerogatives man may give selective attention to a wider sphere of objects.

Selective attention to all objects wins omniscience, and to be attentive at all points implies omnipresence. To be omniscient is to penetrate all relations, and to master relations is to

become omnipotent. There is nothing in this series that man cannot do, if he have the opportunity, thinks Professor Royce. Dr. Whiton says God is imitable in type and kind. With man then it is only a matter of degree in his shortcoming of being a God. The way is open to perfect divine imitableness.

But intensity of thought, saturation with a sublime idea, is not the way. Mere intellectualism, says Dr. Whiton, is not the avenue to attainment. The refined, susceptible, human nature must be "filled with all the fullness of God." Temperament is a factor of large account. Ecstatic intuition is the true way of approach to the divine consciousness.

Speculative consciousness will not answer; the immanence of deity is requisite. The emotional element suffusing the intellect is the conspicuous and essential factor. A high temperature of ecstatic feeling is the capable means to the perfect imitableness of Jesus. Humanity and Deity are one nature; man is the embryonic state of the divine. All that is needed is more incubation.

There is more heat than light in Dr. Whiton's exposition. The emotional element is one of nerves. Of course the the intellect from the naturalistic standpoint is only refined action of fine nerve filaments; but the avenue to the divine seems to be through the coarser grained nerves of the human organism. The secret of Jesus lay in his tender emotional filial consciousness. Through it he became one with the Father The ecstatic feeling as a product of the emotional element in man becomes the avenue to union with God.

When Jesus from the mountain top of divine character and eminence calls, "Come unto me," he is not inaccessible. There is perfect imitableness; we lack but degree.

Mr. Matthew Arnold would be pleased perhaps with this explication of the divine in Jesus, for religion is but "morality touched with emotion." Schleiermacher, too, might be satisfied with this analysis of man's religious nature. But the susceptibility to embosom the emotions of the divine Being, and to reach God through ecstatic feeling must be left to the profoundly natural people of religiously educated nerves.

Metyphysics may not count for much in the explication of religious verities, but, carefully conducted, may save the mind from worse vagaries.

ARTICLE IX.

REVIEW OF RECENT LITERATURE.

A. C. ARMSTRONG & SON, NEW YORK.

A History of Preaching. From the Apostolic Fathers to the Great Reformers. A. D. 70—1572. pp. 577. By Edwin C. Dargan, D. D., LL. D., Professor of Homiletics in the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Louisville, Kentucky.

This is the first volume of a work that promises to be by far the most comprehensive and satisfactory history of preaching in the English language. The present volume, beginning with the Fathers, brings the subject down "to the death of John Knox, the last of the great reformers." The two volumes under contemplation, should they be completed and published, will extend the account from 1572 to the year 1900. We sincerely hope that the author will speedily realize his—and we may say our—desire and expectation.

The book before us meets and satisfies a deeply felt need. It is comprehensive, thorough, impartial and critical. It is less brilliant than Ker's *History of Preaching*, and less philosophical than Broadus' *Lectures* on the same subject. But it is written in a clear and strong style. The author has not only used the materials gathered by other toilers in the same field, but he has studied the sources of information; and this is the proper way to do in preparing a book on any subject. No scholar can afford to ignore the labors of others who have studied and written on a subject. Much less can he afford to stop short of the original documents and the very matter itself about which he proposes to inform others. Should he do so he is far more likely to expose his ignorance than he is to expound his subject. Compiled books are seldom worth reading, as compiled sermons are seldom worth hearing. Both are proofs of weakness and degeneracy. We are glad that our author has shown the more excellent way.

The book, taken as a whole, brings inspiration to the reader. It shows what a mighty power preaching has been in the intellectual, moral and religious progress of the world. It shows that where men have preached a pure gospel with sincerity and conviction, and have witnessed to the same by a becoming conduct, there the Church has shown the best condition and the people have exhibited the best Christian conduct. It shows also that in proportion as ritualism and the elaborate institutions of men have been set up in the Church, preaching has declined in originality and in power. The Reformation was a return to preaching, and it made preaching the most important ministerial function.

But besides being a history of preaching the book is also a history of preachers. The biographical matter is important, and the estimates of

persons are judicious and impartial. The brief description of the rise of the national literatures, and that of Scholasticism, are very satisfactory. In no unimportant sense the book is a history of Christianity on the side of its most potent and practical activity. Lutherans will find no just reason to be dissatisfied with the place given by the author to the great Lutheran preachers.

We heartily commend the book. Every preacher should be familiar with the history of his calling, both that he may be aided in avoiding its weaknesses and that he may know the secret of its power.

J. W. RICHARD.

The Devotional and Practical Commentary, W. Robertson Nicoll, Editor. The Epistle to the Ephesians, by Joseph Parker, D. D. A. C. Armstrong & Son, $1.25 net.

Encouraged, doubtless, by the great success of the Expositor's Bible, the editor of that fine series has undertaken a commentary of a different sort, which he calls devotional and practical. The writers of the new series have been chosen not only because of their intellectual fitness and scholarly equipment, but especially because of their skill in appealing to the heart and conscience of the reader.

This volume on Ephesians is the second of the series and it fulfills the intention of the editor. Joseph Parker, the author, was for many years one of London's most famous preachers, holding in England a reputation somewhat like that which Henry Ward Beecher held in America. Mentally a man of large proportions, he was possessed of wide sympathy, hearty, downright, direct, and, particularly, independent. In this commentary he describes himself. "I belong to all the denominations. I would not belong to any one denomination because it does not give me room enough," and in another place he writes, "There are no little minded Christians; if they be Christians growing in Christ, they are growing towards perfectness of knowledge and completeness of character."

His treatment of Ephesians is just what we should expect from one of such temper. Dispensing with an introduction, instead of beginning with the first verse, he leaps at once into the heart of the letter, reminding us of one of the Homeric heroes, who sprang full-armored into the thick of the fray, "on the ringing plains of windy Troy." And like an Homeric warrior, he hurls huge sentences at us, great masses of thought. Here are few well-ordered, clean-cut polished phrases, but most unconventional expressions. He almost takes one's breath, startling the reader with his forcible bluntness. And that is well. He keeps us awake. He is no commonplace commentator, digging for roots, counting petals and stamens, like a botanist, but a great reaper, or gatherer of flowers, who gives us armfuls at a time. Or, to change the figure, he quarries huge blocks for us. These the reader, and especially the preacher, will shape for himself.

This is not a perfect commentary, even of its kind. It lacks order, occasionally; it lacks balance, skips too much and is uneven. Here and there the author scolds at us, although this indeed gives the work a human touch not always found in a product of the study. Sometimes there appears to be a straining for effect, with now and then a little bombast. But then some critics have said that even Shakespeare is bombastic in places. This book, with all its faults, will be a decided addition to the minister's library. The sort of devotion here offered us is not hothouse devotion where orchids and delicate, tender flowers of piety abound, nor the sanctimoniousness of artificial type, but a vigorous, virile devotion, genuine and manly for the street and market as well as for the closet and prayermeeting. Its practical feature is almost radical sometimes, but on the whole is healthy. The quality of the book can be best illustrated by a few quotations. "Charity is the best critic; love is a judge that seldom errs," reminds us of John Morley's fine words, "Charity is the best of all illuminants." "When we are more anxious about the faith than about the creeds we shall have a real church," arouses our doubt of the author's balance. "There are some people who find it almost impossible to forgive. They can persecute finely, they can stand up for orthodoxy six feet high; but to forgive—that is the supreme miracle of grace." Insisting that Christianity is, above all other religions, most practical, he says it is folly for people to leave the Christian Church in search of a sphere of practical usefulness. "He who keeps company with the ten commandments," he remarks quaintly, "need not go from home to warm his hands." And again, "The only Christianity some people seem to have is the power of nursing their wrath to keep it warm."

One might add many other quotations quite as good as these, even better. Enough has been given, however, to show that this is a suggestive commentary which will prove valuable to the minister in preparing his sermons and also to such laymen as feel the need of something to help them in preparing to take part in the prayermeeting;—that is if such laymen are not an extinct species.

D. W. WOODS, JR.

The Atonement and the Modern Mind. By James Denney, D.D. Professor of New Testament Language, Literature, and Theology, United Free Church College, Glasgow. 12mo; pp. 159.

This book is a supplement to *The Death of Christ* by the same author. Some relevant questions awakened by the former work find consideration in this volume.

What is the relation of the modern mind to the Atonement, especially to Atonement by the Death of Christ?

The modern mind finds itself preoccupied by materialistic and scientific predilections which come into conflict with the New Testament doctrine of atonement. The book contains three chapters. The first is an

explication of the Biblical doctrine of the atonement from the misconception of its inadequacy as viewed by scientific and historical criticism. The second chapter treats of the qualities of the mind which is predisposed to reject atonement as Biblically taught, and the nature of the arguments which seem to discountenance the doctrine. The third chapter deals chiefly with the ground of the divine forgiveness.

The subject is most ably presented, and well vindicates New Testament exegesis on this essential feature in the work of divine redemption of man. The third chapter, however, gives overweight to the aspect of physical death in neglect of the saving import of Christ's life, and the revelatory mission of his character and work.

M. COOVER.

LUTHERAN PUBLICATION SOCIETY, PHILADELPHIA, PA.

These Little Ones Which Believe. A Plea for Early Baptism. By J. A. Hall, D. D., pp. 150.

The above is from the pen of one of our General Synod pastors, and the purpose of the book, as stated on the title-page, is to emphasize the importance of early baptism. The author thinks the Church should return to the practice of the early Church, when, as he thinks, the practice of early baptism was universal. The appeal is not so much to the theologian as to the parent, and his discussion throughout is earnest, and generally along conservative lines.

The first three chapters treat of faith, its nature and object, and misconceptions which the author thinks are entertained by some concerning it. He holds that the term faith when used by inspired writers, is used in a specific sense. In its nature Christian faith is *sui generis.* Whether regarded in the light of its origin, of the object upon which it lays hold, or considered from the standpoint of the work that it accomplishes, it stands alone and unique. And this is so because it is Christian faith. It is not mere intellectual assent to any truth as such. "It is the act of trust in God by which we receive and trust Jesus Christ alone for salvation." Its office is to unite the believer with Christ, and through such union it makes him a partaker of the divine life. It is the gift of God, but like all God's gifts it is bestowed mediately.

The author devotes a chapter to child-faith, and distinguishes between infants and children of riper years. Infants can not receive the Word understandingly, and so he apparently denies the possibility of faith in them. Infants are capable however of having a "germ" implanted or "infused" which is capable of future development. Faith and repentance, we are told, are not necessarily connected in point of time, nor is their union necessary to the full benefits of baptism.

Because of the "germ implanted," the new life "infused," regeneration is to the infant a "germinal possibility." The last chapter treats of the benefits of infant baptism. What these benefits are, "no one can fully tell." Through baptism however a new life is communicated, and

the subject made a member of the Kingdom of heaven. By it the infant is also included in the covenant, and made an "heir" of the "everlasting promise."

This short summary will suffice to indicate to the reader of this review that the author has thrown no new light on the subject of infant baptism, and sufficient has been given to show that some of the views presented are hazy and confused. "These little ones which believe" after all do not even seem capable of believing. It it true, by baptism a germ is implanted. This is the work of Christ in baptism. But another act is necessary, that of the Holy Spirit engendering faith, "personal faith," without which regeneration is only begun, but not completed, etc. There is much in this little volume that must be commended. It is easy to criticise, and the author does not expect to escape criticism. We dare say there are few who would escape criticism did they undertake the task the author had tried to perform for the Church. We believe that in the main, our Church, where she is free from the taint of synergism, still holds that by the proper use of the sacrament of baptism there is actually conveyed all that is essential to justification. That by baptism there is conveyed *to the children of the Church*, (not therefore *ex opere operato*) through the Holy Ghost, the movements of faith and love, or rather, that which is like unto the movements of faith and love, and the signers of the Wittenberg Concord of 1536 declare "this is what we mean when we say that infants have faith." And this is a "faith pregnant with good works, and justifies even before they are brought forth." This is a greater gift than an infused germ. It is the imputing of Christ's righteousness, and the child abiding in this grace can evermore be as sure of its salvation, as it can be of its own life, as it can be that the Almighty rules in the heavens.

R. H. CLARE.

THE SABBATH LITERATURE COMPANY, ALBANY, N. Y.

The Passion of Our Lord. An Interwoven Narrative of the Sufferings, Death, Resurrection and Ascension of Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, in the words of the four Evangelists. Intended for Devotional Reading and for Public Use during Lent and Holy Week. By Rev. Charles W. Heisler, D.D. The Sabbath Literature Company, N.Y., 1905.

An examination of this neat volume of 141 pages explains the fact that a second edition of it has been already called for. A *Foreward* informs us that the work not only answers to the growing tendency to observe the week preceding Easter as "Holy Week" and recognizes the great spiritual benefits which result from a devout and orderly contemplation of the profoundly significant and touching events of that week, but has grown out of a harmony of the Gospels which furnish the succession of these events, as compiled by the author himself,

the fruit of long st dy and investigation. The volume therefore comes as the fruit of an earnest interest and ripe thought. The page of *Contents* presents the successive events, that mark each of the days during the period, beginning with Palm Sunday and closing with the Ascension, giving an orderly grouping of Jesus' movements, acts, teachings and experiences belonging to every day. This tabulated view, exhibiting, from the Four Gospels, the order of events marking the history of each day, and suggesting the instructive significance belonging to each by its relation to the rest, is in itself a most valuable help to a true and enriching study and meditation. The body of the volume is made up of the Scripture narratives of the occurrences of the successive days, gathered out of different Gospels and woven into a "harmony" in t e language of the old version—with appropriate Scripture mottoes and verses of poetry prefixed for each day, and a proper Collect given at the close of the Harmony. By a large amount of work thus done the book furnishes at once a most valuable manual of suggestion to pastors and of help in devotional reading to laymen, during the days and services of the week which memorializes so much of the Saviour's redemptive work.

M. VALENTINE.

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SON'S, NEW YORK

The Messages of the Apocalyptical Writers; the Books of Daniel and Revelation and some uncanonical Apocalypses, with Historical Introductions and a Free Rendering in Pharaphrase. By Chamberlain Porter, Ph.D., D.D., Winkley Professor of Biblical Theology in Yale University.

This is the eighth volume in the series on "The Messages of the Bible," now being published by Scribner under the general editorship of Professors Frank K. Saunders, Ph.D., and Charles F. Kent, Ph.D., of Yale University.

Besides the two canonical Apocalypses, the Book of Daniel and of Revelation, the author discusses six others, the Book of Enoch, The Assumption of Moses, The Secrets of Enoch, The Apocalypse of Ezra, The Apocalypse of Baruch, and The Apocalypse of Peter.

A chief value of this book is found in the "Introduction," which covers 75 pages. In this essay Dr. Porter discusses, in a very interesting and instructive way, the Number and Scope of the Apocalyptical Books, their Historical Place and Significance, the Relation of Apocalypse to Prophecy, Pseudonymous Authorship, the Apocalyptical Vision, the Literary Composition of Apocalypses, their Messages in their own Times, and their Messages for our Time. Each separate Apocalypse has also a special "introduction," in which the special problems pertaining to that particular writing are presented and discussed. Of these we are especially interested in the introductions to

Daniel and Revelation. As might be expected the author follows the Historico-critical method, and accepts and defends the conclusions of the "Higher Critics." The Book of Daniel was not only not written by Daniel, but by some unknown author, or authors, about 166 B. C., but we are told, p. 103, that "we cannot even assume that there was a Daniel in the Exile." The date of Revelation is placed at about 93 A. D., but its "author is certainly not the writer of the Fourth Gospel," (184).

The book is a valuable contribution to the literature on this subject, but needs to be read *cum grano*, like all the utterances of this school of critics, keeping in mind the fact that whatever may be their learning and ability, they do not have a monopoly of the scholarship of the present day, as they so often seem to assume, and that there are still many very respectable scholars who hold, and ably maintain, the traditional view of the Bible, at least in its main features.

The book has an "Appendix" in which a very full bibliography of subjects is given, and also an excellent table of "Contents," both of which are very helpful features.

JACOB A. CLUTZ.

A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Amos and Hosea. By William Rainey Harper, Professor of Semitic Languages and Literatures in the University of Chicago.

This is another volume in "The International Critical Commentary Series" being published under the general editorship of Drs. Briggs, Driver and Plummer, and to which the attention of the readers of the QUARTERLY has been called from time to time, as other volumes have been issued. This volume has both the merits and the faults of its predecessors. As would be expected in a book from the pen of President Harper, there is everywhere the evidence of great learning, patient research and careful preparation. As would be expected also from this same source, we find here everywhere the methods and the results of the Higher Criticism which is so popular just now with this school of Bible students and exegetes. No minister or intelligent layman can afford to be ignorant of these methods and conclusions, but it should ever be remembered that the last word has not yet been said on the subject.

A specially valuable feature of this commentary is the lengthy introduction of over one hundred and fifty pages, nearly half of which is devoted to a careful study of "pre-prophetism," by which is meant the prophetic moment that preceded written prophecy. The remainder is taken up with a discussion of "The Personal Life," "The Message," "The Ministry," and "The Literary Form" of each of the two prophets where written utterances are the subjects of comment.

JACOB A. CLUTZ.

Outlines of the Life of Christ. By W. Sanday, D.D., LL.D., Litt.D. Lady Margaret Professor and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford. Duodecimo, pp. 241.

Dr. Sanday has for years been favorably known as a student of various departments of New Testament theology. We are sure that this, his latest publication, will not detract from his well merited reputation. The volume before us is a reprint, *mutatis mutandis*, of the article on Jesus Christ that appeared over the author's name in volume II of Dr. Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible* published in 1899.

The work from beginning to end is critical and scientific. In no other way could it meet the demands of the times. It is based almost exclusively on a critical examination of the gospels, chiefly the Synoptics, but the fourth gospel, which the author regards as a genuine work of the Beloved Disciple, is often appealed to, now for purposes of confirmation and now for exhibitions of deviations.

The author's stand-point is that of a devout personal faith in Jesus Christ as the promised Messiah and as the Son of Man and the Son of God. As a Messiah he was to fulfill the expectation raised by the prophets. "Son of Man" is Christ's chosen designation of himself. "This comprehensive and deeply significant title touched at the one end the Messianic and escatological expectation through the turn which had been given to it in one section of Judaism (the Book of Enoch). At the other and opposite end it touched the idea of the Suffering Servant. But at the centre it is broadly based upon an infinite sense of brotherhood with toiling and struggling humanity, which He who most thoroughly accepted its conditions was fittest also to save. As Son of God Jesus looked upwards to the Father; as Son of Man he looked outwards upon His brethren, the sheep who had no shepherd."

The question of the miracles of Jesus is examined with much critical care. The author is thoroughly convinced that the historical evidence for the miracles of Jesus is satisfactory, and that the tendency of recent researches is to enhance the historical value of the Gospels. Very pertinent are these words: "Eliminate miracles from the career of Jesus, and the belief of Christians from the first moment that we have undoubted contemporary evidence of it (say A. D. 50), becomes an insoluble enigma."

The Resurrection of Christ is a difficult problem. It is not satisfactorily solved by the evangelistic narrative. Its chief witness is Paul—"the double witness of what Paul says and what he implies. It is hardly possible for testimony to be stronger than this is." Besides this, we have the unanimous belief of the Church "that the Lord Jesus Christ rose from the dead on the third day and appeared to the disciples." The significance of the resurrection is found in the fact that "as a divine act, the crowning mark of divine approval, it is a necessary complement of the crucifixion."

Taken all in all this may be regarded as a critical life of Christ. It is not devotional, it is not dogmatic, it is not psychological. Every essential point in the career of Christ is examined in the light of modern criticism. Difficulties are recognized and some problems are left unsolved, because the evidence is inadequate and the testimony is discrepant, as for instance the exact date of the Last Supper and the Crucifixion. But the effect of the presentation is to confirm faith in the historical Christ, as the Son of Man and the Son of God, who came into the world to save men and to set up the Kingdom of God. There is no doubt that such critical presentations do affect the traditional view. But it must be remembered that the conditions for the study of all theological problems are more favorable than they have ever been. We have a more accurate New Testament text today than our fathers had. We have also more historical, and archaeological and ethnological knowledge than they had. We need not be surprised that results are reached that differ from those obtained by the fathers. Adoration of the past is not proof of scholarship, nor does it give assurance of piety. Christ must be justified before the intellectual consciousness as well as to the experience of every age, for he is large enough and full enough to satisfy the demands of all ages. The more his person and his career are explicated the larger the view becomes; and there can be no doubt that Christ fills a larger segment of humanity's horizon today than ever before.

We welcome such a critical examination of the life of Christ as that before us. The author modestly calls it *Outlines*, and such it is if regard be had to the number of pages. But it is exceedingly comprehensive in its range of subjects, and it embraces all the great christological problems, and suggests a fuller development. Hence we are happy to learn that "the writer is engaged upon a larger work on the same subject," though alas! it "is not likely to appear for some years."

J. W. RICHARD.

The Gospel and the Church. By Alfred Loisy. Translated by Christopher Home. Pp. 277. Price $1.00 net.

This book has no preface, and there is nothing on the title page to tell who the author is, or what he has done. But from another source of information we learn that from 1881 to 1893 he was Professor of Hebrew in the *Institut Catholique* in Paris; that in the year last named he was deprived of his chair and appointed chaplain to a girls school; that this book was placed in the *Index Librorum Prohibitorum* in 1903, and that the author has at length been appointed to a chair in *Ecole des Hautes Etudes*, where he enjoys academic freedom.

The book belongs to the so-called *liberal* theological literature of the present age. After an *Introduction* of twenty-two pages it dis-

cusses: I. The Sources of the Gospels; II. The Kingdom of Heaven; III. The Son of God; IV. The Church; V. The Christian Dogma; VI. The Catholic Worship. In content the book is a reply to Harnack's *Essence of Christianity*, which has made such a stir in the world since the year 1900. In general Loisy agrees with Harnack in the view that the Gospels are not, strictly speaking, historical narratives, but that they have been so changed by the interpretation of their authors as to give an exaggerated and ideal view of the Messiah. "It is true, however, that these narratives represent a normal development of the history of Christ. The very nature of their subject, the critical examinations of the two versions taken separately or compared, and an analysis of evangelical tradition, make it impossible to regard them as a definite expression of historical memories."

But from this point the two authors separate and turn back to back; and though *development* is the watch-word of both, yet in Harnack's view the historical development of Christianity is a *degeneracy*, while in the view of Loisy the development is normal, and is in the direction of higher and more perfect forms While Harnack finds the essence of Christianity in Christ's relation to us, and in his revelation of the paternal love of God, Loisy finds it in the institutions and mediations of the Church. The former is eminently subjective; the latter is eminently objective. The former represents the Protestant principle of freedom in an extreme form; the latter represents the Catholic principle of ecclesiastical authority as culminating in the Pope in a form that, to Protestants at least, seems extreme. He says: "To the churches maintained or established in barbarian lands, and in the nations themselves, the Pope appears not only as the supreme judge of all ecclesiastical causes and controversies. From the end of the eighth century, he acts as the depository of the Imperial tradition, transferring the title of Caesar to Charlemagne and his successors. Towards the close of the eleventh century, all authority seems vested in him, not only over particular churches, but also over nations. The Pope has become social instructor, tutor of Monarchies, head of the Christian Confederation, while he remains and becomes more and more supreme as the chief of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, the arbiter of the faith, the guardian of discipline, the bishop of all the churches. His two offices are not distinguished one from the other," pp. 160, 161.

Paul "laid the foundations of Christian dogma;" but this foundation, notwithstanding "Helenization," indeed by means of the Hellenic logic and philosophy, has been built upon by the Fathers, and by the councils. "Greek science has not been substituted for the Gospel nor Plato taken for master in place of Christ and the Apostles." The author does not regard the vatican definitions as final. He thinks it possible that the future will make observations in the nature and object of ecclesiastical authority that will influence its exercise.

In regard to worship the author only states a fact when he says: "History knows no instance of a religion without a ritual, and consequently the existance of a Christian ritual should surprise no one." True! The soul in this mundane existence must have a body. The moment religion expresses itself it creates or assumes a form. There is form in the Quaker meeting. There is a certain order in the Methodist service conducted in the backwoods school-house. But the "development" is immense from the few simple data of worship in the Apostolic Church—O. T. reading with explanation and prayer; communion with prayer and thanksgiving—and the prolonged, complicated and elaborate service of the Roman Catholic Mass, with its sentences, responses, confessions, glorias, kissings, crossings, genuflections.

That cannot be a logical development which contains momenta in the conclusions that are different in kind from any and everything contained in the premises. That cannot be regarded as a sacrifice—or offering to God—which Christ meant to be a sacrament—a gift from God to man. Our author makes a fundamental mistake in declaring "that the central act of worship is the celebration of the Eucharist and that worship is essentially sacramental by virtue of the place that rites hold in it as the vehicle of the Spirit and the means of Divine life." The central act of worship is the teaching and preaching of the Gospel, and the chief and most potent vehicle of the Spirit, and the most effective means of the Divine life is the Word of God. Worship as shown in the New Testament is not essentially sacramental, but *evangelistic*, for the chief instrument of the Holy Spirit in all the operations of grace—illumination, justification, regeneration, sanctification—is the Gospel Word. And there can be no higher act of worship than the pure preaching and the reverent hearing of the gospel of God's grace. "Belief comes by hearing, and hearing by the word of Christ."

And our author is only partly correct when he says: "The primitive Church knew but two principal: Baptism, with which confirmation was associated, and the Eucharist; the number of secondary sacraments was indefinite." The primitive Church knew but two sacraments. Of secondary sacraments she knew nothing, but our author, who is a devout Roman Catholic, will have it otherwise. In his judgment the present number of sacraments in the Roman Catholic Church is legitimate and was effected in the social, political and moral conditions that surrounded the Church. But he says: "The end is still to come, as sacramental development, continuing to follow the general lines, can only end with the Church herself."

The book is exceedingly clever—clear, bright, learned and logical. We have read it from beginning to end, and are glad to see Catholicism presented from the author's standpoint. It is a revelation; and yet it is said that the author represents an important school of liberal-

ism among Roman Catholics on the continent and in America, that is stigmatized as *l'américanisme*, and that stands as the antithesis of ultramontanism. The book will be read with interest by all persons who wish to ascertain how a "liberal" Roman Catholic theologian applies the canons of modern criticism and of the evolution philosophy to the exposition of the great problems of Christianity.

We are not surprised to learn that the book has been interdicted by the Archbishop of Paris. It certainly "is of such a nature as seriously to trouble the faith of the faithful."

J. W. RICHARD.

Fetichism in West Africa. By Robert Hamill Nassau, M.D., S.T.D. Cloth bound. 389 pages. Illustrated. Price $2.50.

Dr. Nassau was absolutely fitted for the task he has performed. For forty years a missionary in the Gabun district of Kongo-Francaise, his work is not a compilation of the rough notes of a transient traveler, but the result of personal observation, as a pioneer of native customs and superstition. Fetichism, broadly defined, is the localization of deity; it includes in its philosophy a great mass of tradition and ceremony. This fetich-religion, its manifestation, its witchcraft, sorcery, charms and amulets and its dominion over civil and family life, form the subject-matter of intensely interesting chapters. Much light is thrown upon the problems of modern mission-work in Africa. The book has, in addition, a distinct apologetic value. We have here the picture of a people who have wandered from monotheism to crass fetichism. Traditions of Eden, of the deluge, of blood-atonement, and of the coming of a Deliverer, still remain. Dr. Nassau states that although he has preached in hundreds of villages of various tribes, he has yet to be asked, "Who is God?"

STANLEY BILLHEIMER.

VIR PUBLISHING COMPANY.

Immortality. By Rev. William L. Seabrook. ($7\frac{1}{2}$x 5; pp. 203).

The subject of Immortality is one that can never cease to be interesting The number of books recently published on this theme shows how much space it occupies in the thoughts of men even in this commercial age and how earnestly they strive to be assured of their future existence. Mr. Seabrook has gathered together various considerations bearing on this topic and presented them in a manner suited to the comprehension of the average thoughtful reader. Many of the most beautiful passages in the poets, major and minor, are included in the volume and the selections are made with taste and judgment. The style of the book is clear, the manufacture is attractive, and altogether the volume is one at the appearance of which the author and his friends can feel gratified.

J. A. HIMES.

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY, NEW YORK.

The Freedom of Authority. Essays in Apologetics. By J. Macbride Sterrett, D D, The Head Professor of Philosophy in The George Washington University. 12 mo. Pp. 317.

The title of this book is identical with that of the first essay. Hence it is by a sort of accommodation that it is made to extend its significance to the other essays, seven in number, which help to make up the book.

Very properly does the author say in the Preface: "The volume is a series of *Studies*, rather than a sustained thesis. Yet there runs through them all, the contention that nature and man are known truly, only when they are reviewed as a process of the objective Mind, realizing itself afresh in and through empirical conditions" This paragraph is an epitome of a book that is full of thought clearly and logically presented. Taken as a whole the book is an apologetic defense of Christianity as it appears in the history of the Church and in her doctrines. The author does not enunciate his philosophical creed, but he strictly maintains the *knowability* of God against the New Kantians and the Agnostics who deny the *knowability* of God and insist that we can only believe that there is a God, and must act upon the supposition that there is a God. He lays much emphasis on *Cause*—the *Actus Purus* of the Scholastics, the Prime Mover of Aristotle, the Good of Plato, the God of Christians. The Final Cause he regards, and rightly we think, as the real cause, as the first cause. There is development in the universe, but development towards a destined end and by direction of Mind. Evolution is not mechanical. Matter does not have in it "the potency of all life" "To understand the finite processes of potentialities becoming other forms of actuality, there is implied an *Absolute Actual*, a matterless Form—a Form which has *eternally* realized all its potentalities * * * the Unmoved Mover—a causal actuality because a *Causa Sui.*" In a word the author is in philosophy a devout theistic Evolutionist, and in Religion a devout Low School Episcopalian "from intellectual convictions." His Philosophy makes him a very strong defender of the doctrine of the presence and activity of a personal Deity in all the affairs of a planned and created universe His ecclesiastical position as an Episcopalian (albeit Low School) gives the cue, in part at least, to his view as touching authority. His object in the first essay is to show that man is free only in so far as he is under authority—the authority of God, of the conscience, of the Church, of the State, of society. The "non-conformist" ceases to be a man, and, according to Aristotle, is "either a beast or a God," "self-schismed from all of his kind by his un-*Kindness.*" Man becomes a good citizen by conformity to laws and to institutions which others have established. He becomes a good Christian and attains to perfect freedom by conformity to "The *Divine* compulsion." "God compels—persuades mankind into better and

better forms of living. This persuasive form of the Divine grace is mediated to individuals through social institutions. The central principle of persuasive authority is that of the Christian doctrine of Divine Grace, so that ultimately man is finding that conformity to God's authority—that is, 'God's service' is 'perfect freedom.'"

The second essay is devoted to a criticism of the religious subjectivism of Sabbatier and Harnack, and of Loisy's view of Christ as "a subjective one in the hearts of the bereaved band of disciples, and not historical facts." In the third essay he combats Loisy's theory of ecclesiastical development toward perfection. In the fourth essay he discusses *The Historical Method* in its scientific and in its philosophical form. Self-consciousness or personality is the highest in thought or being "Thought, mind, self-consciousness, personality being thus the loftiest *ne plus ultra* principle, becomes the ultimate principle because the ultimate principle of explanation of both nature and humanity." In the fifth essay we have a discussion of *Ecclesiastical impedimenta.* Some of these impedimenta are as useful as our clothing; others are hindrances, but cannot always be discarded. In the sixth essay: *The Ethics of Creed Conformity*, we have the central thought in these words: "It is equally irrational to seek to stereotype Christian thought according to the form of the first, the fourth, or the sixteenth century, or to seek to make a brand-new creed for the twentieth century." In the seventh essay we have a discussion of *The Ground of Authority in Religion*, both in its rational and on its psychological side.

The book is ably written. The author is exceedingly well-read in current philosophical and religious literature. He thinks independently and expresses himself unequivocally. He holds fast to the good found in the past and accepts all that has been established by modern discovery and criticism, and has his eye on the future in expectation of things larger and better. If the book fails of a wide reading it will not be because it is deficient in content.

J. W. RICHARD.

EATON AND MAINS. NEW YORK.

Old Truths Newly Illustrated. By Henry Graham, D.D. Cloth bound. 229 pages. Price $1.00.

The book contains more than three hundred illustrations which the author found useful during his ministry of thirty years. The most of these are entirely original, applying the old truths of the Gospel under varied forms to the mind and heart of the audience. The preacher will find here plenty of good material for sermonic use. The topical index is helpful and suggestive.

STANLEY BILLHEIMER.

Back to Bethlehem pp. 280.

The purpose of the book is indicated in the title. All roads lead back to Bethlehem. In this book of a dozen chapters the writer considers the problems of the modern world, notes results of science, examines the pages of history, covers the tracks of commerce, examines the beauty of art, gives you the meaning and purpose of literature, examines the beauties of art, takes you through the ranks of the world's heroes, sages, and philanthropists, and in every case, "sooner or later you come face to face with the living, loving Christ." The theory of evolution, the doctrine of the survival of the fittest, the race problems, militarism, higher criticism, all are familiar subjects, and all are laid under tribute to the Christ. The author covers his prayer with crisp epigrammatic sentences that keep the mind alert, and at times put it in a whirl, and you wonder how things so diverse, and yet as you see somehow connected, can be crowded on a single page. There are more facts and illustrations in this book that can with profit be woven into sermons, than are found in a score of books of the ordinary kind. You may not find yourself in agreement with the author in his inspiration theory and other theories of orthodoxy, but you will be helped in your endeavor to separate the base from the pure, by the reading of this book. The author shows wide and extensive reading, and more than ordinary power in the assimilation and adjustment of thought.

R. H. CLARE.

ATLANTIC MONTHLY, BOSTON, MASS.

The *Atlantic Monthly* for July contains a number of very valuable contributions.

J. Laurence Laughlin, of the University of Chicago, has given to this number a paper on "Large Fortunes" which is, in view of recent controversies, most timely. A paper on "Publicity in the Express Business" is written by Frank Haigh Dixon who is an expert on transportation problems. Chester Holcombe, a diplomatist, who has had wide experience with Eastern nations contributes an article on "Some Results of the Russo-Japanese War," and Henry D. Sedgwick has written for this number a satirical analysis called "Mob Spirit in Literature."

Any number of the *Atlantic* which contains, as the July number does, contributions from Agnes Repplier, Thomas Wentworth Higginson and Martha Baker Dunn, will not lack delightful entertainment. There are other literary papers dealing with Saintsbury, the critic, with Laurence Sterne, and with the present outlook for the Art and Science of Writing History. Miss Sherwood contributes a brilliant installment of "Coming of the Tide."

THE

LUTHERAN QUARTERLY.

OCTOBER, 1905.

ARTICLE I.

THE OLD LUTHERAN DOCTRINE OF FREE-WILL.

(CONCLUDED FROM PAGE 345).

By Professor J. W. RICHARD, D.D., LL.D.

In the current volume of THE LUTHERAN QUARTERLY, p. 158, we stated that at least four of the authors of the Form of Concord had, in earlier life, held a doctrine of Free-will that is different from that contained in the Form of Concord, and we expressed our willingness to prove our statement when requested to do so. The request has come, and we now proceed by the use of documentary evidence to make good our declaration. The citations will be copious, and will thus exclude all suspicion of garbling, or of partiality in the use of the material. Moreover, by means of the copious quotations that follow, the reader can reach independent conclusions as to what the men in question held and taught on the subject of Free-will.

I. JACOB ANDREAE.

We begin with Jacob Andreae, Chancellor of the University of Tuebingen in Würtemberg. He was the most active, and perhaps the most influential of the six men who are commonly regarded as the authors of the Form of Concord. In 1562 Andreae, and Christopher Binder, Superintendent of Nürtingen, were sent to Weimar to assist in allaying the synergistic strife, and especially to give an opinion in regard to the orthodoxy of a *Declaration* which had been made in March of that year by Victorine Strigel, who had been in conflict with Flacius about the doctrine of Free-will. In said *Declaration* Strigel

"plainly and clearly confessed that by Free-will he understood in harmony with Augustine the Will itself, and that this Will, after the Fall, retains freedom from necessity and compulsion. Otherwise there would be no Will remaining. That God in and by conversion does not take away the Will, but changes it and makes it better, and begins and perfects the good in it, though he does not apply power, but out of an unwilling man makes one willing. The Will is *passive* in so far as God alone works all good, but *active* in so far as the Will in its conversion must be present and must consent and not resist, but accept." *

With the substance of this declaration the Würtemberg theologians found no fault. "They said that they had read Strigel's confession, in which many obscure and ambiguous words occur. Among these was the statement that our nature is not unlike a traveler who has been despoiled and severely wounded by robbers; and in regard to the human will either assenting or resisting; and in regard to man as in some manner willing;" † and they requested an explanation.

Thereupon Strigel more fully explained his meaning in accordance, as he declared, with Melanchthon's use of the words in question. The Würtembergers now expressed themselves as entirely satisfied, and asked Strigel to put his doctrine in writing. Strigel then wrote what is known as his third *Declaration*, which we now give in full:

"In the controversy about Free-will two points are especially to be considered. One of these is efficacia, the other is modus agendi or aptitudo or capacitas. Therefore as regards δυναμις or power or efficacia, by which we think and will and perform things pleasing to God and salutary to our soul, there is no doubt that that was completely lost in the Fall of our first parents, and that in its stead ἀδυναμία or impotence has been propagated upon all men, who are begotten of impure seed, according to the following passages: The animal man receiveth not the things that are of God, the sense of the flesh is enmity against God. He is not subject to the law of God, and is not

* Salig, *Hist. Augsb. Conf. III*, p. 882.

† Otto, *De Victorino Strigelio*, p. 17. Salig, *ut supra*, p. 883.

able to be made subject. We are not able to think of ourselves as of ourselves. Without me ye can do nothing. If any one absolutely denies this impotence of mind, will and heart, or extenuates it with words, he does not entertain correct views of original sin, which is not only a want of true wisdom in the mind and a lack of righteousness and of holiness in the will and heart, but also a depraved inclination, which begets doubts in regard to God and divine things, and a contumacy of the affections which rashly rush against the law of God. But the efficacia of which I have spoken is restored not by the human powers, nor by the strength of any creature, but by God through the Son the Mediator, and through the Holy Spirit, as the following words clearly affirm: No one can take anything to himself except it be given him from above. No one cometh to me except the Father draw him. It is God who giveth to will and to do. By patience we run the course that is set before us, looking to Jesus the captain and finisher of our faith. It is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father speaketh in you.

"From these and like passages it is clear that the efficacia or power or strength by which we either think or will or do things acceptable to God, does not lie in our own powers which remain after the Fall; but they are the gift and work of God who renews his image in those who for the sake of the Son are received unto grace and become temples and homes of the Holy Spirit.

"But as regards the second point, whether it be called modus agendi or aptitudo and capacitas, it is most certain that man differs from all creatures which are not endowed with either mind or will. For a block was not in any sense created so as to be susceptible of the Word and sacraments through which God operates in the Church. But men are susceptible of the divine call, and by the Holy Spirit not only assent to the Word of God, but also guard this splendid deposit and treasure of great value. In regard to this aptitudo or capacitas there is extant that noted line in the writings of Nazianzen: *Κεῖνος δεκτὸν ἔθηκε καλοῦ καὶ κάρτος ὀπάζει*: God made me susceptible of the good and supplies the power. And Bernard

distinctly says: God is the Author of Salvation; Free-will is only susceptible. None but God is able to give it; none but Free-will is able to lay hold of it. What therefore is given by God alone and to Free-will alone is not able to exist on the one hand without the consent of him who lays hold, and on the other hand without the grace of him who gives. Also: Take away Free will, there will be nothing to be saved. Take away grace and there will be nothing by which to be saved.

"But though the term Free-will be offensive to many, yet in the words of Bernard nothing else is meant than the substance of mind and will, to which if the power of believing, which the Scripture declares to have been lost, be not restored by the Holy Spirit, the mind or will or heart is moved neither by the Word nor by the Sacraments. Wherefore, if, in the human Will after the Fall you consider the power of doing, it is only the slave and captive of Satan. But if you consider the aptitude it is not a stone or block, but it has been divinely created so as to be susceptible of the heavenly gifts of the Holy Spirit." *

This is known as Strigel's third *Declaration.* If now we look carefully at the first part we find that the author denies unqualifiedly the ability of man by means of his own powers to do anything well-pleasing to God, or promotive of his own salvation. He is impotent in mind and will as regards spiritual things, and is utterly deficient in righteousness and holiness. Certainly there is no Pelagianism here, neither is there a trace of the Flacianist doctrine of original sin. But we are not now much concerned with this first part of the *Declaration.* Let us look at the second part.

1. It denies unqualifiedly that there is any similarity between a man and a block, inasmuch as the latter is not susceptible of the Divine Word and sacraments.

2. Man has susceptibility for the divine call, and not only can he *assent to the Word of God* (the famous Melanchthonian

* Latin in Schlüsselburg's *Catalogi Haereticorum*, V, pp. 88–91, and in Otto's *De Victorino Strigelio*, pp. 59–61. German in Salig, III, pp. 884–6.

form of expression, word for word in the original), but he can guard (*custodire*) this glorious and precious treasure—which requires determination of the Will and persistence in that determination, or the highest kind of volitional activity.

3. It is declared that there must be *consent* on the part of the accipient of grace, which is a joint action of mind and will, the former cognizing and the latter surrendering to the proffered redemption, that is, an exercise of the *liberum arbitrium* in both of its elements.

4. Appeal is made to Gregory Nazianzen, who is known to have been a down-right "synergist," who, as Dr. Luthardt well says, "nowhere expressly teaches anticipatory grace, but only the help of grace, which he identifies as something added to the grace of creation, government, and revelation. When Paul says, Rom. 9 : 16, that salvation is not of him who wills, Gregory explains thus: That is, not alone of him who wills, but also of God who shows mercy."* Indeed any appeal to the Ante-Augustinian Fathers on the subject of Free-will is an appeal to "synergism," for they all were synergists.† And to say that Strigel and the other learned men who with him signed the *Declaration* did not know that Gregory taught "synergism" is to impeach their intelligence and their sincerity.

5. Appeal is also made to Bernard, and a passage is quoted from his celebrated Tractate *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio.* We quote the entire paragraph of which it is a part: "What then, you say, does Free-will do? I answer briefly: It is saved. Take away Free-will and there will not be anything which is saved. Take away grace and there will not be anything by which to be saved. This work cannot be effected without both: The one by whom it is effected; the other to whom and in whom it is effected. God is the author of salvation, Free will only is susceptible. None but God is able to give it; none but Free will is able to lay hold of it. Therefore it is

* *Die Lehre von Freien Willen*, p. 20.

† See Thomasius, *Dogmengechichte*, 2nd Ed. I, p. 487. Kahnis, *Dogmatik*, *Zweiter Band*, p. 113. Luthardt *die Lehre von Freien Willen*, p. 12 *et seqq*.

given by God alone, and given to Free will alone. On the one hand it cannot exist without the consent of the accipient, and on the other hand not without the grace of the giver. And thus Free-will is said to coöperate with the grace that works salvation, while it consents, that is, while it is being saved. For to consent is to be saved. Hence the spirit of a beast can in no sense appropriate salvation, for the reason that it does not have voluntary consent by which it can quietly yield to God who saves, or submit to him who commands, or trust him who promises, or render thanks to him who bestows. For voluntary consent is one thing, the natural appetite another. The latter we have in common with the irrational animals. It cannot consent to the Spirit; it is hindered by the enticements of the flesh. Perchance it is that which is called by the Apostle the wisdom of the flesh, where he says: *The wisdom of the flesh is hostile to God; it is not subject to the law of God, nor can it be.* This therefore we have in common with the beasts. The voluntary consent distinguishes us. For it is a habit of the mind, personal freedom. Since I am not compelled I am not carried away by force. It is a matter of the will, not of necessity; nor does he (God) deny himself nor present himself to anyone except by the Will.

"If one could be forced against his Will, that would be a matter of violence, not a voluntary matter. But where there is no Will there is no consent. For there is no consent unless it be voluntary. Therefore where consent is, there is Will. Moreover, where there is Will, there is freedom. And this is what I think is called Free-will."*

There is no mistaking the meaning of this paragraph. It clearly and distinctly affirms the activity of Free-will in the matter of a man's salvation Hence we are not surprised to learn that the Flacianists in censuring Strigel's *Declaration*, pointed to the fact that both Nazianzen and Bernard were "synergists."†

Now on May 6th, 1562, Strigel's *Declaration* was signed, not only by its author, but by Andreae and Binder, who "judge

* *Opera*, curis Mabillon, *Ed. Quarta*, I, p. 1367.
†Salig, III, p. 888, note; Otto, *ut supra*, p. 66.

it to be in harmony with the Word of God, with the Augsburg Confession and the Apology, with the Schmalkald Articles, with the Confutation Book, and with the Würtemberg Confession and its Apology" (Brentz). That is, these two Würtemberg theologians, one of whom some years later was the leading spirit in the work of Concord, subscribed a doctrine of Free-will that is Melanchthonian through and through, and that was as violently assailed by the Flacianists on account of its "synergism," as was Melanchthon's *Loci* by the same persons for the same alleged reason. That the assailants judged it rightly cannot be denied. It destinctly denies the *lapis-truncus* theory of man, and affirms a *modus agendi*, that is, some kind of activity in man, and the *assentiri verbo Dei*, and the *power of believing*, and the *consent of the accipient*—which, taken together, present a doctrine of Free-will that stands in marked contrast with that contained in Article II of the Form of Concord.

Another fact: The second part of Strigel's *Declaration* is taken almost bodily, though in condensed form, from Brentz's *Apology* of the Würtemberg Confession, and Andreae and Binder declare that the *Declaration* and Brentz's *Apology* agree *de libero arbitrio*. Now there is not one word in the Würtemberg Confession that supports the *lapis-truncus-pure passive* doctrine. But how is it with Brentz's Apology? Here it is: "But some one will say, If since the Fall no power remains to Free will except to sin, and if Free-will of itself is only the slave, captive and servant of sin, What, I pray, is the difference between a man and a stone or a block? And as a block of wood on being fashioned into a statue does nothing, but only suffers, is thus Free-will in acquiring the true salvation *merely passive*, so to say? Most emphatically, No (Nihil certe minus). Free-will does not *of itself* have that by which it can prepare itself for laying hold of salvation, or by which it can merit salvation. But it has that by which it *can appropriate* the favor of God (Habet autem quo beneficia Dei excipiat).

"For since man has fallen into sin and has become the slave of sin, he is oppressed by such tyranny that he neither wishes nor is able by *his own powers* to free himself from the bondage

of sin and Satan, and to contribute to the freedom of righteousness. Nor is there any difference between the wills of men if you consider their corrupt nature. The mass of all human kind is one; the natural disposition of all men is the same; in order that the purpose of God according to election may stand fast. Thus Esau does not have in himself, of his own nature, anything by which he can convert or prepare himself for God, nor does Jacob. Both are conceived in sin, both are subject to the tyranny of Satan. Both have sinned, that is, died in Adam, and have become unprofitable. But that God hated Esau and loved Jacob does not result from Jacob's preparation, much less from his desert, but alone from God's gracious election. And yet Jacob does not hold himself in regard to election as a block or a stone. For a block was not created by God in order to be susceptible of the divine election to the true and eternal salvation. Nor is there arbitrium in a block which is able to be converted to the appropriation of the gifts of the Holy Spirit by the ordinary dispensation of God. But Jacob and Esau are men created in the image and likeness of God so that they are susceptible of the gifts of the Holy Spirit and of eternal salvation. In each there is arbitrium, which, though by reason of sin it has become the servant of Satan, nevertheless retains an *aptitude* by which it is able to be turned to the freedom of righteousness. This *aptitude of arbitrium* makes the difference between Jacob and a block. It does not make the difference between Jacob and Esau. Both have this aptitude, and both by reason of their corrupt nature are subject to the bondage of sin. But that the one is elected and receives the gift of the Holy Spirit in order that he may wish and may be able to yield to the call of God and attain to eternal life is the gracious mercy of God. But that the other is left in the bondage of sin and does not receive the gift of the Holy Spirit, is the just judgment of God, who has compassion on whom he will and hardens whom he will." Then after further explanation Brentz declares that his doctrine of Free-will is in accord with the views of the ancient writers who have treated the subject, and he follows this by quoting the passage from Bernard: "Take

away Free-will," etc. * Italics ours. Now let us analyze this teaching of the great Würtemberg master on the subject of Free-will.

1. The first thing that impresses us is the transparency of presentation. There is not an ambiguous word, phrase, sentence or paragraph, from the beginning to the end. He that runneth may both read and understand.

2. We discover at once that Brentz's statement is the model after which Strigel framed the second chief part of his *Declaration.* Not only is the doctrine the same in both documents, but the pivotal words, phrases and forms of expression are identical. In a word, Strigel simply condensed Brentz. Hence we can easily understand why it was that Andreae and Binder could say that the two documents coincide in doctrine.

3. We discover also that this Apology excludes the *lapis-truncus mere passive* doctrine of Free-will in the most unqualified sense,—*Nihil certe minus.* And while it affirms that Free-will has nothing *ex se ipso* or by which it can merit salvation, it has something by which it can *lay hold of* or *appropriate* the grace of God, for the Latin word *excipiat*, here employed, as clearly and as distinctly expresses an action of the *liberum arbitrium* as it is possible for any word to do in the premises, for as Doederlein says, the word means to "intercept, to catch anything that is escaping,"† or as Harpers' Latin Dictionary says, and as the text plainly requires, "*to take* a thing to one's self." Hence in the first paragraph quoted there can be no two opinions on the main subject, either as to what is denied or as to what is affirmed, unless we are willing to say that the author juggled with words.

4. The susceptibility (capax) and aptitude of which Brentz speaks in the next paragraph are not qualified by the adjective *passiva*, as is the case with *capacitas* in the Form of Concord. It is an aptitude which per Spiritum Sanctum is able to be turned to the liberty of righteousness, not as a block is able to be turned into a statue *mere passive*, but because it has ap-

* *Apologia*, pp. 35–37.
† *Latin Synonyms, sub voce.*

titude of arbitrium. The entire course of thought is antithetical to the *tantum subjectum patiens* and the *tantum subjectum convertendum* of the Form of Concord.

5. And when this Apology (somewhat in accordance with Luther's earlier doctrine of Predestination that still lingered in Würtemberg) says that one (Jacob) is elected and receives the gift of the Holy Spirit, the matter does not end there; salvation is not yet secured. This precedent work of God has an *immediate* end in view, which is, "that Jacob may both *will and be able to yield* to the call of God"—in which choice and moral responsibility are distinctly taught. The election of God and the giving of the Spirit must be followed by the corresponding activity on the part of man. The giving of the Spirit as here taught is simply *enabling* grace.

6. When we look at the teaching of this Apology *de libero arbitrio* as a whole we see that it sets forth these three fundamental truths: (a) That Free-will cannot *ex se ipso* merit salvation; (b) that salvation is of grace through the Holy Spirit; (c) that Free-will appropriates salvation, that is, it appropriates the *beneficia Dei*, and does not simply suffer the Holy Spirit to work conversion in it as only *in subjecto patiente*.

It remains for us to say only these two things in regard to this Apology: (a) It shows us why it was that at Worms in 1557 Brentz and Melanchthon could agree "absolutely" "*in doctrina et dogmatibus.*" (b) It shows that in 1562 Jacob Andreae (and indeed the Würtemberg Church) did not, as regards Free-will, stand on the platform of the Form of Concord; and this is all that we set out to prove in regard to this man. To which it must be added, that in August 1569 he came to Wittenberg and "in a public discourse declared the theologians orthodox and the *Corpus Doctrinae Philippicum* correct." *

* Loescher, *Hist. Motuum*, p. 243. See Hutter, *Concordia Concors*, p. 29 *et seqq.;* also Balthaser, Historie des Torgischen Buchs, 1, p. 12; also Calinich, *Kampt und Untergang des Melanchthonismus in Kursachsen*, pp. 20-34: Andreae said at Wittenberg repeatedly: Symbolum nostri consensus debet esse Corpus doctrinae vestrarum ecclesiarum. Also: Ich will mein Leben zusetzen über euerm Corpus doctrinae. From the pulpit he declared his entire agreement with the Wittenbergers in every article of doctrine. Calinich, *ut supra*, p. 20.

II. NICHOLAS SELNECCER.

Nicholas Selneccer was one of Melanchthon's favorite pupils. In 1565 (after the expulsion of the Flacianists) he, with two other Wittenbergers, was called to Jena, " where for some time the Philippistic tendency had found an entrance." Three years later, upon the accession of Duke John William, Selneccer lost his place, and returned to Electoral Saxony, and accepted a professorship in the University of Leipzig. " August 18th, 1568, he entered his new office, and lectured with applause on Melanchthon's *Loci*, defended the Church of Electoral Saxony against the attacks on its Lutheran orthodoxy that had proceeded from Jena and declared here as in the Dedication of his *Commentary on Genesis*, August, 1569, his emphatic agreement with the *Corpus Doctrinae Philippicum*, which at that time was being energetically pressed upon the theologians and ministers as a standard of doctrine." *

Surely these facts show where Selneccer stood at that time on the subject of Free-will, for it is exactly in the *Corpus Doctrinae Philippicum* that we have Melanchthon's most matured views *de libero arbitrio*, as in the *Variata*, in the last edition of the *Loci*, in the *Confessio Saxonica* and in the *Reply to the Bavarian Articles*. That is, in 1569 Selneccer showed himself a thorough-going " synergist." And more: In 1573 he published his *Institutio Religionis Christianae*. It is from this work that we now quote. After declaring that " God himself confers on us grace and faith, which grace and faith are the gift of God," he says: "And yet the Will in the very act and operation of the Holy Spirit who kindles faith in man who hears and meditates on the Word and promise of the Gospel, is not absolutely taken away, is not dead, is not absolutely inactive, but as Will it is moved by the Holy Spirit, as the saying is: God draws, but he draws him who is willing, because there is some action in assent, although somewhat languid and insufficient, just like a weak boy who wishes to carry a burden which is far beyond his strength, and succumbs. Nevertheless, all pious minds

* Herzog, 2 ed., XIV, 78.

who are not engaged in speculation only, but also in the practice and exercise of faith, worship and repentance, when moved by experience, freely and openly confess that by their own will and freedom they neither prepare themselves for grace and faith nor rightly hear the Word of God, much less rightly assent to the promise; nor are they active even in the least thing which has reference to true faith, conversion, righteousness and salvation; nor can they merit anything; but as regards preparation, and right assent and power and merit they are wholly subjectum patiens though not impelled or forced by violence as a workman cuts and shapes a block and a stone by great violence, nor carried by enthusiasm, nor led by excitement and clamor as a driver drives an ass, nor drawn by impetus as wood is drawn, nor by a change in its entire substance, and transformed (for to say this, is both to fight against the will of God and the rational creature and the experience of all the pious). But they are called, accepted, adorned, clothed, renewed, turned and moved by the mercy and goodness of God. But when God calls, it is necessary that we hear and that we come to him. When God accepts and receives us, it is necessary that we commit ourselves to him, extend our hands and wholly give ourselves up, as David says: 'Deal with thy servant according to thy mercy.' When he is adorning, clothing, renewing, turning, and moving us, it is necessary that we permit ourselves to be clothed, and do not contumaciously resist the Holy Spirit, nor reject and pollute the garments. Hence the efficiency is of God alone. We are only material, but not destitute of understanding and will, at least, in things subject to reason, but rational material created in the image of God, and to be formed anew, intelligent, and often willing carnally *per se* and by our own nature, and, also, sometimes assenting to Divine things; but rightly understanding, and rightly and spiritually willing and rightly and firmly assenting to the promise, only by the grace of God and the operation of the Holy Spirit, who though he at first finds us resisting, nevertheless, as soon as he begins to work and to move our mind and will, operates upon us no

longer resisting and contumacious (for otherwise he would not operate), but hearing, willing and submitting." *

Again: "Nevertheless, the human will cannot be called the cause of conversion, since the thing to be converted is not the thing converting. But, since it is named *συνέργον*, it is shown to be nothing else than the Will not inactive.

"These things are expounded in this way for the purpose of instruction, and they are true and pleasing to God. For the Holy Spirit does not convert a stone or a block or an ox or an ass, but a man who is endowed by God with reason and is created in the image of God, and who is able and ought to hear, to reflect and to understand. And, though man in his own nature since the Fall has become the enemy of God, nevertheless, as an enemy endowed with reason he hears, understands and receives the reconciliation offered him by him whose enemy he is, and permits himself to be moved and turned to peace and becomes a friend. Thus man, hearing the promise of the Gospel and seeing the ambassador of God offering grace and peace, that is, hearing the Word and perceiving the moving of the Spirit in his heart does not repel or reject the offered grace, but joyfully incited submits to the divine voice and movement, as Paul says: Lord, what wilt thou have me to do"?†

Also: "Although the depravity and perversity of our nature is so great that the imagination of the human heart is evil from childhood, Gen. 8, and the carnal mind is enmity against God, Rom. 8, and contumacy in many ways resists God, as is elaborately shown in the doctrine of original sin, nevertheless, in conversion itself the Holy Spirit so reforms the reason and moves and turns the Will that man by nature an enemy of God and a child of wrath now becomes a friend of God and a son and heir of God, understands and joyfully embraces God's goodness and grace, assents to the promise and in all things submits to the will of God, not indeed by the natural human reason and Will, but by the grace and efficacious action of the

* Pars. II, pp. 85-86.
* *Ibid*, p. 88.

Holy Spirit who instructs and illumines the reason and heals and reforms the Will, but nevertheless in such a way that the reason and the Will are not inactive, but both suffering and in their own order doing something, and, to use the words of Luther, coöperating with the Spirit operating in us and renewing us not without us, that is, not contumaciously resisting or spurning, but admitting the Holy Spirit and accepting his grace and obeying and serving God while the Holy Spirit moves and assists."*

On pp. 284–5, after quoting 1 Cor. 3: "For we are workers together with God," Selneccer says: "Hence usually it is said that there are three causes of a right and good action, namely, the Word of God, the Holy Spirit and the human Will not resisting the Word of God, nor shaking off the Holy Spirit, as Saul shook him off by his own Will." And on pp. 294–5 he quotes the famous dicta of Chrysostom and Basil: "God draws, but he draws him who is willing; Only Will and God anticipates," and says: "The Will is not inactive, nor does it hold itself as a statue, but it does something. For the Will when moved by the Holy Spirit does not hold itself as a statue. Indeed the natural power of following the drawing of God does not reside in man. But when the Holy Spirit is received man acquires the power of obeying, and this is only of grace. * * * The ability to obey God is not in our power. This is true of man before grace without the Word and the Holy Spirit.

"Man is able to obey God when he calls. This is true of man admonished, moved and drawn by grace, by the Word and by the Holy Spirit.

"The Will is not absolutely passive. This is true in two respects. 1. As already said, in respect of external discipline. 2. In respect of the Will moved by the Son of God.

"The Will is the attendant of the Holy Spirit, as the old saying proves: *Praeeunte gratia, comitante voluntate.*

"In the internal renewal of the heart three causes concur:

* *Ibid*, 282-283.

The Word of God, the Holy Spirit and the Will obeying. This is true of man who has the Word of God and the beginnings of the renewing of the Spirit, or of the regenerate when they stand in spiritual conflict."

These quotations face right against the doctrine of Free-will as taught in the Form of Concord, and are Melanchthonian through and through, and in their essential parts they reproduce the characteristic language of Melanchthon *de libero arbitrio.* That is, if Melanchthon taught "Synergism" in the *Loci* and elsewhere, then truly did Selneccer teach "Synergism" in his *Institutio* in 1573, that is, just four years before he helped to put the Form of Concord in its final shape. Moreover, in expounding his doctrine of Free-will he quotes Brentz's *Apology* (see above) and Bernard's famous passage (see above) in support and in illustration of his own position—thus showing how he understood both Brentz and Bernard, that is, as teaching that there is some activity of the Will in the appropriation of salvation. But Selneccer, like Melanchthon, taught with all emphasis that man does not operate or coöperate meritoriously, nor by his natural powers, but by not resisting, not rejecting, by assenting, by consenting, by accepting, by submitting to the will of God, by obeying the divine call, in which "*est mens et voluntas humana non ociosa,*" as he says.

III. DAVID CHYTRAEUS.

Chytraeus was a pupil and follower of Melanchthon, and had heard Luther one year. It will be remembered that in 1557 he assisted in preparing the *Formula of Pacification* sent to Wittenberg by the Duke of Mecklenburg, for the purpose of reconciling Melanchthon and Flacius. That that *Formula* was through and through "Synergistic," has been shown.* But already, (1556), he had published a catechism, which, as Walch says, "closely follows the *Loci and the Catechism* of his preceptor, Melanchthon."† He declares almost in the very language of his Master: "Three causes concur:

*See C. R. 9:92–103, and THE LUTHERAN QUARTERLY, July, 1905, p. 335.
† *Introductio in Libros Symb.* p. 623.

"I. The Word of God and the true knowledge of Christ.

"II. The Holy Spirit kindling in the mind the knowledge of Christ, and faith, and the knowledge of the holy commandments. Thus moving the Will so that it obeys the holy commandments, and thereby regulates the actions of the external members.

"III. The mind and will of man obeying the Holy Spirit and ruling the external members."

In 1558 Chytraeus published a *Commentary on Genesis*, from which we extract the following: "But the three causes of faith are to be united, namely.

"*Αἴτιον*: The Holy Spirit.

"*Συμαίτιον*: Hearing and meditating on the Word of God.

"*Συμοργόν*: The human Will which is not absolutely inactive, or absolutely passive; but it does something. It does not resist, but it assents to the Holy Spirit who operates through the Word. This doctrine *de synergia voluntatis* we most firmly fix in our minds, so as not to nourish indifference, nor security, nor unbelief, nor despair in ourselves. Let the following firm and unanswerable arguments be constantly kept in view.

"I. Since the promise of grace is universal God wills that all men shall be saved. Also, as I live I will not the death of the sinner. And it must not be thought that there are contradictory wills in God. If this be true, then it follows that there is some cause in us why some persons assent to the promise, and why others do not assent. Luke 13: I would have gathered you, but you would not.

"II. It is evident that in the wills of the pious who strive to assent to the promise of the Gospel there are great and severe struggles and conflicts, as in Abraham when he was about to sacrifice his son; as in Jacob when he was wrestling with the angel; as every one daily experiences in prayer. But if the Will, like wax on which an imprint is made, were only passive and were absolutely without any action at all, then there would be no resistance, as when water is poured into a vessel.

"III. Paul 1 Cor. 3 and 2 Cor. 6 calls us *συνεργους* Dei.

"IV. We must not yield to doubt, distrust and security. These curses are strengthened by the doctrine of the Manichaeans.

"V. Because God is no respecter of persons, but is just, that is, truly impartial towards all, according to the one rule which he has given; hence there is some cause in us why some accept the promise and why others are rejected."

Here as in the *Catechesis* we have the Melanchthonian doctrine of Free-will set forth almost word for word as we find it in the *Loci.* There is no trace of *lapis* and *truncus* in any shape or form, and the *pure passive* is expressly rejected.*

IV. MARTIN CHEMNITZ.

Martin Chemnitz stands, by common consent, at the head of the list of Lutheran theologians of the second generation In 1545 he became a student at Wittenberg, where he heard Luther preach and lecture, though he was not formally engaged in the study of theology. In 1554 he began to deliver lectures at Wittenberg on Melanchthon's *Loci Communes.* Called the same year to Brunswick he continued his lectures, which in 1592 were published by Polycarp Lyser. His method is first to quote a *Locus* from Melanchthon and then to make an elaborate exposition of the same. These lectures exhibit moderation of temper, good judgment, sound interpretation of the Scriptures, and comprehensive acquaintance with the Fathers. Consequently these *Loci* have always stood high in the estimation of the Lutheran Church, and have been much used by subsequent writers on Lutheran theology. In expounding the doctrine of Free-will he takes Melanchthon's *Locus de Libero Arbitrio* (including the *Liberum arbitrium in homine facultatem esse applicandi se ad gratiam*) as his basis. He then proceeds exactly in the spirit of his Master, often in pivitol points employing the very language of his Master. But as these points were exhibited by us in THE LUTHHRAN QUAR-

* As late as 1572 Chytraeus declared that he still adheres to "the simple and correct form of doctrine in the *Loci Communes,*" and retains it in his teaching at Rostock. See his letter in Balthaser's *Historie des Torgischen Buchs*, 1, p. 8.

TERLY for January, 1904, pp. 44-45, we deem it unnecessary to make quotations from the *Loci* at this time. We turn our attention to the *Examen Concilii Tridentini*, which still ranks as the classic criticism of the *Decrees* and *Canons* of the Council of Trent.

In that work the author discusses Free will under the following heads: *The Various Cognate Questions on Free-will; The Principal State of the Controversy; The Council of Trent's Doctrine of Free-will; The Scripture Doctrine of Free-will; Augustine's Doctrine of Free-will; The Insidious Statement of the Tridentine Doctrine of Free-will.*

It is our humble judgment that we have here the most importent and the ablest dogmatic and polemic treatment of Free-will to be found in the entire field of Lutheran theology. Would that our space allowed the presentation of the entire chapter! We must content ourselves with one lengthy quotation from the section on *The Scripture Doctrine of Free-will* and with a few short ones from other sections.

After stating, in harmony with the *Old Lutheran Doctrine of Free will*, that man has Free-will in things subject to reason, but that in spiritual things "*'αδυναμί'α* is propagated upon all men who are born of impure seed, and that to this defect and *'αδυναμία* is now joined in this corruption of nature an opposing depravity and inclination," he says: "But the Holy Spirit so heals and renews the corrupt nature, that it begins to mortify that depravity, and in the place of the defects he works in the mind and will a new *δυνά'μια*, afficacia or facultas, from which follow spiritual affections and actions, that is, he works to will, to be able and to do. But these gifts the Holy Spirit works through the medium or instrument of the Word, provided it be read, heard and meditated upon, which man ought and in some sense is able to do. And he does not infuse qualities as liquid is poured into a vessel; but in such a way that affections and actions follow in mind and will. Hence when the Holy Spirit by the Word begins to heal nature, some spark of activity and of spiritual power is kindled, although renewal is not at once perfected and finished but only in great weakness begun.

Yet then neither the mind nor the will is *inactive* (*otoisa*), but they have some new emotions which they ought also to exercise by meditating, praying, striving, wrestling, etc. But that spiritual power, those spiritual emotions, however slight they may be, do not arise, are not born either *ex toto* or *ex parte*, of the natural powers which the mind and the will have from the first birth; but they are the gifts, operations, workings of the Holy Spirit in us. And to the first production of spiritual efficiency and faculty, to the spiritual actions in us the mind and will contribute nothing effectual by their *natural powers*. For these principles must be retained without modification: Not from ourselves as of ourselves, but our fitness is from God. Without me ye can do nothing. What hast thou that thou hast not received? But when a spark of efficiency has been kindled in us by the Spirit, then both mind and will do something in spiritual matters. But the question arises, From what source do we have that which both *wills* and *is able to do something?* From the Holy Spirit of renewal who works *to will* and *to do*, from whom is the salutary ability to know." Italics ours.

After stating in the strongest way that man is not converted as Balaam's ass speaks, or as a stone is rolled, but by meditating on the law and the gospel, by desire, volition and assent, by struggling against security, unbelief and the stubbornness of the old man, he says: "In a word, in conversion there must occur and exist some movements and actions by which some *application* of the mind is made by understanding, of the Will, by *assenting*, *desiring*, *willing*, etc., and an application of the heart by serious affections to those things that have been made known to us in the law and in the gospel. For where there is absolutely no change in the mind, in the Will and in the heart, there no new knowledge, no reflection, no assent, no desire, no striving, no wrestling, etc., follows, but the entire man only resists and presents a contrary action. In a word, where there is no act of knowledge, of reflection, of desire, and of the affections, and where there is begun no *application* of the mind, the Will, the heart, to those things that are set forth in the law and in

the gospel, there, it is certain, no convertion takes place or exists. A workman uses an inanimate tool in one way. The Holy Spirit works conversion in mind, Will and heart. For he causes us *to will* and to be able to understand, to reflect, to desire, *to assent*, *to accept*, to work, etc." Italics ours.

In the fourth section he declares that Augustine "joins grace and Free-will," and he says: "Where in the divine commandments action of the Will is required for doing or for not doing Free-will is clearly demonstrated. Likewise: To the grace of God it is necessary that *our consent* be added. That our good action is not *ex necessitate* but voluntary. As regards spiritual things some power *must be attributed* to Free-will. But omitting equivocations, it is easy to understand Augustine's meaning. For the things enjoined upon us by God in his Word, viz., the knowledge of himself, contrition, faith, hope, love, patience, worship, obedience, etc., are such as cannot be begun nor be effected without a movement and action of the mind and will. For without mind and understanding, no one can understand, reflect on or judge a thing; without Will no one desires, longs for, seeks, strives after, struggles for, wrestles, etc. Augustine says that men do many things *nolentes*, but no one can believe except *volens*. Beyond all controversy this is self-evident." And while he declares most unqualifiedly that the mind and Will of man do not have the ability to obey God per se or ex se, yet equally decided is he in declaring that when grace has illumined the mind and given new powers, "from being ignorant men become intelligent, from being unwilling they become willing, so that in conversion, the mind and Will now *begin* by means of the gift to do that which before by their natural powers they were not able to do, and by the operation of the Spirit of renewal they have spiritual *movements* and *actions*, by knowing, meditating, judging, desiring, striving, wrestling, willing, doing, etc. This certainly is the view of Augustine." Italics ours.

These quotations taken almost at random from the *Examen* (1565) show what Chemnitz taught in regard to Free-will at that time. Not only does he not in any sense liken man to a

block or a brute beast, but he expressly denies any such likeness. And instead of speaking of man as absolutely passive in conversion, he ascribes to Free-will, when illumined and assisted by grace, all the different kinds of activity that belong to mind and Will, and says expressly that when the Holy Spirit has *begun* his work, "then neither mind nor Will is inactive." Nay more; he tries to show, against the Papists, that even Luther "non docuit, sine cogitatione mentis et consensu voluntatis fieri conversionem," p. 144.

We follow Chemnitz to a later period. He assisted in the composition of the *Corpus Doctrinae Pruthenticum* in the year 1567. In this official statement of doctrine we find no trace of the *lapis-truncus-pure passive* theory of conversion. On the contrary the activity of man in conversion, after the working of the precedent divine grace, is distinctly affirmed: "Man does not by his own Will anticipate God so as to know and seek that grace. But God by his most compassionate grace anticipates the Will of man who does not know and does not yet seek him, in order that he may cause him *to know* and *to seek him.* * * * The good purposes and the good desire of man, although they *are assisted* by grace when they *have begun to be*, nevertheless *do not begin* without grace. * * * We indeed *will*, but God works in us to will." Pp. 15 *et seqq.* Italics ours.

And still further in the *Sententia D. Martini Chemnitzii de facultate liberi arbitrii non renati, ad inchoandos et efficiendos motus spirituales, in conversione, seu renovatione*, given by Schlüsselburg, * we read among other things the following: "Augustine has most splendid views of *Grace and Free-Will*, chap. 16: It is certain *that we will when we will, but he who works to will causes us to will.* It is certain *that we also act when we act, but he who works to perform, causes us to act. De Correp. et Gratia*, chap. 2. They know, if they are the sons of God, that they are led by the Spirit of God, so that they do what is to be done, and, when they have done it, they know by whom they are led, and they give thanks; for they are led that they may

* *Cat. Haeret.*, pp. 639 *et seqq.*

do, not that they may do nothing," And *De Dogmatibus Ecclesiasticis*, Chap. 32: "*God works in us to will and to do, and in us he does not suffer those things to be inactive which ought to be active, nor does he give them to be neglected.* But since conversion in all its parts is not completed immediately, or in one moment, it must not be said that the Will ought to be inactive or purely passive until it perceives that conversion is completed; or since conversion and renewal are the work of God, it must not be said that faith ought not care whether it be effected or has been effected, but ought to submit to God who is able to accomplish his own work. There were such in the time of Augustine, and for these he wrote the tractate *Of Grace and Free-will* and likewise *Of Reproof and Grace.* But when the beginnings of conversion have been given us by the Holy Spirit, immediately there arises a struggle between the flesh and the spirit which manifestly takes place not without an action of our will, and this *συνεργία* of the will, not of the old will, but of that which begins to be renewed, and those beginnings in great weakness grow and increase not without an action of our Will. And thus it is rightly said: *Praeeunte gratia, comitante voluntate.* But that *συνεργία* always depends upon the grace of God, which if we desert, the gifts also cease and are lost."

It is unnecessary that we make any elaborate comment on this quotation. It plainly teaches that when the Holy Spirit has once begun a work of grace in the heart of man, then the mind and will are not inactive. They do something. They do not remain absolutely passive until the Holy Spirit has perfected conversion. And this plainly is the teaching of the four men who have been made special subjects of discussion. The three last named were through and through Melanchthonian, even in their vocabulary, and in the employment of the same characteristic quotations from Augustine and other Fathers. Andreae and Brentz do not express themselves in the language of Melanchthon nearly to the extent that the others do, because they had not been his pupils; but they teach essentially the same doctrine of Free will, namely, that man is not like a stone or a block, and that in conversion the Will is not *absolutely pas-*

sive, but that it assents to the Word of God and appropriates the *beneficia Dei.* And they all five show this common characteristic, namely, that they do not set up Luther's *De Servo Arbitrio* as a standard of doctrine on the subject of Free-will; and this is a point particularly to be noted in view of what is to follow.

But before we make an application of the facts established, and draw conclusions, let us exhibit the Old Lutheran Doctrine of Free- will, and that of the Form of Concord, in comparative statement.

V. THE COMPARISON.

THE OLD LUTHERAN DOCTRINE OF FREE-WILL.

In matters appertaining to this earthly life in so far as they can be known by the natural understanding man has Free-will, that is, the power to know things subject to reason and the power to choose between the things known. Consequently the natural man even before regeneration is able to lead an externally virtuous life. This is called Free-will *in civilibus.*

In things appertaining to the true knowledge, worship and service of God, the natural man does not have Free-will, that is, he cannot by means of the natural power of his mind know God aright, nor can he by the natural power of his will serve and obey God acceptably. Nor can he by means of the natural powers of his mind and will do anything to save himself from sin or to procure justification before God. That is, the natural man does not have Free-will *in spiritualibus.*

But the natural man differs in every respect from a block, a stone, a statue. For he has *arbitrium* and is susceptible of salvation, and has that in him by which, under the operation of divine grace, he

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It is maintained that in external and civil affairs which appertain to this life man is intelligent, rational and very active; "but in things spiritual and divine, which appertain to the salvation of the soul man is like a pillar of salt (into which Lot's wife was changed). Yea, is like *a block, a stock, a stone, a statue destitute of life*, which does not have the use of eyes, or of any senses, or of heart." And *prior* to his illumination, conversion and regeneration, man continues knowingly and willingly in his security and thereby falls into eternal death; and *prior* to his conversion he can of himself do as little as a stone or a piece of clay. Yea, in his relation to the gospel he is *even worse than a block*, and has not an active, but only a *passive* capacity, in the sense that through God's grace Free-will can be turned to the good. Man has Free-will in a certain sense to go to church, and to hear or not to hear the sermon. But man *prior* to his conversion has no *modus agendi* in divine things, and can assent to the divine Word only after he *has been converted.*

can *assent* to the Word of God, can appropriate the grace of God, can lay hold on salvation. That is, when he reads or hears the Word of God, and begins to be assisted by the grace of God, and to be illumined and quickened by the Holy Spirit, he is not now *wholly inactive*, but he begins *to do* something, such as to assent to the Word of God, to pray, to strive, to resist his own weakness, to will to yield to the divine call. Hence in and during conversion man is not *absolutely passive*, nor is he in understanding and will only *subjectum patiens* or *only the subject to be converted*. Nor does he resist the Holy Spirit until conversion *has been perfected* in him. But this activity of Free-will *praecedente gratia, adjuvante Spiritu Sancto*, contributes nothing meritorious toward our salvation. Nor is it that for or on account of which God bestows additional grace, or pardons our sins, and justifies us in his sight. For salvation is by grace alone through faith alone on account of Christ alone. Even the power to will and to do is the gift of God, but the *willing* and the *doing* are *ours*.

"*Man in his conversion is absolutely passive*, that is, does nothing whatever, but only *suffers* that which God works in him;" not that conversion occurs without the preaching and hearing of the divine Word; but conversion is not only in part, but *entirely* an operation "of the Holy Spirit alone, who accomplishes and effects it by his own virtue and power through the Word in the understanding, will and heart of man as in *subjecto patiente*, where man does or works nothing, but only *suffers*," though not in the way in which a statue is cut in a stone, or as a seal is impressed on wax. That is: "Conversion to God is the work of God the Holy Spirit alone, who alone is that excellent workman who works these things in us, meanwhile nevertheless using the preaching and hearing of the divine Word (as his ordinary and legitimate instrument). But the understanding and will of the unregenerate man are only the *subjectum convertendum*, for they are the understanding and will of a man spiritually dead, in which the Holy Spirit works conversion and regeneration, to which work of man to be converted the will contributes nothing, but *suffers* God to work in it *until it is regenerated*."*

Now when we come to study the contents of these two columns we discover a marked difference in their teaching. The Old Lutheran Doctrine of Free-will repudiates the conception *in toto* that man is like a stone or a block. The doctrine of Free-will contained in Article II of the Form of Concord affirms such a conception, and declares that man in his relation to the gospel is even worse than a block. The former affirms

* All the italics, except those in the sentence: *Man in his conversion is absolutely passive*, are ours.

that in and during conversion the mind and will of man are not *absolutely inactive*, but that Free-will does something; moreover, that conversion is not instantaneous, but has its beginning and its progressive movements. The latter affirms that in conversion man is *absolutely passive*, and in understanding and will is *tantum subjectum patiens*, and is *only the subject to be converted;* and consequently, since man only resists until he is converted by the Holy Spirit alone, conversion is instantaneous. That is, in conversion man is absolutely destitute of Free-will. Hence the two teachings are different in kind. The fundamental predicates of the one are different from the fundamental predicates of the other. What the one affirms the other denies. ut to get the full conception of this difference the reader must read again Strigel's *Declaration*, Brentz's *Apology*, and the quotations made from Selneccer, Chytraeus and Chemnitz. And if he will compare our right-hand column with Article XVIII of the Augsburg Confession, and with the corresponding article of the Apology, he will discover that there are elements in it that are not in those confessions; hence that Article II of the Form of Concord is not a logical and legitimate conclusion from the two oldest Lutheran confessions; that it is, or at least contains, a doctrine of Free-will that had had no official recognition in the Lutheran Church (except in very limited circles) prior to the year 1580; that it is a new doctrine of Free-will; consequently that there are two *different* doctrines of Free-will in the Lutheran Church, though it may be noted as an historical fact that the later doctrine has not had universal endorsement in the Lutheran Church, inasmuch as there have been at all times since 1580, not only individual Lutheran congregations, but even entire national bodies of Lutherans, which have not accepted the Form of Concord.

But the question now arises, What brought this later doctrine of Free-will into the Lutheran Church? Or, Why is it that we find in the Form of Concord a doctrine of Free-will that is *different* in *kind* from that which exists in the Augsburg Confession and in its Apology?

VI. THE SYNERGISTIC CONTROVERSY.

Our question finds its proper answer in what is known as

the *Synergistic Controversy.* In the year 1555 John Pfeffinger, a Leipzig pastor and professor, published an academic programme in which he had discussed certain propositions on Free-will, as for instance: "When we inquire about spiritual actions it is rightly answered that the human will does not have freedom of such a nature as to be able to effect spiritual conduct without the aid of the Holy Spirit.

"Three acting causes concur: The Holy Spirit influencing through the Word, the mind thinking and the Will not resisting, but in some sense yielding to the Holy Spirit now influencing. Some consent on our part ought to concur when now the Holy Spirit illumines the mind, the Will and the heart.

"We perceive that the Will is different from stones. But if it were like a statue, there would be no wrestling, no struggle in retaining faith. The Will is not inactive. If the Will were inactive or absolutely passive, there would be no difference between the pious and the impious, between the elect and the damned, between a Saul and a David. Also God would be a respecter of persons, and the author of contumacy in the impious and the damned.

"It follows, therefore, that there is in us some reason why some assent, and why others do not assent." *

This is essentially the old Lutheran doctrine of Free-will, though the author was not happy in the use of certain words. But now after three years, when the Jena Academy was being erected into a university, and a theological faculty especially hostile to Leipzig and Wittenberg, † was being installed therein, Nicholas von Amsdorf, who was residing at the Weimar court, as in honor of the occasion, and in the execution of a matured plan, attacked Pfeffinger's *Propositions*, and

* See Herzog, *Realencyclopaedie*, 2nd, XV., 105. Schmid, *Dogmengeschichte*, pp. 212 *et seqq.*, Thomasius, *Dogmengeschichte*, II, pp. 497 *et seqq.* Münscher (von Coeln) *Dogmengeschichte*, 2, pp 427 *et seqq.* Preger, *M. Flacius Illyricus*, II, pp. 114 *et seqq.* Pressel, *Nicholas von Amsdorf.* p. 125.

† Salig, III, p. 377; Planck, IV, p. 571. In 1555 John Stolsius, court preacher to the Dukes at Weimar, wrote a reply to Pfeffinger, but it was not published until Oct. 1558. Given by Musaeus in *Disputatio Vinariensis*, pp. 354 *et seqq.*

declared that it was insolent and presumptuous for Pfeffinger to say "that man by the natural powers of his Free-will can fit and prepare himself for grace without the aid of the Holy Spirit, just as the godless sophists, Thomas Aquinas, Scotus and their followers, had affirmed."

This is a direct falsification of what had been taught by Pfeffinger, but it served the purpose of hate, jealousy and hostility. Pfeffinger at once republished his *Propositions* and indignantly repudiated all such teaching as had been charged against him by Amsdorf.* The next year Amsdorf replied to Pfeffinger and declared, among other things equally absurd, that "when God justifies a man he acts precisely as a carver does when he makes a statue out of wood. Out of a sinner who loves sin God makes a man righteous and holy without any participation on the part of the man. As stone and wood are in the presence of the stutuary, so is the Will of man in the presence of God."†

Meanwhile Flacius, who was now professor at Jena, entered the lists and carried the fight into the schools, and "accused the entire University of Wittenberg of error." ‡ He affirmed that man in conversion is not only absolutely passive, but that "he is toward God by whom he is made a new creature as a block is toward the statuary, and in conversion holds himself *adversative, vel repugnative seu hostiliter* towards the operation of God."§

This same doctrine in regard to conversion was subsequently repeated by Flacius in a *Disputation* held in Jena, and in the

* Thomasius, *ut supra*, p. 498; Münscher, *ut supra*, pp. 430–1; Pressel, *ut supra*, p. 125; Planck, IV. pp. 574–5.

† Herzog, *ut supra*, 105. In his *Sententia*, Schlüsselburg, V. pp. 546 *et seqq.*, Amsdorf says that "God has only one *modus agendi* with all creatures."

‡ Thomasius, *ut supra*, p. 498.

§ See *M. Fl. Illyrici Refutatio Propositionum Pfeffingeri de Libero Arbitrio* in Musaeus, *Acta Disputationis Vinariensis* (the Weimar Disputation), pp. 380, 382, 436, *et passim*. Also the Weimar *Disputation*, pp. 2, 134, and several tractates by Flacius on Original Sin and Free-will, in Musaeus' *Acta*, *passim*. Flacius's *Refutatio Pfeffingeri* is little else than a repetition, exposition, and application of Luther's *De Servo Arbitrio*, which he calls "an invincible book," p. 395.

Weimar *Disputation* of 1560, where again and again, in the face of denials and protests and documentary evidence to the contrary, he charges that his opponents teach that "there are three efficient and coöperating causes in conversion." * In his various treatises and disputations he rings the changes on words and propositions that afterwards found defining place and use in the Form of Concord, as: "Man is absolutely passive and does nothing in conversion;" "Our will in conversion is like a block, a statue or stone;" "Corrupt human nature is worse than a block;" "*Tantum ut* subjectum patiens *nos habemus*;" "The Scripture attributes the conversion of man to God alone;" "God alone converts man." † In addition he, Amsdorf and others canonize Luther's *De Servo Arbitrio* and make that book and certain extracts from Luther's writings normative and final in the premises, and charge it as a vicious defect that their opponents have not followed the *De Servo Arbitrio.* They also heap reproaches upon their opponents, and call them opprobrious names, such as Synergists, Adiaphorists, Erasmians, Pelagians, Hyprocrites, Sophists, Sacrilegious,

* Melanchthon, as we have shown, never speaks of the Will as a coöperating, or as an efficient, cause of conversion. He says that "there are three causes of a good action." With him the Holy Spirit is the sole *efficient* cause; the Word of God is the instrumental cause. The Will assents. And very truly does Salig say: "Strigel never spoke of three efficient and apprehensive causes of conversion, but of three *concurring* causes. The Holy Spirit is the *efficient cause*, the Word the *instrumental.* If it be asked, Is the Will a cause? the answer is: The Will does not have *the nature of an efficient cause*, but in so far as it is assisted, urged, moved, turned, by the Holy Spirit, who works in one way in children, and in another way in adults. The Holy Spirit draws us. The Will does not draw itself, but is drawn by the Word, though not as a block. It has its own *modus agendi.*" III, pp. 613-4. See Strigel's own declarations to the same effect in the Weimar *Disputatio*, pp. 8, 40, 102, where he says that neither he nor his preceptors (the Wittenberg Faculty) "had ever used the new words, coöperation and synergia." See also Strigel's *Loci*, *Prima Pars*, pp. 368-9. Also Strigel's *Confesson* in Musaeus' *Acta* p. 585. For Pfeffinger to the same effect see Münscher *ut supra*, pp. 430-1. For the Wittenbergers and Pezel see THE LUTHERAN QUARTERLY, July, 1905, p. 321, note. It is demonstrable that Flacius simply calumniated.

† See *passim* in Flacius *De Originali Peccato* given in Musaeus' *Acta*, pp. 398 *et seqq.* Also in *Disputatio*, pp. 429 *et seqq.*, *passim* and in the Weimar Disputation *passim.*

Church robbers, Philosophico theologians, Corrupters of Luther's books, Disturbers of the Church, and the like. In a word the Flacianists carried on a campaign of slander and defamation against their opponents, and proclaimed themselves the teachers and defenders of the pure Lutheran doctrine.

By such methods they brought the Old Lutheran Doctrine of Free-will into discredit, and precipitated violent controversies upon the Lutheran Church. Strigel and the aged pastor Hügel, both of Jena, were arrested, thrown into prison and inhumanly treated. The Weimar Disputation brought no reconciliation, and Strigel's *Declaration* only intensified the strife and widened the breach. The commotion is thus described by Salig: "It (Strigel's *Declaration*) was a new apple of discord flung among the Thuringian clergy, some of whom had signed it at Weimar, as we have already said. The Würtemberg theologians, as mediators, had declared it correct and orthodox. The Court was entirely satisfied with it, and if it be regarded as to its fundamental principles, it is Christian and Scriptural, and today no theologian would teach differently from Strigel. Let the reader turn back to the reflections made by us on the Weimar Colloquy. The situation was extremely awkward. The Flacianist pastors, about sixty in number, could not chide the Würtembergers as being synergists; and yet they preached and declaimed throughout the land from the pulpits against Strigel's *Declaration*, and told the people that man in conversion is like a block, a log, and is converted like a swine, in spite of himself (*repugnative*).* And in order to place their cause in the more favorable light they declared that they stood by Luther's *De Servo Arbitrio*, and that what it contained they accepted to the last letter (which is done by very few Lutherans of today), and that the party that accepted Strigel's *Declaration* were Erasmians and Pelagians. They charged the Duke and his counsellors and the Würtembergers with driving Luther's doctrine into exile. They sought help from the exiled theologians, who faithfully assisted them, and they had spies in all Thuringia who reported to them all that transpired in the country, as can be seen by the originals which are often

*Musaeus' *Acta*, pp. 2, 382 *et passim*.

still quoted in the Acts. Wigand and Judex, who were then at Magdeburg, come out with a criticism of Strigel's *Declaration* almost as soon as they saw it. Then followed Dr. Hesshuss, the Mansfeld ministers, Nicholas von Amsdorf, Nicholas Gallus, Flacius at Regensburg, and others, who—some from misunderstanding, and others from party-feeling because they thought that such great men as Flacius, Musaeus, Wigand, Judex, could not be mistaken, or regarded it as a piece of unnecessary strife—rejected Strigel's *Declaration*, or regarded it as obscure, ambiguous, heretical, and contrary to Luther's *De Servo Arbitrio.*

"When after long years we look at these polemical tractates we are amazed to see how the people fought like blindfold gladiators, and how their hearts, embittered against each other, and enraged, would not listen to reason, nor look at the matter aright, nor by explaining terms and by learning the truth, come to an agreement in a Christian and fraternal manner, not by disputing on metaphysical questions, but by apprehending the sole operation of God's grace and the power of the Holy Spirit in true conversion and regeneration. Of the two parties, one was necessarily right, because in things that are contradictory they thought that they stood in antagonism to each other. The Würtembergers were orthodox, and the exiled theologians announced themselves as extra-orthodox. And yet the Würtembergers had declared that Strigel's *Declaration* accorded with the Augsburg Confession, with the Schmalkald Articles and even with the Saxon Confutation. What conclusion can we now come to in regard to the matter, other than that the people did not know what they were fighting about, and that the Flacianists wantonly urged on these ungodly contentions from a quarrelsome disposition and from an insolent spirit."*

As early as August twentieth (1562) the Mansfeld ministers published a statement in which they say that "the proposition of the whole case, that which the Holy Scripture and the Holy

* *Vollstændige Historie der Augsb. Conf.*, III, pp. 887 *et seqq.* The author gives in elaborate notes the documentary proof of his narrative and the grounds of his conclusion. See also Otto, *ut supra*, p. 65, 66; Walch, *Einleitung*, 4 and 6, pp. 100–101.

Luther lay down, is this: "In conversion man is absolutely passive and in no sense whatever coöperates by his own powers with divine grace." They further say, "that man contributes not more to his conversion than an infant in its mother's womb contributes to its own formation;" "he is *subjectum mere patiens*; has no *modus agendi*," and "can do no more in conversion than a block." And to give authority to their affirmations they say: "This doctrine is handed down by the holy man Luther and is firmly established in the Scriptures." They also allege it as a special fault that Strigel's *Declaration* makes no mention of the *De Servo Arbitrio*, which is to be accepted as the standard of teaching on the subject.*

And Dr. Hesshuss, whom we shall meet later, declared that man is *subjectum patiens*, and is absolutely passive in conversion and is like a block, and only suffers. "He does not assent, nor embrace, nor believe, but only resists so long as he is not converted, regenerated, and changed by the Holy Spirit." "Man only suffers." "The Will is causa materialis, subjecta et patiens." "Subjectum passivum." "Man is absolutely passive and is a block, as regards spiritual actions." "Mind and Will are the material in which, or subjectum patiens, in the operation of the Holy Spirit."† The usual appeal is made to Luther as to a final authority, and the "synergists" come in for their customary share of misrepresentation.

We now go back a little and then forward. In the year 1561 the Flacianists were driven from Jena on account of their turbulent spirit,‡ and their places, as has been already noted, were filled by Wittenbergers. There was peace now between the theologians of Ducal and those of Electoral Saxony. But when Duke John William took the government in 1567 the Wittenbergers were dismissed, and the Flacianists (not Flacius himself) were reinstated, whereupon the war broke out afresh. Soon Jena was in arms against Leipzig and Wittenberg. In the years 1568–9 a colloquy was held at Altenburg. In this col-

* See the *Sententia* of the Mansfeld ministers in Schlüsselburg's *Cat. Haeret.*, V. pp. 473 *et seqq.*

† Schlüsselburg, V, pp. 315 *et seqq.*, *passim.*

‡ Preger, II, 173.

loquy and in the *Endlicher Bericht* the theologians and superintendents of Electoral Saxony planted themselves squarely on the Augsburg Confession and its Apology and on the *Corpus Doctrinae Philippicum*, and maintained unequivocally that Free-Will by its own native powers can contribute nothing whatever to man's conversion and justification; but at the same time they declare that Free-will is not a block or a stone, and that in conversion man is not absolutely passive, as the Flacianists so persistently taught.*

In March (1569) the theologians of Ducal Saxony, headed by John Wigand, presented a Confession,† in which almost at the very beginning they say: "We embrace the doctrine and the view of Dr. Luther, the Elias of these last days, as they have been transmitted most luminously and skillfully in the *De Servo Arbitrio* against Erasmus, in the Commentary on Genesis and in other books, and we judge that this view of Luther's harmonizes with the everlasting *Word of God*." True to this declaration they accept and quote the *De Servo Arbitrio* and other works by Luther as final: "It is certain that Free-will is nothing else than the supreme enemy of righteousness and of man's salvation." "We are like a block marred in every possible manner." "In theology man is verily a pillar of salt, as was Lot's wife;" "Man is absolutely passive and does nothing, but is wholly made;" "We are only passive;" "We do nothing, but we suffer;" "God himself converts us, not we ourselves." It is also said in this Confession: "As in the beginning in the womb of the mother God creates and forms us men without our coöperation, so also does he recreate or regenerate us by water and the Spirit, as Prosper beautifully says: '*Vasque novum ex fracto fingit virtute creandi.*'" That is, the Confession of these Thuringian theologians teaches the *lapis-truncus-pure passive* doctrine of conversion without equivocation or qualification, just as we have found that Flacius does in his numerous discussions *De Peccato Originali et Libero Arbitrio*, and alike these Thuringians and Flacianists go back

* See *Endlicher Bericht*, pp. 70–5.

† Given in full in Schlüsselburg, V. pp. 132–200.

to Luther's *De Servo Arbitrio*, which, we repeat, they avowedly lay down as canonical, and hence as final in the premises.

Now, it is exactly in this Thuringian Confession and in Flacius's tractates and discussions *De Libero Arbitrio*, and in other Flacianist writings, that we find the true antecedents and presuppositions of Article II of the Form of Concord. The central idea and the doctrine in all are identical to all intents and purposes, so that, following the law of cause and effect and of natural sequence, we can say, If the former had not been, the latter would not be. The pivotal words are the same. Even the *ratio disserendi* is strikingly alike. Moreover, this Confession begins its argument by appealing to Luther's teaching on the subject; and the Article begins its argument with what *purports* to be a quotation from Luther's Commentary on the 90th Psalm, * and they both lay down Luther's teaching as normative even before they begin the argument from the Scriptures. They both quote from the same works of Luther, though the quotations in the Confession are more abundant, because it is much larger than the Article; and they both quote to a large extent the same passages from the Scriptures, and alike they omit those passages of Scripture which do not support their theory of Free-will. Also in both we find great

* We consider that the argument in Article II of the Form of Concord really begins with the declaration *alleged* to be found in Luther's *Commentary* on the 90th Psalm. But Luther did not write what is here attributed to him. On verse 11, 90th Psalm, he wrote this: Philosophi hominem definiunt esse animal rationale. Sed hoc quis dicet in theologia esse verum? Ibi enim vere homo est statua salis, sicut uxor Lot, quia magnam iram Dei non intelligit, et ruit imprudens in mille pericula mortis, imo saepe volens et sciens. *Erlangen Ed.*, Latin, XVIII, p. 318.

The Form of Concord here followed the example of Flacius, who in the Weimar Disputation (Musaeus' *Acta*, pp. 211–2) appealed to Luther, and, probably quoting from Spangenberg's "corrupt translation" (See Erlangen Ed., Latin, XVIII, p. 260), or as the St. Louis editor calls it: "An exceedingly prolix and completely arbitrary elaboration" (Vol. V. p. 732, note), grossly misrepresents Luther. Let the reader compare Luther's few simple words given above in Latin with the putative quotation found in Article II, Form of Concord (Müller, *Libri Symb.*, p. 593; Jacobs' *Book of Concord*, p. 556; New Market edition, p. 614), attributed to Luther. Such a radical change of text, in form, and in matter, and in intensification, deserves to be branded as a forgery.

similarity of phraseology, the same method of misrepresenting the position of the opponents and the same manner of making reference to "the three causes," and the same misinterpretation of Melanchthon's definition: *Liberum Arbitrium in homine esse facultatem*, etc.

Consequently we can say that Article II of the Form of Concord, finished in the cloister of Bergen in 1577, existed in essentials, and in substance, and in purpose, since March, 1569, though the later document shows abbreviation, condensation, omissions, adaptation, improved arrangement, but absolutely no difference in idea and in substance of doctrine *de libero arbitrio*, since both teach unequivocally that in conversion man is *absolutely passive*, and both reach that conclusion substantially by the same methods.

Hence he who can unqualifiedly subscribe Article II of the Form of Concord, can unqualifiedly subscribe this Thuringian Confession in so far as the doctrine of Free-will is concerned, indeed is logically bound to do so, for the dominant note, the major and the minor, are the same in both; both are based fundamentally on what, since 1558, Flacius had taught on original sin and on Free-will, though the Form of Concord and Wigand and Hesshuss rejected the Flacian absurdity that original sin is the substance of man. Hence we can say, and in fidelity to the facts in the case, it must be said, that the Synergistic Controversy was settled (in so far as for a time it seemed to be settled) by the Form of Concord *essentially in the sense of Flacius*, who laid hold of certain hyperbolical expressions found in Luther's *De Servo Arbitrio*, and elsewhere in his writings, tore them from their contextual relations, assigned them canonical authority and (practically ignoring Luther's explanations and modifications) employed them dialectically as the basis of argument, and as guides in the interpretation of Scripture, though it is notorious that Luther did not desiderate those expressions in the older confessions, and did not place them in his catechisms, nor in the Schmalkald Articles; but, by his unqualified endorsement of Melanchthon's *Loci* in 1535 and again in 1545, he did, to say the least, acquiesce in *The Old Lutheran Doctrine of Free-will*, that is, in what Melanch-

thon taught in his *Scholia on Colossians*, and more plainly in the Confession and Apology, and then elaborated in the *Loci* and in other text-books that proceeded from his pen—facts which no scholar will presume to deny, and if facts, then proofs that the Flacianist doctrine of Free-will is not the genuine old Lutheran Doctrine of Free-Will.

But we have not yet answered the question, Why do we find in the Form of Concord a doctrine of Free-will that is different in kind from that which exists in the older Lutheran Confessions? Or, how did it come to pass that the Flacianist doctrine of Free-will entered essentially into Article II of the Form of Concord and imparted to that article its generic idea and its specific determination? We have shown that four of the six men who are reputed to have been the composers of the Form of Concord had previously taught and confessed a doctrine of Free-will that does not have in it a single element of the *lapis-truncus-pure passive* theory—taught a doctrine that distinctly affirms that in conversion the mind and will of man are in some sense active, that the Will assents to the divine Word, and that man has some power to appropriate the *beneficia Dei;* and this doctrine those four men taught and held as being *in harmony with the teaching* of the older confessions. It is also a fact that the *lapis-truncus-pure passive* doctrine did not have place in Andreae's *Six Sermons* (1573), nor in the *Swabian-Saxon Concordia* (1575), nor yet in the Torgau Book without qualifications.

But now, inasmuch as the Swabian-Saxon Concordia, the work of Andreae, Chemnitz and Chytraeus, had been rejected by the Flacianists, chiefly because it still contained large remnants of Melanchthonianism, it was resolved at Lichtenburg, February 16th, 1576, under the leadership of Selneccer, to exclude Melanchthon's *Corpus Doctrinae* from the plan of union, and to retain the three ecumenical creeds, "the Unaltered Augsburg Confession," the Apology, the catechisms of Luther and the Schmalkald Articles. *

*This resolution know as the Lichtenburg *Bedenken* (given in Hutter's *Concordia Concors*, pp. 77–79) was composed by Selneccer. See his speech in Heppe, *Geschichte des deutschen Protest.*, III, pp. 88–90. In the *Saxon-Swabian Concordia*, chiefly the work of Chemnitz and Chy-

In accordance with this plan was the Torgau Book composed (May 28th–June 7th, 1576), and although its authors did not succeed in excluding all distinctly Melanchthonian teaching from the Article *De Libero Arbitrio*, * yet they gave it a decidedly Flacianizing coloring and sense.

VI. THE TORGAU BOOK.

And now it was that Selneccer, Andreae and Chemnitz set to work in the most systematic and diplomatic way, by concessions, by intercessions, and by flattery, to satisfy and win over the Flacianists, particularly Hesshuss, who was now bishop of Samland, and Wigand, who was bishop of Pomesania, both of whom had refused to sign the Swabian-Saxon Concordia, † and who together controlled and determined the doctrinal position of the Prussian clergy, without whose coöperation the plan for Concord must have inevitably failed.

The procedure was as follows :

June 23rd Chemnitz writes to Hesshuss about the Torgau convention and about the Torgau Book, and informs him that the Lichtenburg resolution, that Melanchthon's *Corpus Doctrinae* " should no longer be held as a norm and form of doctrine and confession, nor be imposed on anyone, since it contains certain errors, as *de libero arbitrio, de evangelio, de coena*, etc.," had been carried out. " In the *Locus de libero arbitrio* we have referred expressly to Luther's *De Servo Arbitrio* and to his Declaration on the twenty-sixth chapter of Genesis. Mention of Philip's books has been expunged, and for justification in this part we have referred to the Lichtenburg resolution." " The Elector contemplates the reorganization of the Wittenberg University, so as to have it genuinely Lutheran." He solicits Hesshuss' prayers and counsels. " But I think you do not need to be exhorted. For I do not doubt that you pro-

* See Heppe, *Der Text der Berg. Concordienformel*, p. 67. Semler pp. 96–8. THE LUTHERAN QUARTERLY for January 1904, p. 58. Balthaser, I, p. 11.

† Pressel, *Martin Chemnitz*, p. 60.

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traeus, the writings of Melanchthon " are justly commended" and he and Luther are named together as "our dear Fathers and Preceptors." Pfaff, *Acta et Scripta*, pp. 385, 446; Balthaser, p. 7.

pose that corruptions shall be rejected, and that the purity of the Lutheran doctrine shall be retained. Since to this end we have tried to make a modest preparation, and have followed the example of the *Prussian Corpus Doctrinae*, I do not doubt in regard to your willingness to promote this matter. I understand that there are certain pseudo-Lutherans who entertain the hope that this matter will be interrupted and hindered by you. But at Torgau I said and I still say what I think of and hope about you." Here now was material concession, for the Flacianists had constantly insisted on the extinguishment of Melanchthon, and on the unqualified endorsement of Luther's *De Servo Arbitrio.*

He also tells him that the Elector of Saxony has spoken about him, and has expressed the hope that he will approve what had been done at Torgau. Here is the flattery, since he gives Hesshuss to understand that he is an important factor in promoting concord.

He also informs him that he and others had petitioned the Elector in behalf of "the Thuringian exiles" (among whom were Hesshuss and Wigand), who had been banished from Thuringia by said Elector. Here was the intercession. He says that Andreae (whom the Flacianists had not forgiven for having signed Strigel's *Declaration*)* and Selneccer (whom the Flacianists had classed among the "synergists)" had both conducted themselves nobly at Torgau, and had contributed not a little to the results attained.

Indeed this letter, which lies before us in the full text, is a revelation, and it throws a flood of light on the history of the Torgau Book, and on the methods used to conciliate the Flacianists. It more than justifies Loescher's declaration that "Chemnitz took pains to win this hard-pated man, who, almost everybody said, would oppose the work of concord."†

Also: In a strain that is almost obsequious Andreae writes

* See Hesshuss' letter in reply to Chemnitz's letter in Hospinian, pp. 72–3. Also, Loescher, *Historia Motuum*, pp. 252, 289.

† *Historia Motuum, Dritter Theil*, p. 254. Chemnitz's letter is found in Rehtmyer's *Kirchenhistorie der Stadt Braunschweig, Beilage Zum VIII cap. Num.* 47, pp. 255–259. In part in Heppe, *Geschichte des Deutschen Protest. Dritter Theil*, p. 113.

to Hesshuss and Wigand (July 24th, 1576) begging them to forget the evils of former days and to rejoice over the things that God is now doing. He assures them the Elector of Saxony is intent on the restoration of the pure Lutheran doctrine. He says: "Luther, that is Christ, whose faithful servant Luther was lives. What more do you wish? Here nothing is counterfeit, nothing is cloaked, nothing concealed, but is according to the spirit of Luther, which is the spirit of Christ. Everything has been done candidly, openly, piously, sacredly, for illustrating and promoting the truth." He tells them Chemnitz and Chytraeus feel and judge as he does. "Truly this is the change of the right hand of the Most High."*

Now there is no mistaking the meaning and the purpose of these two letters, which bear internal evidence of having been written in concert. They show that the Torgau convention had virtually surrendered to the Flacianists, and that two of its leaders had taken upon themselves, or perhaps had been requested, to announce the fact. Also: There was great rejoicing among the theologians at Torgau over the result of their deliberations,* which were declared to be in harmony

*Anton, *ut supra*, pp. 175–6. Balthaser, *ut supra*, p. 13.

with the Augsburg Confession, the Apology, the Schmalkald Articles, and Luther's catechisms, and the theologians witness before God and all men living and yet to be born that this their explanation of the controverted points, and no other, "is our faith, doctrine and confession, in which we are willing to stand indismayed before the judgment seat of Christ and render an account."†

Copies of the Torgau Book were sent to various princes for examination. The Duke of Prussia placed the copy sent to him in the hands of Hesshuss, who had copies made and distributed among his clergy. Later Hesshuss and Wigand at the command of the Duke rendered each an opinion on the Book. These opinions were afterwards made into one (chiefly according to the concept of Hesshuss), which was sent to the

* Letter given by *Heppe in Geschichte des Deutschen Protestant.*, III, p. 111, note.

† Semler, *ut supra*, p. 322.

Elector of Saxony.* This *Prussian Opinion*, entitled *Bedenken von der Formula Concordiae*,† praises the Torgau Book in general as a grand and noble book, but criticises it sharply in many particulars. It demands the emphatic condemnation by name of the "authors and patrons of corruptions," as Flacius in the doctrine of sin, and Melanchthon and others in the doctrine of Free-will. It expresses the hope that Selneccer and Crell, who had opposed the Flacianists in their writings, "have been truly converted to God," and its authors say that if Andreae will truly repent, they as Christian men will forgive and forget the injuries received at his hands.

Coming to the article: *Of Supposed Free-will*, they demand, among other things:

1. That the paragraph in which the Torgau Book treats the passage, Gal. 3 : 24: "The law is our schoolmaster," etc., in a Melanchthonian sense, be supplanted by Luther's explanation of the same passage.

2. That the comparison by which the Torgau Book likens the natural mind and will of man to our eyes, which see the earth, but cannot behold the bright sun, be dropped, because it is too weak, since the natural understanding is stark blind and dead to the good.

3. That the declaration that the question, Whether man before, in, and after conversion, resists the Holy Spirit, is only a scholastic dispute, be not so understood, "for Luther was not a scholastic disputer when he earnestly and justly contended for the *pure passive*."

4. That the Melanchthonian *Hominis voluntas in conversione non est otiosa* (which in the Torgau Book is explained in the Melanchthonian sense) be supplanted by: *Rectissime Lutherus contendit hominem in conversione se habet pure passive.*

5. That the *tres causae concurrentes*, which had received a somewhat Melanchthonian explanation in the Torgau Book,

* Anton, *ut supra*, pp. 190–1. Also Heppe, *ut supra*, pp. 137 *et seqq.*

† This document (dated January 8th, 1577), which has never been printed, is in the hands of the present writer in the form of a type-written copy made expressly for his use from the Original Protocol in the Kgl. Staatarchiv zu Königsberg, Pr. Briefarchiv, J. 2. Indispensable for the proper understanding of the history of the Form of Concord.

be rejected as dangerous and false and as favorable to the Synergists.

6. That the dictum of Chrysostom: "God draws, but draws him who is willing," be rejected as false and pelagianizing; and they close by saying that Melanchthon's teaching on Free-will as contained in the *Loci* and in the *Examen Ordinandorum*, and in his other writings, and the teaching of Strigel and others on the same subject, and the doctrine of "the three efficient causes," are rejected by them, "because contrary to the Word of God."

VII THE FORM OF CONCORD.

Finally, in March 1577, in the Cloister of Bergen, near Magdeburg, Andreae, Chemnitz and Selneccer, whom Chytraeus calls "the triumvirate," revised the Torgau Book by the aid of the numerous opinions that had been received, and transformed it into the Bergic Book, that is, the Form of Concord. In the Article, *De Libero Arbitrio*, every demand made by the *Prussian Opinion* (Hesshuss, Wigand, *et al*), is conceded either in form or in substance. The paragraph on Gal. 3 : 24 is simply dropped. The Melanchthonian formulae given above in Latin, which, we repeat, were explained in a Melanchthonian sense in the Torgau Book, are now declared "to be contrary to sound doctrine, and are justly to be avoided." In a word, the demands of the Flacianists *de libero arbitrio* as they have found concentrated official expression in the *Prussian Opinion*, have been complied with in the essential things. The offensive Melanchthonian formulae are not indeed stricken out, but they are expressly condemned, and the last trace of *The Old Lutheran Doctrine of Free-will* (except in matters purely formal) is supplanted by an essentially Flacianistic repristination of Luther's *De Servo Arbitrio*. The *lapis-truncus-pure passive-tantum subjectum patiens* doctrine *de libero arbitrio*, as it stands in the Form of Concord, is declared to be "the pure doctrine concerning this article according to God's Word, and conformable to the Augsburg Confession and to other approved writings"—all done essentially as the *Prussian Opinion* had demanded. The proof is documentary. In a word, Flacianism *de libero Arbitrio* has triumphed. Andreae (Aet. 49), Chemnitz (Aet. 55), Selneccer

(Aet. 47) have capitulated. Under Flacianist pressure, and to the behoof of the Flacianists, they now promulgate a doctrine of Free-will which is contrary to Strigel's *Declaration*, and contrary to what is taught on the subject of Free-will in Chemnitz's *Loci* and *Examen*, and in Selneccer's *Institutio*, and which cannot by any fair process of logic be drawn out of the Augsburg Confession and its Apology, and which is in direct antagonism to that explanation of the same which had prevailed in the Lutheran Church almost universally until the University of Jenâ was called into existence in opposition to Wittenberg and Leipzig.

Hence we really have here in the Form of Concord a *new* Lutheran doctrine *de libero arbitrio.* In the controversy that was begun in 1558 the end constantly affected by the Flacianists was the resurrection and the formal installation of Luther's doctrine of Free-will, as the same had been set forth in the *De Servo Arbitrio.* But in pursuing that end they out-Luthered Luther. Not only did they set up the *De Servo Arbitrio* as canonical (which neither Luther nor the Lutheran Church had done); not only did they translate Luther's rhetorical flourishes into confessional and didactic formulae (which neither Luther nor the Lutheran Church had done); not only did they expand and intensify Luther's comment on verse 11, 90th Psalm, in a manner that suggests forgery; but they stated their central proposition: *Hominem in conversione sua sese pure passive habere* in a form and in language that Luther had not employed, though they attributed the proposition directly to Luther. For instance: In the *De Servo Arbitrio* Luther, after quoting John 1 : 12, says: Johannes non loquitur de ullo opere hominis, neque magno, neque parvo, sed ipsa innovatione et transmutatione hominis veteris, qui filius Diaboli est, in novum hominem, qui filius Dei est. Hic homo mere passive (ut dicitur) sese habet, nec facit quippiam, sed fit totus. That is: "John is not speaking of any work of man, whether great or small, but of the very renewal and changing of the old man, who is the child of the Devil, into the new man, who is the child of God. This man is merely passive (as the saying is) and does nothing, but is made whole." *

* Erl. Ed., Latin, 7, p. 239.

The Flacianists and the Form of Concord, without quoting the passage of Scripture, and without giving Luther's full explanation, condense the paragraph into *Hominem in conversione sua pure passive sese habere*—a proposition found nowhere in the writings of Luther. Moreover, Luther is speaking in a general way of regeneration, which is very different from conversion in the specific sense used by the Flacianists and by the Form of Concord. Also: They change Luther's *mere passive* into *pure passive*, which is decidedly more intense, and expresses the antithesis to the opposite (*active*) much more positively and exclusively, as the merest tyro in Latin knows. Besides, they omit the parenthesis, *ut dicitur*, and by so doing they turn a popular saying into a solemn dictum, into an article of faith. In short: When the Flacianists and the Form of Concord present their version of Luther's comment on verse 11, 90th Psalm, and when they say: Lutherus affirmat: *Hominem in conversione sua pure passive sese habere*, they sin against the eighth Commandment, inasmuch as Luther made no such comment and no such affirmation as they attribute to him. And to say that that is what Luther meant is to commit a barefaced *petitio principii*. Hence the Form of Concord in these central propositions does not *represent* Luther. It in so far *misrepresents* him. To say the least the Form of Concord in so far presents Luther's doctrine of Free-will in a form that must inevitably make an impression such as is not made by Luther's own words. That is, the Flacianists and the Form of Concord teach a doctrine of conversion that is not justified by their own canonical standards; to which must be added the facts that their principal standard had been written in heated controversy when Luther was yet fully under the powerful hand of Augustine, five years before the Lutheran Church was born, and had become a relatively forgotten book, until it was called out of obscurity and canonized by Flacius *et al.* in 1558. *

* No edition of the *De Servo Arbitrio* seems to have been published after 1526 until 1553, when it appeared in a collected edition of Luther's works. In 1591 Jacob Remedoncius published an edition at Heidelberg for the purpose of showing that this book agrees with the Reformed in the doctrine of grace and of the absolute decree of God. See St. Louis Edition, vol. XVIII, p. 1670, note.

VIII. CONSENSUS ECCLESIAE.

The conclusion thus based on the facts given above, is that the doctrine of Free-will contained in the Form of Concord is not the generic and catholic Lutheran doctrine, and that outside of small partizan circles it had no official authorization until half a century after the Lutheran Church was born. Yea, more: This Flacianist doctrine of Free-will does not have the *consensus ecclesiae:* "Justin, Tatian, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Cyril of Jerusalem, Basil, Gregory of Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa, Chrysostom, teach that neither the will of man nor even grace alone lead to salvation in Christ, but a co-working of the two."* "All the Greek Fathers taught in a semi-Pelagian way."† *Αὐτεξούσιον* is libertas arbitrii, liberum arbitrium, which the Greeks also call *τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν.* This *αὐτεξούσιον,* liberum arbitrium, is defended by all the Fathers."‡

"The Greek and Latin church teachers are in general one in the decided emphasis which they place on human freedom."§

"*All* the Latin fathers also maintained that Free-will was not lost after the Fall; but they did not express themselves so strongly on the point as the Greeks, and especially the Alexandrians." ||

"It was not the view of Augustine that man is like a stone or stick, upon whom grace works externally; he could conceive of grace as working only in the sphere of freedom. 'For the grace of God is not offered to stones, nor to blocks, nor to beasts, but man merits this grace because he is the image of God.' Not as in insensate stones, nor as in those things in whose nature he did not place reason and will, does God work our salvation in us.'" ¶

Dr. Shedd presents Augustine's scheme as follows: "The Holy Spirit is the efficient; the human spirit is the recipient.

*Kahnis, *Dogmatik, Zweiter Band,* p. 113.

† Luthardt, *Die Lehre von Freien Willen,* p. 16.

‡ Suicer, *Thesaurus Ecclesiasticus, sub voce.*

§ Dr. Landerer, *Jahrbuecher fuer Deutsche Theologie,* 1857, p. 513.

|| Wiggers, *Augustinianism and Pelagianism.* Eng. Trans. p. 336.

¶ Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctrines.* Translation from the fifth edition, vol. I, p. 428.

The former acts independently; the latter acts as it is acted upon. The consequence of the divine efficiency is regeneration; the consequence of the human recipiency is conversion. God regenerates, and as a consequence therefrom man converts."* And Dr. Warfield: "Towards the end of this treatise (*De Spiritu et Litera*) he (Augustine) treats in an absorbingly interesting way of the mutual relations of Free-will, faith and grace, contending that all can exist without the voiding of any. It is by Free-will that we believe; but it is only as grace moves us, that we are able to use our Free-will for believing; and it is only after we are thus led by grace to believe, that we obtain all other goods."†

Such are the judgments of three eminent Augustine Scholars of the Reformed Church. We have already seen that three eminent Lutheran Scholars, Melanchthon, Chemnitz, and Selneccer, appeal to Augustine and interpret him as teaching the activity of the will in conversion. And he who knows Augustine's doctrine of *Prevenient Grace*, and hears him say (Anno 414): "Free-will is not destroyed when it is aided, but it is aided when it is not destroyed" (Epp. 157, chap. 2;) and, "the grace of God makes one not willing, to be willing;" and, "to yield our consent to God's summons or to withhold it is (as I have said) the function of our own will" (*De Spiritu et Litera*, 34), and knows of many other passages of similar character, will be forced to conclude that Augustine, notwithstanding his doctrine of *irresistible grace*, recognized some action of the human will in conversion. We may not be able to find in the great African Doctor exactly the same doctrine of Free-will that we find in Melanchthon, Chemnitz, Selneccer, Chytraeus; but much less will it be possible to find in him the *lapis-truncus pure passive* doctrine of the Form of Concord.

The Synod of Orange (529) softened the asperities Augustinianism, and promulgated the Catholic doctrine of sin and Free-will. It declared that man cannot by his own powers, without the illumination and quickening of the Holy Spirit, *begin* faith. But when the Holy Spirit is given he can do so,

* *History of Christian Doctrine*, vol. II, p. 68.

† *Introductory Essay*, p. xxviii, Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers.

and when the grace of baptism has been bestowed, by the *aid* and *coöperation* of Christ he both *can* and *ought* to do those things that pertain to the salvation of the soul.* Of the *pure passive* doctrine there is not a trace

We pass on to Peter Lombard, Master of Sentences, who summed up into a system the teaching of all the preceding Christian ages. The Flacianists repudiated his doctrine of Free-will. He taught the coöperation of Free-will and grace in unmistakable terms: "Grace anticipates the Will by preparing it to will the good, and assists it when prepared that it may perform. This is grace operating and coöperating. For operating grace prepares man's will that it may will the good; coöperating grace assists it that it may not will in vain. By coöperating God perfects in us what by operating he begins, because he by beginning operates that we may will. He coöperates with those willing by perfecting." †

There is not a sentence, nor a line, in the Lombard that indicates that in his view "Man *in his conversion is absolutely passive.*"

But it is superfluous to pursue the matter further. It is clearly demonstrable that the Form-of-Concord doctrine *de libero arbitrio* does not have the consensus of the Lutheran Church, nor of the Catholic Church, nor even of the Roman Church in so far as we learn from the writings of the Fathers. Whether Article II, *De Servo Arbitrio*, of the Form of Concord, contains a fair and impartial exhibition of the teaching of the Scriptures on the relation of grace to human freedom, and whether, and to what extent, it contains and really exhibits the Augustinian doctrine of irresistible grace—for the leading Flacianists, Flacius, Amsdorf, Hesshuss, Wigand *et al.*, whose fundamental propositions *de libero arbitrio* found central and defining position in the Form of Concord, were out and out Augustinian predestinarians, and held as a fundamental proposition that "in spiritual things man is absolutely dead to the good"—these questions the intelligent student of theology must settle for himself; but it may not be out of place to say

* Mansi, *Councils*, 8, pp. 728, *et seqq.*

† Migne's *Patrologia.* Tom. CXCII, pp. 709, *et seqq.*

here that said Article does not quote and apply the following passages of the Divine Word: Matt: "All things are ready: come to the marriage feast;" John 3 : 16: "God so loved the World, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have eternal life;" Acts 3 : 19: "Repent ye therefore, and turn again;" Rev. 22 : 17: "And the Spirit and the bride say, Come. And he that heareth, let him say, Come. And he that is athirst, let him come: he that will, let him take the water of life freely;" Luke 15 : 11–20, the Parable of the Prodigal Son; and certainly the Article makes a very superficial exposition and application of Matt. 23 : 37. Hence we may well ask whether Article II of the Form of Concord has declared unto us the whole counsel of God concerning our salvation. Acts 20 : 37.

ARTICLE II.

THE RELATION OF THE CHURCH TO THE STATE.*

By Judge Samuel D. Schmucker, LL.D.

The sixteenth Article of the Augsburg Confession is not a prominent one. It does not deal with the great questions of faith and doctrine over which the herculean struggle of the Reformation was made. It alone, of the twenty-one articles which compose the body of the Confession proper, relates to purely secular matters, and it seems almost as if it had been introduced into the Confession incidentally in order to round out the general statement of the position assumed by the protestants.

It declares: "Concerning civil affairs our churches teach that legitimate civil enactments are good works of God; that it is lawful for Christians to hold civil offices, to pronounce judgment and decide cases according to the imperial and other existing laws; to inflict just punishment, wage just wars and serve in them, to make lawful contracts, to hold property, to make oath when required by the magistrates, to marry and be married.

"They condemn the Anabaptists who forbid to Christians the performance of these civil duties. They also condemn those who make evangelical perfection consist not in the fear of God and in faith, but in the abandonment of all civil duties, because the gospel teaches the necessity of ceaseless righteousness of heart whilst it does not abolish the duties of civil and domestic life, but especially requires them to be observed as ordinances of God and performed in the spirit of Christian love. Hence Christians ought necessarily to yield obedience to their civil officers and laws, unless when they command something sinful, for they ought to obey God rather than man. Acts 5 : 29."

The Article begins and ends with the assertion of the duty of obedience to the civil authorities within their legitimate sphere.

* Lecture on the Holman Foundation, May 12th, 1905.

All the subordinate statements in the Article lead up to that one fundamental principle.

It seems strange to us living in this day that it should ever have been found desirable to include in a great protesting declaration of faith so elementary and axiomatic a proposition as that it is the duty of a Christian citizen to obey the legitimate laws of the government under which he lives. But the framers of the confession lived in a different age from ours. The fine hand of the ecclesiastic had for centuries so commingled the exercise of civil and spiritual authority that the principles underlying them had become confused in the minds of the people and required fresh definition and assertion. The Reformers recognizing the inherent distinction between the spheres of secular and religious control asserted in effect, in this article of the Confession, the principle that legitimate civil enactments are binding upon the Christian citizen *ex proprio vigore*, or at least without reference to ecclesiastical sanction or censure. They were aware of the fact that the logical conclusion of the position which they assumed was the separation of the Church and State, as two inherently distinct authorities concurrently operating in separate spheres of action, for they distinctly avow in the seventh article of the Abuses corrected that "The civil and ecclesiastical governments ought therefore not to be united."

Luther personally held strongly to this view. In his work on The Civil Magistrate issued in January, 1523, dedicated to Prince John, he says: "God has ordained two governments among the children of Adam, the reign of God under Christ and the reign of the world under the civil magistrate, each with its own laws and rights. The laws of the reign of the world extend no further than to body and goods and the external affairs on earth. But over the soul God can and will allow no one to rule but himself alone." * It is also said that at the time of the framing of the Confession both Luther and Melanchthon were in favor of taking a formal stand for the separation of the Church from the State, but they were dissuaded

* Schaff's *Church History*, vol. VI, p. 524, *et seqq.*

from pursuing that course by the opposition of the German princes.

The participation in civic affairs accorded to the mass of the German people in the sixteenth century was much more limited than that which we now enjoy. Outside of a moderate control of local interests in the larger cities the citizens had slight concern with the function of government. The extent of their privilege was to obey laws made for them by their rulers and assume the burdens laid upon them by those in authority. Hence the Confession naturally treats of civic duty from the standpoint of obedience to existing enactments and has nothing to say about the responsibility for the proper use of the law making power with which we are so greatly concerned today.

The Confession assumes a moderate attitude upon the subject of the meritorious character of obedience to secular authority avoiding alike the monastic view that the withdrawal from all civil duties and the abandonment of domestic life promoted spiritual perfection and secured Divine favor, and the anabaptist unrestrained conception of liberty which threatened the destruction of the social order.

It would serve no good purpose to recount here the events that led up to the mighty social upheavel in the sixteenth century, of which the German Reformation formed so important a part, or to enumerate the abuses which then called for correction, the grievances which demanded redress, the errors and superstitions which required removal, or the heroic achievements of the men who were the chief actors in that great struggle for civil and religious freedom, or the many and far-reaching results of their labors. All of that has already been done and well done by many hands. Our time can be more profitably devoted to a consideration of the cardinal proposition of the 16th article of the Confession which, as has already been said, when extended to its logical conclusion involves an assertion not only of the dignity and authority of civil government and the duty of the citizens to yield obedience to its enactments, but also of the propriety of the complete separation of the

Church and State as sovereigns of the respective domains of the body and soul.

In most of the nations of antiquity, Heathen and Judaic, there was some form of union or co operation between the administration of religious and secular affairs, the two kinds of anthority being often blended into one government and not infrequently exercised by the same set of officials. The churches, failing by mere moral suasion to enforce their edicts upon society and subdue the outbreaks caused by immorality, leaned upon the civil arm for efficient though forcible means of upholding their authority. The civil rulers perceiving the unbounded influence of religion over its sincere votaries, who readily yielded life and treasure to its demands, welcomed the aid of so valuable an ally and soon utilized its forces for the achievement of their ambitions. As the combination of the two powers in those ancient times was almost universal, and, in the case of the Judaic system, enjoyed the Divine sanction, such unions were doubtless fairly adapted to the then existing types of religion and condition of society.

When Christ appeared upon the earth He did not interfere with existing civil institutions nor did He, as the founder of the Church which bears His name, give any positive directions touching the formation of organizations for the government of His followers, much less did He require their formation, or specify their structural character if they should be formed, or indicate the extent of the authority which it would be proper for them to exercise. He declared His kingdom to be a spiritual one and not of this world, and He yielded obedience in secular matters to existing civil governments recognizing them as ordained of God. When He was tempted to repudiate the despotic rule of the Roman conqueror He crystalized the statement of the concurrent but distinct civil and spiritual dominion over the realms of the body and soul, in the brief sentence "render to Caesar the things which are Caesar's and to Christ the things which are Christ's." It involves no violent assumption to infer from His conduct and declarations that it was His purpose to permit the precise relation of His Church to civil in-

stitutions to be from time to time modified with the advance of civilization and intelligence until a perfect adjustment between them could be obtained under some form of institutions which would insure its permanence. It may be possible that such instutitions have been found in our own political system where the civil government has no official connection with any church organization and accords no special favor to any form of faith but leaves to its citizens complete liberty of conscience and belief with the right to practice any form of worship which does not interfere with property rights or disturb the public peace.

Christianity started on its career as a matter of faith and conscience unconnected with the civil power, but in a few centuries when princes and rulers began to be converted to the faith they first became its patrons and defenders and then sought to use its influence to strengthen their own power. But the wit of the clerk proved superior to the sword of the knight, and by the end of the 15th century the Church had got its grasp so tightly about the neck of the State as almost to strangle civil authority. Since the Reformation of the 16th century the authority of the State has under protestant influences been restored to something like its normal condition and a better adjustment has been reached of its relations to the Church, but, except in our own country, the two powers have not been completely emancipated from their unnatural union or the Church placed upon that voluntary basis which alone accords with the free exercise of the will and conscience involved in genuine acts of faith and worship.

It is surprising that the Reformers, with the clear words of Christ touching the spiritual nature of his kingdom ringing in their ears and the example of primitive Christianity before their eyes, were unable to completely dissolve the entangling alliance of the Church with the civil power, but they failed to accomplish that result. Burdened by the opposition of a powerful and vigilant adversary and perplexed by the disorders in some of the Protestant communities who failed to use their liberties aright, the leaders of the Reformation turned to princes and

rulers for the aid of the strong arm of the law and entered again into the union with the civil power from which no important State in Europe has as yet fully emerged. Although they thus failed to entirely sever the fetters which bound these two jurisdictions together they by their mighty strokes for freedom of thought and conscience set in motion a chain of events which has gone so far toward the realization of their aims that to-day in every Protestant nation of Europe and in many of the Catholic ones the civil power is practically free from ecclesiastical dominion and a degree of religious toleration exists which approaches substantial independence in forms of faith and mode of worship.

In the protestant Kingdoms of Great Britain, Holland, Denmark, Sweden and Norway, the prevailing denomination, which is Episcopal in England and Lutheran in the other four nations, is established by law and supported by public taxation, but all other denominations are freely tolerated and protected in the open conduct of public worship according to their respective methods, although in most if not in all cases they derive no support from the public purse, while their members remain liable to taxation for the maintenance of the State religion. In the Catholic Kingdoms of Austria, Italy and Spain the Roman Catholic Church is established and is maintained at the public expense, while some measure of toleration of the several forms of Protestantism exists by law although the position of dissenters from the State Church is not always comfortable.

In Germany the imperial constitution is silent on the subject of religion, and no religious tests are required as a condition of holding office under it, but in all of the States composing the empire the union between civil authority and either the protestant or Catholic Church continues in force. The French constitution of 1870, like the German one, is silent on the subject of religion, but various churches, chiefly Roman Catholic, are recognized and supported by the State. Current events in France point strongly toward an early and complete divorce of the State from all churches, if not from all religion. The Bel-

gian constitution guarantees religious liberty to its citizens, but the establishment of religion in so far remains that the State contributes to the support of the Catholic, Protestant and Jewish congregations The Swiss Federal Constitution declares, that the freedom of belief and conscience are inviolable, and it guarantees freedom of worship within the limits of morality and public safety, but in the several cantons of the Republic the Catholic, or Protestant Church, according to the faith of the inhabitants, is established by law. In Russia the closest union still exists between the Church and the State.

The salutary scheme of separating the civil government from all ecclesiastical control, so clearly indicated in principle by Christ and again asserted by the Reformers of the 16th century in the Confession now under consideration, first found its full realization at the end of the 18th century in the formation of the government under which it is our privilege to live to-day. The best opportunity, therefore, to briefly observe the practical operation of the concurrent but independent administration of temporal and spiritual authority advocated by the Reformers, will be found in a short examination into the origin, growth and present status of the relation existing between the civil power and religion in our own country. Neither our theory nor practice of religious freedom was acquired by our ancestors in their European homes. Our system is indigenous to our own soil and has received its development here. Some of the early colonists doubtless came to America to escape religious persecution, but their conduct after they had come ashore made it manifest that few of them escaped the intolerant spirit of their age.

In every one of the colonies except Rhode Island and Pennsylvania some religious denomination was established by law or supported by public taxation. In the Carolinas, Virginia and Maryland the Episcopal Church was early recognized by law as the State Church and was supported by taxation. This was true of Virginia throughout almost its entire colonial history. Maryland began its career under the Catholic Lords Baltimore with a liberal form of toleration, but as early as 1692,

under the provincial rule of William and Mary, the Church of England was formally established in the province by legal enactment. In New York, New Jersey and Delaware, the Church of England was also the State Church under the charter for the New Netherlands granted by the Stuarts in 1694 to the Duke of York, afterwards James the Second. In the New England colonies, except Rhode Island, there was a slightly different style of official relation between the State and the churches. There was in those colonies no legal designation or establishment of any particular denomination as the State Church but the laws authorized and required local taxation by the parishes, towns and other political subdivisions for the support of religious services which were currently held according to the then prevailing puritan type of congregationalism. Under the legislation of the colonial period at certain times in some of the colonies a liberal degree of toleration was exhibited toward dissenting denominations, but at other times and places the legislation discriminated, to a degree amounting to persecution, against persons not in fellowship with the established or prevailing form of faith.

After more than a century of experience with this species of church establishment at home and with the discouraging spectacle before them of many centuries of European alliances between the Church and State, which had almost invariably debased the former and weakened the latter, our forefathers threw off the yoke of transatlantic dominion and addressed themselves to the task of establishing civil liberty and representative government on this continent. It is not strange that under such circumstances they did not permit the status of the State toward religion to rest upon mere usage and tradition, but declared by adequate provisions in both State and National constitutions what the nature of that relation should be.

The primary purpose of the far-seeing and sagacious framers of the Federal Constitution being to found a civil government they produced an instrument adjusting and distributing the civil powers of government and defining and securing the rights of citizenship in a manner which has ever since challenged the

admiration of the civilized world, but they also by a few brief constitutional provisions declared the inflexible purpose of the nation to secure complete freedom of religion and prevent any form of alliance between the Church and State. These provisions are found in section 2 of Article VI of the Federal Constitution which declares that "no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to hold office or public trust under the United States," and in the first amendment to that instrument which provides that "Congress shall make no laws respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."

An admirable historical review of the causes and events leading up to the adoption of these two clauses of the Constitution is found in the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Reynolds vs. the United States, 98 U. S. 145, where it is said: "Before the adoption of the Constitution attempts were made in some of the Colonies and States to legislate not only in respect to the establishment of religion, but in respect to its doctrines and precepts as well. The people were taxed against their will for the support of religion and sometimes for the support of particular sects to whose tenets they could not and did not subscribe. Punishments were prescribed for a failure to attend public worship and sometimes for entertaining heretical opinions. The controversy upon this general subject was animated in many of the States, but seemed at last to culminate in Virginia. In 1784 the House of Delegates of that State having under consideration 'A bill establishing provision for teachers of the Christian religion' postponed it until the next session and directed that the bill should be published and distributed and that the people be requested 'to signify their opinion respecting the adoption of such a bill at the next session of the Assembly.'

"This brought out a determined opposition. Amongst others Mr. Madison prepared a 'Memorial and Remonstrance' which was widely circulated and signed in which he demonstrated 'that religion or the duty we owe the Creator' was not within the cognizance of civil government. Semple's Virginia Bap-

tists Appendix. At the next session the proposed bill was not only defeated but another 'for establishing religious freedom' drafted by Mr. Jefferson, 1 Jeff. Works, 45, 2 Howison History of Virginia 298, was passed. In the preamble of this Act, 12 Hen. Stat. 34, religious freedom is defined, and after a recital 'That to suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his powers into the field of opinion and to restrain the profession or propogation of principles on supposition of their ill tendency is a dangerous fallacy which at once destroys all religious liberty,' it is declared 'that it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere when principles break out into overt acts against peace and good order.' In these two sentences is found the true distinction between what properly belongs to the Church and what to the State.

"In a little more than a year after the passage of this Statute the convention met which prepared the Constitution of the United States. Of this convention Mr. Jefferson was not a member, he being then absent as minister to France. As soon as he saw the draft of the constitution proposed for adoption, he in a letter to a friend, expressed his disappointment at the absence of an express declaration insuring the freedom of religion, 2 Jeff. Works, 355, but was willing to accept it as it was, trusting that the good sense and honest intentions of the people would bring about the necessary alterations. 1 Jeff. Works, 79. Five of the States, while adopting the constitution, proposed amendments. Three, New Hampshire, New York and Virginia included in one form or another a declaration of religious freedom in the changes they desired to have made, as did also North Carolina where the convention at first declined to ratify the constitution until the proposed amendments were acted upon. Accordingly at the first session of the first Congress the amendment now under consideration was proposed with others by Mr. Madison. It met the views of the advocates of religious freedom and was adopted. Mr. Jefferson afterwards in reply to an address to him by a committee of the Danbury Baptist Association, 8 Jeff. Works, 113, took occasion to say: 'Believing with you that religion is a matter which

lies solely between man and his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or worship, that the legislative powers of the government reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their Legislature should make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, thus building a wall of separation between Church and State. Adhering to this expression of the supreme will of the nation, in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments which tend to restore man to all of his natural rights, convinced that he has no natural right in opposition to his social duties.' Coming as this does from an acknowledged leader of the advocates of the measure it may be accepted almost as an authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of the amendment thus secured. Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order.

These two provisions of the Federal Constitution operated only to relieve federal office-holders from religious tests and to limit the legislative powers of Congress over the subject of religion, and therefore the people of the several States in making the transition from the colonial to the State form of government gave further evidence of their determination to establish and perpetuate religious liberty by inserting in the State constitutions which they adopted fuller and more detailed provisions to that end. The provisions of the several State constitutions upon this subject are not uniform in their terms and import, but they all give unmistakable evidence of the purpose of their authors to secure complete freedom of religious opinion and worship and at the same time to protect the State from religious interference with its administration of civil affairs.

Judge Cooley in his excellent work on Constitutional Limitations sums up these constitutional provisions as prohibiting the States from enacting any laws:

1st. Respecting the establishment of religion, which has

been construed to cover all laws giving to one sect or denomination an advantage over other sects however slight the advantage may be.

2nd. Requiring compulsory support, by taxation or otherwise, of religious instruction. All such support must be voluntary, it not being within the sphere of government to coerce it.

3rd. Compulsory attendance upon religious worship, for the obvious reason that it is impossible by compulsion to produce true religious belief or worship

4th. Restraining the free exercise of religion by any person according to the dictates of his own conscience.

5th. Restraining the expression of religious belief.*

The religious freedom which we enjoy in the United States has been thus defined by its Supreme Court in the case of Watson vs. Jones, 80 U. S. 679: "In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality and property, and which does not infringe personal rights is conceded to all. The law knows no heresy and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect. The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the dissemination of any religious doctrine and to create tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the association and for the ecclesiastical government of all the individual members, congregations and officers within the general association is unquestioned." Strictly speaking our government is neither a Christian nor a pagan one. It is a civil government created and administered for the regulation of the secular affairs of its citizens. It does not deal directly with the subject of religion, but leaves each citizen free to act upon that subject according to the dictates of his own conscience within the limits already mentioned.

Lord Hale † and Sir William Blackstone ‡ are both credited

* Cooley's *Constitutional Limitations*, 7 Ed. p. 663.

† Rex vs. Taylor 3 Keble 607.

‡ Blackstone's Commentaries, Book IV, p. 60.

with the statement that Christianity is part of the Common Law of England, and similar expressions have been used by many of the Courts of last resort in this country in reference to our common law which we have inherited from England, but as was said by Justice Story in the Girard will case,* this is only true in a qualified sense. It has never been formally adopted as part of our law nor are all of its commands enforceable by the agencies at the service of the civil government. Of the commandments of the Decalogue, murder and theft are universally punishable at law as crimes against society, and adultery is generally so punishable, but the law does not undertake to enforce filial respect, nor to punish lying or covetousness, or idolatry if it be so practiced as not to endanger the public peace and good order. The law requires men to abstain from secular labor on Sunday and not to disturb the quiet of the day but it does not compel obedience to the divine command to keep it holy or to devote its hours to religious worship.

Nor can the law compel the practice of those Christian virtues which pertain especially to the spiritual domain, such as brotherly love, charity, forgiveness or purity of heart. If you, when passing along the highway, see your neighbor lying by the way side so grievously injured by accident or violence that he will die unless his wounds be promptly dressed, and you fail to stop and aid him you violate one of the highest precepts of Christianity, but the law will not take cognizance of your act or punish you for your inhumanity. Again, if your neighbor hunger and you do not feed him or if he thirst and you give him no drink you are deeply culpable before God but you are guiltless before the law. Blasphemy was indictable as a misdemeanor and profanity as a nuisance at common law, and in most of the American States both offenses, especially when committed in public, are made punishable by statute, but the weight of modern authority holds that they are not punished as violations of religious precepts, but as temporal offenses against civil society, which tend to subvert its good order and to provoke breaches of the peace. In the maintenance of

* Vidal vs. Girard 2 Howard U. S. 198.

public peace and good order for the protection of the citizen the civil government has of necessity enacted many regulations of conduct that are identical with precepts of Christianity and it compels obedience to them with the strong arm of the law, but it does not do so because of their divine origin or sacred character, but because their enforcement promotes the welfare of society. The civil power does not presume to attempt the vindication of the Divine authority or to punish infractions of its laws. God does not require human assistance to enforce his commands. He has attached to sin its own penalties, which are adjusted to the offense and imposed upon the offender with an unerring wisdom that no human tribunal can supply.

Our government recognizes the existence and providence of God and the moral obligation laid upon men of gratitude to Him and obedience to His commands. It is also convinced of the beneficent influence of religion upon human character, of its restraining power over the lives and conduct of its votaries and of the sure foundation furnished by its rule in the hearts of men for a well ordered civil society. Our people have also given abundant evidence that they are in so far religious that an appeal to that side of their nature will stimulate them to virtuous action or hold them to an honest line of conduct. Accordingly our laws provide for the appointment and support of chaplains to look after the spiritual welfare of those engaged in the military service, for the exemption of Church property from taxation, for the administration of oaths by legal tribunals in order to more strongly bind the conscience of witness, and for the proclamation of days of national thanksgiving, or in great crises for national humiliation and prayer. In some of the States no one is competent to be a juror or a witness who does not believe in the existence of God and that He will hold him accountable for his conduct and reward or punish him accordingly.

In the absence of any form of alliance between the Church and State in the United States the genius and spirit of our free institutions has operated to develop a system of voluntary representative organizations which by the consent of their

membership have been made the depositaries of the power employed in the regulation of the religious interests of the community. The unit of these organizations is the parish or congregation whose affairs are ordinarily managed by the suffrages of its members. It in turn, in most denominations, selects delegates to higher bodies, such as synods, presbyteries, conferences and conventions which exercise a general supervision, with a certain measure of control, over given districts or territories. In some of the denominations there is an ultimate representative body or tribunal which exercises supreme authority over all persons and organizations in fellowship with it.

The State allows to those various forms of religious organizations the privilege of legal incorporation for the better management of their temporal concerns and it accords to them when so incorporated the right to hold, manage and dispose of a limited amount of property suitable for their legitimate purposes, but it retains as complete legislative and judicial control of the civil and property rights of these religious corporations as it does over similar bodies created for secular purposes. It also recognizes the exclusive jurisdiction of ecclesiastical tribunals not only in matters of doctrine and belief but also in all matters of government, organization and discipline and in other interests pertaining solely to the Church as such, and having no relation to civil or property rights. The Civil Courts will therefore not ordinarly review or pass upon the acts of ecclesiastical tribunals or governing authorities of religious organizations with relation to their internal affairs where the subject-matter of the controversy is purely religious in its nature and does not directly involve or affect property rights.

In the more than a century of our national life numerous cases have come before the State and Federal Courts calling for a construction of the constitutional provisions to which we have adverted touching the relation of the civil power to the religious rights and interests of the people. It is beyond the scope and compass of a lecture like this to review these many cases or discuss the various issues presented by them, but certain general propositions, mainly relating to property rights,

are deducible from them, some of which may be noticed with advantage here. * The great majority of the cases are broadly speaking divisible into two classes one of which relates to the property held by or on behalf of religious bodies and the other concerns the protection of the citizens in the enjoyment of the liberty of conscience and freedom of religious worship secured to him by law.

The cases involving property rights are the simpler of the two classes because the title to property rests upon long settled principles and is regulated by rules of almost universal application. Controversies over property, held by or on behalf of religious bodies, generally hinge upon some incident of the form and character of the organization entitled to its benefit, or upon the purposes to which it has been dedicated by the conveyances under which it is held.

When property has been devoted, by the express terms of a deed or will made in accordance with the laws of the State where it is located, to *some specified purpose* such as the support or propogation of some specific religious belief or form of worship, the Courts will, when their jurisdiction is properly invoked, prevent a diversion of the property from the purposes to which it has been dedicated. If by the terms of the deed or will the property has been conveyed to a particular religious congregation for such specified uses and the majority of the congregation radically change their views and adopt other and opposite doctrines, it is beyond their power to apply the property to the support of the new and conflicting doctrines, as that would amount to a diversion of it from the uses to which it was limited by the conveyance, a result which the law will not tolerate in reference to property limited either to sacred or secular uses.

Where the conveyance has been made to *an independent and self-governing* religious body or congregation for its *general uses*, and not for any specified purpose the congregation may use the property for any lawful purpose, and if it afterwards change

* For a more extended discussion of this subject see Watson vs. Jones, *supra*, and Vol. 24 pp. 348 *et seq*. and 360 *et seq*.

its faith and embrace new doctrines such change will not deprive it of the title to the property. In such cases if there arise a schism in the congregation which results in a division of it, the right to the property would not be determined upon questions of faith and doctrine, but would depend, as with secular bodies, upon which one of the two factions was at law entitled to be regarded as the original organization or its legitimate successor. But when a congregation holding property *for its general uses is not independent*, but belongs to a general denominational body or organization which has an eccleasiastical government and tribunals of its own with a jurisdiction more or less complete over the persons and associations in fellowship with it, and a chism or division in the congregation occur resulting in the assertion of conflicting claims to the property, the Civil Courts in passing upon those claims will recognize the title as being in that part of the congregation which is true to the rules and standards set by the governing body of the denomination, and in determining what those rules and standards are the Civil Courts will accept as controlling precedents decisions theretofore made by the highest tribunal of that denomination as to its ecclesiastical usages, customs and laws. Modifications of these general propositions must necessarily occur in order to adapt the relief sought to the special facts and circumstances of particular cases, and especially to carry out the variety of purposes manifested by donors of property to different religious uses.

The cases in which the courts have been called upon to define the limits of the liberty of the conscience of the citizen and protect its exercise present mere subtle problems than those concerning property rights. By our fundamental laws we have proclaimed liberty of conscience in the broadest terms consistent with the preservation of the public peace and good order, but when we are called upon to determine whether the exercise of that liberty is impaired by particular kinds of legislation the question presented for solution is often an extremely delicate one. The line between liberty and license is often hard to draw.

Sometimes the task is simple and the answer clear. For

instance, when Congress in 1874 in exercise of its jurisdiction over the territories passed an Act prohibiting the practice of polygamy, a member of the Morman Church residing in Utah was indicted for violation of the law. He admitted committing the acts with which he was charged, but set up as a defense that he had not done them with criminal intent, but in conformity with the rules of his faith and in pursuance of what he believed at the time to be a religious duty. The Supreme Court of the United States, when the case came before it on appeal, rejected the defense and affirmed his conviction by the lower court. The Supreme Court although admitting that Congress had no power to pass any law for the government of territories which prohibited the free exercise of religion held the Statute in question to be within the legislative power of Congress, saying in that connection: "It (the law) is constitutional and valid as prescribing a rule of action for all those residing in the territories and in places over which the United States have exclusive control. This being so the only question which remains is whether those who make polygamy a part of their religion are excepted from the operation of the Statute. If they are, then those who do not make polygamy a part of their religious belief may be found guilty and punished while those who do must be acquitted and go free. This would be introducing a new element into criminal law. Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. Suppose that one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Or if a wife religiously believed it was her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pile of her dead husband, would it be beyond the power of the civil government to prevent her carrying her belief into practice?

"So here as a law of the organization of society under the exclusive dominion of the United States it is provided that plural marriages shall not be allowed. Can a man excuse his practice to the contrary because of his religious belief? To

permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances."*

A much more delicate question is that of the right of the State under our system of government to enforce the compulsory reading or study of the Bible by the pupils in the public schools. Except in the territories, Congress has no power over this subject as the Federal constitution makes no provision for protecting the citizens of the respective States in their religious liberty. This is left to the State constitutions and laws which are not uniform in their provisions on the subject. It may be conceded that none of the State constitutions permit the public authorities to compel distinctly denominational or sectarian religious instruction to be given to the pupils in the public schools, yet most of those constitutions contain such assertions of the right of freedom of conscience and religious belief as to present a question of the legality of the compulsory use of the Bible as a text-book in the public schools by the children of those parents who have conscientious scruples as to the propriety of such employment of that book. To a Protestant its use is of course free from objection on that score, but, giving as we should to our Roman Catholic fellow-citizens credit for sincerity in their objection on conscientious grounds to such use of the Bible, we are confronted with a question, directly germane to the discussion in hand, which is so close that the Courts of last resort of the several States have not been able to agree in their conclusion upon it.

The laws prohibiting the pursuit of secular occupations and all forms of labor except works of necessity and charity on Sunday have in many instances met with opposition by those who conscientiously think that the Sabbath or seventh day and not the first day should be so observed. They insist that, as they in obedience to the dictates of their conscience and the teachings of their faith, actually observe the seventh day as sacred and abstain from all labor on it, it is unconstitutional and vio-

*Reynolds vs. The United States, *supra*.

lates their freedom of conscience and religious liberty to compel them to similarly observe also the first day of the week.

Sunday laws have however been generally sustained as constitutional not upon the ground of enforcing the sanctity of the day, but because they are valid exercises of the Police Power, as Sunday is not only a sacred day, but also a civil and political institution established and maintained as a periodic day of rest, the observance of which is requisite for the moral and physical welfare of society. Some deviations from this view have, however, been sustained, for in Michigan a law was held to be constitutional which prohibited barbers from carrying on their business on Sunday, but excepted from its operation such barbers as observed another day as Sabbath and abstained from labor on that day; and in New York a law was upheld which prohibited barbers from carrying on their business on Sunday, but excepted barbers doing business in New York City and at Saratoga Springs until one o'clock on Sunday afternoon.

The immunity from liability to taxation accorded in most of the States to property held by or for the use of churches and other religious bodies has at times met with decided opposition upon the contention that it violated the spirit if not the letter of the constitutional inhibition of the passage of any laws respecting the establishment of religion, in that it accorded special favor and advantage to the portion of the community composing christian churches, but the Courts have held with practical unanimity that in the absence of a positive constitutional restriction the State has so complete control over the subject of taxation as to authorize it to allow such exemptions from taxation as it deems expedient.

It thus becomes apparent that even with the most just and liberal delimitation, in the organic law of the land, of the respective spheres of civil and spiritual authority, the difficulties of a correct application of the general principles governing the subject to the concrete facts of special cases are very great. Such difficulties are however inherent in every attempt to apply abstract principles and general propositions to concrete situations of human experience.

Neither the acumen of legislators nor the wisdom of courts has succeeded in locating with entire precision the invisible dividing line between the temporal and spiritual worlds which, lying side by side, compose the domains of the body and soul. Our lives are not lived in only one or the other of these domains, but in both, and their boundaries so touch and overlap each other that now we can discern their dividing line and again it is lost in impenetrable mist. Their influences ever contend for mastery over us; for a time the one is paramount and then the other gains dominion over us and again they hold us in their joint embrace. As civilization advances and society becomes more highly organized novel phases and presentations of this ever present conflict will be produced for which it is impossible to provide a precise solution in advance. The utmost that we can do is to correctly settle the principles on which the civil and spiritual jurisdictions rest and then by applying those principles in a spirit of fairness to the situations which from time to time arise, effect the best solution of these vexed questions of which human wisdom is capable.

ARTICLE III.

THE INCARNATION.

By M. Valentine, D.D., LL.D.

The incarnation stands in theology as the miracle of miracles, the greatest of all, central to all, carrying all others with it. It puts into time and the world, in a unique and sovereign way and for a specific and eternal purpose, the presence and action of the Supernatural—all preceding miracles and theophanies being its anticipatory and preparing action, all succeeding miracles and powers its continuance and reverberating movement. As warranted by the Scriptures and held in the faith of the Church, this incarnation was the supreme event in the world's history, all other providential movement being in view of it and adjusted to its significance, and all after ages recognizing its sublime increment of divine self-manifestation and saving goodness, as concerned with the realization of the earth's intention and destined to exhibit its issues. It was and forever is God's supreme thought and act of love for the world.

We obtain the most illuminating and assuring view of this fundamental and central truth of Christianity by a consideration of its essential and explaining pre-suppositions, opening to view at the same time its all-justifying design. Its place and aim in the divine economy fully vindicate the mysterious transcendence in its supernaturalism. There are especially three of these pre-suppositions.

The first is such a constitution or reality of the Godhead as to make an incarnation possible. Christian theism universally maintains that God can make Himself known in His power and doing. A God unable to manifest Himself would not be God. This generic self-revelation is properly understood as implied in the designation "Logos" or Word applied to the only begotten Son, (compare John 3 : 16; 1 : 1—4; Heb. 1 : 1, 2). It is thus placed in close connection with the entire doctrine of the Trinity, and belongs indeed to its profoundest import. Evi-

dently the incarnation, as a specific act of self manifestation, must be viewed as resting back upon the same interior reality in the Godhead. The supreme unity consists with distinctions. The truth of the Trinity is thus a logical pre-supposition of the incarnation. This mystery in the interior of the being of God holds the possibility and power of the divine self manifestation according to His will. And in thinking of the "second Person" of the Trinity as representing to us the Divine Being or nature as self-disclosing or self-imparting, we must bear in mind that this is equally true whether the self-expression be in creative action or in redemptory sacrifice of love. For by "the Word all things were made," before human need was answered by the grace of the incarnation. The doctrine of the Trinity is no mere speculative truth, without practical import, but a vital reality, underlying the whole creational and providential economy of the world.

So practical is it, that wherever it has been denied or obscured nearly all the great truths in the order of the divine love and grace, emphasized in the Scriptures, have fallen away with it, especially those pertaining to the way of salvation, such as the true Deity of Christ, the incarnation, the atonement, regeneration, etc. We do not say that without the Trinity, an incarnation would have been absolutely impossible; for Sabellianism is not metaphysically inconceivable. But we say, first, that the Scriptures clearly link the incarnation with the tripersonality of God (John 1 : 1—4, 14, 16, 27; 17 : 5, 24, 25; Rom. 8 : 32; Heb. 1 : 6); and secondly, that the truth of the Trinity furnishes what may be termed a natural basis for it, in the mysterious being of the one absolute eternal God, opening to us an intelligible view of the distinctly declared ecomony of salvation.

A second pre-supposition is such a constitution of *humanity* as to made the incarnation possible. It is especially proper that this pre-condition should be looked at fairly. For plausible difficulties may be suggested. The incarnation of God in a human being is so strange an event, so foreign to the regular order of life, as to justify a raising of the question of its credi-

bility. It is not necessary that it should be relieved of mystery, since mystery meets us everywhere in the immense realm of reality. But impediments to faith may be removed, if the mystery can be shown to be not essentially an impossibility, nor incredible. And this can be done.

The asserted possibility may indeed be made to seem doubtful if the confessedly great difference between God and man be allowed to hide from view the great truth of likeness, as taught by revelation and sustained by reason. If, through theories of man's origin, or discrediting appearances in his actual condition, he is reduced to classification with mere animal existence, with no given life or endowment constituting him in any attributes kindred with his Creator, with nothing but positive antithesis to the Divine Nature, then, indeed, we could not conceive of an incarnation as possible. There would be nothing in common, no elements of the same kind of being, which could coalesce in conceivable union. But in proportion as consideration is given to the unique place of man in relation to all other created existences on earth, confessedly marked by essential characteristics exalting him far above all other species of living beings, unquestionably constituting him alone an intelligent, rational, free moral personality, after God's own "image," capacitated to "think His thoughts after Him," to understand Him through His works, and to enter reverently into fellowship with His will and purposes, in love, obedience, and worship, the difficulty diminishes. God is absolute, eternal *mind*. As God formed human personality essentially in *created mind*, finite indeed, but with powers in the likeness of His own nature, it would seem that immeasurable possibilities of kindredship, affinity and communion may have been provided for. If God is the Absolute, perfect Spirit or Mind, man is created finite spirit or mind. Revelation declares the human mental or spiritual faculties to be after the mould of the divine, and the deepest scientific thought of the ages sustains this conception. We are fully entitled to believe that God has made thought, love, and volition essentially the same in man as they are in Himself. Though infinite in Himself, and only finite in humanity, they

are correspondent realities, creatively adjusted in man for true knowledge, obedience, and fellowship The "religious nature" of the race, to which philosophy and science are giving special emphasis, is but an expression and witness of this. It is heard in the forever repeated cry of Augustine: "O God, my heart was made for Thee, and cannot rest till it finds Thee." This revelation of *likeness* of capacities, not equality of them, is the point specifically involved in the possibility of the incarnational union.

The evidence of features in common, between the Divine Nature and the human, as thus established, is supported by further truths integral in the teaching of revelation. The reality of "image and likeness" carries us to the truth of *sonship* in man's nature and position. And this human sonship is most wonderfully found resting back on the Trinitarian reality of an "Eternal Sonship" in the being of God Himself, as exercising the divine agency of creation. We find this work of creating humanity in features of likeness, to be true children of God, is by the same Son who comes to redeem. Sonship, constitutional and ethical, appears to be the ultimate principle that underlies the creation. The principle of sonship is in God Himself. The physical world is not an end in itself, but is relative, as means, to spiritual ends towards which is the outflow of God's love. Thus the divine love cannot rest in creative activity through the successive stages of the inorganic and animal spheres, till it has embodied in its works a realm of self-likeness in personal constitution and character. "Man is made in the image of God, because he is the analogue in creation of the uncreated Son whose working is in him consummated." *

In the light of this analogy of human personality with the divine, the incarnational assumption of humanity, while not divested of mystery, is relieved of contradictoriness. Nothing forbids the conception that the Infinite Spirit, the Eternal Revealer, may take the limited human capacities within the movement of the infinite Divine, so as to blend the two natures into a single personality. God could not communicate to the human nature

* See Forrest's *The Christ of History and Experience*, p. 183.

self-existence; for that would obliterate the very distinction between Himself and created being; but He, conceivably, can communicate all communicable attributes to the Divine Human Person within the measure in which humanity has been capacitated to receive, and which shall fill them with the Divine. We are without warrant, then, should we undertake to say that the Logos could not personally identify Himself with and reveal Himself through humanity. The eternal Son of God could unite Himself with the humanity of created sons of God formed after the divine likeness. Very significant is it, too, that we must add that, along with the fact of man's "religious nature" with its deep sense of need of divine fellowship and perhaps as growing out of this, different ethnic natural religions have developed belief in some manifestation of God in human form. Incarnation has not been contradictory to, or even wholly alien from, human thought. The logic of the mighty need has been the logic for the conclusion involved in the conception. Incarnations appear in the Buddhas of Buddhism and the Vishnus of Brahmanism; but paganism's false conceptors of both Deity and man made possible only gross and distorted ideas of the divine reality.

1. The third pre-supposition *is the fact of sin.* It was not for creational work, but redemptory, providential, sotariological. Though part of the eternal purpose, it was eternally in foreview of the lapse of man out of the status and competence which creation had given him. It was to recover to the life and destiny for which God had formed and capacitated him.

The question arises, could not the needed recovery have been accomplished except through this divine incarnation? To this we answer: First, that no man can know the possibilities of God so as to be able to say that it was absolutely impossible. But, secondly, no one can show that it could have been accomplished in any other way than through the incarnate Son. Reasoning from the actual fact, we are entitled to conclude with Augustine and general Christian thought since his day, not only that it was an eminently fitting way, but also that it was really necessary. God does nothing in vain. And we are en-

titled to add that, as nothing else than the manifestation of God's love in such an approach and appeal to the human soul as was presented therein, and in all that it involved, can be conceived of us victoriously inspiring faith and restoring real communion between God and man, justifies the conclusion that just this was the first great condition of human salvation.* The denial of the true Deity of Christ, reducing Him to a mere man or some semi-deified creature, leaves the rupture made by sin unbridged.

But a further question has been raised and claims notice: Whether sin was its sole ground, or whether it does not rest on a deeper and non-contingent basis, and would have taken place though sin had never entered the world? Speculative theology has here and there been setting forth the conception that the incarnation rests not alone in a redemptive need and work, but belongs to God's creative work and its necessities, as required for the perfecting of human nature, irrespective of the fall. The first appearance of this is found in the scholastic age, in Rupert, abbot of Deutz, a theologian of mystic temper. He was followed in its maintenance by Alexander Hales, Dun's Scotus, Raymond Lullus, John Wessel and others, and earnestly confuted by Thomas Aquinas and Boneventura. At the Reformation Osiander adopted it. No advocacy of it is found during the period of Protestant dogmatic theology until its modern revival by Lieber, Martensen and Dorner, in Germany and Sweden, and some "progressive" theology in England and our own country. The aim of the theory is to offer what its supporters think better ground for speaking of Christianity as the "absolute religion," by lifting it above the contingent basis of dependence on man's lapse into sin through abuse of his froodom. And while its advocates formulate it in different types of view, these have converged in conceiving of the incarnation as an immanent necessity of the love of God, or as involved in the best possible creation—as determined by the necessities, not of redemptive need, but creative love. Its fundamental and supreme end is the *perfecting* of man, while subordinately and incidentally it

* Sartorius, *Doc. of Div. Love*, pp. 146–7.

answers the need that has contingently occurred through sin. But neither the Scriptures nor reason authenticate this view, as a few points suffice to show.

To begin; the asserted *necessity* of the incarnation for "perfecting humanity," apart from man's fall into sin, is a pure assumption. The intimation that God's "creative" action was incompetent to perfect His creative work according to His "purpose," has no warrant in Scripture or reason. The anthropology of both the Old and New Testaments negatives the idea. They represent man as actually made "in the image and likeness of God," declared "very good," (not "a torso," simply pointing to the future, "merely destined" to ethical goodness, as Dr. Dorner puts it), called a "Son of God" (Luke 3 : 38), placed, in fact, in living fellowship with God. He was endowed, by creative love and power, for all that he was to become and enjoy. When the regenerative and restorative work of redemption is defined by St. Paul, it is in being "*renewed* unto knowledge—after the image of Him who created him, in righteousness and the true holiness," Col. 3 : 9, 10 : Eph. 2 : 24 Christ Himself puts it as "being born again," John 3 : 5. The only perfecting function asserted for the God-man is with respect, not to unfallen, but fallen men, and with these marked as a *restoration* into the "image and likeness" with which human nature was originally endowed. The Headship of the "second Adam" exhibits necessity of a *redeemed* humanity, not of the natural as something which God's creative power failed adequately to endow or put in right and necessary relation to Himself.

Perhaps the evolutionary hypothesis of the genetic origin of man and the unity of creation, may seem to some to give a scientific place and justification of the asserted necessity of this completing step. Dr. Dorner's suggestion * concerning the original man, that the creative work made him "innocent" but "*not yet pneumatic*," might appear thus to obtain real place. It might be imagined that the genetic origin from physical and animal existence failed to endow with a true πνευμα or pneuma.

* Sys. Christian Doc. vol. II, pp. 210–212.

tic principle, and that nothing short of a personal incarnation in humanity could confer it. It is said: "More stress is laid in recent theology upon the cosmical relations of the incarnation. The old truth of the natural headship of Christ receives new significance in view of modern theories of the origin and unity of creation. If theistic evolution be assumed, the Christ is not dethroned, but exalted as the goal of the whole ascent of life, the end and completion of all conceivable development, the perfect man beyond which there can be none higher, the Head of all, in whom Humanity is raised to the throne of Divinity, the second Man who is the Lord from heaven." * But the intimation in this representation is gratuitious, that the necessity of the incarnation was primarily to help out the failure of the eternal Son, by whom "all things were made," (John 1 : 1–3), by *creative* power to endow man with spiritual or pneumatic principle. It not only reflects on God's creative work as inadequate, but is compelled to abandon the very principle of evolution to which it appeals. For that principle, even theistically viewed, is that the creative and perfecting processes are purely *naturalistic*, i. e., found simply in the forces and interactions of nature under law. From monera to fish, from fish to reptile, from reptile to mammal, from brute to man, with whom Christianity has come to deal, the process is naturalistic only. When Prof. John Fiske, as its prophet for the "destiny of man," interprets theistic evolution, he finds the reality of what theologians term "original sin," in the incomplete evolution, as "the brute inheritance which every man carries with him;" and he sees redemption and regeneration in such further transformation that "nothing of the brute can be detected in him, the ape and the tiger become extinct." The process of natural evolution is thus the true progress toward salvation—'the creation and perfecting of man being the goal toward which nature's work has been all the time tending.' † But in locating the primary direct function of the supreme *miracle* of the incarnation in the necessity of completing the creation of

* Schaff-Hertzog Ency. Art. *Incarnation*, by Dr. Newman Smith.
† *Destiny of Man*, pp. 25, 103.

man, this new theology, while reflecting on God's creative power, at the same time contradicts the evolutionist principle itself, that the formative and perfective cosmic powers belong to nature by original divine constitution and reach their goal by simply *natural process.* Whatever may have been the *mode* of God's creation of humanity, there is no warrant for assuming that it was left without its right endowment for its high position and blessed life. And still further, it must be noted that should human nature *per se* be thought necessarily to require incarnation for right endowment, must we not, on parallel logic, hold that the perfecting of the nature of angels demands it in their nature also? But an apostle declares: "He took not on Him the nature of angels."

But further, the Scriptures positively give another and different reason. They make sin its distinct pre-supposition. The given relation is: "incarnation in order to redemption." Everywhere, from the *proto-evangelium* in the forfeited Eden to the songs "unto Him that loved us and washed us in his blood" in the new heavens of the restored state, the explanation of the glorious phenomenon presented in the person of Christ as "God manifest in the flesh," is declared to be the world's need of a Saviour. Take the classic text in which Jesus Himself expressed the whole gospel of the divine love: "God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on Him should *not perish*, but have eternal life, John 3 : 16. The object in view was that men might not "perish" in want of that regeneration just spoken of to Nicodemus. Jesus makes the affirmation still more explicit when He tells His disciples: "The Son of Man is come to seek and to save that which was lost," Luke 17 : 10. Again, He is come "to give His life a ransom for many," Matt. 20 : 28. He pictured His own mission and the reason for it in the parable of the lost sheep—the fact of its being lost forming the definite and alone ground of His leaving the ninety and nine, and going after the wandering one. Christ's own distinct answer, thus given, why the Word was made flesh and dwelt among men, thenceforward clearly formed the regulative conception on the subject

in the minds of the apostles, and it is the monotone of their statements throughout the Epistles. "For what the laws could not do," writes St. Paul, "in that it was weak through the flesh, God, sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and for sin condemned sin in the flesh," Rom. 8 : 3. "But when the fulness of time was come, God sent forth His Son, made of a woman, made under the law, that He might redeem them which were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons," Gal. 4 : 4, 5. "Since the children are sharers of flesh and blood, He also Himself in like manner partook of the same, that through death He might bring to nought him that had the power of death, that is the devil; and might deliver them who through fear of death were all their life-time subject to bondage. For verily not of angels doth He take hold but He taketh hold of the seed of Abraham. Wherefore, it behooved Him in all things to be made like unto His brethren, that He might be a merciful and faithful High Priest in things pertaining to God, to make propitiation for the sins of the people," Heb. 2 : 14–18. Could it be more definitely and explicitly stated than it is here, that the revelation of the Son in human nature had its great end in His *priestly* action, to *make propitiation for sin*? "Faithful is the saying," further explains St. Paul, "and worthy of all acceptation, that Jesus Christ came into the world to save sinners," 1 Tim. 1 : 15. "To this end," declares St. John, "was the Son of God manifested, that He might destroy the works of the devil," 1 John 3, 8. "Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us and sent His Son to be the propitiation for the sins of the world." "And we have beheld and bear witness that the Father hath sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world," 1 John 4 : 10, 14. Many other passages might be quoted. Indeed the web and woof of the gospel representation is woven to this pattern.

It is to be borne in mind that all this is but the culmination of the voices that, in the long centuries of the Old Testament preparation, had been prophecying of the needed Messiah as the Immanuel, God with us. From the first and all through, the promises marked the coming blessing as a Deliverer, a Saviour,

through whom the sinful and guilty might have hope. His mission was centralized in a royal priesthood, His work typified in altars and sacrifices, in atoning and reconciling blood, in self-offering, in being bruised for men's iniquities, and making intercession for the transgressors. Through great preparing dispensations, the people had been taught that the coming One, who was at once the seed of the woman, the son of David, and the Son of God, was coming that He might bruise the serpent's head, and by the one offering of Himself for sin forever perfect them that believe; so that when John the baptist discovered in Jesus the long looked for Messiah, he but expressed the ages of divine shaping thought in announcing Him and His mission in the characterizing terms: "Behold the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world," John 1 : 29. Thus we have the spirit of prophecy in the Old Testament, the words of Christ Himself in the New, continuously and constantly, instead of seeing and announcing a reason for the God-man back of sin and redemptive need, connecting the divine coming with the "eternal purpose" to provide salvation to fallen man.

It is but fair to note that several Scriptures have been offered in behalf of the new view. They are: Eph. 1 : 9–12, 22, "Having made known the mystery of His will, according to His good pleasure which He purposed in Him unto a dispensation of the fulness of the times, to sum up all things in Christ, the things in the heavens and the things upon earth; in Him, I say, in whom also we are made a heritage, having been fore-ordained according to the purpose of Him who worketh all things after the counsel of His will; to the end that we should be unto the praise of His glory, we who had before hoped in Christ. * * * * And he put all things in subjection under his feet, and gave Him to be head over all things to the Church, which is his body, the fulness of him that filleth all in all:" and Col. 1 : 15–17, "Who is the image of the invisible God, the first-born of all creation; for in Him were all things created, in the heavens and upon the earth, things visible and things invisible, whether thrones or dominions or principalities

and powers, all things have been created through him and unto him; and He is before all things and by him all things consist." Now it seems to us impossible to read this new ground of the incarnation out of these passages without first reading it in. There is neither distinct assertion of it, nor fair implication of it. For they simply declare relations of the Son to other orders of intelligences than man—relations of creation and government—without even a suggestion that these relations have come only by virtue of the incarnation, or that the incarnation was necessary to them. The Logos, of course, by becoming the God-man, is none the less thereby the eternal Son in whom all things consist, their natural Head by creation, and under whose dominion they are forever. There is no assertion that it has been through the incarnation that the Son became or eternally is the Head of the angels, or that only thus He became revelatory of the Godhead to them or the centre of their union in God. Moreover, the incarnation for *redemption* is the only consistent idea that will explicate the apostle's statement of Christ's purpose to "sum up," "gather together again," (ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι) all things in heaven and on earth. The ἀνα, *iterim*, "again" in the compound word points back to a state in which no separation as yet existed. The disharmony came by *man's sin and fall.* The redeeming work of Christ, annulling this disharmony, re establishes the unity of God's Kingdom in earth and heaven. The gathering together is "in Christ." He is the central point of the union. But it takes place by the recovery of *man* and the necessity was *redemptive.* There is not a word in all this that legitimately implies that the harmonization of the things in heaven and earth, or the gathering of them under one blessed headship, required the incarnation apart from the lapse of humanity. To connect the necessity of a God-man with the placing of the *angels* in right harmony would not only be *per se* singularly inept as implying that *man* is the centre about which the things in heaven are to be summed up, but utterly incongruous also with the non-relation of the purpose of the incarnation to the angels clearly indicated in the declaration: "Not of angels doth

He take hold, but He taketh hold of the seed of Abraham." These texts, critically examined, give no different conception of the incarnation from that for redemption. The most that can be claimed for them is, that if the theory we are studying were elsewhere distinctly taught, these *could* be interpreted in accord with them. But in themselves they are utterly inadequate to establish it.

The theory, moreover, is unnecessary for the very purpose for which it has been formulated and urged—a supposed better and absolute basis of Christianity. The supposed gain is illusory. If the aim is to lift the reality of the God man out of all relation of contingency into that of eternal certainty and sure divine purpose, this, in all essential features, clearly belongs to it without this new view. It is generally admitted that God's foreknowledge, whether based on foreordination or not, is absolute and eternal. It covered the fall of humanity and the need of redemption as completely as it did the fore-purpose of creation; and this at once gives the same absolute certainty to the redemptive basis as belongs to the creational and perfective. For all theology acknowledges that creation is a free action of God—not an absolute reality like the immanent activity or *opera ad intra* of the Trinity. Absoluteness of that kind is not sought or supposed in the necessity for the incarnation. The only absoluteness is that of the free eternal purpose of love in Jesus Christ. And as the foreknowledge of God covered the future fact of sin as truly as the creation, though He stood in a different causal relation to the two, His love could act as absolutely in the purpose to redeem as in the purpose to create. Each purpose was a purpose of free love, and eternally chosen in the same absoluteness of love's foresight and free foredetermination. Redemptive Christianity is the "absolute religion."

Further, transfer of the motive of the incarnation to the creative aim would take from it the unique and imcomparably inspiring significance it has as a *specific revelation of God's love to recover and save a self-ruined and undeserving race.* No merely cosmic working can disclose such a view of the reach

and possibilities of the divine goodness. It has, indeed, been urged that since the incarnation is so transcendently the world's greatest exhibition of God's love, it is something that cannot reasonably be supposed to have been left contingent on human sin. But the impressive fact is rather that it is just its relation to the necessities of the race as self ruined and guilty in sin, that it *becomes* such an unequalled exhibition of the heart of God, that we have no calculus to measure it. The sore heart of a lapsed humanity, struggling in the faith that has caught a glimpse of the vision and hope it offers, is not easily ready to surrender it. It has even an apologetic value, as having in itself the very reason why we may believe it. The soul opens in confidence toward God through the very thought of such supremely Godlike goodness. There is a correspondence between means and end. "The incarnation, apart from the *cross of redemption*, would lack precisely that revelation of God's love which is to us the most immediately impressive and soul-subduing—His yearning compassion for the unworthy."* "God commendeth his love toward us in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us," Rom. 5 : 8. It is this all-surpassing vision of redemptory self-manifestation that has inspired the mind and shaped the songs of the Church, breathing out even in the rapt strains of "*O felix culpa quae talem ac tantum meruit habere redemptorem*," as being a vision that more than compensates for the damage done by sin, and forms the supreme environment of the moral universe. The exstatic strain is no bewildered concession to sin, but a recognition of the supreme reach and triumph of God's love. And it is in line with the truth of the incarnation for recovery, that philosophical thought is beginning to obtain, if not a solution of the mystery of moral evil in the world, yet glimpses that offer some light for the problem.

For it is conceded that the problem is inseparably connected with God's creation of free personal beings capable of abuse of freedom in wrong-doing. Such creation, indeed, raised creature existence into attributes kindred to God's own life,

* Forrest, *The Christ of History and Experience*, pp. 189–190.

with correspondent fellowship and blessedness. But with this supreme endowment, in His "image and likeness," and its correspondent exaltation of the world system above the mere aggregations of matter, "things," or forms of material or physical motion, into the sublime realm of intelligence, reason, ethical character, and the blessedness of holy communion in love, came also necessarily the possibility of the misuse of freedom in sin. The principle of freedom is alternativity of choice. The elevation of life into this realm involved the possibility of lapse into moral evil. But God, as we must conceive, could not find His true measure of satisfaction in a universe of mere mechanics and incapable things, unable to respond to creative love or share in its meanings. God could find his own, i. e., kindredship, only in the life of a fellowship in which creature thought, life, love, and goodness may meet His own and be made blessed in and by it. The only kind of creature that could satisfy a Being of absolute personal goodness would be a creature capable of the highest form of excellence, in filial relation and blessedness. "Creation, to be agreeable to Him, must be of creatures like him; spirit as he is Spirit, intellect as he is Intelligence, love as he is love."* The material creation is only relative and subsidiary. "The only creation worthy of a personal God is a universe of persons," freely obedient to duty and love, respondent to their motives, and advancing in the high life of free goodness.

Some further things need to be distinctly perceived. (1). God'spurpose in forming a creature world in the supreme grade of exaltation of life and excellence, was neither to introduce sin, nor as *necessitating* it. At the fullest import, sin thereby became a possibility, to the *actuality* of which through creature will, God's will is an eternal moral antagonism. He neither created sin nor any necessity for it; on the contrary He incorporated, in the dowry of a moral personality kindred with His own, a law of utter condemnation of it and of absolute obligation to righteousness. (2). If the ethical world-system is in-

* See suggestive presentation, by A. M. Fairbairn, *Philos. of the Chn. Rel.*, pp. 152–168.

deed the best, and the only one worthy of God, His eternal self-consistency and goodness forbids us to think that He could then, by acts of preventive interference with freedom, have secured against the possibility of any but right moral choices. For such system of control would annihilate the very principle of free self-determining personality. The intervention would be destruction. The lofty grandeur of self-moving spiritual life in holy love would be lost in a show of will-less automata. (3). The term "permission," often used to state God's relation to the entrance of sin, needs distinct interpretation before its use can be true to the truth. It suggests a degree of "consent" that cannot possibly have been involved. "Non-prevention" would better express the reality, as accordant with the principle of responsible freedom in which He himself had constituted human life. The moral law, with its behests and prohibitions, had been written in that life. The moral elevation had been given for blessed preservation and its fellowship of holiness. The creature's use of it for sin was a direct antagonism to God's will or eternal purpose of creative love, and God's attitude permitted the sin in no more positive sense than simple abstention from physical prevention. Sin is eternally that with respect to which God says to those made in His image of freedom: "Thou shalt not." (4). But here, from the incarnation, enters light upon the mystery of unprevented creative disobedience. While God did not, foreseeing the disobedient purpose, arrest it by annihilation of the creature freedom which His wisdom and love had created, and, going back upon His plan, drop His world-system down to the low grade of impersonal things, with no capacity of fellowship in thought, aim, or love, a universe of will-less automata, He *did*, just as truly as He fulfilled His purpose to create with foresight of possible or even actual fall, also, in the same foresight, determine to establish a providential administration of redemptive grace and recovery of the fallen, through this remedeal incarnation and its otherwise unrevealable love. The true theodicy of creation must include, with the foreseen possibility of sin, the pre-determined incarnate manifestation of love for restoration of moral

life. God thus gave the universe the supreme revelation both of His love and of His opposition to sin. He turned the creature's self-ruin and guilt into occasion of transcending creative goodness by the new glory of the compassionate and self-sacrificing goodness of redeeming love. He thus added to His creational expression against moral evil, in the ethical behests made constitutional for guidance of human freedom, the infinitely surpassing expression of antagonism to it given in the incarnational and redemptory administration for salvation from it. Though God could not fail creationally to lift the world-system up unto the worthy range of ethical life, nor then retract the system by annulling freedom, yet in His infinite resources of wisdom, power, and love, He could establish a providential economy of recovery through motives appealing to personal freedom itself. The incarnation stands for this whole economy of provision and persuasion for man's return from self-wreck to the true relation and life to which his creation looked. It has its appropriate agencies, means, and spiritual influences. "Marvellous was the absolute primal creative love, which made something, nay, everything out of nothing. But still greater is redeeming love, still greater is God as the Redeemer, inasmuch as He conquers the contradiction of Himself (Heb. 12 : 3), the enmity of sin, by His divine *love of His enemies, or grace.*" *

This view explains and justifies the fact that the conservative evangelical theology of our day is increasingly emphasizing the incarnation. Its significance and value are more and more clearly seen. It is viewed not only as a necessary prerequisite to the teaching, ministry and atoning sufferings of Christ, but as itself, in its place and aim, the sublimest and most assuring revelation of the holy character and love of God. In it, sin-smitten and enslaved humanity is given a vision of His goodness and beneficence than which nothing can be conceived more impressive, or appeal more mightily to the soul for abandonment of sin and new life in righteousness. It is a vision the world cannot afford to lose. Yet over against this supremely needed, significant, and inspiring truth is the fact

* Sartorius, *Doc. of Div. Love*, p. 128.

that evangelical theology is facing an active movement appealing to science and philosophy against acceptance of it. Materialistic evolutionism, and idealistic monism or pantheism also evolutionistic, have been elaborating cosmogonies that, even if claiming to be theistic, wholly exclude from the creative process for both the world and man any forces but those that operate under the form of natural causation, and leave no place for any direct divine working or supernatural manifestation in the world—God forever remaining, either apart from it, an absentee God, or pantheistically self-revealed in it, in all its naturalistic forms and individualities of being, but without any direct, miraculous self-manifestation. Their teaching deletes the whole supernaturalism of Christianity, to which the incarnation preëminently belongs. In the law of cosmic creation and procedure God is regarded as self-barred from all direct working or transcendence of natural causation. We are told: "The modern perception of the uniformity of nature and the unbroken domain of law makes the idea of miracle inconceivable, save in the line of natural causation. We do not, and we ought not to expect God to act otherwise than in accordance with those modes of his action which we have learned to designate natural law." If natural law be understood, as rightly, the unbroken uniformity of causation established by God's creational will and work, the redemptive self-manifestation of God, the incarnation is absolutely excluded from his administration, or is strongly discredited to faith, and we are pointed to Christ only as the divinest of men and the best religious teacher of the world. The miracle of the incarnation is eliminated from Christianity, and Christianity is reduced to a natural religion, though the highest that human thought has thus far read from God's self-disclosure in nature. No wonder that conservative theology resists these destructive urgings, based only on speculative science or pantheistic theorizings, tending to darken out of sight this vision which the incarnation gives of God's redeeming love and saving aim for humanity —the vision that, above all others, has been the inspiring power of Christianity and remains the supreme appeal to the human soul to forsake sin and turn to righteousness.

ARTICLE IV.

JOHN ARNDT.

By Professor John O. Evjen, Ph.D.

Three hundred and fifty years have passed since Germany saw the nominal close of the Age of the Reformation, the Peace of Augsburg, 1555. The Emperor, who almost personified Spanish Catholicism, found himself compelled to grant religious liberty to the adherents of the Augsburg Confession. But since the treaty made no provision whatever for the Reformed Church, and since the Lutherans were accorded the right of free religious worship only under the pressure of the infamous "cujus regio, ejus religio," the Peace of Augsburg was at most a compromise which gave no satisfaction to the contending parties. The Peace of Augsburg did not establish liberty of conscience (that was left to Oliver Cromwell); on the contrary it brought about the Thirty Years' War, which broke out in the following century. It is therefore doubtful if any one will celebrate the three hundred fiftieth anniversary of the religious Peace of Augsburg, even if some fancy a mild form of superstitious belief in the almanac or show a certain preference for round numbers.

In the mean time the year 1905 offers another link which connects the past with the present, and which is both opportune and interesting. It is *interesting* to know that it is in this year exactly three hundred and fifty years since John Arndt was born, and three hundred since he wrote his first book of *True Christianity*. As this book is one of the most widely circulated devotional books in the world, and as Arndt is known to all Protestants, and to many Catholics, who regard him as the Fénélon of Lutheranism and the Thomas a Kempis of Protestantism, we wish to dwell on his memory and ascertain if our age cannot learn something of him. To remember him now is, moreover, *opportune*, especially since the present year is making strong efforts in bringing about a better understand-

ing among the several denominational bodies of American Protestants.

John Arndt was born Dec. 27, 1555, in Ballenstädt, in the Duchy of Anhalt, Germany. His father was an upright Christian, a minister, who would have been overjoyed, had he known the future of his son. He died when John was ten years old. To him as well as to many others it was not revealed that Arndt should write a book which should be for the Protestant Church that which *The Imitation of Christ* was for the Catholic.

The life of Arndt covers that period in which the articles of the treaty of Augsburg determined the fate of the German people in confessional matters until the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War, which closed with granting free religious worship also to the Reformed. His life and work can therefore throw much light upon the religious phase of his times. He was too original and independent to follow the theological program of his day: The mere framing and shaping of theoretical views and doctrines. As an heir of the Reformation he became its heir in a special sense: Contrary to the greater number of his contemporaries, he understood how to make use of the great spiritual treasures of the Reformation without turning them into dogmatical coin.

Before we relate anything further about Arndt let us turn our eyes to the Reformation. The inheritance left by this movement was exceedingly great. No period in the history of the world has to such an extent been so creative as that of the Reformation. It broke the ascetic view of life. It burst the unity of the middle ages. It transformed, to speak in philosophical terminology, the world-view.

The Middle Age was ruled by Asceticism. The monk's view of life, to renounce the world, was the ideal of that time. No distinctions were made between the world and the sinful world. If the world is contaminated with sin, it has nevertheless relative goods, which we may use freely and gladly, as the gifts of God. But Asceticism saw something positively good in the renunciation of real goods. Marriage for instance was sinful for the clergy; for to marry was natural, but nature and what

was natural should be renounced. The unmarried monk or nun was consequently more perfect than the married man or woman. According to the idea of the Church it was also sinful to engage in mercantile pursuits. Thus the Jew became the merchant, who then laid the foundation for the wealth that he controls to-day. He stood under the jurisdiction of no Church. The same spirit of renunciation commanded the other secular fields. Asceticism in this form is found among the heathen in Egypt. The root is heathenish. Christ and his apostles were not ascetics.

The Reformation caused the barriers of Asceticism to fall. From now on Asceticism is regarded as a means, no longer as an end. It can be useful or useless, as the case may be. As Luther wrote about fasting, it can be a "good external discipline." The liberating view of life engendered by the Reformation now supplanted that of the Middle Age. The Roman Catholic ecclesiasticism was overcome by the sword of the Spirit. The Bible became an open book. The power of Hierarchy met with opposition from the doctrine of Justification by Faith. It was again clear that man could no more be justified by fasting and renouncing the goods of the world than he could by making proper use of them. For faith justifies.

Therefore the Reformation taught that the natural goods are not to be despised; there is no merit in despising them. Such goods as art and science are to be cultivated. Schools must flourish. The State must be supported in such a way that it can solve the problems which it has to face. Family life is to be regarded as high and as sacred as the life in the monastery. Work—physical as well as intellectual—is a duty. The laboring man and the servant girl are no less personages than the mendicant monk or the saint. The calling of the statesman is just as honorable as that of the priest. Work, trade, calling, station in the service of the honorable neither adds nor detracts in the process of sanctification. For the Christian is free. The truth has made him free. And he is saved through faith in Jesus Christ.

Luther was the great spirit in the work of the Reformation,

a man of God, a religious genius, who understood the needs of his times, which had sunk down into spiritual slavery and carnal apathy. He became the Reformer of the Church, and his co worker Melanchthon the Reformer of Theology. Luther furnished the material for Lutheran theology, he thought out the thoughts: Melanchthon put them in theological form and logical formulae; but his influence on the development of Luther's theology must have been great, perhaps very great.

The consolidation of the blessings of the Reformation was left in the hands of a new generation. Luther had furnished materials for centuries. A necessity was soon felt for collecting his thoughts, for putting them into a system so as to obtain a firmer hold on the truths which he, much less by logic than by intuition, in a hundred writings had presented in so many different ways. It was then especially the dogmaticians who took up this work of consolidation. They wished to produce the doctrines of the Bible in a dogmatic system. But the system was to be built up according to the main view-points in Luther's theological thinking.

Luther was not a dogmatician, Melanchthon was. Hence the "*Loci*" of the latter, though strictly speaking not a dogmatic system, became the fundamental type for the dogmatics of the future, and remained so until Schleiermacher three hundred years later, gave the *loci* method its death blow. Many of the post-Reformation dogmatics of the *loci* type bear witness to a wonderful and unparalleled diligence. The most minute details were measured and weighed. But in the process of this work great controversies arose among the theologians. The exposition of "pure doctrine" became the favorite past-time of Latin speaking theologians. The aim and the result of the Reformation, at least for the time being, consisted in pure doctrine, revision of dogmas. The Formula of Concord set the pace. And the natural development of doctrine as well as the healthy growth of Christian life in the congregations was retarded. Various dogmatic systems because of their restraining qualities were like theological strait-jackets. The dogmatics of

the seventeenth century became the Alpha and Omega in Germany. It was developed at the expense of Church life. And the other theological branches such as Exegesis and History were overshadowed by the dogmatic colossi, which even in our day possess such intrinsic merit in the eyes of so many on this side of the ocean. Fortunately it is known that not every dogmatic system possesses canonical worth, and that not every dogmatician is a saint even if his greatest concern consists in keeping the dogmatical rubrics of himself and others in faultless arrangement. Dogmatics has ever been an apple of discord. It is loved and it is hated. Its ardent lover does not see its faults; "love is blind." Its passionate hater sees nothing good in it; for "hatred strikes blind." But why go to extremes? Our age unfortunately is about to show dogmatics the door, like the salt which has lost its savor, thenceforth good for nothing but to be cast out. (Math. 5 : 13). This threatening attitude is the reaction against the exalted opinion that an earlier age held of dogmatics, which it regarded as the noblest and most important branch of theology, as its blossom and crown—yes, as identical with the whole field of theology.

In such an age it was that John Arndt lived, a time when the ministers brought into the pulpit the paragraphs of dogmatics and argued a doctrinal issue before the congregation as a lawyer would before a jury. This was a time, when many seemed to forget that Christianity is Life in God and not alone a doctrine about God. While the ministers could preach sermons of three hours or more about "pure doctrine," spiritual death and ungodliness spread within the congregations in many places. Pure doctrine and pure doctrine mean two different things. To preach the pure doctrine is to preach the good tidings that the faith which lays hold of Christ is saving faith: Believe in Jesus Christ. Another preaching of "pure doctrine" is: Believe in the doctrines laid down and developed in dogmatics with all its definitions, formulae and paragraphs; it contains the precious truths of and about God, is *the* doctrine concerning our faith, the only true and genuine faith; believe in this pure doctrine, believe in Belief.

Every one ought to know that the preaching which we mentioned first is evangelical, scriptural. The other falls short of the principles of the Reformation, and does not make it clear that we are saved through faith in Christ, for it demands a *plus* —belief in the system. The whole reduces itself to this: We are justified by faith and works. These are the practical consequences of this kind of preaching, the presuppositions of its advocates be whatever they may.

It was a blessing for the seventeenth century to receive divine truth in a form which could appeal to something else than the mind of the theologian who theologized in Latin and breathed the air of post-Reformation scholasticism. An appeal to the heart was necessary. It came in the form of devotional works and Church hymns. Who does not know the beautiful hymns of Paul Gerhardt, and who is ignorant of John Arndt's *True Christianity?* Arndt and Gerhard were both such strong Lutherans that they sacrificed their pastoral charges rather than to make any—what seemed to them—vital concession in favor of the Reformed. But their confessionalism was free from bitterness. With each, doctrine meant more than theory, it was life.

With this historical setting in mind we are in some degree prepared to appreciate a character like Arndt. Let us now take up the thread of his biography where we left it. It will verify as well as exemplify the general statements given above.

We left him bereaved of his father in the hands of his good mother in a Christian home. Generous hearts provided him with means to get an education, the rudiments of which he received in Aschersleben, Halberstadt and Magdeburg. At the age of twenty-two we find him at the University of Helmstädt, where he studied medicine. He wanted to become a physician. But under a severe sickness which almost proved fatal he promised God to study for the ministry if he ever recovered.

His mystical bent of mind found much pleasure in the writings of authors like Bernhard, Tauler and Kempis. After recovering, true to his promise he turned his attention to theology. After leaving Helmstädt he studied under ultra-orthodox professors in the universities of Wittenberg and Strassburg. He

then went to the University of Basel, Switzerland, where he came under the gentle sway of the Lutheran Prof. Simon Sulcer. At the same time he attended the classes of some of the lecturers in medicine, and gave lectures himself on philosophy and theology. He distinguished himself in interpreting the Epistle to the Romans. Once near drowning in the Rhine, one of his private pupils, a Polish nobleman, rescued him. This event was of no small psychological importance in shaping the future of John Arndt.

At the age of twenty-six he was appointed teacher in his native city. In the next year he was ordained a minister, and married Anna Wagner, the daughter of an eminent jurist. They were childless. But no cloud was permitted to overshadow their domestic happiness. After seven years of laboring in his pastoral charge, Badeborn and Ballestädt, the little household received a severe blow in the deposition of Arndt. The duke—and here we notice the coarse hand of territorialism supported by the godless "cujus regio, ejus religio"—who sympathized with the Reformed faith, ordered the discontinuance of the act of exorcism, an ancient baptismal form consisting simply in a sentence adjuring the evil spirit to depart from the subject of Baptism. The duke designated the act as an "impious ceremony." He likewise ordered the removal of the pictures from the churches. Arndt interpreted this move as an indication of the duke's abandoning the Lutheran faith. He did not err, for a few years later the duke publicly adopted the Reformed faith. But Arndt, who refused to comply with these ducal commands, lost his charge. He would not have staked his charge on an adiapheron like exorcism, if he had not seen that a principle was involved, for he was no bigot. The same may be said about the removal of the pictures. In the iconoclastic controversy which followed Arndt's first writing appeared. It dealt with the use and abuse of pictures, and embodied the reasons for the author's refusing to obey. Arndt was then forty-one years of age.

The deposed pastor soon received a charge in Quedlinburg, about five miles from his first field of labor. The members of

his old congregation, who had made strenuous efforts to keep him, did not forsake him. They came regularly to hear him. But some of the inhabitants of Quedlinburg became busy in circulating evil reports about him. They tried in different ways to make him appear disreputable and to cut down his salary. Arndt was grieved at this. He had done his utmost to win the love and confidence of his congregation by preaching assiduously—for a long time every day in the week—and by laboring unremittingly among the sick and bereaved during the several visitations of the pest, which took away over 3000 lives from Quedlinburg. But his holy zeal and devout spirit were misunderstood, his efforts were in vain. Anything was considered good enough for the preacher who had once been deposed. He longed to get into a new field of labor, and was glad to accept the call tendered him from Brunswick. In this his third charge his life was comparatively peaceful and happy until his colleagues, moved by a spirit of jealously, made him the victim of a hostile persecution. Several political riots occurred in the city at this time. They closed with the gruesome execution of the burgomaster of the city. Arndt, who was ever ready and often invited to support the magistracy with counsel, suffered much when he thought of the uprising of the mob and the malice of his fellow ministers. We learn this from his letters to the young student, afterwards the famous dogmatician, John Gerhard, with whom he corresponded for many years. The letters are full of sad and bitter complaints. He was tired of the world and longed for eternal rest.

Then—fifty years old—he began to write his famous work *True Christianity*. In a few months the first book was published. It came late, but it was the mature work of a matured spirit. One of the true signs of a truly great man is his modesty. Arndt spoke of his work with the greatest modesty. What he had to say was new, because forgotten. But it raised a storm of opposition, as truth always does.

The book was a protest against the "ungodly and impenitent life of those who loudly boasted of Christ and of his Word." "It is not sufficient to acquire a knowledge of the Word of God; it is also our duty to obey it practically with life and power.

There are many who suppose that Theology is merely a science, or an art of words, whereas it is a living experience, a practical exercise. Everyone is very willing to be a servant of Christ, but no one will consent to be his follower." These sentences taken from the author's preface strike the keynote of the book.

In their zeal for the doctrine of justification by faith the vast majority of theologians and preachers left out of consideration the renewal of life. Only too many taught justification by faith as a shibboleth, never inquiring about the fruits of faith. Faith with them meant holding fast to certain truths rather than laying hold of Christ. Little thought was given to the sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit. But much room was given to the antinomian spirit, though Antinomianism was nominally condemned. The gospel was shamefully abused by those "who loudly boasted of Christ and of his Word, while their unchristian life resembles that of persons who dwell in the land of heathens and not of Christians." It was against this that Arndt protested in his *True Christianity*.

The pastors of Brunswick immediately attacked the book and its author. Poisonous words were spoken and fell on fertile ground. Slander promoted their growth. The motives of Arndt's opponents were various. Envy, personal dislike, "doting about questionings and disputes of words," littleness of heart, were the chief ones. But the injustice which they did Arndt, was enormous.

Fortunately he received in the year 1608 a call from Eisleben, the birthplace of Luther. He accepted. Perhaps no place ever pleased him as much as Eisleben. But he remained there only a short time. John Gerhard had recommended his old and tried friend for the office of General Superintendent of ecclesiastical affairs in the principality of Lüneburg. The sole motive for Gerhard's recommendation was Arndt's ability; Gerhard as well as Arndt was opposed to everything that savored of nepotism. And when Arndt accepted this fifth, the last and most important, call in his life, he was actuated only by warranted motives. Money, gain, or dignity had no

attraction for him, but the new, wide field of work needed him. Celle became his headquarters. It was here that the active life of Arndt reached its zenith.

He labored indefatigably in Celle for ten years, till his death. He wrote and preached, made extensive journeys, visiting the schools and congregations in his territory. He possessed a great administrative talent, and was a strict disciplinarian, painstaking and conscientious, kind towards those who were faithful in the discharge of their duties, but severe in cases of sloth and unfaithfulness.

It is in this period that he wrote most of his literary works. In Eisleben he had completed *True Christianity* in four books. He now wrote "The Garden of Paradise," a postile, an interpretation of the Psalms in 451 sermons, and an interpretation of Luther's catechism.

In the meantime a great controversy was taking place regarding Arndt's orthodoxy. Men with little hearts and narrow minds made savage and persistent attacks on his expressions and belief. The Lutheran theologian Lukas Osiander called *True Christianity* a "book of hell." After the death of Arndt, a theologian in Danzig gave vent to his feelings by bursting out, he hoped Satan would pay Arndt for his words; he (the theologian) would not ask to come to the place to which the soul of Arndt had departed.

It had been discovered that the thirty-fourth chapter of the second book of *True Christianity* reproduced almost verbatim a passage from the prayer-book of a certain Weigel, who differed very much from the doctrines of the Church. For this reason the orthodox became suspicious. Arndt excused himself by making the statement, that a friend had communicated to him an extract from Weigel's work without mentioning the author's name; since this passage contained no doctrinal error he had inserted it in his book, though he rejected the Weigelian errors. Arndt was innocent in this matter. Though he was subsequently released from censure, the seeds of suspicion already thrown out made his path one of thorns.

Some of the university faculties entertained scruples about the new terminology in *True Christianity*. Many of the terms

which Arndt had used were taken from the mysticism before the Reformation. Even John Gerhard became cautious in his statements about the book.

In the course of the controversy Arndt was accused of Papistry, Pelagianism, Osianderism, Calvinism, Flacianism, Schwenkfeldianism, Weigelianism, Paracelsism and of other isms and enormities. But he had also many admirers and defenders. The whole Lutheran Church was drawn into the controversy.

Under these wranglings Arndt passed away. He was certain in his cause and laid all things in the hands of God. He longed to be released from this world. On the third of May, 1621, he delivered his last sermon. The text was the two last verses of Psalm 126: "They that sow in tears shall reap in joy, etc." After the sermon he remarked to his wife, To-day I have preached my funeral sermon. He felt ill, a violent fever set in and within a few days his exhausted frame yielded to the assault of disease. On the eleventh of May after receiving the Lord's supper he prayed: 'Enter not into judgment with thy servant.' After having slept a short time he awoke, looked upward and exclaimed: "We beheld his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth." His wife asked him, when he had seen that glory. He replied: "I saw it just now. O what a glory it is! It is the glory which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath entered into the heart of man to conceive of. This is the glory which I saw." His last words were, "Now I have overcome all." On the eleventh of May 1621 he fell asleep. It was midnight. The soul of Arndt went home to God.

Arndt was a gentle, truth-loving character, honest and straight-forward in everything he said or did. His generosity was great, so great that the common people suspected him of having learnt the art of making gold by the aid of the "stone of the wise." His learning and humility equaled his generosity. His interests lay more in the sphere of religious feelings, and in an active development of Christian virtues than in "doctrine" or the "system."

His sermons were practical, of a didactic nature. They contain no anecdotes, nor do they indulge in rhetorical artifices,

but they make copious use of scripture passages and Bible history. Bengel, the greatest exegete of the eighteenth century, says about Arndt's writings: "In these writings we inhale an air as fragrant as the fragrance from the flowers of Paradise. His speech sounds as gentle and beautiful as the music of the home bells to the weary wanderer returning home from distant lands." Perhaps the preacher of modern times could learn from Arndt. His draughts from Scripture were heavy, his vocabulary was large, his thoughts were profound. There are biblical thoughts, words, and phrases *en masse* which are seldom heard in a pulpit. A certain circle of scripture verses, a certain scheme of thought, a certain number of set phrases and words often constitute the kernel of sermons on the most varied themes. In preaching, as well as in other matters, we thus often note that spirit of indifference and despondency which is satisfied by repeating—and each time more wretchedly—the material used a first time.

But it was not Arndt's sermons which made his name famous. It was his literary works, *True Christianity* and *Garden of Paradise*, now generally published in one book under the title of the first. No devotional book excepting *Imitation of Christ* has been translated so frequently as *True Christianity*. It has been rendered into almost every European tongue: Latin, Norwegian-Danish, Swedish, Bohemian, Polish, Low-Dutch, English (1712, revised American edition 1868), French, Turkish, Russian, etc.

The effects were extraordinary. We have noted that many looked upon *True Christianity* with disfavor. One pastor tried to suppress its publication. Many preached from the pulpit against Arndt and advised those who came to the confessional to keep at a distance from an "Enthusiast" and "synergist." But a great number acknowledged the greatness in the efforts of Arndt and showed him their gratefulness. Letters of thanks were sent to Arndt, even from distant Sweden. Arndt's spiritual son, John Gerhard, praised the book as did Gerhard's pupil, Glassius, who often said: "He who does not love Arndt must have lost his spiritual appetite." Even Quenstedt, the "bookkeeper of Lutheran orthodoxy," recommended the work,

though he felt it his duty to add that it contained some "hard phrases." Baier, the dogmatician in Jena, delivered lectures on it. And Spener was inclined to place Arndt by the side of Luther.

True Christianity gradually overcame the opposition raised against it and was finally, by general consensus, received as a Lutheran work. True, it contained alongside genuine Lutheran thoughts "mystic-pantheistic thoughts and sentiments." But the latter being of little prominence as compared with the former received a charitable interpretation or were regarded as of no account. Gerhard could write: "Since we are not offended at the many errors contained in the writings of the Fathers we ought to show the same fairness with respect to Arndt. In such writings we must take into consideration what their purpose is. They do not contain exact investigations, but earnest exhortations to lead a godly life."

There were two things which made *True Christianity* famous. 1. Arndt's book was the first ascetic book in the German language. Prayer-books were not by any means wanting; but there were no devotional books for the people. True, the work laid much stress on asceticism, but asceticism is here no longer an end, as in the middle ages, but a means. 2. The book called the people's attention away from the vain doctrinal controversies to the practical problems of Christian life, at the same time, however, emphasizing the contemplative side of Christianity.

Arndt himself tells in a letter what purpose he had in view in preparing the work. 1. He wished to withdraw the minds of students and preachers from an inordinately controversial and polemic theology, which had well-nigh assumed the form of an earlier scholastic theology. 2. He purposed to conduct Christian believers from dead orthodoxy to such faith as might bring forth fruit. 3. He wished to guide them onward from mere science and theory, to the actual practice of faith and godliness. 4. He wished to show them wherein a truly Christian life consisted, with the true faith, as well as to explain the apostle's meaning, when he says: "I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me."

Arndt's book was therefore a protest against dead orthodoxy, a summons to bring forth the fruits of faith, a peace-maker among the warring members of the Church. As the author of such a work, Arndt has been respected by Lutherans, Reformed and Catholics. An Italian translation of *The Garden of Paradise* was for a long time catalogued in the Vatican library as a work on horticulture. At the Jesuit library in Madrid, Spain, a German Professor in the year 1687 asked the librarian what book was the greatest "asceticus" in the collection. The librarian answered the inquiry by exhibiting a Latin book the title-page and last leaves of which were wanting. He declared that it was the most edifying work that they possessed. It was Arndt's *True Christianity*. Popular tradition often relates how this work was wonderfully rescued from fire and floods. This shows how the common people clung to it.

Arndt had spoken betimes. Three years before his death the "Thirty Years' War" broke out (1618–48), the worst war which has been fought on German soil, a punishment to that people that disregarded the law of love.

The war became a trade, the soldiers made no oath, and received no other wages than what they could get by stealing and plundering. Women and children, and hordes of harlots followed the men in camp. All bonds of discipline were relaxed, untold cruelties were perpetrated regardless of vocation, age or sex. One day the armies would be on the verge of starvation, another they would revel in luxury and licentious gluttony. After thirty years of fighting we see an unruly, ignorant, godless, dissolute generation let loose, a generation which had never known what peace was. It is despondent, cowardly, incapable of work. It begs and steals. But the serious are filled with grief and sadness. The plow is covered with rust, the fields with weeds.

The desolation caused by pest and sword remained a long time fresh in the memory of the people. Their spiritual power seemed to be paralyzed. The whole of Germany was now in the hands of foreign powers. Before the Reformation it had been split up into two hundred sovereign parts, the result

of territorialism. After the "Thirty Years' War" the number was doubled. The German provinces distrusted each other. Hundreds of courts were established and filled with fawning courtiers, French customs and French morals. Everywhere were seen the marks of a maimed existence, of vanity and littleness. The dismissed trumpeters were turned out as schoolmasters, they nourished the academical coarseness which we often meet with in European universities of this day, but which is really a production of the seventeenth century. Germany was put back two hundred years in its development. Just at the beginning of the nineteenth century did Germany again number as many people as it did in 1618. Not since the migrations of the Teutonic tribes can history tell of a destruction like that which followed the religious wars of the seventeenth century.

It was especially in this century that Arndt's *True Christianity* proved itself a source of consolation to those who humbled themselves before the Lord. And Arndt's life became an example for the pastors, whose eyes were more and more opened for the necessity of preaching and living Christ rather than supplying fuel for uncharitable polemical theology. Arndt lived to see only the beginning of the horror of war and only the first fruits of the blessings of *True Christianity.* But in his writings he lives forever. One of the lines of his tomb reads: Arnidius in scriptis vivit ovatque suis.

We have said nothing about Arndt's style; nor have we given any topical anlaysis of his writings or catalogue of the symbolical books in which he believed. These are formal matters, which need not be considered in this article. It may be mentioned that he accepted the Formula of Concord. But he was no doctrinarian, no defender of a polemical confessionalism. His work was through and through *irenical.* For that all nations bless him. Catholics, Reformed, and Lutherans have vied with each other in calling Arndt their own. The spirit of this book has overcome confessional barriers. If our age would pay less attention to party watch-words, shibboleths and names, and give more heed to the working of the Holy Spirit, many imaginary barriers would fall. The wanting title-

page in the copy of Arndt at Madrid would likely, if discovered, have modified the librarian's opinion of Arndt's fame as an "asceticus." As it was, the book was judged by its contents, independent of any confessional bias.

America has had no "Thirty years' war" with bloodshed. And it has never been oppressed by a "Cujus regio, ejus religio." But it has had—only to look at our own field, Lutheran America—more than twice thirty years of doctrinal controversy. And it has been as much oppressed by the tyranny of petty customs, usages, practices as any State-church under the whims of a secular head. Faults have been magnified, virtues belittled. But truth liberates; and where the Spirit of the Lord is there is liberty. May we become less polemical, more irenical. Arndt, as one of the servants of Jesus Christ, has shown us the way. Blessed be the memory of John Arndt.

ARTICLE V.

"REMOVE NOT THE OLD LANDMARKS." *

By Rev. W. H. Dunbar, D.D.

In taking up the duty laid upon me this evening I can not avoid calling attention to the significant fact that this is virtually the third time within two years that we are called upon to induct into office new men in the professorial chairs of our Seminary. It solemnizes our hearts with the thought of how the men to whom we looked for guidance are passing. It gives an even greater solemnity to our thoughts by the sense of vast responsibility which comes upon us as a new generation comes to fill the places of our trusted guides.

It is not my purpose to touch upon the time which properly belongs to him who is to be inducted into office. Entering into a position of sacred trust the Church will await with eager interest the expression of his thought indicating the line of his work. My own part must of necessity be very perfunctory.

In view of the combined departments of teaching which are to be his, it is in my heart to say one earnest word to my brother. I can not say it better than to put it in the words of Holy Writ:—"Remove not the old landmarks." I say this word, not because I have any reason to doubt the loyalty of thought to established standards on his part. Any whisper of such doubt would have prevented his choice for the place. But I say it because of the mighty trend of thought in these days—the claim that the marks of real advanced thought are set far beyond the old established lines—the feeling that to be confined to the old limits is to be adjudged obsolete. And I am led to say this word because in the very departments committed to him our brother is entrusted with the task of making and guarding these old landmarks of sacred truth.

*An address delivered by Dr. Dunbar, as President of the Board, at the installation of the Rev. M. Coover, D.D., as Professor of Church History and New Testament Exegesis in the Theological Seminary of the General Synod of the Lutheran Church, Gettysburg, Pa., September 13th, 1905.

"*Professor of Church History and New Testament Exegesis.*" I do not know the history of this combination—how these two came to be joined in one chair. It is not for me to question the wisdom of the conjunction. But it is evident that the combination lays an immense responsibility upon the man to whom it is committed.

New Testament Exegesis.

No department of study goes more vitally to the very foundations of truth. We look to the men who study the Bible in the original to bring to us the very essence of biblical truth. They give the cue to our religious thinking. They give shape to our systematic theology. They set the pace for our interpretation of Scripture. They give the trend to the preaching of the Word.

And so it comes to pass that a false exegesis vitiates the system of theology, undermines the foundations of sound doctrines and sends a false note into the utterances of the pulpit. It is the very center of biblical criticism. It forms the basis either for a firmer and more intelligent faith or for the desolation of destructive theories of the Word.

Vast, unestimated and inestimable, tremendous are the responsibilities of those to whom is committed the exegetical interpretation of God's Word—whose office it is to teach and train the preachers of a generation in their understanding of God's Word. And never has it been more so than in these days, when consummate learning and distinguished scholarship is engaged in the task—when the critical interpretation of the Bible has became the very summit of scholarship—and when negative criticism is regarded as the mark of the most acute intellectuality.

So, my brother, you will pardon me and will understand that I do not even suggest a suspicion of personal doubt, when I say to you, as you enter upon this work of opening the very intent of the Bible to those young men who are to be the expounders of gospel truth—when I say, with trembling earnestness: "Remove not the old landmarks."

Church History.

Rightly or wrongly connected, the combination of Church

History with New Testament Exegesis increases the responsibility of the teacher.

Church History! It is a field so vast that few men can compass it—no man can master it, its volumes form libraries. Its study forms a university of its own. We deem ourselves happy today in having selected one who has given years of discriminating study to this department. For any but a student of Church History to have undertaken the work of teaching Church History would have been absolute presumption.

Church History! Not alone because of the vastness of the field does its teacher assume a great responsibility, but because of its intricacies and complications. Its movements are as complex as are the mazes of human theories. Error has drawn its lines across the field as well as truth, and they are marked with just as much pretension and prominence. To teach Church History demands the discrimination of the clearest thinking and the soundest faith, the most acute vision and the best-balanced conservation.

Church History! In its pages is to be found the most vivid testimony to truth. Dr. Wolf said: "The living facts of history are the best practical illustrations of the nature, character and aims of Christianity. Next to Revelation no realm of truth has richer instruction than the department of History. It is largely necessary to a full understanding of Revelation. It is the best commentary on Revelation. It is the strongest proof and confirmation of Revelation." It contains the record of errors, reveals their weakness, and gives us the story of their disastrous overthrow. Error has no originality. The error of each age is but the repetition of old errors. As has been said of Mrs. Eddy: "She was too ignorant ever to have heard of Berkeley, and to have read Turgot's History of Philosophy, in which her hypothesis is ridiculed a hundred years ago as the first guess of every beginner, was beyond her power." The lines of truth were fixed long ago. The history of the Church is the abiding record of established fundamental truths.

And so you will pardon me if again I say to you with all earnestness, "Remove not the old landmarks." As you teach these young men, fix their minds upon the oft-proved fallacies

of errors. And let the fixed landmarks of truth stand out clear and distinct, as the mighty ranges of mountains stand out the impassable boundary lines between truth and error, the intellectual life and death, spiritual joy and spiritual desolation.

And is there not enough to give us serious concern and to cry out with all the intensity of earnestness? When gifted men, even devout men, like Harnack, are subverting history with apparently the most acute intellectuality and much conscientious devotion to truth, when great universities are swept from their moorings and become sources of error, when whole bodies of Christians are driven from the safe protection of their established creeds, when current literature teems with old errors in new dress—need I ask pardon in saying to you with all earnestness tonight as you enter upon your high and holy work: "Remove not the old landmarks."

There are certain landmarks of truth clearly and distinctly fixed—great primary truths in the realm of religious thought. Out of the mystery of light they appear, a body of truth mighty not because of its multitude, but mighty because of its towering forms: The idea of a Personal God and a Divine Creator—the Fall of Man and Original Sin—the Divinity of Christ and its attendant doctrine of atonement—immortality, eternity after death, with its attendant facts of an eternal heaven and eternal hell. These are fundamental truths. There they stand. The dim gray dawn of human history falls around them—gray and venerable with age, yet showing no signs of weakness, or indications of tottering, momentous and eternal realities, realities which rest on grounds of their own, mighty boundary lines of truth which sweep in tremendous circles around all the vast realms of human thought, old landmarks.

These landmarks are fixed, immovable, permanent. Intolerance, Bigotry, Dogmatism this? So be it. But dogmatism whose home is in the heart of revelation, dogmatism which reflects the character of its divine author "with whom is no variableness neither shadow of turning," dogmatism of truth against dogmatism of error. The true creed of Christendom is like Christ in his heavenly throne, "the same yesterday, today and forever."

These ancient doctrines as set forth in Scripture constitutes a revelation complete, perfect, final. Does this seem to narrow down the field of human thought? Does this seem to antagonize human progress? Is this tyrrany of creed-ideas over human mind? Why, there is an infinitely broader realm in the unseen than in the seen. Why, it is an infinitely greater achievement to penetrate to the source of power than to be carried out by the streams of the outcome of power. Why, the sublime laws of Spirit open reaches infinitely vaster than all the laws of matter, through which the human mind may soar with unfettered pinions. The sphere of human thought is not to create, but to explore the faith once delivered to the saints.

We would put forth not one finger to check the advancing tides of life in all its hundred departments. Let them roll on and out like the waves of ocean from the shore. But the main lines of truth must stand firm, like the rock-bound shores—the dividing lines between that which is stable and that which is unstable—the utmost bounds of the great main-land of Truth. Far out upon its outer verge stands written that last curse of this Book of Revelation, the seal at once of its divine origin and completeness: "If any man shall add unto these things, God shall add unto him the plagues that are written in this Book; and if any man shall take away from the words of the Book of this prophecy, God shall take away his part out of the Book of life and out of the holy city and from the things which are written in this Book."

The logic of it all is that the Church of Jesus Christ, as the grand conservator of truth, must move and be recognized as moving in the forefront of the great onward movement of the world; that within her sacred walls where truth is enshrined and, by the power of that truth, must be fulfilled the great promise and accomplished the great work of the redemption of the world and the elevation of mankind. By the mercy of God we are in the true line of advance, and then only, when "we have fallen into the ranks of that mighty movement of humanity which, as it traverses the ages, follows the uplifted banner of the cross, and when it would sing its hymn of human progress repeats instinctively the Creed of the Apostles."

ARTICLE VI.

THE STUDY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.*

By Professor M. Coover, D.D.

The Bible is a unique literature. It arose not through man's striving after fellowship with the unseen; not by man's lifting himself ethically upward; but by God stooping downward to lift man up into fellowship with himself. Not by apotheosis of man, but by incarnation of God came the history of the world's greatest religion.

The Old Testament prepares; the New Testament executes. The prophet expresses the ideal; Christ makes real. The old covenant embraces a race of men; the new covenant embraces all men. The old is engraven in stone; the new is a spontaneous principle in the soul. The old compels by statute; the new wooes and leads by impulses of moral worth. The old is specially for society; the new for the individual. The Old Testament is a lamp; the New Testament is an illumining soul.

But the soul has a body, and the Word of God is handed down to us in written characters. As the Word was made flesh to reveal God, and only the spiritually sympathetic could see God in the Christ and behold his glory; so the will of God has been given us incorporated in language by which God's purpose is adequately revealed only to the spiritually discerned.

There are three important aspects of the New Testament literature to be considered: the philological, the supernatural, and the historical; the content of the word relative to written character, the supernatural and inspirational in relation to the word, and the historical continuity and outcome.

I. THE PHILOLOGICAL ASPECT.

In oral address ready-made ideas are not sent to you from the lips of the speaker. What comes to you is simply sound-

*Inaugural Address.

waves, orderly vibrations of atmospheric ether. These waves of sound strike the tympanum of the ear and produce a series of sensations from which are built up by the attentive recipient the ideas contained in the mind of the sender. The reader of the printed page sees well-ordered characters with which he has learned to associate certain mental conceptions. In reading or hearing, ideas do not come ready-made, but characters or sounds are transmuted into ideas by the mind trained to receive.

There is no absolute certainty, however, that the idea of the speaker or writer will be identically reproduced in the mind of the hearer or reader. If you and I have been educated in the same school of thought, in the same aspects of philosophy and science, there is the probability that our verbal intercommunications will effect approximately the same ideas in eachother's minds. But if the forms of our mental development were different, or if we were separated by time and by national characteristics psychological as well as social, there is no assurance that my utterances would create in you ideas identical with my own.

An adequate use of philology depends upon the correct ascertainment of the content put into the word by the original writer. Differences of education and temperament largely modify the meaning involved in language. The language of the New Testament must have associated with it an adequate historical conception, an appreciation of the age, customs, and mental habits of the writers. Temperamental as well as educational elements and factors must be considered. The student must be saturated with Greek until Greek habits of mind become innate.

Nor is this sufficient. New Testament Greek is Hellenistic. Semitic habits of thought modify language and color its content of idea. The history of the Hebrew race with its characteristic religious consciousness and peculiarities of mental habit figures largely in the proper penetration of New Testament ideas. An acquaintance with the Septuagint, and with Aramaic tendencies of expression, is necessary to an understanding of New Testament language and literature.

The temperamental feature also undergoes a peculiar modification in the religious character of the New Testament writers.

There is a self-repression of passion, a lofty ethical tone, a superiority of historic view, which differentiate their literary product from the literature of the first Christian century. An additional element of inspirational content affected the minds of the writers. New Testament idea is both revelatory and inspirational, and mere literary study cannot penetrate that idea. The reverential mind, the spiritually susceptible mind, alone can interpret the true content of that which is the product of inspiration. The mind of the Spirit as well as the trained mind of man must coalesce. The elucidation of the text can efficiently proceed only from the illuminated man, and that illumination should consist of more than mere intellectual sympathy with the subject. Spiritual possession of the interpreter's mind is a necessary factor for the discernment of that idea the content of which is spiritually given for a spiritual end.

There is constant danger to the exegete of becoming an antiquarian of words, or of being led into an opotheosis of abstractions. This must be corrected by a sense of historical principles. The contributions to exegesis made by historical study, when pursued in serious earnestness, are sane and profitable. The supremacy of historical fact must be recognized over the suppositional or merely inferential.

There is danger of interpretational defect from oversight of facts. The reproach of subjectiveism may arise through slight of facts or through assumptions incompatible with ethical principles. A system may be established by deductions from mere theological notions. A subjective expectancy due to predilections and presuppositions of a planned system not infrequently violates textual exposition. An idea may naturally have its implications, but presuppositions in their unfolding issue in a defective exegesis. A depreciation of history, and the neglect of sober concrete fact are subversive of truth. Such an inhospitable attitude will firmly stand in the way of well-established historic conclusions. Indifference to concrete fact, and opposition due to previously assumed notions may cause

the text to be treated tortuously by subtleties and sophistries to the oversight of the spiritual purpose of the record. There is too often a reluctance to admit what would necessitate a change in some system hypothetically coördinated, and a stoutness to maintain what is historically indefensible. Even immutabilities are sometimes relative and must give way to ascertained results secured by faultless investigation. Established sequences have the right of recognition and of incorporation into the body of truth.

Exegesis must not be abstractly critical, nor exclusively historical; but should be conducted with sympathy for ethical truth, and with discerning appreciation of the spiritual content. The divine word is not for mere intellectual refinement, nor breadth of historical religious conception, but for the salvation and elevation of the whole man. A thirst for knowledge and for keen understanding of religious verities should imply more than mental satisfaction as a goal.

There should be the concomitant of noble religious consciousness, and a worthy moral purpose. The ethical intellect is not to be improperly restrained. Intellectual sincerity should not be absent from spiritual dependency, but the reverent mind should have the attitude of confidence in God when facts of biblical exposition and interpretation are not plain. To forbid inquiry is to stultify the intellect.

Philological study historically and ethically conducted is a necessary feature for the comprehension of the language which conveys to us so great a religious import. It is the divine word that intelligently and dispassionately communicates to us spiritual verities.

By it we come into close contact with the mind of God and are able to read his thoughts. But we must remember that the word of the text is a symbol, the content of which may be vitiated by what we put into it. The word is not idea, but only suggests it; the human mind transposes it into thought, and the content of that human mind which reflects upon the word may not reflect the true idea embodied.

The word is but symbol or character, it is mind that calls the thought into existence; and the color of that mind with

its peculiarities may unconsciously give a false interpretation. The textual word is the occasion of that which is impalpable and sometimes illusive to the mental grasp. The divine mind which regulated the record must accompany the perception of the reader of the record to reach the spiritually revelatory. The ascertainment of the true text of scripture is an important factor in reaching the revelation. The Lower criticism is an indispensable procedure for the establishment of the true text.

But in matters of criticism where the subjective element sometimes finds play for tentative conclusions the moral aim must not be overlooked. The New Testament was recorded and wrought in human experience and is a living word. Having been divinely inwrought, the divine factor must aid in its adequate evolution and exposition.

II. THE SUPERNATURAL AND INSPIRATIONAL ASPECT.

The world is now being interpreted in terms of cosmic force. The whole cosmos is so coördinated that material movement is declared to account for all development from the atom to impalpable idea in the human brain. A regulative principle underlies the ascent of matter from star dust to reasoning intellect.

Though natural law is not a causative thing, but only a name given to the orderly sequences of things observed, yet it is viewed as some sort of regulative principle propelling matter in its gyrations and evolutions. A primary causative principle to introduce life into organisms is deemed scarcely necessary; for nothing is dead or ever has been dead. All material nature is alive. The crystal and the vegetable fiber push forward into orderly forms. Everything feels and has a greater or less degree of life. The mineral feels magnetic forces and is drawn. *Panbiotism* eliminates the necessity for a primal source of life. Everything existing has the sense of feeling, from nebulae or star dust in the rotary evolution of worlds to the consciously self-directing creature. Matter has never been dead, and there is no need to call in a Creator of life.

And matter not only feels, but thinks. The crystal is not self-conscious, but acts intelligently in its self-constructive powers. The plant is not a reflective creature, but acts with

intelligent forthreach. All matter is subconsciously automatic. Teleology is simply the orderly movement of psychical matter.

Panpsychism eliminates the necessity for the special introduction into the cosmos of soul or spirit life. All nature thinks consciously or unconsciously in degree according to high or low organism. The innate principle of forthreach in matter works upward from incognizant psychic action in inorganic nature to the delicately produced chemical scintillations in man's brain effecting self-consciousness and thought. Thought is a function of matter, but not dead matter; for there is no such thing as dead matter. There is no real distinction between matter and mind. Man is nothing psychically but feeling. Ratiocination is the ferment of oxygen and hydrogen. Thought is the scintillation of chemical electrons. Pain is the sensation of jarring repellant atoms; pleasure, the social joy of blending chemicals. The thinking creature is a mechanical contrivance operated by living forces which leave nothing unexplained.

There is no matter without mind. Intelligence is posited in every form of life. There is mind all the way down to the protozoic cell, and all the way up to the complex action of the philosopher's brain.

The mind of thinking man is but a specialized form of universal intelligence, a refined form of sentient substance, the highest efflorescence of matter. The atom is everything that man is in latent potential life. The spontaneity of the atom makes man.

Ethics is embraced in the same material system. Man's ethical conceptions and regulations are an economic development, an evolution in the history of man's personal interests.

There may arise a peculiarity in this specialized sentient substance called the mind of man in which there appears the conception that nothing exists but the thought of the thinker. Instead of mind being a function of matter, matter is but a function of mind. This is only a variety of specialized nerve energy, the upturned face of a once down-looking atom.

Though all cosmic nature thinks, yet no psychic action is really voluntary. The forthreach of the atom is centrifugal energy. Matter flees from the sum of absorbing solidarity

into the form of individuality, and attains in man an assumption of voluntary self-direction, the consciousness of seeming free-will.

But this centrifugal force is equally balanced by centripetal energy, which holds all things in check. All forces are braided together in a network of determinism. All matter feels and thinks, but there is no dynamic freedom. Though forces of energy seek individuality, all are suppressed into one central solidarity of plan from which there is no escape. This is the trend of Monism. No personal architectonic mind superintends cosmic action, for the cosmos has in itself both material energy and mind potency.

Whatever psychical power may be posited in this schematic cosmic regime it is still materialism rampant. There is no place for absolute personality as a first cause.

To the philosophic mind considering this scientific aspect the living psychic force in the cosmos assumes the phase of the Divine Immanence. The onetime theory that the Absolute Consciousness is the sum of all finite consciousnesses through which alone the Absolute has reached self-consciousness has been inverted, and now the finite consciousness is but a derivative from the Absolute, shares in its attributes, and by selective attention to one thought-form after another is able to rise into relative self-absolutism. This personal absoluteness of the growing finite, however, never attains to real endless personal existence, but remains a phase of the one sole monistic principle.

Continuity of self-consciousness after the dissolution of the body and soul of man can scarcely be maintained. The monism is after all but a pantheism.

In this rarified materialistic regime there is no room for any supernatural. Face to face with this phase of science stands religion today. Cryptically coalescing with Christianity is the philosophy of the divine immanence, which is in some forms allied to this aspect of cosmic nature. Of the supernatural there is no necessity; for nature itself is super-substantial. Inspiration viewed from the philosophic standpoint is but a more lively divine immanence in man; and from the standpoint

of materialistic science it is but cosmic emotion, the habitual admiration of the profound grown ecstatic. It is the more fervidly glowing psychic matter in the mind of the religious genius.

But whatsoever potency be posited in the primal form of matter or energy, who or what is the primary cause? The first link is undiscovered and is deemed undiscoverable by science. Which is the harder to conceive, an eternity of matter; or an eternity of personal will? The choice lies between an eternal God, and eternal star dust. Those who choose eternal nebulae put an unconscious God into it, and being cryptically theistic in primal principles, the development of the system must end in pantheism. There s a subliminal supernatural at the inception of the system under the form of monism. Its advocates cannot allow the term supernatural, but it nevertheless is super-substantial as psychic matter, which is but another name for the same thing. In this guise inspiration is psychic energy full-orbed in literary genius.

Simplicity of conception starts not with thing, but with thought. A personal self-conscious Creator is the standpoint of personality and the only adequate standpoint to reason from; for reason exists whence reason comes. An ethical personality stands at the threshold of material existences, and ethical personalities are the aim and end of the process. If man close the door to the incoming God, Theology will pass to Christology, and Christ will come in the flesh, a door of entrance which can again be closed only with blood on the threshold, in which returning man cleanses his steps.

The creed wisely affirms two supernatural events; a supernatural birth, and a supernatural resurrection to life. These were wrought upon Christ, and all that comes in between the birth and death of the Redeemer is but a natural outflow of his supernatural character. The miracles of Jesus are appropriate actions of his unique personality.

His own unpremeditated conduct also gives witness to his unique personality. He is tempted to do not the weakly human, but the humanly impossible. Satan reaches the self-consciousness of Jesus in the predominant part of his person-

ality. The tempter reaches out to elicit susceptibility not in Christ's human, but divine nature. It would be no temptation to you to turn stone into bread; for you could not do it. It was a temptation to Jesus because he could do it. This unique form of self-witness to the divine character of Jesus is most peculiar and potent. It excludes invention, because it is no part to be played by the expected Messiah, and is too subtle for the literary craftsman.

But may not Jesus have been an unbalanced enthusiast tempted to do the fanatical? Then he would have tried to do the impossible and failed. May not Jesus have been self-deceived, or perhaps a willing deceiver of others?

A twofold moral question obtrudes itself here, and demands an answer. Jesus claimed to work miracles. Was he himself deceived, or did he accommodate himself to prevalent expectations of the power of the Messiah and suffer himself to deceive others?

His own ethical character is at stake, and he is in danger of invalidating his teaching by his unethical qualities. The answer as well as the question is on the moral plane. His every temptation was ethically conquered to the denial and exclusion of all selfishness.

His sanity in teaching is beyond question. The ethical implications of the gospel record bear no blurred stamp. An evil tree does not bring forth good fruit. The excelling fruit of Christianity cannot come from a deceived fanatic, nor from a deceiver whose consummate skill lay in deluding observers.

Nor can the supernatural element in the gospels be but a chronicle of legendary traditions. The brevity of the period between the facts and the record preclude the possibility of legendary growth. And more trenchant than this is the peculiar interrelation of deed and doctrine in the career of Jesus. His teaching and miraculous conduct coalesce so absolutely that they cannot be severed without reciprocal contradiction. If the miracles be not true, the teaching of Jesus in John's gospel cannot honestly be extricated from its occasions and environments. If the whole assumption of the supernatural lies with the reporters of Jesus who in their literary craft imposed on

him works he did not do; then his words he did not say; and the gospels remain a unique fiction which only a Jesus could invent.

When we evaporate the miracle, we evaporate the morality of the gospels, and the sincerity of the Christ-character. Then the authenticity of Christianity is not in Christ, if he be not historically presented in the gospels; and a new history must be subjectively formulated to coördinate his conduct and speech when critically sifted.

The authenticity then resides in an interpretation of Christ subjectively reached, which does not rest on historic grounds. We do not then have a factual Christ, but an eclectic interpretation of him.

If the gospel records be legendary and not historic; if they be the outcome of ecstatic admiration for a mere consummate genius, we have a fictitious product so sane, unique, and life-giving, that the fiction must be an inspired product. The inspiration of the writers must be assumed or inferred even upon the ground of their work being a character fiction. We can evaporate the historic fact not by a superficial explanation of the nature of the fact, but only by a supernatural substitution.

A legend dealing with ethical supernaturalism becomes trivial with attributes contributed by fancy. The historicity of the gospels alone accounts for their logical consistency.

III. THE HISTORICAL ASPECT.

The phenomena of human character have a significant place in the weaving of history. There are three universal religions, and each has a personal founder. Ethnic religions die with the nations which foster them. They are founded on poetry, legend, and customs, breathing the religious aspirations of the people. But Buddha, Mohammed, and Christ are founders of universal religions, which still live.

Buddha's life is involved in myth, yet he is an historical character. Mohammed is somewhat environed by legend, but nevertheless stands out with sufficient distinctness to give historic proportions to his life and work. But Christ has a fourfold history of unique quality and distinct impression. It is ethically sane above all others.

There is a worthy thought product in Buddhism; a fatalistic obduracy in Moslemism; but in Christianity alone is there a profound ethical civilization. There is no need of laying exaggerated stress on the exclusively moral excellence discernible in Christian ethics incorporated in religious character, business integrity, financial stability through brotherhood confidence, and social and industrial progress, to show the superiority of the religion of Christ to that of other founders. It is not an uncritical acceptance of truth to admit dynamic moral relations and spiritual aspirations in Christian teaching undiscoverable in the detached and fragmentary phenomena of other religions. We need not search long to find significance in the Christ-life and teaching in sympathetic relations to man's need. Speculative aptitude is not required by the honest investigator to penetrate the meaning and sympathetically to appreciate the religious forces embraced in Christianity, which are fundamental and determining for stability and civilization, and efficient for all forms of progress, as well as for human redemption. The mere literary antiquarian may find equal thought-fancies, profound speculative assumptions, and moral maxims in oriental literature. But he will discover nothing concretely caused and historically motived comparable with biblical literature and history. He need not even spiritualize scripture with what he may deem an import irrelevant to its historic significance to recognize the superior moral outcome. He can formulate and systematize on basal facts and moral forces now prevalent in Christian social order as products of the religion of Christ, and not on opinions of plausibility manifested in the beauteous imagery and stilted precepts of poetic morals. Incorporation of rare ideas which lack assimilation with lofty character hints of incongruity and falsity somewhere.

The observer can compare theoretic with factual propositions, mental imagery of moral aspiration with concrete moral conduct among men, and holding subjective considerations in abeyance, reach no hasty inference in declaring the supremacy of Christ over other masters, and the superiority of his moral influence over the potency of the poetic precepts of Buddha or Confucius.

The New Testament is not a mere theoretic religious treatise, a pious disquisition to soothe aching hearts. Its concrete Savior towers above a legendary ethical teacher. The historical aspect of the New Testament is profoundly ethical both in content and resultant effect in human character. The assumptive assertion that the gospels are legendary may be dismissed to honorable retirement since it has done its work by arousing reverent criticism, which by historical inquiry and critical exegesis has made adequate defence and exposition of the New Testament as authentic history.

History is not a matter of dates; but of persons and moral principles. Carlyle says, "The history of the world is the history of the great men who have figured in it." Epochs and events are dominated by personalities. Next to the supreme and unique personality of Christ stands the intrepid Saul of Tarsus. The apostolic age is ancillary of all the fire and glow of subsequent church life. The principles of operative Christianity are deductions from plain history, and not inductions of laborious theses insinuated into a revised and theory-constituted record of events. No arbitrary eclectic method of dealing with the facts can banish the outstanding features, the moral principles and forces of the apostolic age. There is historic harmony and cohesion in the cosecutive record of the Apostolic Church, with implicit relations of orderly facts and forces. The facts are real, and not mere mental pictures. Though the order of sequences may not be entirely uninterrupted in the flow of Paul's missionary events, we have always light enough to discern conclusions which will not contravene historic consistency and healthy divine revelation.

We are not called to surrender the supernatural in a consecutive history of events. The epistolary literature of Paul is not the child of mere circumstances, the product of ephemerals. A divine factor dominates the apostolic development. The study of Paul's career as recorded in the Acts of the Apostles brings to the understanding the situations as reflected in his epistolary expression. His missionary experience in Galatia, Macedonia, Achaia, and Ephesus, furnish the historical environment and the psychological and social conditions amid which

the letters arose. His stay in Corinth amid his acute experiences gives acquaintance with the circumstances, a clear ascertainment of social and factional relations, which contribute to a more adequate penetration of his letters. The objective historic grounds, the chronological framework, and the occasions of speech and action, stand out boldly. Instead of the exegesis of words, which may be left to the commentary to be consulted on occasion, the exegesis of apostolic history should be the chief work of the New Testament student, who wishes to master the facts for moral and religious use. The mastery of the Acts of the Apostles lays the foundation, which reflects plainly the geographical, social, and religious environment of Paul's epistolary correspondence.

True exegesis is largely involved in history. The historical study of the apostolic age is a theological discipline which will eliminate the resorting to hypothesis for the solution of peculiar situations and obscure moral causes. In this study will be found the explication of some dark difficulties attending the life of Paul. Didactic power will be found embedded in facts of historic revelation when the genesis of New Testament epistolary products is interpreted in historic terms. The historic disclosure will make the distinctive features of moral and spiritual truth more easily and comprehensively grasped.

The product of the study will not result in mere value judgments, the cavalier acceptance of good ethical and religious effects, which have no substantial historic grounds. But the product will be a veritable reproduction of fact and pleromic revelation. The arbitraments of undecided beliefs respecting apostolic literature will give way to plain coördination of historic facts. History makes emphatic protest against mere intellectual theory. The product of imaginary or subjective conditions must vanish when confronted by historic radiation proceeding from a personal apostolic actor, whose situations civic, religious, and psychological, appear in a rightly interpreted record.

The fundamental principles of the apostolic age stand forth boldly enough in outline to dispense with the considerations of a too free literary criticism. History subjectively considered,

and forsooth crucially tortured, is psychologically variable under the treatment of exponents who are disparate in moral perception and feeling. A sympathetic religious consciousness and an ethical motive are necessary concomitants of biblical study.

A false view of Christ, and a tortured treatment of New Testament literature entail errors of belief which reappear again and again in various forms in the history of the Christian Church. The trinity of persons in the Godhead has shown itself to be a necessity for man's religious nature. The human desire for divine fellowship cries out for satisfaction.

Teach that Christ was a docetic appearance, a mere phantom of physical presence in the world, a spirit with a seeming body, a Christ not come in the flesh, and the tie of fellowship with God is severed. Antichrist is a principle that breaks the bond of communion with the manifested God. Emanations of beings subordinate to God, angels and other operative spiritual ministers will then be posited as intermediaries between sinful man and the exalted God, who dare not come into close fellowship with material nature lest he be contaminated.

Then Paul must rebuke the Church at Colossae for the worship of angels. In the cry for fellowship false teachers had taken away the real Christ, and resort was made to angel worship. Evaporate the human nature of Christ by an overdue exaltation of his divine nature, and say that Mary was the mother of God; then Nestorius will arise and claim fellowship with higher life by declaring that Christ is come only in the flesh to be near to man. Eliminate, or forget the Holy Spirit; and Montanus will claim communion with God by a personal incarnation of the Spirit. Let the Roman Church extol the divine nature of the Redeemer to a neglected aspect of his human nature; and the Virgin Mary, and numerous saints, will become intermediaries between men and God. The sense of fellowship has been lost through a lost Christ, and prayer will be offered to beings humanly sympathetic to moral needs. Let Unitarianism and the school of Harnack deny divinity in Christ; and the philosophy of the divine im-

manence in man will take the place of the divine trinitarian relation.

The soul is satisfied in none other than a divine-human Savior, and history repeats itself in theology and philosophy to appease the spirit of man astray in his religious faith. The word of God is both history and revelation suited to the absolute need of fallen man.

Its exposition historic and textual is for salvation, and that salvation is widely effected only by a proper conception of its revelatory truth.

ARTICLE VII.

USE AND ABUSE OF SYMBOLISM.

By Rev. W. H. Feldmann, A. M.

Carlyle, or some one, once said, "My blessings on Cadmus, or whoever it was, that first invented letters." When we think of their use and value, we too will rejoice! For by the art of symbols, not only in letters, but also in picture and statuary, we are able to record the thought and life of the world, from its remotest past down to our own times. Who can ever truly estimate the value of that system of marks known as the alphabet in its varied combinations known as words; the power of pictures; the influence of sculpture? All this is symbolism—a given character representing a definite object and calling up that specific image every time we interpret it. Symbolism is the telepathic cord between mind and matter, man and man. We use it for the incitement of ideas in our own minds, as well as the means of communication with others. It is the circulating medium in every walk of life. The trades, the arts, the sciences, domestic relations and social intercourse all employ it for conveying thought and inducing action.

The acme of all life's thought and action is embodied in religion. Though spiritual, it too is bound up with the temporal; it too employs symbolism to give expressions to its life and truth. Who has ever looked on Thorwaldsen's Christ in the original

or some reproduction and not had a wealth of thought and suggestion spring out of the nail pierced hand or spear pierced side? How we are transported from the dead marble to the living Christ! All our emotions are called into play; our imagination is winged and our feelings set on fire by the hints those outstretched hands contain. Who has ever looked on Hoffman's "Christ in Gethsemane," and not realized the value of prayer?

Do they not point to underlying truths; are they not genetic in power and life, pregnant with soul-stirring persuasion and parental of wholesome spiritual enthusiasm? If these things are good and wholesome in the "art gallery," magazine, "Sunday school lesson leaf," in books and parlors, why not in the sanctuary of the Lord?

It is a matter of fact that every form of religious thought whether of ancient or modern times, has sought to give material expression to the unseen objects of its devotion in form and symbol. The Parsee and his sun-emblem, Thor and Woden and the Walhalla, as well as thousands of shrines in every land attest to the truth; and the more perfectly they symbolized, the more tenacious became the hold on the people. The history of Christian missions warrants the assertion. The untutored Fijian yields to the Christian missionary much sooner than the educated Japanese. Furthermore, it is to be noted that as long as they held *honestly* to these symbols they possessed a power for good over their lives. However, all these systems have long since been degraded into hollow mockeries. The stocks and stones are sad relics of what they formerly represented! Many reasons for this can be given, but a simple and all-sufficient one is this; their symbols *never* embodied facts—they were counterfeits, not counterparts of truth; and the best proof thereof is the effete and decadent conditions of the natives blighted by the same. A lie is ever pernicious.

Idol-worship and its dire consequences, as well as the abhorence around by its cruelties and practices, together with the stern commands of Mt. Sinai, and also the desire that our faith and worship be as unique as its truth is original, has led many

a Christian to look askance at all embodiment of spiritual truth in *any* material form.

Extremes are, as a rule, too sweeping in their declaration.

A symbol as a secondary may be a helpful factor in religious life when it is to the truth itself what the illustration is to the sermon. But alas, it has been subjected to abuses. These have been so flagrant that they have caused many to lose sight of the use entirely; with them symbolism is an unmitigated evil.

That abuses did and do arise is natural. That much damage was and is done is only too true. But let us never forget that it is the good thing missed that causes the greatest trouble, even as a half truth is a greater mischief-maker than a whole lie. Symbolism suffers for these very reasons. Then, too, zealots are often the worst advocates for the very cause they espouse.

The cry has been raised against symbolism because of its shamful abuse by Rome. No one can deny this. Were Rome seed-sound, however, then the rest would have shaped itself otherwise. Its transubstantiated doctrine must inevitably lead to materialistic symbolism. This is by no means the weakest spot in her system—nor is it as bad as it has been pictured. There is a blind fanticism against the Tiberine Church that is wholly unwarranted. This stupidity has robbed us of many useful lessons she can teach.

Rome and symbolism have been made synonymous; whereas Rome and the *abuse* of symbolism are conterminous. Let us never forget that no Church has worked out externals as she has. One cannot enter a Roman Catholic Church, but instantly the eyes travel to the place of the alter! Did that alter but speak the living truth, what a magnet the arrangement would prove! We can hardly allow any force to the argument, that because it is "Roman Catholic" it *must* be sensual, devilish and without a redeeming trait! These arguments *against*, like the aesthetic argument *for*, are wholly untenable. Prejudice prevails on this subject. A good principle ought not to be condemned because of a bad practice. God uses symbolism. This is the only means whereby the Creator can speak to His creature. Though He *is* a spirit, yet He writes His glory in

the heavens, and the earth preaches His power. The Bible teaches His commands. The Saviour too used this common tendency of the human mind, when He symbolized Himself as a door and a vine; and His Kingdom as a seed, a feast, a vineyard. We call them parables, making known the unseen by the seen, the unknown through the known, the concrete standing as a symbol for the abstract. Thus the abstract truth, "God is love," finds its grandest utterance and culmination in the concrete God-man, Jesus of Nazareth—indeed a divine symbol in a higher sense than Carlyle would ever allow. He was a perfect blending of fact and symbol, truth and action, body and soul. An ideal—yes, the ideal in every way! This points to the reciprocal relation that exists between symbol and fact. When rightly used they mutually strengthen each other. The fact creates the symbol, the symbol sets forth the fact. The history of human thought warrants this assertion; for the mind is ever busy giving symbolic expression to the concrete, and the concrete operation to the abstract. Principles are worked out in practice. Isolated events are grouped and classified under a general characterizing symbol. Let us illustrate that. We are conscious of the fact that God is everywhere, yet we localize His presence in a building called a church; we thereby embody in a concrete object an universal truth. What has been here cited is true at all times and in all places. It is a universal law.

This is done by the spirit-moved Quaker and the incense-loving ritualist. The blind bard who spoke of God as one who "loved before all temples the upright heart and pure," gathered in a room—the church—to worship that God. The socalled prisoner of the Vatican does the same. Thus the antipodes of religious thought and training agree on this one thing—they localize God by the symbol of a church. But from this point they part on diverging lines. The former has left his church bleak and barren, with no marks or designs to distinguish it externally from any other building; "nothing earthly must distract my attention in the house of God," he says: the latter has lavishly decorated the same by adding one embellishment

after another, till nearly all the senses are captivated—"all to the glory of God," he exclaims. The ultra-puritanic devotee would attenuate the whole system of religion into a modern Nirvana: the ultra-ritualist would symbolize the breath of the Holy Ghost if he knew how.

Both extremes nurture onesided tendencies, both leave a vast part of their natures lie waste and undeveloped. Both are sincere and think the other to have misconceived the whole scheme of God. Why is this?

Many factors enter to give a bias one way or the other, such as education and environment, temperament and taste, geographical location, political and natural aspects as well as other external forces.

Personal features are involved in the problem also. One person is subjective and introspective, another objective and extraspective. One is imaginative, impulsive, excitable; another is phlegmatic, methodical, deliberative; one likes adornment, the other simplicity. Both have followed inborn inclinations. One leans to the abstract and subjects the concrete to it; the other employs the concrete and evolves the abstract from it. The one craves spiritual ideas, the other develops spiritual ideals; each obtains what he seeks after and is rewarded according to the intensity of application displayed. Their lives tell the story.

Thus we can account for Greece and her art, Caesar and his conquests, Rome and her ritual, Scotland and her stern simplicity. Thereby we can explain Calvin and Zwingli, Manning, Loyola and Assasi. These men are polar opposites in religious life. What one considers a relic of heathenism, the other treats as the finest development of Christian life. Who is right and what are the grounds of defence? What warrants the use and wherein lies the abuse of symbolism? What are their respective claims?

Let us take up the former for consideration.

The use of symbolism is based on two things; namely, Old Testament precedent, and the laws of thought; the one the plan of God, the other the nature of the mind. Incidentally we would

note that other proofs such as tradition and national tastes and custom are only secondary matters and are dismissed as non-essential.

What part does Old Testament precedents play? The advocate of symbolism justifies his procedure by referring to the temple. By it, he declares, God set the example Himself. God was its author and founder. He insists that what the Lord instituted must have been for the good of the people; and capable of conveying a true conception of the Almighty, or He would never have given it. He points to the minute details to be executed strictly in accordance with the divine behest! Must not the Almighty, he argues, have known that the golden-domed temple with its attractive altar, glowing candlesticks, curling incense, elaborate sacrifices, vested priests and chanting choir, the "Holy of Holies" and a highly wrought ceremonial, would not *mislead*, but rather *lead* the people honestly to worship the unseen, though true and living God? Did He not do it, that things seen might help the worshipper to lay hold on things unseen, and thereby enrich, elevate and ennoble the believer's ideas of His God and Lord? It is to this temple the Greek Catholic, the most extravagant in this matter, refers you in defence of his overladen splendors and gorgeous surroundings. This temple the Roman Catholic points to as prototype of his own and finds here authority for all the sensuous externalism characteristic of that communion. This temple the Anglican claims inspired his conceptions of a church; and justifies his ceremonialism because of it. What shall we answer?

Among the many weak rejoinders a few may be mentioned; namely, that they drifted from God; that their worship became mere cant; that form never insures life; etc. Though true indeed, they in nowise militate against the truth that *God gave it* and gave it for *good!* That this good was possible the noble lives of Moses and David, Elijah and Isaiah, Simeon and Anne prove conclusively. Nor is it a valid objection to attribute this splendor to Egyptian influence, oriental phantasy, the nation's love of display, a desire for the picturesque and dramatic.

Against all these, we simply insist *God gave it!* The plan was divine and its purpose holy, because God was its author. To this we would add that Christ recognized its claims while on earth; and was incensed at the errors and abuses that abounded and thereby misrepresented it.

Though these arguments cannot dislodge the symbolist, yet his defence is a specious one at best; for he has not, judging the temple per se, or in the light of the Old or New Testament, given it the true import or conception intended by the Lord. Beyond all doubt the whole Old Testament economy had but *one* purpose, namely, to evolve faith in the coming Messiah. The paschal lamb, the sacrifice, the temple, etc., were to be creative of faith in a fact not yet accomplished. Theirs was the bud of promise that should find its fruition on Calvary. Symbolism was needed to strengthen and engender faith. How well it met its purpose the eleventh chapter of Hebrews—the Hebrew "Hall of Fame"—clearly shows. But the bud fell away when the fruit matured. The temple is a thing of the past; Christ has taken its place. The symbol is now swallowed up in the fact—Christ Jesus—and only one abiding viewpoint remains from which we can estimate the worth of symbolism, to wit, the New Testament dispensation. Christ's labors and teachings are to be the norm and guide for the present Church. The fuller revelation of the New Testament makes this plain in the surest sense. It is evident, too, even to the most casual reader, that the genius of the New Testament differs from the Old Testament even as the fruit does from the flower. What does this highest court of appeal say?

Though the New Testament gives no positive injunctions in the matter, yet we know that the process is just the *reverse* of the "law and the prophets." This points out the true use of all symbolism, namely, to outgrow its very need. A single instance will make it all plain. Take that magnificent piece of symbolism, allegorical in thought and construction, "The Pilgrim's Progress," with its "Vanity Fair, lions, Wicker Gate," etc., are they not all symbolical? Though abounding in the richest of Christian truth and thought, they cannot produce

faith, and therefore mean nothing to the unbeliever. But where faith *exists*, this masterpiece of imagery becomes living to the reader, because his own life is portrayed in the book. The spiritual precedes now.

The sensuous arrangement of the former revelation is displaced and the temple vanishes from our sight. We are to "walk by faith and not by sight," for "God is a spirit and those who worship Him must worship in spirit and in truth." With us the fact must evolve the symbol—now "faith is the substance"—we now must have faith before we can or dare use the symbol. For the Hebrew mind, types and symbols were *creative*, for us they can only be *suggestive*. Then they were almost primary and essential; now they are only secondary and non-essential. But non essential must not be made to mean worthless. Let us not despise the things of bygone days! Christ came to fulfil. They have a rare worth. The one abiding result of the Old Testament regime that we must recognize is this: Its religion stood for a spiritual *fact*, not an esthetic fancy. We would sum up then this argument thus: The Old Testament religion sets forth a fact, not a fancy, it is prophetic not esthetic. Its pictures fade away, its grand truths remain. Since we are not limited now by a fixed set of rules on God's part, it is all the more important that we be governed by sound rules of our own. This becomes at once both harder and easier. Whereas, with the Jew these things were prescribed, we are to work them out in accordance with Sacred Scripture on the one hand and the laws of thought on the other. The second suggestion is before us.

The glory of the Old Testament system was its fact—the coming Messiah. Around it all gathered. We must make that fact the fundamental postulate under this second, even as it was under the first. Neither theory nor fancy, but fact is the great necessity. Christ must be the all for us. We are told "No man hath seen God at any time"—Christ hath revealed Him. The Holy Ghost's entire mission is, to make Him known to us. He is the heart of the Trinity and must be the centre

of the Church. Paul said: "I determined not to know anything among you, save Jesus Christ, and him crucified."

Our doctrine is Christocentric; our symbolism must correspond. Patron saints must yield to an all-prevailing Saviour. Our churches are not to be converted into art galleries or halls of fame, with a galaxy of religious heroes to be venerated and adored or even admired. But *one* is to be there, and no one else ought ever be allowed a place within its walls. We can reverently say, the symbolic command is, I am the Christ, thou shalt not have any other symbols beside me. In accordance with this plan we must sweep away all myth and fancy, fiction and tradition. The "holy coat of Trebes," "the Holy Grail," "St. Anne's bone," and the whole museum of rare relics, are to be consigned to the ashheap. According to our views they can be, at best, but pious frauds; but granting, for argument's sake, that they are real and that we might behold a nail from the cross or a thorn from the crown, we would not want it, though a fact, for fear that such an insignificant fact would crowd out an all-controlling one. Incidentally we would here remark that herein lies the danger of the zealous symbolist. He is never satisfied until he has worked out the scheme even to its minutest form, simply because it is a fact. Every leaf is surely part of the tree, but the painter ignores individual leaves in the treatment of his theme. He paints the *tree* not the leaf. Paul and Peter played their part, but Christ is to be the all important and only consideration. Christ divides his glory with none. Partnership is impossible. Our only hope of escape is in the simplicity and grandeur of the Christ. One thing guides, many confuse. Fundamentals are few and fruitful, non-essentials are often complex and misleading.

Fundamentals are always simple. Physics can essentially be summed up in four words, air, heat, light and sound. Geometry is the development of a point. Chemistry is simply the laws of combination and reaction. The same holds good in religious fundamentals when applied to symbolic thought and representation. The purpose that runs through it all is simple, specific and formative. The mind requires this.

It is a self-evident truth that the mind can employ but a certain amount of energy at any one given time. It is likewise true that simplicity is concentrative, whereas complexity is distributive. Paul with the one thing accomplished more than Rome with its myriads. The multiplied attractions of overwrought symbolism have just this scattering effect. Then the eye is taken captive. Nor is it hard to find causes. Symbolism's prescribed course is to feed the soul. But since its materials are earthly it often usurps the place of the spiritual. Failing to feed the inner life, it becomes a matter of loaves and fishes—a thing of the senses. Then there is nothing left but the external adornment. This is the feature of all Romish pictures, relics, etc. They are made to appeal to our earthly feelings and sympathy, bringing before us more of our bodily feelings than those of our spiritual natures. The crucifix with its highly wrought coloring is a single instance among many. This is very effective with sympathetic natures, savages and materialistically minded persons. The cost in money is beyond reckoning. The disestablishment of the French Church is a fair criterion. This leads to a suggestion that is often rightly raised as an argument, namely, that symbolism prevails when prosperity overtakes a nation. This is true. A vast difference marks the Church from the time when persecution drove the Christians to the gravel pits and catacombs and that of Leo X. We know that as the former sturdy spirit of devotion with its martyrdom and service decreased, externalism arose. The girded lion and burning lamp gave way to the mitre and incense. Even as prosperity is the ruin of nations, so it is the death knell of inward spiritual life. When the fire has gone out then the ashes must suffice, and pomp and parade, but no life. The beautiful life gives way to the gorgeous cathedral. Many have in this matter of beauty an argument for decorative splendor. "It is so nice," they say. Estheticism appears to us an abuse rather than a use. The Church is not an art gallery and pastors are not to be hawkers of esthetical wares! The wholesale importation of the classically beautiful has led the people unto a species of religious superficiality. Very often we have

found that in proportion as the pastor was mentally and spiritually of small calibre and his people indifferent, aesthetical features controlled. This inordinate lust for the symbolical has led many to the spectacular and theatrical with its mummeries and shams. When the startling is sought and striven for and affected, so called, as the sole aim, then symbolism is a failure. Though the spectacular may arrest for a season it never feeds the soul. In one sense we agree with Carlyle, worship is transcendent wonder. But a vast deep lies between this and the cheap frippery that tickles the esthetic palate of sensualism! God is a spirit and our worship must tend to increase the spiritual and not the physical. High art in the Church generally means low religion in the heart.

Again, fundamentals are never involved or obscure. Paul had a specific thought that stood out like a beacon in his life and work.

The rules of rhetoric must prevail here—for symbolism is rhetoric applied to things instead of words—clearness first, then force, lastly beauty. Generally the last is sought first. The symbol must make the fact clearer or it has no right to exist. Symbolism is a wilderness-preacher telling of one who is greater. It seeks not its own glory, but rather to lend lustre to its type-giving fact. This is right. The servant must never control his master. The moment the symbol assumes the functions of the fact that gave it birth, it overshadows the same and robs instead of robes the original. Then its inherent worth is gone: religion sinks into idolatry and worship becomes superstition. As with Eli's sons, God is denied and the ark venerated. This is wrong. The "motif" must so stand out, that it will bring before our minds the intended fact in the most unmistakable manner. This was the strength of Old Testament symbolism, and accounts for its success; in other words it must be incapable of misinterpretation; or the error will override the truth and the counterpart becomes a mere counterfeit, giving the whole affair a mysterious aspect; making the symbol a sort of sign or password capable of interpretation by the initiated only—an "open sesame" wherewith the conver-

sant conjure. Others can then show only reverential ignorance for that which soon sinks into a cheap magic. The symbol is dragged into the gutter of legerdemain and is fruitful in superstition only. Better not have a symbol than to use a doubtful one. Superstition's power lies in the truth it misrepresents, not in the error it maintains.

Furthermore, all symbolism must be formative.

We all know the intensest joy experienced by the possessor of a treasure is the first blush of ownership; after that it grows less. This is the joy of possession, but not of expansion. This will do for a diamond, but not for faith. Unless we can expand a symbol and read richer things out of it, it soon clogs. It must contain sources of growth capable of yielding new viewpoints that are deeper and more lasting. Otherwise it crystallizes into a single thought or form and becomes not a living seed but a lifeless pillar of salt—a fetich, an idol, an unreality.

Paul determined not to know anything among the people except Christ and his cross. But this does not mean shallowness or poverty of thought and life! With what wisdom he brought out that fact; making the thought rich by showing all that it meant; becoming thereby a wonderful inspiration to him and all believers! Only a solar thought and truth sends out such rays of light and warmth! Such a symbol is always constructive in conception, and expresses some all-controlling thought and of highest import. It is an algebraic formula of the soul—capable of expansion—grouping many thought's under one head. What a multitude of thought's rush through the mind at the mention or sight of the cross! It suggests at once the plan and scope, as well as the life and hope of the Church: Setting all other truths in perspective, and thus giving us a bird's eye-view of the scheme of God. It proves a governor over our personal choice of truths that appeal to us and which we like to over-emphasize—a sin modern Christianity has overindulged in. It is indeed a cornerstone fitly joining the whole edifice, giving proportionate values to all the rest. Christ in the life, in the doctrine and in the symbol. This is the only true course.

To sum it all up briefly, we would say that the use and worth

of symbolism are found in its power of association and suggestiveness as explanatory, and its powers to incite the emotions and imagination and thus to produce enthusiasm. Its abuses we conceive to be these: The supernatural stands ever in danger of being dragged down to the natural; that pomp comes with wealth, ease and luxury; that the theatrical is ever near and leads to shallowness; that man wants to live by rules and will accept anything in this guise; that the natural man receiveth not the things of God, but *will accept a host* of substitutes.

Symbolism is very much like fire, a good servant but a cruel master. Poise and judgment of the finest kind are needed. It takes a skillful driver to keep the sun-chariot from burning the fields of religious life through the senses, and likewise to keep from chilling the same by the frost of intellect.

To pervert slightly the idea inscribed on a classic shrine, we would say, Use symbols, use symbols, but don't abuse symbols.

ARTICLE VIII.

THE INDIVIDUAL COMMUNION CUP.

By Rev. J. D. Krout, A.M.

The subject of the individual communion cups is one of no little moment, one which has raised and still is raising comment from all sides. It is a question which involves not only the clergy; but, since the Lutheran and several other denominations do not recognize the rulership or domination of the clergy, this question hears a voice from the laity. Some good and earnest men are among its vigorous advocates, while others equally good and earnest are equally vigorous in the denunciatian of what they term "a new way of celebrating the Lord's Supper." But how and by whom did the suggestion originate? Was it the invention of some fertile mind, or has it been a gradual outcome of years of study and research? These are questions which we must of necessity consider. We find that the use of individual cups, *in modern times*, was first suggested by Mr. A. Van Derwerken, of Brooklyn, N. Y., in the year 1882. In 1887 he wrote an article advocating the use of individual cups in the communion service; but, being opposed by his pastor, he did not publish the article until a year later, when it appeared in the *Annals of Hygiene* of Philadelphia. One year passed ere anyone braved the idea of putting Mr. Van Derwerken's suggestion into practical use. In November 1893 the Psi Upsilon fraternity of Rochester, N. Y., celebrated the Lord's Supper with individual cups. The news spread like wild-fire; like a river gathering new volume as it goes to sea, so this question has gathered new volume as it wends its way into the sympathies of Christian hearts. There are to be found many good people who are always on the alert, ready for any advance thought, and it is for us to determine whether these are justified in defending and advancing the individual cup.

In treating this subject we shall first investigate the biblical account of the institution of the Lord's Supper, and endeavor

to ascertain the mode of administering the *initial* Supper. We are also compelled to deduce from Christ's command the mode in which He wished the Supper to be celebrated. Not only must the Word be preached in its purity, but the sacraments must be administered according to divine command. Only three of the Gospels give an account of the institution of the Supper—Matthew, Mark and Luke—all of whom record *Καὶ λαβὼν ποτήριον*, "and taking *a* cup." True, Paul in his letter to the Corinthians makes use of the article—*τὸ ποτήριον*. Those who have been the ardent defenders of the *common* cup have held that the use of the article by Paul necessarily limits us to the use of but one cup. But this shall be treated later. It has also been claimed that Christ, when he said, "This is my blood of the New Testament which is for many," pointed to that one cup which he had used and thereby designated the use of one and only one cup. We shall for a *moment* concede them the point, however, we shall ask, Where is that cup to which Christ is claimed to have pointed? If that particular cup was "the blood of the New Testament," then wherein are we justified in celebrating the Lord's Supper, since we have not *that* cup? Again, were it *possible* to produce the *identical* cup which Christ used, how were it possible for all Christians to drink from *that one* cup? The absurdity of this argument against the individual cup lies in carrying it to its logical end, namely, producing that cup to which Christ is claimed to have pointed, and then use no other in administering the Sacrament. It would require long years for *that one* cup to make the circuit, and many would never have the divine pleasure of communing with Christ. Those who have placed so great emphasis on *ποτήριον* have gathered a wrong conception of the word. Thayer in his Lexicon says: "*ποτήριον* by metonymy of the container for the contained, the contents of the cup." Dr. Valentine says: "The Lord's Supper is that sacrament or rite in which, by the institution and words of Christ, bread and *wine* are made to the believer the communion of His body and blood." However, let us go to higher authority; returning to the account as given in Scripture, we see that Christ himself

gave the true definition of the import of ποτήριον when he said: "I will drink no more of the *fruit of the vine*, until the day I drink it in the Kingdom of God." Thus the Synoptics and Paul convey the same idea, namely, that the wine was His blood, and necessarily the cups had no essential import. The cup or cups, be they silver, gold or glass, have nothing to do with the validity of the sacrament. The validity lies in the *contents*, and the efficiency in the spirit in which it is received. Says a writer in the Lutheran Quarterly, "If the Church provide the (individual) cups it would be expensive in a membership of 500 or 1000 or 2000." Granted that this would entail more expense to the Church, I would ask, "Is not communion with Christ *cheap* at any cost?" Again, we venture to say that this Reverend Divine has at *least* two cups in his communion set. Would it not be more *economical* to have but one cup? We find many of the great antagonists of the individual cup with at least two cups in use at the Holy Supper. If two cups cause them not to stumble, why should fifty, a hundred, or even a thousand offend their taste? If the use of individual cups is unscriptural, we venture to say that the use of *two common* cups is equally contrary to divine command.

We shall proceed one step farther and assert that not only are individual cups permissible, according to Scripture, but that at the *initial* Supper individual cups were used. As proof for our assertion we cite the fact that at the Paschal feast there were four wine drinking periods, each one of which was known as a *cup*; Christ took one of these cups, or wine drinking periods, when he instituted the sacrament which commemorates His death. Thus it is that the Synoptics say that he took "a cup," meaning that he set apart one of the drinking periods which they should celebrate in remembrance of Him; so also Paul says that he took "the cup," wishing to designate the particular cup or drinking period which was set apart. It is also a well known fact that at the Passover table each person was provided with his cup for individual use. Since this is true, is it not likely that the same custom was observed when Christ transformed the Passover into the Lord's Supper, and also that

individual cups were used? Again, religious art tells us that each one of the Apostles had his own *individual* cup at the initial Supper. In the celebrated painting of Leonardo da Vinci, Christ and the Apostles are represented as each having his own *individual* cup. But the question naturally arises in the minds of my readers, "How then was the *common* cup substituted for the *individual?*" The reply is very simple. Might it not have occurred thus? In the times of the hierarchical Church, as in the Roman Catholic Church of today, the cup was withheld from the laity—the pope or priest drinking all the wine for reasons which are known to all. This withholding of the wine from the laity made the numerous cups unnecessary, and since the priest alone drank the wine his cup was the only one retained. Thus when the Reformation came the one cup idea was so rooted and grounded into the lives of the people that to have made a change would have hindered the progress of the Reformation. To us it would seem that the common cup is the fruits, not of strict interpretation, but of the hierarchical Church.

Since the individual cup is not *contrary* to Scripture, and is in all probability more nearly the *correct* mode of celebration, let us view some reasons why it should be introduced into church usage. The *common* cup should be shunned for sanitary reasons. There is an old adage, "Cleanliness in next to godliness." The use of a *common* cup is by no means a cleanly practice, to say nothing of the various diseases which can be transmitted by the use of a *common* cup. As the same cup is passed from person to person, the wine advances to the lips, and then receding carries with it the impurities of the mouth. The cup gradually becomes partially emptied and is then refilled and again passed to the communicants This refilling process is repeated many times, until at length we have a cup which *may* contain germs of scores of diseases. Professors on Bacteria agree that "from what is known of the biology of these organisms, it can readily be seen that the mouth should form a kind of hot-house or forcing ground for their cultivation." It is estimated that there are at least twenty-two known diseases

which may be communicated from one person to another by the mouth. If the mouth be the hot-bed of germs, why should it be asked of people to open themselves to these germs, when it can be avoided without breaking the divine command? Again, the usage of polite society calls for the adoption of individual cups. When we invite friends to surround our family table, we deem it essential to courtesy to give each person a cup from which to drink; not to do so would be a lack of propriety. Social custom should not be in advance of religious custom. Why *compel* men to do at the Lord's table that which in home life would not only be deemed uncleanly, but the height of impertinence? Behold the communicants as they surrounded the chancel at our first celebration of Christ's Holy Supper. Here we have a man with a much detested growth on his lips; again, we have the constant user of tobacco; now we have one with a throat-and-nasal disease. The detested growth is immersed in the wine, the abominable tobacco is washed from the lips, and the germs of the throat-and-nasal disease are disseminated in the wine. The discreet brother and sister are to follow. And all joy of the divine communion is lost in the thought of the brother who preceded. They sip of the cup timidly, with no thought of the meaning attached thereto, or perhaps they never allow the wine even to touch their lips. They shrink from the idea of opening the system to the germs of disease, and they revolt at the unclean brother who has preceded. This is all eliminated by the *individual* cup. Were it not better for those who believe this bacteria question to be of no consequence, to say with Paul: "If meat maketh my brother to offend, I will eat no more meat while the world stands"? The choice between the *individual* cups and the *common* cup involves a choice between *clean* and *unclean.*

Apart from the sanitary and cleanly aspect is that of its convenience. The individual cup not only expedites matters, but it also relieves the minister of a great nervous strain. In administering the Supper with the *common* cup the minister must be continually on his guard lest he tip the cup too far or per-

chance not far enough; in the one case spilling the wine and causing disorder, and in all likelihood causing the recipient to lose all thought of the solemnity of the occasion; in the other case he will offend the communicant by not allowing him to partake of the blood of our Lord. The tipping of the cup to the proper angle is not only difficult, but also very trying, especially when administering to the "large-hatted" sister, and of necessity requires considerable time.

This brings us to our next point, that of saving time. In this advanced age when congregations swell to the ranks of hundreds and thousands, it is necessary to expedite matters as much as possible. People are no longer willing to sit in the sanctuary and watch the minister as he slowly moves to and fro in administering the Lord's Supper. As a rule the communion services are prolonged to twice the length of the ordinary services, and for this reason we should expedite matters as much as possible. The *individual* cup *will* expedite the service, and as we have shown it is biblical, historical, sanitary, cleanly and convenient. This is attested by the fact that practically all denominations and sects are using the *individual* cups. This is true not only in America, but the wide world over wherever Christ is preached. The individual cup is making its way rapidly, considering all circumstances. However, its general use will be attained, as all reforms are attained, only by slow and general education, and by bringing scientific truths to the attention of the clergy and of the public; and the time will come when an individual cup may be passed to each communicant, who can partake of its contents without fear of contracting any contagious disease from his brother.

ARTICLE IX.

REVIEW OF RECENT LITERATURE.

EATON AND MAINS, NEW YORK; JENNINGS AND GRAHAM, CINCINNATI.

The World as Intention. A Contribution to Teleology. By L. P. Gratacap, Curator of American Museum of Natural History, New York.

We have here a work of scholarly ability, belonging to the class of books devoted to the discussion of the problems raised by the scientific and religious thought of our times. The author was moved to its production by his conviction that Christianity as interpreted and held by orthodox theology has passed or is destined soon to pass away by reason of the science and knowledge of our times. Being somewhat sympathetic with the methods and aims of the destructive criticism, he estimates the results of its work as much larger and more revolutionary than the facts justify. But there is some conservative element in his spirit, by which he is prompted to seek preservation of various underlying religious truths and principles, from the wreck of the past form of Christian doctrine. "This work," he tells us in "Prolegomena," "is prepared for many who wish to hold fast to the constructive elements of Christianity and yet do no violence to their judgment nor their good faith." For he believes that it has divine sources and that, metamorphosed and reconstrued, its spiritual or religious power will flow on under other conceptions.

With a view thus to save or inspire faith's acceptance of the new and future form of Christian or religious conception he uses the truth that has been long and almost everywhere recognized, the reality of "intention" or "design," which he accepts as the supreme, guiding, and unfailing principle in the world and interpretative of the import of all human life and its economies. The title of the volume evidently means the reality of intention as embodied in the cosmic existence and its order of evolution and proper goal. Even the physical earth carries a grand and far-reaching teleology from the supreme mind. The conception of the "world" is not, therefore, atheistic, but claimed to be theistic, and therefore reconcilable with the Christian view.

The first chapter gives what the author names the "articles of intention"—its elements or characteristics—fifteen of them making, together, his full definition of its meaning. The other chapters explain the World as Intention, the Bible as Intention, Conduct and Creed as Intention, the Church as Intention. The discussion of these presents many truths of interest and importance, as showing them to be in harmony with the Supreme Mind through the cosmic system and pro-

gress, viz., *life*, especially *personal and ethical.* The creative evolution looks to man and his highest elevation.

In the conclusion Mr. Gratacap applies his doctrine of intention to the Bible and Christianity. These, too, he represents to be among its generic products. "The philosophy of the doctrine of intention," he states, "is remedial for those systems of thought which narrowly circumscribe feeling and practice within dogmatic limits, by asserting the emancipative and effective power of good intention; it makes the world clearer as an intention, which by a necessary defectivity from some violent and pervasive obstruction, is only partially achieved, but which is increasingly realized in time; and it helps us in creed and conduct by presenting the conception of an intention, of which man is partly an involuntary agent, though by voluntary submission he can hasten the development and realization of the final result, and in which his personal estimate is determined by his personal *desire* to think and do right."

But our author's philosophy of intention and its movement involves a most destructive and radical transformation of the teaching of the Scriptures and the Church's orthodox theology, with respect to their distinctive doctrines. Though he speaks of "supernatural" as in the world, and even of supernatural "r evelation, in his prolegomena on "the supernatural" and the "ordinates of revelation," he reduces these to a merely naturalistic sense. His "supernatural" is only the supreme intention working *on creatively* through the fixed forces and powers of natural cause and effect; and "revelation" is but the increasing product of human discovery or thought. The supernatural and revelation in the accredited sense of Christian theology have no place. The idea of redemption is foreign to his views. Despite the kind intent to preserve some essential elements of religion and ethics out of evanishing Christianity, his effort cannot be accepted as a success. A personal God is pushed back and obscured behind the natural movement of cosmic aim and power, and man is left alone, simply to read nature and life and try to conform himself, religiously and ethically, to his interpretation of it. Indeed the discussion, though learned and able, tends to show how dark and impenetrable is the mystery of the world and human life, if despoiled of the Christian vision of God as our Heavenly Father and of His redemptive love in the gift and self-sacrifice of His eternal Son.

M. VALENTINE.

Burden Bearing and other sermons. By John Rhey Thompson, pp. 260.

The book contains sermons preached in Grace Methodist Episcopal Church, Brooklyn, N. Y., 1883–4. The subject of the first sermon gives us the title of the book. There are fifteen sermons in all embracing such subjects as "The Religion of Love," "The Power of the Holy Ghost," "The Credibility of the Resurrection," "The Theistic Basis of Immortality."

It is evident that the author is a preacher of more than ordinary ability and power, and that he holds the truth in sincerity, and maintains the sound principals of revealed truth with ability and clearness. The sermon on strong and loving words of righteousness, plain of speech and honest of purpose, preached not to please man, and no thoughtful reader can fail to be moved by the passion for holiness and purity which characterizes these discourses.

R. H. CLARE.

Old Truths Newly Illustrated. By Henry Graham, D. D., pp. 229. Price $1.00.

The author of this book does not proceed after the fashion of the usual Cyclopaedia Illustrations. He has not given us simply a collection of anecdotes, or quotations, which may be conveniently woven into sermons, or other religious addresses. Instead of this, he has collected from his own storehouse of material, something like two hundred illustrations of religious truth and experience, drawn from history, from service, from nature, and especially from life, which he says, "he has found useful during a ministry of over thirty years in applying divine truths to the audiences which he has been privileged to address."

Perhaps the best use of this book will be to teach the reader how to get, or make illustrations of his own, and this is what every public speaker, and especially every preacher, should learn to do as fast and as far as possible.

The book has two admirable indexes, or tables of contents, one an alphabetical list of the subjects illustrated, and the other a list of the passages of Scripture illustrated. These will greatly facilitate its use.

JACOB A. CLUTZ.

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, NEW YORK.

Israel's Historical and Biographical Narratives. By Charles Foster Kent, Ph.D , Woolsey Professor of Biblical Literature in Yale University. Pp. XXXI and 506. Price $2.75 net.

This is the second volume in the Student's Old Testament series, which is to comprise six volumes, the first of which, Narratives of the Beginnings of Hebrew History, appeared a year ago. The present volume commences with Samuel, and carries the history of Israel down to and including the Maccabees, a period of a thousand years. In addition to Samuel and Maccabees it embraces the books of Kings, Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther, and portions of Isaiah, Jeremiah, Haggai and Esdras. Its contents as summarized in the introduction are: The United Monarchy, History of Northern Israel, History of Judah, Re-establishment of the Jewish Community in Palestine, The Maccabean Struggle and the Life of the Jews of the Dispersion. It is provided with an elaborate Table of Contents, Chronological Charts and Maps and an Index of Biblical passages cited, and closes with an Appendix of Se-

lected Bibliography and a final chapter on Hebrew Chronology. The author has made his own translation from the Hebrew and has arranged his material in chronological order according to the latest conclusions of the critics.

It will thus be seen from the above what a thorough and comprehensive work this really is. It is a veritable storehouse of information, and covers all that can be said on the subject of which it treats. One cannot help being filled with wonder at the vast amount of research and investigation, the unwearied painstaking and the prodigious labor involved in the preparation of this volume.

The author finds upwards of thirty sources or documents from which the various books of the Bible under discussion have been compiled and as these documents are in confusion historically, he separates and readjusts them so as to present a continuous and connected narrative. Of course the Old Testament by this method has been entirely re-arranged and re-constructed and it is difficult to recognize the old book under this new form. The claim is made that this reconstruction is proper and necessary, that by this means the Scriptures become clear and intelligible to the average reader and that without such recasting a correct idea of their contents is impossible. We question whether the facts in the case substantiate this claim. The Bible was read for centuries before the appearance of the critical school, and as far as we can judge was pretty generally understood by its readers. The same may not be said of Prof. Kent's reconstructed Bible, it is often involved, confusing and unfamiliar to the reader.

On page 48 the author speaks of "the original books written by Israel's inspired teachers." We do not comprehend this statement. Does he mean that the alleged hosts of writers, the numerous editors and compilers who brought the books to their present form, and who in the process of their work are said to have perpetrated pious frauds, to have played fast and loose with the text, and interpolated or omitted as pleased them, were inspired teachers of Israel? If so Prof. Kent holds a very low view of inspiration. If these writers were not inspired, then of what value are their writings? They are worthless for they are not an infallible rule of faith and practice. We commend this volume to our readers not because of its resetting of the text, but for the sake of the rich information in the introduction and appendix.

T. C. BILLHEIMER.

SEVERINGHAUS PUBLISHING COMPANY, CHICAGO.

Dayspring or Christianity in its rise and progress. Pp. 174. By J. D. Severinghaus, D.D.

This book, well printed, giltedged, neatly bound, is sent forth as "a study-book for young Christians and Sunday school workers as furnishing sidelights for an intelligent confession of our most holy

faith." After a pleasing introduction the author gives a description of the Roman Empire, of Palestine, and of historical personages, just before or at the time of the birth of Christ. This is followed by an account of the birth and career of Christ. He then enters the apostolic era and describes the labors of the Apostles and the founding of the Church. Then follows a chapter on the *Inspired Records*, in which we are shown how the Scriptures have descended to us, and are given an account of the canon of Scripture, of the translation of the Bible, and of its circulation. Then comes a chapter on the growth and corruption of the Church, the means of grace and the kingdom of heaven. The Didache (both Greek and Latin), the Apostolic Church Order, and the Apostolic Constitutions, the Apocryphal Testimony and Ancient Christian literature, are becomingly discussed. The Testimony in Art and Science, and the Creed of the Early Church are then treated. A general index crowns the whole work and makes its contents readily available.

The work shows wide reading, comprehensive scholarship and the gift of condensation. The little book is a veritable *multum in parvo.* Not only "young Christians and Sunday school workers," but adults will find it a useful compend of information about Christ and Christianity.

The author, who is equally at home in both German and English, and who has served the Church as pastor, editor and professor of theology, for nearly half a century, still looks hale and vigorous, as represented by the portrait which serves as fronticepiece to this the latest production of his busy pen.

J. W. RICHARD.

HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND CO., BOSTON.

The October number of the *Atlantic Monthly* is one that is calculated to attract wide-spread interest. The contributors to it are writers of great ability and they write in this number on subjects that are especially attractive. The article on "The Endless Life" by Samuel McCord Crothers is one that will be appreciatively read.

In writing of "The Fame of Franklin" William MacDonald presents some hitherto unknown facts concerning Franklin One of the finest papers in this number is the one on "The Cowardice of Culture" by Thomas Wentworth Higginson. Nobushige Amenomori contributes a valuable paper on the late "Lafcadio Hearn, the man" and William Allen White on "The Golden Rule." The fiction in this number is of the usual high order and the essays and poems have decided merit. The contributions to the Contributors' Club are very bright and original. The *Atlantic Monthly* continues to be easily the brilliant leader of all literary magazines. It is now *non-returnable*, so that it is advisable for occasional readers to place their orders with newsdealers a month in advance, but the readers of good literature cannot afford to be without the *Atlantic* regularly.

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